Collective Enforcement and Access to “Means Required” under the European Works Council Regime: Comment on Charpentier v Verizon Ireland Ltd [2025] IEHC 628

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1. Introduction

This High Court judgment, Charpentier v Verizon Ireland Ltd [2025] IEHC 628, is the first Irish judicial consideration of the Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Act 1996 (“TICEA”) and its implementing of Directive 2009/38/EC (the “Recast EWC Directive”). It is a decision of real structural importance for the operation and enforcement of European Works Councils (“EWCs”) based in Ireland.

At its core, the case concerns:

• Whether individual EWC members can bring collective claims under s. 17 TICEA;
• What is meant by the Directive’s requirement that EWC members have the means required to apply the rights arising from this Directive (Art. 10(1));
• Whether these “means” include financial and expert resources, notably legal and specialist advice;
• Whether the Labour Court may simply treat any claim for costs as moot where the substantive appeal fails; and
• How far Irish courts and quasi-judicial bodies must go in interpreting national law in conformity with EU directives (the doctrine of indirect effect or “Marleasing” interpretative obligation).

The High Court (Bolger J) allowed the appeal in part, identifying a series of errors of law by the Labour Court in two determinations (TID 241 and TID 242). While the Labour Court’s factual findings on the adequacy of employer-provided training were left intact, the court profoundly reshaped the understanding of:

• The collective dimension of s. 17 TICEA; and
• The scope of the “means required” that central management must provide to EWC members, including the potential reimbursement of legal and expert costs as part of a substantive EU-based right rather than as traditional procedural “costs of proceedings”.

The decision also reiterates the duty of the Labour Court to:

• Give adequate reasons for its determinations; and
• Engage expressly with EU law and the implementing Directive where a statute expressly requires interpretation in the light of that Directive (TICEA, s. 3(3)).

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2. Background and Context

2.1 The parties and institutional framework

• Appellant: Jean-Philippe Charpentier, Chair of the EWC of Verizon Communications Inc. He is employed by Verizon France SAS but acts as an EWC member and chair.
• Respondent: Verizon Ireland Ltd, the central management’s representative in the EU for Verizon.
• Notice parties:
  • The Labour Court; and
  • The Attorney General, who intervened on the proper interpretation of s. 17 TICEA.

The case arises against the background of the Recast EWC Directive (2009/38/EC), which governs information and consultation of employees in Community-scale undertakings. Originally, many EWCs were established in the UK following the extension of the Directive there by Directive 97/74/EC. After Brexit, a significant number of multinational enterprises relocated their EWCs to Ireland, making Irish law and institutions central for EWC governance.

Ireland implements the Directive via TICEA. A key peculiarity of Irish law is that EWCs have no separate legal personality. As a result, Charpentier had to bring proceedings not in the name of the EWC itself, but in his capacity as chair and EWC member, in what the Labour Court described as a “representative capacity”.

2.2 The two underlying disputes

(a) Determination TID 241 – Expert assistance and costs

The EWC’s select committee engaged “EWC Academy” and sought advice from Dr Altmeyer. An invoice of €11,200 was submitted to central management (Verizon Ireland) for payment. The employer disputed the necessity and appropriateness of parts of this invoice.

Charpentier brought a complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) under s. 17 TICEA, read with para. 6 of the Second Schedule (subsidiary requirements), seeking:

• Payment of the full invoice as an operating expense of the EWC; and
• Reimbursement of legal costs incurred in pursuing the claim, framed as part of the “means required” under Article 10(1) of the Directive and s. 17(1A) TICEA.

The WRC adjudication officer awarded only half the amount. Both sides appealed to the Labour Court. Charpentier argued that:

• Expert and legal costs were necessary and appropriate to enable the EWC to exercise its rights;
• Article 10(1) of the Directive (and its transposition in s. 17(1A)) requires that EWC members have the means required to apply the rights arising from this Directive – which, he argued, includes legal representation and associated costs; and
• Not covering such costs would undermine the EU principle of effectiveness and render the rights under the Directive practically unenforceable.

