Coates v R [2025] EWCA Crim 1676: Sentencing for Criminal Damage Following Civil Contempt – Avoiding Double Punishment while Preserving Deterrence

1. Introduction

The decision in Coates v R [2025] EWCA Crim 1676 is an important criminal sentencing authority at the intersection of:

Serious criminal damage driven by hostility to civil court orders; and
Previous punishment for civil contempt arising from the same incident.

The case arose from a long-running boundary and neighbour dispute which escalated into substantial civil litigation, a charging order over the appellant’s home, and finally to the appellant’s deliberate destruction of both his own property and that of his neighbours. He had already been punished in the High Court for contempt of court in relation to the same episode before facing criminal charges for criminal damage.

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), constituted by Mrs Justice Thornton, dismissed an appeal against a custodial sentence of 4 years and 16 weeks’ imprisonment for two counts of criminal damage contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. The judgment provides detailed guidance on:

How sentencing courts should approach criminal sentencing after an earlier civil contempt sentence for the same conduct.
How the Sentencing Council guidelines on criminal damage are to be applied where:
- There are multiple counts of category 1A seriousness; and
- The offending constitutes an attack on the integrity of the civil justice system.

The core precedent may be formulated as follows:

Where conduct has already resulted in a civil contempt sentence, a criminal court sentencing for overlapping criminal offences must:

Assess seriousness in accordance with the criminal sentencing guidelines, including all relevant aggravating features (such as an attack on the civil justice system itself);
Avoid double punishment by making a clearly reasoned reduction to reflect the earlier civil sentence; but
Is not required to achieve parity or “matching” of the civil and criminal sentences, particularly where the criminal offending is broader in scope than the conduct punished as contempt.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The parties and their dispute

The appellant lived at 9 Eatenden Lane, Mountfield, East Sussex. The complainants, Mr Greenwood and Ms Turner, lived in the adjoining semi-detached property at number 10 (2).

A long-standing boundary dispute escalated into civil litigation. The complainants secured:

A civil judgment awarding:
- £60,000 for trespass,
- £50,000 for harassment,
- £150,000 for diminution in the value of their property,
together with substantial costs (3).
A court order dated 15 September 2022, imposing prohibitions or restrictions on the appellant’s conduct towards his neighbours (3).

2.2 Charging order and order for sale

On 14 March 2024, the High Court made a charging order over the appellant’s house, granting the complainants a vested interest in his property, and ordered that the property be sold by 13 June 2024 through solicitors instructed by the complainants (4). This was the enforcement mechanism for the substantial civil judgment.

The order for sale and associated loss of control over “his” house appear to have been the psychological and practical trigger for the appellant’s subsequent destructive conduct.

2.3 Contempt proceedings

On 17 April 2024, the complainants issued an application for contempt of court alleging 20 breaches of the September 2022 order (5). One of those alleged contempts was the appellant’s later conduct in damaging the complainants’ roof on 10 June 2024.

Before the criminal trial, on 17 September 2024, the High Court handed down judgment on this contempt application and found the allegation relating to the damage to the complainants’ roof proved (12).

Relying on Lovett v Wigan CC [2002] EWCA Civ 1631, the civil judge:

Identified the objectives of sentencing for civil contempt as:
- Securing compliance with the underlying order,
- Punishment, and
- Rehabilitation.
Imposed a sentence of 3 months’ imprisonment for the damage to the complainants’ roof, later effectively reduced to 10 weeks to reflect the totality of all contempts (12).

2.4 The destructive acts

Between the days leading up to 10 June 2024 and that date itself, the appellant embarked on a conscious course of destructive behaviour:

He gutted the inside of his home, including removing floors and a staircase, in an attempt to reduce the value of the property before sale (6).
On 10 June 2024 he accessed the roof via a hole he had created and began smashing roof tiles with a hammer and throwing them to the ground (7).
Ms Turner was in close proximity to the falling tiles, and Mr Greenwood was also at risk when he arrived to assist her (7).
Although the appellant took some care after the police arrived not to hit passers-by directly, there remained a risk from ricocheting debris (7).

