Clarifying the Limits of Extended Sentences for Historical Child-Offenders: The Significance of R v Maunders [2025] EWCA Crim 579

1. Introduction

R v Maunders concerned an appeal against sentence in which the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) was asked to correct two fundamental errors in the sentencing of a defendant convicted in 2021 of non-recent sexual offences committed when he himself was a child. The parties agreed that:

an extended determinate sentence had been unlawfully imposed for an offence (buggery) that is not a “specified offence” under Schedule 18 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (“SA 2020”); and
terms imposed for indecent assault exceeded the maximum that could lawfully have been passed on a 14- or 15-year-old offender at the material time.

The Court (Cheema-Grubb J) granted leave out of time, quashed the unlawful elements, and substituted a determinate sentence totalling 7 years 6 months. Beyond correcting the instant sentence, the judgment crystallises two important principles:

An extended sentence cannot be attached to an historical offence unless that offence appears in Part 2 of Schedule 18 SA 2020, even where the facts would today be charged as a more serious sexual crime such as rape of a child.
When sentencing an adult for offences he committed as a child, the court should start with the maximum (and typical) sentence available at the time of the offending for a child of that age, and depart upwards only if there is “good reason” (R v Ahmed applied).

2. Summary of the Judgment

The appellant was 14–15 when he committed nine offences of indecent assault and buggery against an eight-year-old (C1) and 13 when he committed one offence of buggery against another boy (C2). Decades later, aged 47, he was convicted after trial and received:

Sentences of 5 years (counts 1, 3, 4), 2 years (counts 5, 6) for indecent assault;
7½ years (counts 7, 8) and an extended sentence of 15 years (custody 7½ + extension 7½) on count 9 for buggery; and
No separate penalty on count 10 (buggery of C2).

During later proceedings it was spotted that count 9 (buggery) was not a Schedule 18 offence, so an extended sentence was impermissible. On appeal the Court:

Quashed the extended sentence and substituted a determinate 7 years 6 months on each buggery count (concurrent).
Reduced each indecent-assault count to 4 months’ detention (the maximum for a 14-year-old at the time), to run concurrently with buggery counts but consecutively to each other (thereby not altering overall length).
Imposed 7 years 6 months on count 10 instead of “no separate penalty”.

The total term is now 7 years 6 months—reflecting gravity yet conforming to the statutory framework. The finding of “dangerousness” was untouched because the illegality lay not in that finding but in the mechanism (extended sentence) used.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

R v Forbes [2016] EWCA Crim 1388 – then-leading authority on sentencing historic child sexual offences; its sentencing tables were used (imperfectly) at first instance.
R v Pinnell (2010) – prohibits constructing a notional 4-year “appropriate custodial term” by adding consecutive sentences in order to satisfy the 4-year condition for extended sentences.
R v Camara [2022] EWCA Crim – reaffirmed Pinnell on aggregation and concurrency.
R v Ahmed [2023] EWCA Crim 281 – comprehensive guidance on sentencing adults for offences committed as children; crucial paragraphs 6.1–6.3 (Sentencing Council’s Children & Young People Guideline) applied.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Unlawful Extended Sentence on Count 9

Under ss 266–280 SA 2020 an extended sentence is available only where:

The index offence is “specified” in Schedule 18;
The offender is 21+ at conviction;
Dangerousness (significant risk of serious harm) is found; and
EITHER (i) the offender had a previous Schedule 14 conviction when the new offence was committed (“earlier-offence condition”), OR (ii) the court would otherwise impose at least a 4-year custodial term (“4-year condition”).

Buggery under s 12 Sexual Offences Act 1956 does not appear in Schedule 18. As statutory wording is exhaustive, the extended sentence was ultra vires. No “reading-in” is permissible: Parliament has not listed buggery even though modern equivalents (rape/assault by penetration) are included.

(b) Could an Extended Sentence Be Re-Attached to Indecent Assault Counts?