The Labour Court dismissed the appeal, holding essentially that:

• s. 17 was designed only for individual rights, not collective claims; and
• The application for costs was “moot” as the appeal was not upheld.

(b) Determination TID 242 – Training in Hamburg and costs

Separately, Verizon had arranged online EWC training in May 2021 (“May training”). Charpentier wished instead to attend a training conference at the EWC Academy in Hamburg in September 2021 (“Hamburg training”). Verizon declined to fund this, asserting the May training was sufficient.

Charpentier nonetheless attended Hamburg and later claimed:

• Reimbursement of the Hamburg training costs under s. 17(6) TICEA (right to training “without loss of wages”); and
• Legal costs in bringing that claim, again relying on s. 17(1A) and the principle of effectiveness of EU law.

The Labour Court:

• Found that the May training did constitute adequate training under TICEA and the Directive;
• Held that the employer is not required to provide a “blank cheque” for training; and
• Again dismissed the application for costs as “moot” because the appeal failed.

2.3 Appeal to the High Court

Charpentier appealed both determinations to the High Court under s. 46 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, which allows an appeal from the Labour Court only “on a point of law”. He also sought, if necessary:

• Declarations that certain provisions of TICEA (particularly s. 17 and the Second Schedule) are incompatible with Directive 2009/38/EC; and
• An Article 267 TFEU reference to the CJEU.

The Attorney General, as notice party, sided with the appellant on key interpretive questions, in particular:

• That s. 17 can encompass collective claims; and
• That expert costs properly incurred by an EWC may fall within the “means required” in s. 17(1A).

The High Court declined to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU, holding that the relevant EU law was sufficiently clear to permit a national resolution, and identified several errors of law in the Labour Court’s determinations.

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3. Summary of the Judgment

3.1 Main outcomes

Bolger J reached three principal conclusions:

1. Training dispute (TID 242): The Labour Court’s finding that the May 2021 online seminar constituted adequate “training” within the meaning of s. 17(6) and the Directive was a finding of fact, properly reasoned and rational. It therefore did not give rise to an appealable point of law. The appeal on this aspect failed.
2. Scope of s. 17 TICEA and collective claims (TID 241): The Labour Court’s interpretation of s. 17 as only covering individual (not collective) disputes was an error of law. When read in light of the Directive and s. 3 TICEA, s. 17 does encompass complaints relating to collectively-held rights (e.g. the EWC’s expert expenses under para. 6 of the Second Schedule). The Labour Court also erred in failing to consider whether the expert invoice at issue constituted necessary and appropriate expert assistance that central management must fund.
3. Costs applications in both determinations: The Labour Court erred in law by refusing to consider the appellant’s arguments on costs merely because his appeals failed. Given s. 17(1A), Article 10(1) and Article 11(2) of the Directive, and the principle of effectiveness, the Labour Court was required to consider whether reimbursement of legal and expert expenses could form part of the substantive remedy (e.g. compensation or an order to take a specified course of action), even when the substantive claim was unsuccessful. Its “moot” characterisation was legally incorrect and a breach of its obligations to:
   • Interpret TICEA in conformity with the Directive; and
   • Give adequate reasons and engage with the EU-law arguments advanced.

3.2 Key declarations and orders

The High Court held that the Labour Court fell into five discrete errors of law (para. 49), namely:

1. Narrowly interpreting s. 17 to exclude collective complaints and failing to consider the Directive;
2. Finding s. 17 protects only individual EWC members and disallowing the appellant’s representative claim;
3. Failing to examine whether the expert advice (EWC Academy) was necessary and appropriate expert cost to be borne by central management;
4. Refusing to consider the costs applications simply because the appeals failed; and
5. Failing to consider the appellant’s deterrence-based arguments under TICEA and the Directive on whether some or all legal expenses should be reimbursed as part of the “means required” in s. 17(1A), irrespective of the outcome on the merits.