The damage to the appellant’s own house included:

A largely stripped roof with exposed rafters,
Three smashed chimney pots,
Destruction of the roof to a single-storey extension (rafters apparently sawn through earlier) (8).

Crucially, the appellant:

Openly explained to police that he was acting deliberately in order to be arrested and to obtain a jury trial, so that he could publicise his grievances against his neighbours and the civil courts (9);
Was told (incorrectly) by a police negotiator that he could not be tried for destroying his own roof, after which he crossed onto the complainants’ roof and inflicted extensive damage there as well (9).

The financial consequences were substantial:

Undamaged value of the appellant’s house: up to £450,000.
Damaged value: offers in the range of £200,000–£300,000 (10).
Damage to the appellant’s house on 10 June alone: tens of thousands of pounds (10).
Repairs to the complainants’ property: estimates of £15,000–£16,000 for their roof, plus £9,462 for the conservatory, total around £25,000; counsel for the appellant suggested £37,000 overall (10).

2.5 Criminal proceedings and sentence at first instance

The appellant was prosecuted for:

Two counts of criminal damage contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 – one relating to his own house (which, due to the charging order, also “belonged” in law to others) and one to the complainants’ roof (1, 11);
Harassment of the complainants (11).

On 29 November 2024, after a trial, he was:

Convicted of both counts of criminal damage; and
Acquitted of harassment (1, 11).

On 10 March 2025, the Recorder sentenced him to a total of 4 years and 16 weeks’ imprisonment for the two counts of criminal damage (1). This sentence was arrived at after a detailed exercise which:

Considered the Sentencing Council Guidelines for criminal damage;
Placed both offences in category 1A (high culpability, high harm) (14);
Identified a starting point of 5 years custody for the two offences combined; and
Reduced that by 8 months to reflect the earlier civil contempt sentence, giving the final term of 4 years and 16 weeks (15).

3. Issues Before the Court of Appeal

The appellant appealed his sentence, with leave, arguing that it was manifestly excessive (1, 16). The core issues for the Court of Appeal were:

Whether the Recorder’s assessment that both criminal damage counts were category 1A (the most serious category under the guidelines) was justified.
Whether the uplift to a 5-year starting point (before deduction for the civil contempt) fell properly within the guideline range for the two offences.
Whether the Recorder adequately and appropriately reflected in the criminal sentence the fact that the appellant had already served a term of imprisonment for civil contempt arising from the same conduct (the damage to the complainants’ roof).
Whether due weight was given to asserted personal mitigation, especially the claim that the appellant was the main daytime carer for his severely autistic adult son (16).

4. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentence was not manifestly excessive and that the Recorder had:

Correctly applied the Sentencing Council guidelines by categorising both counts as category 1A; and
Justifiably identified significant aggravating features warranting an uplift above the guideline starting point.

Key conclusions included:

The Recorder was entitled to treat the damage to the appellant’s own house as the lead offence given the high degree of planning, the revenge motive, and the attempt to frustrate the complainants’ civil judgment and charging order (19).
The Recorder was entitled to characterise the conduct as a serious attack on the integrity of the civil justice system, and to treat that as a significant aggravating factor (14, 20).
Given:
- The guideline range for one category 1A offence (6 months to 4 years, with a starting point of 1 year 6 months) (20);
- Two separate serious offences; and
- Multiple aggravating features and limited mitigation,
a combined sentence of 5 years before any reduction for the civil contempt was not excessive (21).
The Recorder’s deduction of 8 months to reflect the earlier civil contempt sentence was “generous” where the civil court had imposed 3 months, effectively reduced to 10 weeks, only in relation to the neighbours’ roof damage (21).
The civil contempt sentence dealt only with the lesser aspect of the criminality (damage to the complainants’ house) and did not reflect the far more extensive damage to the appellant’s own house, which properly formed the lead offence in the criminal sentencing (21).
The appellant’s claimed caring responsibilities were not made out by the evidence and could not materially reduce a sentence of this seriousness (20).

