Clarifying the Threshold for Pre‑Action Inspection under s.12 PIAB Act 2003: Commentary on M v T [2025] IEHC 623

Clarifying the Threshold for Pre‑Action Inspection under s.12 of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003:
Commentary on M v T [2025] IEHC 623

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the High Court of Ireland (Egan J) in M v T [2025] IEHC 623, a judgment that provides important clarification on:

  • the distinction between preservation and inspection of evidence;
  • the threshold for pre‑action / pre‑pleadings inspection under Order 50 rule 4 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 ("RSC");
  • the interaction between those powers and s.12 of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 ("the 2003 Act"); and
  • the application of reporting restrictions to protect an infant plaintiff who alleges a sexual assault in a childcare setting.

The case arises from an allegation by an eight‑year‑old infant plaintiff that, when she was five years old and attending the respondent’s creche, she was sexually assaulted by another child of similar age in a garden shed on the creche’s premises. Before any formal personal injuries proceedings were commenced (and before the Personal Injuries Assessment Board process was completed), the intended plaintiff applied to the High Court under:

  • s.12 of the 2003 Act; and
  • Order 50 rule 4 RSC,

seeking two categories of orders:

  1. Preservation of certain evidence (which the defendant ultimately did not oppose); and
  2. Inspection of:
    • the garden shed where the assault is alleged to have occurred;
    • any CCTV footage relating to the incident; and
    • accident / incident report forms, witness statements and contemporaneous notes concerning the alleged event.

The judgment is procedurally significant. It does not decide the underlying liability dispute; rather, it addresses how far a plaintiff may go in seeking access to the defendant’s property and documentation before pleadings are exchanged, and even before court proceedings are issued.

The court also grants reporting restrictions under s.27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008 to protect the anonymity of the child plaintiff, in circumstances where she alleges a sexual assault and resultant psychiatric injury.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 The Orders Sought

The intended plaintiff applied for:

  1. Orders for preservation of three categories of evidence:
    • the garden shed;
    • CCTV footage of the alleged incident; and
    • accident / incident reports, witness statements and contemporaneous records relating to the incident.
  2. Orders for inspection of those same categories of evidence by the plaintiff’s expert(s).

The defendant consented to the preservation orders but opposed the inspection orders.

2.2 Reporting Restrictions

Both parties applied for reporting restrictions to protect the child’s anonymity. Relying on s.27 of the 2008 Act, the court held:

  • The plaintiff had allegedly suffered a sexual assault leading to psychiatric injury, which amounts to a sensitive medical condition for s.27 purposes.
  • Her public identification as a person having that condition would cause her undue stress.
  • The requested restrictions were not prejudicial to the interests of justice, as the judgment would still be published in anonymised form.

Accordingly, Egan J made an order prohibiting publication of any material likely to identify the plaintiff, including material that would identify the defendant creche concerned.

2.3 Preservation vs Inspection

The court accepted the defendant’s consent to preservation and therefore made orders that:

  • the garden shed, the CCTV footage, and the accident / incident records be preserved pending further order.

The controversy lay in whether the plaintiff was entitled at this early stage to an order for inspection of this material.

2.4 Core Holding on Inspection

Egan J refused at this time to grant the orders for inspection, holding in essence that:

  • The relevance and necessity of the requested inspection had not been established at this pre‑pleadings and pre‑action stage.
  • The issues between the parties had not crystallised — the plaintiff had not pleaded even in general terms the basis of the alleged negligence, beyond stating that the plaintiff had been left unsupervised.
  • While a court can order pre‑pleadings inspection in an appropriate case, that jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly, particularly where proceedings have not yet been commenced due to the PIAB regime.
  • The plaintiff’s rights of access to the courts and to equality of arms were adequately protected by the preservation of the evidence.

2.5 Procedural Outcome

Rather than dismiss the application outright, the court:

  • Adjourned the application for inspection, with liberty to re‑enter once pleadings have closed; and
  • Deferred any costs decision until that time.

Thus, the plaintiff preserved the possibility of later obtaining inspection, but only after the issues have been sufficiently defined through pleadings.