The court therefore indicated that the impugned parts of both Labour Court determinations must be set aside and that it would hear counsel further on the appropriate final orders, including:

• Whether to remit the matters to the Labour Court (possibly a different division) with directions; and/or
• Whether to grant declaratory relief on specific points.

The court expressly declined to make an Article 267 TFEU reference, finding EU law sufficiently clear.

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4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

4.1.1 On appellate jurisdiction and standard of review

• An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v The Labour Court [2024] IESC 38 O’Donnell CJ emphasised that on a statutory appeal confined to points of law, the appellate court’s own view of the merits is irrelevant. Bolger J relies on this to stress the limited role the High Court plays in reviewing Labour Court determinations under s. 46 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.
• Daly v Nano Nagle School [2019] IESC 63 The Supreme Court held that quasi-judicial bodies like the Labour Court are under a statutory duty to give reasons. At para. 74, it indicated that “some outline” of the relevant facts and evidence must be given; failure to do so is a breach of fair procedures. Bolger J invokes this to fault the Labour Court for its extremely terse treatment of costs and its failure to engage with EU-law-based submissions.
• Onyemekeihia v Minister for Justice and Equality [2023] IEHC 697 The High Court (O’Regan J) criticised the Labour Court for a “bald conclusion” without adequate reasoning. Again, this is used to underline the need for reasoned decisions and to support the conclusion that the Labour Court’s cursory one-sentence treatment of the costs issue is unlawful.
• L v The Teaching Council [2025] IEHC 155 Barr J clarified that a decision-maker must give “sufficient reasons” so that the losing party can understand what and why it was decided, and it must be apparent that submissions were considered. Bolger J quotes this (para. 25) as a benchmark which the Labour Court failed to meet.
• Hanley v PBR Restaurants Ltd (t/a Fish Shack Café) [2025] IEHC 224 This earlier decision is cited for an administrative but important point: the Labour Court’s determinations lack page and paragraph numbering, making appellate review and citation difficult. Bolger J reiterates her criticism and “hopes” this will be rectified. This underlines a broader theme: procedural quality in the Labour Court’s determinations.

4.1.2 On interpretation of national law in light of EU law (“indirect effect”)

• Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA (Case C‑106/89) [1990] ECR I‑4135 This seminal CJEU authority establishes that national courts must interpret domestic law, “as far as possible”, in the light of the wording and purpose of EU directives to achieve the intended result. Bolger J cites para. 8 to ground the obligation to read TICEA in line with Directive 2009/38/EC.
• S v Governor of the Midlands Prison [2019] 3 I.R. 595 (Charleton J)

In S v Governor, the Supreme Court held that Irish legislation implementing an EU directive must be construed so as to conform with that directive’s purpose, even in disputes between private parties. However, this obligation has limits: courts may not interpret contra legem, i.e. against the clear wording of national law.

Bolger J leans heavily on this jurisprudence to assert that:

• TICEA must be interpreted in a way that properly reflects Directive 2009/38/EC, especially Articles 10 and 11 and Recitals 35–36;
• This duty also applies to the Labour Court and WRC; and
• No “contra legem” problem arises here: the wording of s. 17 is capable of accommodating collective rights and coverage of expert/legal support as part of the “means required”.

4.1.3 Other EU and comparative sources

The respondent relied on:

• European Commission Staff Working Documents (2008 and 2018) These documents surveyed Member States’ transposition of the EWC regime and highlighted:
  • Variations in legal standing of EWCs across Member States; and
  • That in many jurisdictions, provisions on “means” (Art. 10(1) Directive) are not read as a direct entitlement to financial support for litigation.
  Bolger J accepts that such “travaux préparatoires” and implementation reports may inform the CJEU’s interpretative approach, but gives them limited weight. She holds that they do not support the strict limitation of “means” to legal capacity alone, especially given the wording used elsewhere in the Directive and TICEA.