Accordingly, the Court concluded that there was no error of principle and no manifest excess in the overall sentence. The appeal was dismissed (22).

5. Legal Framework and Precedents

5.1 Criminal Damage Act 1971 and property “belonging to another”

Section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 creates the offence of damaging or destroying property belonging to another without lawful excuse. A key feature in this case, though not analysed explicitly in the judgment, is that:

The appellant’s own house was subject to a charging order and an order for sale, granting the complainants a vested interest in the property (4).

Under section 10(2) of the 1971 Act (general law context), property is treated as “belonging to” any person having a proprietary right or interest in it. Thus:

Deliberately damaging one’s own home can constitute criminal damage where others have proprietary interests (e.g. mortgagees, charge-holders, co-owners).

Coates is a practical illustration of this principle: it confirms, in effect, that a homeowner who destroys his own house with the intention of thwarting a creditor can be prosecuted for criminal damage, because the property also “belongs” in law to that creditor.

5.2 Sentencing Council Guidelines for Criminal Damage

The Court (and the Recorder) applied the Sentencing Council guideline on Criminal Damage, which requires the court to assess:

Culpability (A–C), and
Harm (categories 1–3).

Both counts were placed in category 1A (14), i.e.:

High culpability (A): planned, deliberate destructive acts, revenge motive, determined defiance of court orders.
Category 1 harm: very serious damage, high financial loss, and serious distress to the victims.

For such offending, the guideline indicates:

A starting point of 1 year 6 months’ custody; and
A sentencing range of 6 months to 4 years’ custody for a single offence (20).

The Court emphasised that where there are two serious offences, both at category 1A and with additional aggravating factors, the aggregate sentence can properly exceed the guideline range for a single count (21).

5.3 Lovett v Wigan CC [2002] EWCA Civ 1631

Lovett v Wigan CC is a leading authority on sentencing for civil contempt of court. It was relied upon by the civil judge in the contempt proceedings (12).

Lovett emphasises:

Sentencing for civil contempt is directed to:
- Securing compliance with the order,
- Punishing defiance of the court’s authority, and
- Rehabilitation where possible.
The court must impose the shortest possible term that properly reflects the seriousness of the contempt.
The approach should be analogous to criminal sentencing, with attention to culpability and harm, though the regime and maximum penalties differ.

In Coates, Lovett’s importance lies more in explaining the background civil sentence than in shaping the criminal court’s reasoning. The Court of Appeal accepted that the civil judge had appropriately followed Lovett in fixing a short custodial term for contempt, but stressed that the criminal sentencing exercise remained distinct.

5.4 Lomas v Parle [2004] 1 WLR 1642

The central precedent for the Court of Appeal’s analysis is Lomas v Parle [2004] 1 WLR 1642, a Civil Division decision concerning:

Interplay between Family Law Act 1996 injunctions and criminal offences under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997;
Concurrent or sequential proceedings across the family, civil and criminal jurisdictions.

Lomas made two points of particular relevance:

A perpetrator may face sentencing for the same act both as:
- A breach of an injunction (punished as contempt); and
- A criminal offence (e.g. harassment).
In that situation, it is the responsibility of the second court sentencing to:
- Take account of the sentence already passed; and
- Ensure that the defendant is not twice punished for the same act (17).
The second court must be:
- Fully informed about the basis and factors of the first sentence; and
- Seek, as far as possible and within differing statutory maximums, to avoid manifest discrepancy between sentences under the different regimes (17, referring to Lomas para 50).

Coates applies these principles in a different legislative context – civil contempt on the one hand, criminal damage on the other – and develops their practical application, especially where the civil sentence only covers part of the criminal conduct.

5.5 Appellate test: “manifestly excessive”

On sentence appeals, the Court of Appeal asks whether the sentence is:

Wrong in principle; or
“Manifestly excessive” – i.e. clearly outside the range of sentences that a judge, properly directing themself, could reasonably impose.