3. Legal Framework and Precedents Cited

3.1 Statutory Framework: s.12 PIAB Act 2003

Section 12 of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 is central. Under the PIAB regime:

  • No court proceedings may be brought in respect of a personal injuries claim unless an application has been made to the Board and an authorisation obtained.
  • However, s.12 provides that this prohibition is not to be read as affecting the right of a party to apply to the High Court for certain interlocutory orders that could have been made if proceedings were brought or were about to be brought.

Section 12 expressly contemplates orders:

  • requiring evidence to be preserved, and
  • other interlocutory orders made under the Rules of the Superior Courts or the court’s inherent jurisdiction.

Such applications must:

  • be made by motion on notice; and
  • be grounded on an affidavit swearing that:
    • the application is bona fide and for the sole purpose of securing a fair and just disposition of the intended proceedings; and
    • the making of the order is required for that fair and just disposition.

The court has a discretion to:

  • grant any such interlocutory order it considers appropriate; or
  • adjourn or dismiss the application.

In M v T, s.12 provides the procedural gateway by which the intended plaintiff could seek preservation and inspection before PIAB authorisation and before issuing proceedings.

3.2 Order 50 Rule 4 RSC – Preservation and Inspection of Property

Order 50 rule 4 RSC empowers the court, on application by a party to a cause or matter, to order:

“the retention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing, being the subject of such cause or matter, or as to which any question may arise therein…”

As summarised by Egan J (drawing also on Delany & McGrath, Civil Procedure 5th ed):

  • The right of inspection is a facet of the constitutional right of access to the courts.
  • It also secures equality of arms, ensuring a party is not disadvantaged merely because relevant property is under the control of the other party.
  • Inspection may be necessary so that the best available evidence is before the court.

However, inspection can affect the property rights of the party controlling the property. Thus:

  • A balancing exercise is required; and
  • The principle of proportionality, familiar from discovery jurisprudence, equally applies to inspection.

The court will consider:

  • whether inspection is relevant and necessary to the matters in issue;
  • whether it is expedient in the interests of justice;
  • whether there are less intrusive alternatives (e.g. preservation alone); and
  • the efficient use of court resources and avoidance of unnecessary costs.

3.3 Precedents on Inspection

(a) James Elliott Construction Ltd v Lagan [2015] IEHC 631

In James Elliott, Costello J held that:

  • The entitlement to seek an order for inspection does not depend on the strength of the underlying case.
  • But the court must still be satisfied that inspection is “necessary or expedient for the purposes of obtaining full information or evidence”.
  • Relevance, necessity and expedience are determined by reference to the issues in the proceedings.

Egan J adopts and applies this test, emphasising that inspection should be grounded in the concrete issues between the parties — issues which in M v T had not yet crystallised.

(b) SoftCo v DHL Information Services (Europe) [2013] IEHC 623

Ryan J in SoftCo articulated a cautious approach to inspection, stating that:

  • An order for inspection requires a “solid ground of reasonable necessity”.
  • Inspection would not normally be considered before pleadings have closed, as it is only then that relevance can be properly assessed.
  • Nonetheless, in an appropriate case, inspection can be ordered before delivery of a defence or even before a statement of claim.

Egan J relies on this to underline that:

  • the general rule is inspection after pleadings have closed;
  • pre‑pleadings inspection is the exception, requiring persuasive justification.

(c) Ballymore Residential Ltd v Roadstone Ltd [2017] IEHC 539

Murphy J in Ballymore rejected the suggestion that “exceptional circumstances” were a formal prerequisite for pre‑pleadings inspection. However:

  • He reaffirmed that inspection would not normally be ordered until proceedings are closed.
  • This position is consistent with inspection being available but unusual at an early stage.

Egan J adopts this nuanced view: she does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate “exceptionality” in a rigid sense, but recognises that the burden is nonetheless a heavy one at the pre‑pleadings, pre‑action stage.

3.4 Pre‑Action / Pre‑Pleadings Discovery Principles

Although the application was framed as one for inspection, the plaintiff also invoked principles developed in the case law on pre‑pleadings discovery. Egan J summarises those principles:

  • General rule: Discovery is only ordered after delivery of statement of claim and defence, because until then the issues in dispute are not clear.
  • This rule has been repeatedly endorsed; pre‑pleadings discovery is exceptional.
  • Nonetheless, discovery may be ordered before a statement of claim where:
    • it would otherwise be impossible (or seriously difficult) for the plaintiff to properly particularise a comprehensive statement of claim; and
    • the application is not a fishing expedition; and
    • the nature of the claim has already been made clear.
  • The jurisdiction to make such orders must be exercised sparingly.