4.2 Legal Reasoning

4.2.1 The training dispute: limits of appellate intervention (Issue (i))

On the question whether the May training was adequate (and whether the Hamburg training therefore had to be funded), the High Court stresses:

• A s. 46 appeal is limited to points of law, not a re-hearing of the facts;
• The Labour Court had evidence before it, including:
  • The May training PowerPoint slides;
  • Emails showing that EWC members (including the appellant) were invited to contribute to the training agenda; and
  • Testimony from both sides on content and quality of the May and Hamburg training.
• The Labour Court analysed this evidence and drew rational conclusions, invoking its own experience with professional training to interpret “training” in context.

Bolger J notes that only in exceptional cases will the evaluation of evidence and the inferences drawn be so unreasonable as to amount to an error of law. Here, the Labour Court’s conclusion—that the May seminar constituted “training” and was sufficient—falls squarely within its fact-finding remit. The appeal on this issue therefore failed.

This is important doctrinally: it marks the boundary between:

• Legitimate factual assessments by the Labour Court, which attract curial deference; and
• Misinterpretations of law (including failure to consider or misread EU law) which are appealable.

4.2.2 Interpretation of s. 17 TICEA and collective complaints (Issue (ii))

(a) Statutory and EU-law framework

TICEA explicitly requires an EU-conform interpretation:

• s. 3(2): terms used both in TICEA and the Directive have the same meaning unless the context otherwise requires;
• s. 3(3): courts must construe TICEA so as to give effect to the Directive having regard to its provisions, including the preamble.

The key Directive provisions are:

• Recital 33: EWC members must be able to receive the training they require.
• Recitals 35–36: Member States must provide effective, dissuasive and proportionate sanctions and administrative or judicial procedures to enforce obligations.
• Article 9: EWC and central management must work in a “spirit of cooperation”.
• Article 10(1): EWC members shall have the means required to apply the rights arising from this Directive, to represent collectively the interests of the employees.
• Article 10(4): EWC members must receive necessary training without loss of wages.
• Article 11(2): Member States must ensure adequate administrative or judicial procedures to enable obligations under the Directive to be enforced.
• Annex I, paras. 5–6:
  • EWCs may be assisted by experts of their choice where necessary to carry out their tasks; and
  • Operating expenses of the EWC are borne by central management, who must provide financial and material resources to enable duties to be performed “in an appropriate manner”. Member States may, however, limit funding to one expert per meeting.

TICEA’s corresponding provisions include:

• s. 17(1A): Central management shall provide the members of the EWC … with the means required to apply the rights arising from the Directive, to represent the collective interests of the employees…
• s. 17(6): obligation to provide appropriate training without loss of wages.
• s. 17A–17B: WRC/Labour Court remedial powers in respect of contraventions of s. 17 (declaration, specified course of action, compensation).
• Second Schedule, para. 6: subsidiary requirements for EWCs where no agreement exists:
  • Operating expenses are borne by central management;
  • Central management must provide EWC members with such financial and other resources as necessary to enable them to perform their duties appropriately;
  • Funding of experts may be limited to one expert per meeting.

Crucially, EWCs in Ireland lack legal personality, which makes the allocation of rights and remedies to individual members acting in a representative capacity particularly important.

(b) The Labour Court’s narrow view and why it is wrong

The Labour Court had held that:

• s. 17 TICEA “is framed so as to afford statutory protection to individual members of EWCs qua individuals” and
• It was not intended to resolve collective disputes (e.g. disputes about which expert invoices fall within the EWC’s operating expenses).

On this basis, it treated Charpentier’s complaint about non-payment of the expert invoice as outside s. 17, because he was acting in a representative capacity on behalf of the EWC as a whole.

Bolger J rejects this approach as:

• Incompatible with the wording of s. 17, which itself refers to “collective interests of the employees” (s. 17(1A));
• Inconsistent with the Directive’s Article 10(1) which speaks expressly of representation of the employees’ interests collectively;
• Contrary to the requirement in s. 3(3) TICEA and Marleasing to interpret national law in light of the Directive; and
• Overlooking other provisions in TICEA that are inherently collective (e.g. s. 17(5)).

She emphasises that the “legislative context” of TICEA is precisely the Directive it implements. Reading s. 17 in isolation and as if it were a purely domestic provision is legally unsound.