Mrs Justice Thornton emphasised that:

Sentences may be structured in different ways; the Court’s focus is on the overall outcome rather than the micro-structure (18).

6. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

6.1 Categorisation of the offences under the guidelines

The Court endorsed the Recorder’s decision to treat both counts as category 1A criminal damage:

For the damage to the appellant’s own house:
- There was a high degree of planning: damage over several days, including removal of floors and staircase, culminating on 10 June (19);
- The motive was revenge and to defeat the complainants’ benefit from the charging order and order for sale (19);
- The financial harm was very high and the physical damage extensive.
For the damage to the complainants’ house:
- Though less premeditated, following immediately on from the police misinformation, the appellant had an intention to cause very serious damage and was acting out of revenge (19);
- The harm involved substantial loss (tens of thousands of pounds) and severe distress to the complainants (19).

The Court expressly confirmed that the Recorder was:

Entitled to treat the appellant’s own house as the lead offence for sentencing purposes, given its scale and the deliberate targeting of the civil enforcement process (19).

6.2 Aggravating and mitigating factors

The Court accepted the Recorder’s identification of several serious aggravating factors:

The conduct was a deliberate attack on the integrity of the civil justice system:
- The appellant destroyed his own property precisely because the civil court had placed it under a charging order and ordered its sale (14, 19);
- This was an attempt to render the civil judgment ineffective and to frustrate the court’s enforcement process.
The offending occurred in a location where the complainants were entitled to feel safe – their own home – and was targeted towards them as neighbours in a long-running dispute (14, 20).
The complainants were relatively vulnerable, particularly Mr Greenwood who was nearly 70 years old and significantly older than the appellant (14, 20).
There was a community impact, albeit the Recorder appropriately avoided giving excessive weight to this factor where some concerns related to earlier events (14, 20).
The appellant was reckless as to the risk of physical harm to others; there was “clear evidence” that he threw tiles in the proximity of Ms Turner (20).
He was entirely unrepentant, according to the pre-sentence report (20).

As to mitigation:

The appellant claimed to be the primary daytime carer for his severely autistic adult son.
The Recorder, and the Court of Appeal, found there was little or no evidential support for this claim and that the son, as an adult at college, did not generate the kind of dependency that would significantly mitigate a sentence of serious offending (15, 20).
There was no plea of guilty (and thus no credit for a plea).

6.3 Treatment of the earlier civil contempt sentence

A central aspect of the reasoning was how to handle the overlap between:

The civil contempt sentence (10 weeks effectively, based on 3 months for the complainants’ roof damage, subject to totality); and
The criminal sentence for the same roof damage and the more extensive criminal damage to the appellant’s own property.

Invoking Lomas v Parle, the Court reiterated that it is the duty of the second court to sentence so as not to punish the defendant twice for the same act (17).

In Coates, the Recorder:

Explicitly recognised the risk of double counting and directed himself by reference to Lomas (13);
Decided not to treat the fact that the appellant’s criminal damage breached the civil order as an aggravating factor, to avoid double punishment for contempt-like elements already reflected in the civil sentence (20);
Made a specific reduction of 8 months from what he otherwise regarded as the appropriate criminal sentence to reflect the time already served for the civil contempt (15, 21).

The Court of Appeal endorsed this approach:

It agreed that excluding breach-of-order as an aggravating factor in the criminal sentence was an appropriate way to avoid double counting the contempt dimension (20).
It accepted that an 8-month reduction against a 10-week effective civil term was, if anything, “generous” (21).
It clarified that Lomas’ concern to avoid “manifest discrepancy” must be read in light of the fact that the civil sentence here:
- Concerned only the damage to the neighbours’ property; and
- Did not and could not account for the much more extensive criminal damage to the appellant’s own home, which formed the main focus of the criminal sentence (21).