These principles inform the court’s approach to pre‑pleadings inspection, given the conceptual overlap: both are mechanisms by which a party seeks access to material in the other party’s control before issues are fully defined.

3.5 Scope of “Property” under Order 50 r 4: Re Saxton and Huddleston

A subtle but important point arises as to whether documents and CCTV are properly sought under Order 50 r 4 (inspection of “property”) or under the regime of discovery.

  • In Re Saxton [1962] 1 WLR 859, Lord Wilberforce interpreted the English equivalent of Order 50 r 4 and held that “property” was broad enough to include documents, permitting their delivery for inspection.
  • Conversely, in Huddleston v Control Risks Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 701, Lord Hoffmann distinguished between:
    • inspection of physical characteristics of a real object; and
    • accessing the information a document conveys.
    He suggested that where the purpose is to obtain information conveyed by a document, the proper route is discovery, not inspection as to property.

Egan J notes this line of authority and observes that, in M v T:

  • The plaintiff seeks inspection of CCTV footage and written records primarily to obtain information, not to assess the physical qualities of any medium or item.
  • This suggests that discovery, rather than inspection under Order 50 r 4, might be the appropriate mechanism in respect of CCTV and documents.

However, as this issue was not fully argued and did not affect the ultimate outcome (inspection was refused in any event), Egan J expressly declines to decide the point and simply parks it for another day.

3.6 Reporting Restrictions: s.27 Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008

Section 27 allows a court to make an order prohibiting publication or broadcast of any matter relating to proceedings that would be likely to identify a party as having a medical condition, provided:

  1. The person has a medical condition;
  2. Identification as such a person would be likely to cause him/her undue stress; and
  3. The order would not be prejudicial to the interests of justice.

Here, the affidavit evidence was that the plaintiff had suffered physical injuries and a “considerable psychiatric injury” arising from the alleged sexual assault. The court held:

  • This psychiatric injury is a qualifying medical condition under s.27.
    • undue stress.
  • Restricting identification, while publishing an anonymised written judgment, was compatible with open justice and thus not prejudicial to the interests of justice.

Accordingly, reporting was restricted to prevent identification of the child, including indirect identification via the creche’s name.

4. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.1 Preservation vs Inspection: Different Thresholds

A key structural feature of the judgment is the implicit recognition that preservation and inspection are different in intrusiveness and demand different justifications:

  • Preservation primarily freezes the factual situation and prevents spoliation or alteration of evidence. It minimally interferes with property rights and does not disclose sensitive material to another party.
  • Inspection, by contrast, requires the defendant to grant access to its property or documentation, potentially revealing confidential or sensitive information. It thus engages more substantially with property and privacy rights.

In M v T, the defendant did not object to preservation, and the court had no difficulty in making such orders. The real issue was whether the higher bar for inspection had been met at this juncture.

4.2 Assessing Relevance and Necessity at the Pre‑Pleadings Stage

Egan J emphasises that inspection under Order 50 r 4 is contingent upon the court being satisfied that:

  • the inspection is relevant to the matters in issue; and
  • it is necessary or at least expedient in the interests of justice.

However, at the time of the application:

  • No proceedings had been issued (due to the mandatory PIAB process);
  • No statement of claim or defence existed; and
  • The plaintiff had not even set out the general contours of the negligence case beyond asserting that children were left unsupervised.

This led the court to conclude:

“Quite simply, the matters in issue between the parties to these proceedings have not yet crystallised. As such, it is not possible to hold at this juncture that the inspection is relevant, necessary or expedient.” (para. 50)

Although the plaintiff argued that inspection was needed to draft a proper statement of claim, the court held that some form of basic pleading can and must precede invasive orders:

  • The “basic alleged facts” (unsupervised child, incident in a shed, alleged sexual assault by another child) are already known.
  • It remains incumbent on the plaintiff to formulate in general terms the alleged breaches of duty (e.g. staffing ratios, supervision protocols, use of the shed, risk assessments, etc.).
  • The plaintiff’s affidavit did not attempt this; there was only a bare allegation of inadequate supervision.

Thus, the plaintiff had not discharged the onus of showing that inspection was necessary, rather than simply convenient or helpful.