(c) “Means required”: legal capacity vs financial and expert resources

The central conceptual debate concerns the meaning of “means” in Article 10(1) of the Directive and s. 17(1A) TICEA.

The respondent argued that:

• “Means” refers only to legal capacity or standing (a “process guarantee”), not to financial or material resources;
• If financial support were intended, the Directive would have said so explicitly; and
• Commission reports suggest that in most Member States “means” has indeed been treated as legal capacity rather than a guarantee of litigation funding.

Bolger J decisively rejects that restrictive reading:

• The term “means” is used elsewhere in the Directive (e.g. Articles 5(4), 6(f)) and TICEA (e.g. s. 9(1)) in a broader, not purely legal-capacity, sense. It would be illogical to construe it narrowly only in Article 10(1).
• To accept the respondent’s view would imply that TICEA’s s. 17(1A) – which states that “central management shall provide the members of the EWC with the means required” – gave central management power to grant legal standing to EWC members. That would be legally and conceptually incoherent: legal standing is conferred by law, not by the employer.
• There is no reason in the text or structure of the Directive to read “means” as excluding material and financial resources such as funding expert advice.

Thus, “means” under Article 10(1) and s. 17(1A) is properly understood as including financial and other resources, to the extent they are necessary for EWC members to:

• Apply rights arising from the Directive; and
• Represent collectively the employees’ interests in a transnational setting.

This interpretation is both:

• Textually grounded; and
• Required by the principle of effectiveness: without such resources, EWC members may have nominal rights but no practical ability to enforce them, especially where the EWC has no funds or legal personality of its own.

(d) Effective remedies: criminal sanctions are not enough

The respondent contended that the criminal sanctions in ss. 17(2) and 18 TICEA provide a sufficiently “effective” remedy for breaches, satisfying Article 11 of the Directive.

Bolger J disagrees:

• Criminal sanction is an exceptional measure in protective employment legislation and cannot displace or substitute for the more usual route of individual or representative complaints to the WRC and Labour Court;
• Article 11(2) requires “adequate administrative or judicial procedures” enabling obligations under the Directive to be enforced; TICEA’s WRC/Labour Court scheme is clearly the intended primary enforcement route;
• Treating criminal enforcement as sufficient would undermine the EU principle of effectiveness and the Directive’s aim of giving workers real, usable rights through accessible procedures.

Accordingly, the WRC and Labour Court must treat themselves as the primary enforcement mechanism under Article 11, applying TICEA in conformity with the Directive and considering the full range of remedies open to them under s. 17A and s. 17B.

(e) The error of excluding collective enforcement under s. 17

Putting this together, Bolger J finds that the Labour Court erred in law by:

• Holding that s. 17 is confined to individual rights, when its text and context show it also covers the representation of collective interests; and
• Refusing to entertain Charpentier’s complaint about the expert invoice on the false premise that s. 17 cannot be used to pursue collective matters.

The court further finds that the Labour Court should have examined whether:

• The expert advice procured from EWC Academy (Dr Altmeyer) was necessary and appropriate; and
• If so, whether it fell within:
  • the “operating expenses” to be borne by central management under para. 6 of the Second Schedule; and/or
  • the “means required” that central management must provide under s. 17(1A).

4.2.3 Costs and the “means required” (Issue (iii))

(a) Labour Court’s approach

In both determinations, the Labour Court dismissed Charpentier’s costs applications in a single sentence, saying that the question of costs was “moot” because the appeal was not upheld.

This approach ignored:

• The nuanced arguments advanced about the Directive and s. 17(1A);
• The specific function of costs here: not merely as inter partes “costs following the event”, but as part of enabling EWC members to exercise EU-derived rights; and
• The structural fact that EWCs in Ireland have no legal personality or own funds, meaning they cannot litigate (or even obtain expert advice) unless central management pays.