Consequently, the criminal court was not required to confine itself to some parity with the civil sentence; it was entitled to impose a substantially longer sentence to reflect the full scope and seriousness of the criminal offending.

6.4 Overall length of sentence and the “manifestly excessive” test

The Court's key evaluative step was whether a 5-year sentence before the 8-month deduction could be justified as within the range appropriate for these offences. It held that it could (21).

In reaching that conclusion, the Court emphasised:

For a single category 1A offence, the guideline range ran up to 4 years’ custody (20).
Here there were two such offences:
- Both serious; and
- Both laden with aggravating features (revenge, attack on civil justice, risk to safety, lack of remorse).
There was little or no mitigation.

From this, the Court reasoned that:

A total of 5 years for both counts together was not at all outside the range a properly instructed judge could select;
The further reduction to 4 years and 16 weeks properly reflected the earlier civil contempt sentence and avoided double punishment (21);
Accordingly, there was no basis for concluding that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

7. Broader Analysis and Commentary

7.1 Extension and refinement of Lomas v Parle

Although Lomas concerned harassment and family law injunctions, Coates demonstrates that its principles extend more broadly to any situation where:

The same conduct gives rise to:
- Civil contempt proceedings; and/or
- Criminal proceedings.

Coates refines that approach in several ways:

Partial overlap: Lomas often envisaged the “same act” being punished in two jurisdictions. In Coates, the civil contempt sentence related only to one slice of the criminal conduct (the neighbours’ roof damage). The criminal proceedings encompassed:
- That same slice; and
- The much more serious and extensive damage to the appellant’s own property.
Coates clarifies that the criminal court must:
- Protect against double punishment for the overlapping conduct; but
- Remain free to sentence fully for the additional criminality not reflected in the civil contempt disposition.
No artificial capping to “match” civil sentence: Coates makes clear that the “manifest discrepancy” language in Lomas does not mean that a criminal sentence must be calibrated to resemble the earlier civil term in scale. Here, the criminal sentence was dramatically longer than the 10-week civil term, yet entirely justified because:
- The statutory maxima differed (2 years for contempt vs 10 years for criminal damage – 18);
- The criminal sentencing focused on broader and graver harm.
Method of reflection: Coates confirms a flexible but principled method for reflecting the civil sentence:
- Remove from the list of aggravating factors any reliance on breach of the same order already punished as contempt; and/or
- Apply a quantified reduction from the otherwise appropriate criminal term, explaining that reduction.
This provides practical guidance for judges dealing with dual-track civil/criminal enforcement of behaviour.

7.2 Attacks on the civil justice system as an aggravating feature

One of the most significant aspects of Coates is its express recognition that:

Deliberately destroying one’s own property to defeat a charging order and court-ordered sale is a serious aggravating factor because it is an attack on the integrity of the civil justice system.

The Recorder treated this as a “serious aggravating feature”, and the Court of Appeal endorsed that characterisation (14, 20).

This has broader implications:

It aligns with a wider judicial concern that parties respect and comply with civil judgments and enforcement mechanisms.
It sends a clear deterrent message that self-help measures – such as deliberately reducing the value of an asset to prevent a judgment creditor from recovering – may be met not just with civil consequences, but with substantial criminal penalties where criminal damage is involved.
It also reinforces the idea that court orders (including charging orders and orders for sale) are not merely private devices but part of a public system of justice whose authority merits protection through the criminal law.

7.3 Criminal liability for damaging “one’s own” house

Although the judgment assumes rather than argues the point, it is conceptually important that:

The appellant was convicted of criminal damage in relation to his own house, which was subject to a charging order giving the complainants a vested interest (4, 11).

This underscores the operation of section 10 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971: property can “belong to another” even where the defendant is also an owner. Coates therefore serves as a practical confirmation that:

Judgment creditors and charge-holders in land have sufficient proprietary interests to engage the criminal damage statute.
Homeowners cannot insulate themselves from criminal liability by relying on formal ownership where civil enforcement rights in favour of others exist.