4.3 Treatment of the Tusla Report

The plaintiff placed heavy reliance on a Tusla Early Years Inspectorate Regulatory Report concerning the creche, which:

  • was prepared after the plaintiff’s parents made a complaint about the incident; and
  • was said to show discrepancies about the use of the garden shed and deficiencies in record‑keeping.

Two main planks of argument were advanced:

  1. The Tusla report described a "locked storage shed used to store play equipment", whereas the plaintiff’s solicitor averred that the same shed had previously been used as a play area and was open to children at the time of the alleged assault. Photos exhibited allegedly corroborated this.
  2. The Tusla report criticised the creche for poor incident reporting practices — use of copybooks rather than proper templates, inconsistent recording of dates, details and children’s names, and lack of records showing parental notification.

The plaintiff argued that this:

  • showed a change of use of the shed after the incident, pointing to its relevance; and
  • demonstrated a pattern of non‑compliance with statutory reporting obligations, supporting an inference that the internal records concerning the incident (and any CCTV footage) were particularly important to inspect now.

Egan J rejected these as insufficient justifications for early inspection:

(a) Change of Use of the Garden Shed

  • A change in practice after an incident does not itself prove negligence or breach of duty at the time of the incident.
  • Negligence must be assessed by reference to circumstances as they stood at the time of the accident.
  • In any event, because a preservation order was made (and consented to), any current use or condition of the shed is “frozen” pending a later inspection:
    • The plaintiff will not be disadvantaged by the shed remaining under the defendant’s control in the interim.

Accordingly, the purported change of use did not justify immediate inspection.

(b) Deficiencies in Record‑Keeping

  • While the Tusla findings may be relevant to the substantive negligence claim (i.e. whether the creche generally complied with its statutory obligations),
  • They do not establish a present entitlement to inspection of records at the pre‑pleadings stage.
  • In other words, the fact that accident recording protocols were flawed may strengthen aspects of the negligence case, but does not relax the procedural threshold for pre‑action inspection.

The Tusla report was therefore of limited assistance to the inspection application.

4.4 Equality of Arms and the Role of Preservation Orders

The plaintiff argued that without inspection she would be disadvantaged, particularly given her young age and difficulty in recollecting or describing events.

Egan J acknowledged the principle that inspection is linked to ensuring equality of arms. However, she concluded that the plaintiff’s rights are currently adequately protected by the preservation orders:

  • The defendant is prohibited from altering or destroying:
    • the shed’s condition or use;
    • relevant CCTV footage; or
    • documents and notes relating to the incident.
  • The plaintiff will thus have the opportunity to inspect them at a later, more appropriate stage.

The key point is that equality of arms does not require immediate reciprocal access to all evidence at the very outset, particularly prior to pleadings; rather, it requires that the plaintiff not be placed at an irretrievable disadvantage. Preservation ensures that no such irretrievable prejudice occurs.

4.5 The Plaintiff’s Burden at the Pre‑Action Stage

The court places clear emphasis on the plaintiff’s onus in pre‑action applications:

  • Seriousness or sensitivity of allegations (such as child sexual assault) does not, of itself, justify early inspection.
  • The party seeking pre‑pleadings inspection must:
    • identify in at least general terms the alleged breaches of duty;
    • demonstrate how inspection is necessary to plead those breaches; and
    • show that the application is not a fishing expedition.

At para. 47, the court states:

“At present, however, the plaintiff has provided no information at all as to the basic ingredients of her claim that the defendant was negligent… Whilst the court could perhaps take an educated guess, the onus of proof is on the party seeking pre‑pleadings discovery and I am not satisfied that this onus has been discharged.”

This is the core procedural lesson of the case: even in sensitive child cases, the court will not infer the basis of negligence where the plaintiff has not articulated it.

4.6 Prematurity and the Adjournment Approach

Rather than dismiss the application outright, the court chooses to:

  • characterise it as premature; and
  • adjourn it with liberty to re‑enter once pleadings have closed.

This nuanced approach:

  • signals that the plaintiff’s request for inspection is not inherently unreasonable; rather, it is simply too early given the present state of the case; and
  • preserves the plaintiff’s right to re‑apply when:
    • a statement of claim has outlined the negligence allegations; and
    • a defence has clarified the issues in dispute.