(b) Limits of the Labour Court’s domestic power to award costs

It was common case that the Labour Court has no general jurisdiction to award civil procedural costs as such, with national legislation and its own rules (e.g. Regulation 19 of the 1968 Redundancy Regulations) providing otherwise.

However, the Attorney General highlighted—and Bolger J underscores—that this is a separate issue from the question whether:

• Under s. 17(1A), read with the Directive, a complainant may seek substantive relief consisting of reimbursement of legal and expert expenses as part of the “means required to apply the rights arising from the Directive”.

In other words, the fact that the Labour Court cannot award traditional “costs” does not preclude it from:

• Ordering an employer, under s. 17A(b) or (c), to:
  • take a specified course of action (e.g. reimburse reasonable legal/expert expenses); or
  • pay compensation reflecting expenses necessarily incurred in attempting to vindicate Directive-based rights.

These are not procedural costs orders but substantive remedies to ensure the Directive is effectively enforced.

(c) Principle of effectiveness and deterrence

The appellant argued that if EWCs must personally absorb legal and expert costs even when they raise non-frivolous complaints, they will be deterred from enforcing their rights under the Directive. This runs counter to:

• Recitals 35–36 (effective, proportionate, dissuasive sanctions and procedures);
• Article 11(2) (adequate procedures to enable enforcement); and
• The EU principle of effectiveness: national rules must not make it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law.

Bolger J holds that the Labour Court was obliged to grapple with these EU-law arguments. Instead, by simply stating that costs were “moot” because the appeal was unsuccessful, the Labour Court:

• Failed to consider:
  • whether reimbursement could be granted even on a partially unsuccessful claim; or
  • whether the deterrent effect of unreimbursed expenses necessitated some form of compensation or order under s. 17A; and
  • Failed in its duty under TICEA and EU law to interpret and apply s. 17(1A) so as to give full effect to Article 10(1) and Article 11(2).

  The court emphasises that:

  • Charpentier’s argument was not that “costs follow the event” under a domestic statute like the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (s. 169);
  • Rather, he claimed that irrespective of success, EWCs must not be left unable to enforce their rights for want of resources, particularly where complaints are not vexatious or frivolous.

  This distinction is critical: the High Court is not converting the Labour Court into a general costs-awarding body. Instead, it mandates that, in appropriate cases, the Labour Court may be required to treat reasonable legal and expert expenses as falling within:

  • “the means required to apply the rights arising from the Directive” (s. 17(1A)), and therefore
  • remediable under s. 17A and s. 17B.

  (d) Errors of law on costs

  Bolger J therefore finds two distinct errors of law on costs:

  1. The Labour Court erred by treating the costs questions as “moot” simply because the appeals were not upheld, rather than addressing the specific EU-law-based claims.
  2. It erred in failing to consider whether, under TICEA and the Directive (including deterrence considerations), it could or should require central management to reimburse some or all of the appellant’s expenses (including legal costs), depending on the facts and the nature of the claim.

  4.3 Impact and Significance

  4.3.1 For European Works Councils established in Ireland

  This decision significantly strengthens the enforceability of EWC rights in Ireland:

  • EWC members (and in particular chairs or select committee members) can confidently bring collective complaints under s. 17 TICEA in a representative capacity, without being told that s. 17 is limited to purely individual rights.
  • Central management now faces a clearer legal obligation to provide real, practical “means” – including expert and possibly legal support – enabling the EWC to exercise its information and consultation rights.
  • The prospect that reasonable expert and legal expenses may have to be reimbursed, even where a complaint is not entirely successful, will alter the strategic landscape for both employers and worker representatives.

  4.3.2 For the WRC and Labour Court

  The judgment has procedural and substantive consequences:

  • Procedural:
    • Determinations must be better structured, with paragraph/page numbering and fuller reasoning, especially where complex EU law issues are raised.
    • The WRC and Labour Court must show that they have engaged with EU law obligations, including interpretive duties under s. 3 TICEA and principles like effectiveness.
  • Substantive:
    • They must treat s. 17 as covering collective as well as individual rights.
    • They must be prepared to consider non-traditional remedies — such as orders requiring the reimbursement of legal or expert costs — where necessary to secure the effective enjoyment of Directive-based rights.