7.4 Sentencing structure and aggregate sentences for multiple counts

Coates is also instructive on how the Court of Appeal assesses sentences for multiple offences under guideline frameworks designed per count.

Here, for one category 1A offence, the guideline range extended up to 4 years. There were two such offences, with multiple aggravating features and no real mitigation. The Recorder reached an overall pre-deduction figure of 5 years.

The Court’s approach demonstrates that:

The guideline range for a single offence is not a cap on the total where there are multiple counts.
The appellate focus is on whether the global sentence is within the permissible range having regard to:
- Number and seriousness of offences;
- Aggravating and mitigating factors;
- Principle of totality (that the total must be just and proportionate).
Different structural approaches (e.g. concurrent vs consecutive, nominal counts uplifted or not) are permissible, provided the outcome is justifiable (18).

7.5 Treatment of asserted caring responsibilities as mitigation

Mitigation based on caring responsibilities is a recurring feature in sentencing practice. Coates shows a robust evidential approach:

The appellant claimed to be the main daytime carer for his severely autistic adult son.
The Recorder found no adequate evidential basis for treating him as the primary carer, especially given:
- The son was an adult;
- He was at college;
- The pre-sentence report did not support the claim (15, 20).
The Court of Appeal agreed that no “real mitigation” arose from this contention (20).

This reinforces that:

Caring responsibilities can mitigate sentence only where they are substantial, evidenced, and create genuine hardship beyond the inevitable consequences of custody.
Assertions alone, particularly relating to adult dependants with alternative provision (such as college placements), will not carry substantial weight in the face of serious offending.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

8.1 Civil contempt of court

Civil contempt arises where a person deliberately disobeys a court order (such as an injunction or order regulating behaviour). In Coates:

There was a court order of 15 September 2022 restricting the appellant’s conduct towards his neighbours (3).
The neighbours later alleged that he had breached it in 20 ways (5).
One breach was his damaging their roof.

The High Court found that allegation proved and punished it as contempt:

Contempt is punished not only to reflect the wrongdoing, but also to:
- Compel obedience to the court's orders;
- Uphold the authority of the court.
Hence the use of short, sharp prison terms to show that court orders must be taken seriously.

8.2 Charging order

A charging order is a way for a judgment creditor to secure a debt against a debtor’s property (often land or a house). In this case:

The High Court made a charging order over the appellant’s house to secure the large damages and costs awarded to the neighbours (4).
This meant the neighbours had a proprietary interest in the house, similar in some respects to a mortgage.
The court also ordered that the house be sold by a certain date, with the neighbours’ solicitors responsible for the sale (4).

Because of this:

The house legally “belonged to” the appellant and also, in part, to the neighbours (for the purposes of criminal damage law).
His attempt to destroy the value of the house was not just self-harm to his own property, but an attempt to deprive his creditors of the benefit secured by the court’s order.

8.3 “Double punishment” vs “double jeopardy”

Coates engages the problem of double punishment, not double jeopardy in the strict technical sense.

Double jeopardy (in its classical criminal sense) is about being prosecuted twice for the same offence.
Coates involves:
- A civil proceeding (contempt of court) and
- A later criminal proceeding (criminal damage)
based on overlapping conduct.

The law permits both proceedings, but:

The second court must ensure that, in fixing sentence, the defendant is not punished twice over for the same act (Lomas principle) (17).

8.4 Totality and “manifestly excessive”

The principle of totality requires that where a defendant is sentenced for multiple offences, the total sentence:

Must be just and proportionate to the overall criminality;
May require adjusting sentences on individual counts, or running some sentences concurrently or consecutively, to reach a fair overall result.

A sentence is “manifestly excessive” when:

It is clearly longer than what could reasonably be justified on the facts of the case, applying the law and guidelines.
It is not enough that an appellate court might itself have chosen a slightly different sentence; the sentence must fall outside the broad bracket of reasonable options.