This is an important practical guidance: the court is open to inspection post‑pleadings, particularly where liability is contested and the physical scene or records are central, but expects some minimal procedural discipline before entertaining such orders.

5. Complex Concepts Explained in Plain Terms

5.1 Pleadings and Closure of Pleadings

  • Pleadings are the formal written documents in which each side sets out its case:
    • The plaintiff files a statement of claim describing the facts, the alleged wrongdoing, and the relief sought.
    • The defendant files a defence admitting or denying each allegation and raising any defences.
  • Sometimes a reply or further pleadings follow.
  • Closure of pleadings means that all these initial documents have been filed, so the court and the parties know exactly what is in dispute.

Courts are typically reluctant to order invasive procedural steps such as discovery or inspection before the closure of pleadings, precisely because they do not yet know the precise issues.

5.2 Discovery vs Inspection

Two distinct but related procedures:

  • Discovery:
    • The process by which each party must list (in an affidavit of discovery) documents that are relevant and not privileged.
    • Once listed, the other side can usually inspect and take copies.
    • Parties can claim privilege over certain documents (e.g. legal advice), which the court may review and adjudicate upon.
  • Inspection (under Order 50 r 4):
    • Focused on “property or things” relevant to the case — often physical premises, machinery, or objects.
    • The court can authorise a party or its expert to visit and inspect the property to obtain evidence.
    • It does not usually proceed via an affidavit of discovery or privilege claims, though there may be overlap when the “property” is a document or digital record.

In M v T, this distinction is particularly important for CCTV and internal records: the court hints that these may be more appropriately obtained by discovery rather than inspection, because the plaintiff seeks their informational content rather than their physical characteristics.

5.3 “Fishing Expedition”

A fishing expedition is a term used when a party seeks wide‑ranging access to documents or evidence not because they know such material is relevant, but in the hope of finding something helpful by chance.

Courts disapprove of fishing expeditions because:

  • they impose unnecessary burdens and costs on the other party; and
  • they undermine the requirement that requests for evidence be tightly linked to defined issues in the case.

The insistence that the nature of the plaintiff’s claim be made clear before granting pre‑pleadings inspection or discovery is part of the effort to avoid fishing.

5.4 Equality of Arms

The principle of equality of arms is rooted in fair trial rights. It means that:

  • each party should have a reasonable opportunity to present their case under conditions that do not place them at a substantial disadvantage compared with their opponent;
  • one party should not control crucial evidence in a way that prevents the other from putting forward their case effectively.

Inspection (and discovery) serve this principle by giving a party access to evidence held by the other side. In M v T, the court considers that preserving the evidence — even without immediate inspection — is sufficient at this stage to maintain equality of arms, because:

  • the evidence will still be available for inspection later; and
  • no irreversible prejudice will occur in the meantime.

5.5 “Bona Fide” and “Required for the Fair and Just Disposition”

Under s.12 of the PIAB Act, a party seeking pre‑action orders must swear that:

  • the application is bona fide — that is, made in good faith, for a legitimate purpose, not to harass or gain an unfair tactical advantage; and
  • the order is required for the fair and just disposition of the intended proceedings.

This high language (“required”) is an indication that such orders should not be routine, but should only be made where truly necessary for fairness — a theme that runs throughout Egan J’s reasoning.

6. Impact and Significance

6.1 Procedural Significance for Personal Injuries Litigation

The judgment has clear practical implications for personal injuries practitioners, particularly where:

  • PIAB authorisation has not yet been obtained; and
  • the plaintiff seeks early access to physical premises, CCTV, or internal documentation.

The core message is that s.12 does not loosen the general discipline surrounding discovery and inspection:

  • The court will still expect that the nature of the claim be articulated before intrusive orders are made.
  • Pre‑pleadings and pre‑action inspection will remain exceptional or at least unusual.

Practically, plaintiffs should:

  • use the information already available (client’s recollection, medical reports, complaints to regulators) to formulate a provisional but coherent negligence case;
  • seek preservation orders where there is a real risk of spoliation; and
  • defer applications for inspection until at least a statement of claim has been drafted and served (and ideally until a defence is filed).