  4.3.3 For Irish EU-law jurisprudence

  The case deepens Irish courts’ engagement with EU labour law in at least three ways:

  1. It reaffirms and operationalises the Marleasing / indirect-effect duty:
     • National law implementing an EU directive is not to be read in isolation; and
     • Domestic adjudicatory bodies share the obligation to interpret in conformity with the directive “as far as possible”.
  2. It applies the principle of effectiveness concretely in the context of labour rights, insisting that:
     • Remedial structures must not deter or render excessively difficult the exercise of EU-based rights;
     • Merely having a criminal sanction on the books is insufficient if the practical enforcement route is via individual complaints.
  3. It offers an early national interpretation of the meaning of “means required” in Article 10(1) of Directive 2009/38/EC, which may have persuasive value in other Member States and future CJEU jurisprudence.

  4.3.4 For employers and their counsel

  Employers hosting EWCs in Ireland must now:

  • Recognise that:
    • Expert advice costs (e.g. EWC Academy) are very likely to fall within the EWC’s operating expenses and the “means required” in many circumstances; and
    • Refusal to fund such assistance will be critically scrutinised.
  • Be aware that:
    • Even if they successfully resist an EWC claim on the merits, they may still face exposure to orders/compensation for legal or expert expenses, where necessary to preserve effective enforcement going forward.
  • Engage in a genuine “spirit of cooperation” (Art. 9 Directive, s. 12 and s. 16 TICEA) on:
    • Training needs;
    • Choice of experts; and
    • Assessment of whether particular expenses are necessary and appropriate.

  4.3.5 In the legislative and policy context

  Given that a further amendment to the Recast Directive is under discussion at EU level, this judgment may influence:

  • How Ireland adjusts TICEA in future transposition exercises; and
  • How policymakers think about:
    • EWCs’ legal standing and capacity; and
    • Mechanisms to ensure they enjoy real, not merely nominal, rights to enforcement and expert assistance.

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  5. Complex Concepts Simplified

  5.1 European Works Councils and TICEA

  A European Works Council (EWC) is a body representing employees of a multinational company operating in at least two EU/EEA Member States. Its core role is to receive information and be consulted on transnational issues, such as major reorganisations, mass redundancies, or significant investment decisions affecting employees in more than one country.

  In Ireland, EWCs are regulated by TICEA, which:

  • Implements Directive 2009/38/EC; and
  • Provides for EWCs established either:
    • By agreement between central management and workers’ representatives; or
    • Under default “subsidiary requirements” (Second Schedule) if no agreement exists.

  Key point: in Irish law, an EWC is not a separate legal person. It cannot, in its own name, sue or be sued. Instead, its members (e.g. the chair) must bring proceedings in a representative capacity.

  5.2 Indirect effect (“Marleasing” duty)

  “Indirect effect” is an EU law doctrine (from cases like Marleasing) that requires national courts to interpret domestic legislation, as far as possible, in line with the wording and purpose of EU directives that the domestic legislation implements.

  In practice, this means:

  • If a national law can be read in different ways, courts should prefer an interpretation that:
    • Achieves the directive’s objectives; and
    • Gives full force to the rights the directive intends to confer.
  • However, courts cannot rewrite the statute or interpret it in a way that contradicts its clear wording (“contra legem”).

  In this case, s. 3(3) TICEA explicitly codifies this duty for TICEA itself, telling courts to construe it so as to give effect to the Directive.

  5.3 Principle of effectiveness

  The principle of effectiveness is a cornerstone of EU law. It means that national procedural and remedial rules must not make it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights derived from EU law.

  For EWCs, this implies:

  • They must have access to workable procedures (e.g. WRC/Labour Court) to enforce their rights;
  • They must not be deterred from bringing good-faith claims because doing so would impose unbearable financial burdens (e.g. if they must personally pay legal and expert fees with no realistic chance of reimbursement);
  • Member States must provide adequate remedies (civil, administrative, or criminal) that are effective, dissuasive, and proportionate.