In Coates, the Court held that:

5 years for two highly serious criminal damage offences, after considering all aggravating and mitigating factors, was well within the justifiable range (21);
The final sentence of 4 years and 16 weeks, after deduction for the civil contempt, was not manifestly excessive (22).

8.5 Category 1A within the sentencing guidelines

In guideline terminology:

Culpability A = highest level of blameworthiness, typically involving:
- Planning,
- Premeditation,
- Targeting victims,
- Abuse of a position of trust,
- Or acting with intent to cause very serious harm.
Harm category 1 = the most serious harm, often:
- Very high financial loss,
- Serious long-term impact on victims,
- Significant physical or psychological damage.

Both of the appellant’s criminal damage offences fell squarely within this bracket, hence the guideline starting point of 1 year 6 months and maximum range of up to 4 years per count (20).

9. Likely Impact of the Judgment

9.1 Sentencing where civil contempt and criminal proceedings co-exist

Coates will be a key reference point in future cases where:

Behaviour has been sanctioned as civil contempt (often for breach of injunction or court order); and
The same incident also leads to criminal prosecution (e.g. assault, criminal damage, harassment, stalking, or other offences).

The judgment clarifies:

The second sentencing court:
- Must be informed of the earlier sentence and what it covered;
- Must avoid double punishment, including by:
  - Not treating “breach of injunction” as an aggravating factor if already punished as contempt; and
  - Making a reasoned reduction to reflect the civil term served.
But that court is not constrained to keep the overall criminal sentence in the same ballpark as the civil term, particularly where:
- The criminal offence(s) cover wider or more serious conduct; and
- The statutory maxima and sentencing objectives differ (as between civil contempt and criminal law) (18, 21).

9.2 Deterring attacks on court-ordered enforcement

By upholding a long custodial sentence, Coates sends a clear signal that:

Attempts to undermine the practical effect of civil judgments – especially by physically destroying charged assets – will be taken very seriously in criminal sentencing.
Such conduct is not merely a private dispute over property, but a challenge to the authority and integrity of the civil justice system.

This may influence:

Sentencing in other contexts where individuals attempt to frustrate:
- Charging orders,
- Orders for sale,
- Ancillary relief orders in family proceedings, or
- Other forms of civil enforcement,
by damaging or disposing of assets.

9.3 Practical guidance for trial judges

Trial judges and recorders can draw from Coates:

A clear model for:
- Identifying the lead offence in multi-count criminal damage cases;
- Elevating the starting point within guideline ranges where there are multiple serious aggravating features; and
- Structuring an explicit deduction to reflect prior civil punishment.
Reassurance that the Court of Appeal will consider the overall outcome and will not interfere lightly where the sentencing judge has:
- Given careful reasons;
- Applied the guidelines conscientiously; and
- Taken demonstrable steps to avoid double counting.

10. Conclusion

Coates v R [2025] EWCA Crim 1676 is a significant sentencing authority at the junction of criminal damage, civil contempt, and enforcement of civil judgments. It confirms that:

Deliberate, planned destruction of property – including one’s own home – to thwart a charging order and order for sale will be treated as high culpability, high harm (category 1A) offending.
Such conduct is aggravated by being a direct attack on the integrity of the civil justice system and may attract substantial sentences approaching or exceeding the top of the guideline range when combined with multiple counts and other aggravation.
Where the same incident has already been punished as civil contempt, a criminal court must:
- Recognise and reflect that earlier sentence;
- Avoid double punishment by adjustment of aggravating factors and/or explicit deduction; but
- Remain free to impose a significantly longer overall criminal sentence when justified by the broader or more serious criminality.
Claims of personal mitigation, including caring responsibilities, must be properly evidenced and are unlikely to significantly temper sentence in the face of grave, deliberate offending and lack of remorse.

In upholding the 4 years and 16 weeks’ sentence as not manifestly excessive, the Court of Appeal reinforces a coherent set of principles for dealing with overlapping civil and criminal sanctions, and underscores the criminal courts’ role in protecting not only individuals and property, but also the authority and efficacy of the civil justice system itself.