6.2 Child Protection and Institutional Liability Context

The factual background — an alleged sexual assault of a young child in a creche — is highly sensitive. Yet the judgment emphasises that:

  • The court’s procedural standards do not vary because the allegations are grave or emotionally charged.
  • The plaintiff must still:
    • articulate the alleged breaches of standards of care; and
    • respect the phased structure of litigation, including pleadings before inspection.

However, the court’s granting of robust reporting restrictions under s.27 demonstrates a parallel concern for:

  • protecting vulnerable child litigants; and
  • minimising the psychological harm that could result from identifying them as victims of sexual assault with psychiatric sequelae.

Thus, the case balances a disciplined approach to procedure with a protective approach to privacy.

6.3 Clarification of the Preservation–Inspection Distinction

One of the most useful aspects of the judgment is its implicit articulation of a two‑tier approach:

  1. Preservation:
    • Relatively easy to obtain, especially under s.12.
    • Key tool for preventing destruction or alteration of evidence.
    • More readily granted at the pre‑action stage, even where pleadings have not been drafted.
  2. Inspection:
    • More intrusive; engages property and confidentiality rights.
    • Not generally available until issues have crystallised through pleadings.
    • Available pre‑pleadings only when the plaintiff:
      • has clearly defined the nature of the claim; and
      • can show inspection is truly necessary to plead the case.

M v T will likely be cited for the proposition that ordering inspection at too early a stage is premature and inappropriate where preservation already protects the plaintiff’s interests.

6.4 Future Litigation on CCTV and Documentary Evidence

The obiter comments referencing Re Saxton and Huddleston highlight an area ripe for further clarification:

  • Are CCTV footage and internal incident reports properly the subject of Order 50 r 4 inspection?
  • Or should they be sought only through discovery?

Egan J suggests that:

  • if the plaintiff seeks them for their informational content, that leans towards discovery;
  • but stops short of deciding the point.

Future cases may build on this, potentially drawing a firmer line between:

  • inspection of physical scenes (premises, equipment, etc.); and
  • disclosure of recorded information (CCTV, digital logs, written reports).

6.5 Open Justice and Anonymity

The case also reinforces the modern understanding of open justice:

  • While courts must generally administer justice in public,
  • Statutory exceptions (like s.27 of the 2008 Act) allow for targeted reporting restrictions to protect vulnerable parties, especially child victims of sexual assault with associated psychiatric injury.

By publishing a detailed, anonymised judgment while restricting identification, the court shows how open justice can be reconciled with privacy and dignity for child plaintiffs.

7. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

M v T [2025] IEHC 623 is a carefully reasoned decision that:

  • Reaffirms that, even under s.12 of the PIAB Act, pre‑action and pre‑pleadings orders for inspection will only be granted sparingly.
  • Clarifies the distinct roles of preservation (to safeguard evidence) and inspection (to access and analyse it), and the different thresholds governing each.
  • Confirms that serious, sensitive allegations (such as a child sexual assault) do not displace the requirement that a plaintiff must articulate the basis of alleged negligence before obtaining invasive procedural orders.
  • Emphasises that relevance and necessity for inspection cannot be assessed until the matters in issue have crystallised through pleadings — at least to a basic level.
  • Signals that Tusla regulatory findings, while potentially significant for the substantive negligence case, are not by themselves a gateway to early inspection of private premises or records.
  • Protects the plaintiff’s position by:
    • granting robust preservation orders to prevent loss of evidence; and
    • adjourning (rather than dismissing) the inspection application with liberty to re‑enter post‑pleadings.
  • Reinforces the careful use of s.27 reporting restrictions to protect child plaintiffs with psychiatric injury, in a way consistent with open justice.

From a doctrinal perspective, the case consolidates and applies the principles in James Elliott, SoftCo and Ballymore in a pre‑PIAB, pre‑pleadings context, offering a clear roadmap for future applications under s.12 of the 2003 Act. Practitioners should regard it as a prominent authority on the threshold for pre‑action inspection and the structured sequence of:

  1. setting out the basic nature of the claim;
  2. seeking preservation where necessary;
  3. awaiting closure of pleadings; and then, if justified,
  4. seeking inspection (and/or discovery) with a fully articulated basis in the defined issues between the parties.

In that sense, M v T is likely to become a key reference point in Irish civil procedure on the interface between PIAB, pre‑action measures, and the constitutional right of access to the courts.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: High Court of Ireland

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