  5.4 “Means required to apply the rights”

  Article 10(1) of the Directive and s. 17(1A) TICEA say EWC members must have the “means required to apply the rights arising from the Directive”.

  In simple terms, this means:

  • EWC members must be equipped with everything that is reasonably necessary to:
    • Understand their rights;
    • Receive and evaluate information;
    • Engage in meaningful consultation; and
    • Enforce their rights through appropriate legal or administrative procedures.
  • Those “means” can include:
    • Training;
    • Expert advice (e.g. consultants, legal advisers);
    • Financial resources to pay such experts; and
    • Time off without loss of pay.

  The High Court clarifies that “means” is not restricted to the abstract legal “capacity” to bring a claim.

  5.5 Costs vs. substantive reimbursement of expenses

  A critical distinction in the judgment is between:

  • Procedural costs (typical civil litigation costs): where the court orders the losing party to pay the winning party’s legal costs because “costs follow the event”. The Labour Court generally does not have power to make such orders.
  • Substantive reimbursement of expenses under EU-implementing legislation:
    • Where a statute like TICEA permits the WRC or Labour Court to order an employer to pay “compensation” or to “take a specified course of action”; and
    • The substance of what must be paid includes reasonable legal/expert expenses as part of the “means required” under EU law.

  In Charpentier, the High Court emphasises that the Labour Court is obliged to consider this second, EU-derived avenue of relief, which is conceptually distinct from ordinary costs orders.

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  6. Conclusion

  Charpentier v Verizon Ireland Ltd is a foundational decision for European Works Councils operating under Irish law. It clarifies and develops several important legal principles:

  1. Collective enforcement under s. 17 TICEA: EWC members can use s. 17 to pursue collective rights, not only individual entitlements. The Labour Court’s attempt to confine s. 17 to individual claims was erroneous.
  2. Broad meaning of “means required”: The obligation to provide EWC members with the “means required” to apply Directive-based rights is not limited to conferring legal standing. It extends to material and financial resources, including expert assistance and, potentially, legal expenses.
  3. Effective remedies and deterrence: Criminal sanctions alone are not a sufficient enforcement mechanism. WRC and Labour Court procedures are the primary means of enforcing EWC rights, and remedies available there (declarations, orders, compensation) must be interpreted and applied robustly so that exercise of EU-based rights is not deterred.
  4. Costs as part of substantive relief: While the Labour Court has no general jurisdiction to award civil “costs”, it must consider whether, in TICEA/EU law cases, reimbursement of reasonable legal and expert expenses is necessary as part of the substantive “means” owed to EWC members. It may need to order such reimbursement via the remedial powers in s. 17A–17B, even when the substantive complaint is not wholly successful.
  5. Obligation to engage with EU law and give reasons: National bodies like the Labour Court cannot treat implementing statutes as purely domestic. They must:
     • Interpret them in light of the Directive; and
     • Explicitly engage with EU law arguments and give sufficient reasons so parties understand the basis of the decision.

  On the specific facts, the High Court upheld the Labour Court’s factual determination that Verizon’s May 2021 seminar constituted adequate training, reinforcing the curial deference owed to expert tribunals on matters of fact. But it set aside parts of both Labour Court determinations that:

  • Misconstrued the legal scope of s. 17; and
  • Failed to consider properly the appellant’s costs applications in light of EU law, instead dismissing them as “moot”.

  Looking ahead, this judgment will likely:

  • Encourage EWCs to be more assertive in seeking expert and legal support at central management’s expense where justified;
  • Prompt employers to take a more structured and cooperative approach to funding EWC activities and dispute resolution; and
  • Require the WRC and Labour Court to refine their reasoning practices and fully integrate EU-law considerations into their determinations.

  In sum, Charpentier stands as a major step in ensuring that EWCs established in Ireland enjoy practical and enforceable rights to information, consultation, and representation, supported by the “means required” to make those rights a lived reality rather than a paper promise.