Indecent assault is a Schedule 18 offence, but the other gateway—“earlier-offence” or “4-year” condition—was not met:

The appellant had no prior Schedule 14 convictions at the time of the 1987–88 offending (first such convictions occurred in 2006).
The maximum sentence then available for a 14-year-old was 4 or 12 months’ detention. The Court cannot manufacture a ≥4-year custodial term by stacking consecutive sentences (Pinnell).

Therefore, an extended sentence was impossible on any count.

(c) Exceeding the Child-Offender Maximum

Section 59(1) SA 2020 directs judges to the Sentencing Council’s Children & Young People Guideline. Paras 6.1–6.3 (quoted in full at [21]) state that when an offence committed by a child is sentenced after the child has become an adult, the starting point is the sentence that would have been imposed when the offence was committed; exceeding the historical maximum is “rare” and requires “good reason”.

The trial judge assumed contemporary adult maxima (10 years) and halved them for youth. The Court of Appeal held that approach impermissibly ignored the statutory ceiling of 4 months (age 14) or 12 months (age 15). No “good reason” was advanced to breach that ceiling; therefore the sentences were quashed and replaced by the historical maxima.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Checklist for Historical Sentences. Sentencers must systematically verify:
- whether the offence is in Schedule 18;
- whether one of the two gateway conditions is satisfied on lawful figures (no stacking);
- the correct historical maxima for a defendant’s age at the time.
Re-emphasis on Youth Maxima. Practitioners can expect greater scrutiny where the offender was under 18. The default position is the historical maximum; departures require explicit, well-reasoned justification.
Potential Cascade of Appeals. The judgment will likely prompt re-examination of other historical sexual-offence sentences—in particular, cases in which extended sentences were imposed for pre-2003 offences not on Schedule 18.
Sentencing Notes & Counsel’s Duties. The Court diplomatically acknowledged that errors “crept in” to the prosecution’s and defence’s joint note. Maunders underscores the professional duty to vet the statutory framework exhaustively before inviting a judge to impose an enhanced sentence.
Legislative Signal. Parliament may, in response, consider amending Schedule 18 to include buggery (pre-2003) to align with present-day rape offences. Until then, courts are bound by the explicit list.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Extended Sentence (Determinate). A hybrid sentence with (i) a custodial term and (ii) an “extension period” on licence. It allows monitoring beyond automatic half-way release.
Specified Offence. An offence listed in Schedule 18 SA 2020. Only these qualify for extended or life sentences under the “dangerous offender” provisions.
Dangerousness Test. Whether the court judges there is a “significant risk to members of the public of serious harm” from further specified offences.
Concurrent vs. Consecutive Sentences. Concurrent run at the same time; consecutive run back-to-back. You cannot tack consecutive sentences together to cross the 4-year threshold.
Historical Offence Sentencing. The court must not impose a sentence that was not legally possible at the time of the offence (non-retrospectivity), save in very limited circumstances.
Schedule 14 vs. Schedule 18. Schedule 14 lists offences that, if on someone’s record at the time of a new offence, trigger the “earlier-offence” gateway for extended sentences. Schedule 18 lists the offences that can themselves attract an extended sentence.

5. Conclusion

R v Maunders is less about the offender and more about the integrity of sentencing architecture. The Court of Appeal has:

Confirmed that extended determinate sentences are strictly limited to offences enumerated in Schedule 18;
Reaffirmed that historical child-offender maxima remain the primary benchmark, with upward departures requiring cogent “good reason”; and
Provided practical guidance—reinforced by Ahmed—for judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers navigating the labyrinth of historic sexual cases.

In a climate of heightened awareness of non-recent sexual abuse, Maunders ensures that punishment, deterrence and public protection are pursued within the precise confines of statutory authority. The decision will serve as a touchstone for future appeals and sentencing exercises where the chronology of offending, age of the defendant, and evolution of sexual-offence legislation intersect.