Clarifying the Boundaries of Undue Leniency in Manslaughter Sentencing

I. Introduction

The case of Kurtev, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 149) came before the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) following an application by His Majesty’s Solicitor General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The application challenged the sentence imposed by the Crown Court at Canterbury on the defendant, Mr. Rashko Kurtev, for an unlawful act manslaughter conviction arising from a violent altercation involving metal chairs that ultimately resulted in the death of Mr. McLeod.

The essential background revolves around a confrontation that took place outside a fish and chip shop in Kent, during which Mr. Kurtev used two metal chairs in quick succession to strike Mr. McLeod, causing severe head injuries. Mr. McLeod died a short time later from complications related to those injuries. Mr. Kurtev was eventually charged with murder, with an alternative count of manslaughter, but he pleaded guilty to manslaughter only on the day of trial, after the Crown indicated its willingness to accept that plea.

The key issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the sentence of three years and nine months’ imprisonment was unduly lenient given the high culpability factors in the offense, and if so, what the appropriate custodial term should be. In arriving at its decision, the Court analyzed both the nature of the offense—especially the second use of a heavy metal chair causing the fatal injury—and the late plea, ultimately establishing clearer guiding principles on how the Sentencing Council’s Manslaughter Guidelines and the Reduction for Guilty Plea Guidelines should be strictly applied.

II. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal, presided over by Lord Justice William Davis, quashed the original sentence of three years and nine months’ imprisonment, deeming it unduly lenient, and substituted a sentence of six years’ imprisonment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court made several notable findings:

• The gravity of the second, forceful blow with a metal chair—which carried a high risk of causing death or serious injury—placed culpability at the higher end of the “medium” category under the Sentencing Council’s Guideline for Unlawful Act Manslaughter.
• Although there was an initial confrontation instigated in part by Mr. McLeod’s aggression, the second blow occurred while the victim was being restrained and, thus, posed no significant threat. The Court found this was not demonstrably self-defense or defense of another, but rather an act of anger and retaliation.
• The personal mitigation of Mr. Kurtev, including limited intellectual functioning, lack of premeditation, and no criminal history, could only be afforded limited weight given the serious consequences and the high risk inherent in his actions.
• The late plea offered to manslaughter—only on the day of trial—did not merit the full one-third reduction that typically might be available for an early guilty plea. Instead, a reduction of around 10% to slightly above 10% was appropriate.

Consequently, the Court applied an eight-year starting point for the offense before mitigating factors, reduced it to seven years to reflect mitigation, then gave a reduced sentence of six years after accounting for the late guilty plea.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The primary legal framework for the Court’s analysis rested on the Sentencing Council’s Definitive Guideline for Unlawful Act Manslaughter and, in respect of the guilty plea, the Reduction for Guilty Plea Guideline. The Judgment also reaffirmed the principles in Attorney General’s Reference No. 4 of 1989 ([1990] 1 WLR 41), which provide that a sentence is unduly lenient if it falls outside the range of sentences that a judge could reasonably consider.

Although few specific case precedents are discussed in detail aside from references to earlier principles in Bertram [2003] EWCA Crim 2023—which pre-dated the current Sentencing Council guidelines—the Court emphasized that the modern guidelines must be faithfully followed. In that sense, the precedent set by this decision is that courts should carefully categorize the degree of culpability in unlawful act manslaughter cases, especially where a weapon is used in a retaliatory action, and ensure the correct approach to late pleas.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s process for determining whether the sentence was unduly lenient can be broken down into two major stages:

1. Culpability Assessment: The Court recognized that Mr. McLeod’s aggression contributed to the situation but noted that the fatal second blow was delivered at a moment when the victim was being restrained and thus posed no direct threat. This high degree of risk and retaliatory element justified placing the offense at the upper end of the “medium” culpability band within the manslaughter guidelines. The Court found it “inevitable” that the defendant should have appreciated the substantial risk of serious harm when using a heavy metal chair to strike the victim’s head.
2. Reduction for Plea: Typically, a prompt guilty plea can secure a substantial reduction. However, the Court applied paragraph F3 of the Sentencing Council’s Reduction for Guilty Plea Guideline and found that no unequivocal indication of manslaughter had been made until the day of trial. Despite the prosecution’s late readiness to accept a plea to manslaughter, the defense had numerous opportunities to indicate that plea earlier. The Court therefore allowed only around a 10% reduction instead of the 25% granted by the sentencing judge.

By applying these principles rigorously, the Court of Appeal demonstrated the importance of both the seriousness of the fatal blow in manslaughter and the timeliness (or lack thereof) of a guilty plea.

C. Impact

This Judgment underscores the Court of Appeal’s strengthened stance against unduly lenient sentences in manslaughter cases involving serious violence, particularly where a heavy or dangerous weapon is used in a retaliatory manner. The ruling will likely influence sentencing judges who encounter late pleas for manslaughter: unless there are compelling exceptions, they must follow the standard guideline and grant only minimal discounts. Moreover, when defendants deliver a fatal blow in circumstances that go beyond any legitimate self-defense, such actions are likely to be treated as a higher or upper-mid category offense within the manslaughter guidelines, thus attracting a severe penalty.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal and procedural concepts shape this Judgment:

• Unlawful Act Manslaughter: This is a form of manslaughter where the defendant commits a dangerous, unlawful act resulting in death. The key requirement is that the act must be recognized as potentially harmful or dangerous, and this does not mandate an intent to kill.
• Culpability Categories (Sentencing Council Guidelines): The guidelines categorize the defendant’s blameworthiness (culpability) into levels—such as high, medium, and low—based on factors like premeditation, use of a weapon, and the degree of harm risked. Here, the Court placed the offense at the upper end of “medium” culpability.
• Reduction for Guilty Plea: Defendants who plead guilty at the earliest reasonable opportunity can usually receive a reduction of up to one-third of the sentence. That reduction can be smaller if the plea is delayed, especially when pleaded at the door of the court on the day of trial.
• Section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Unduly Lenient Sentences): This provision allows the Attorney General or Solicitor General to refer a sentence to the Court of Appeal if it is believed to be too low. The Court then decides whether to uphold, quash, or increase the original sentence.

V. Conclusion

Kurtev, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 149) offers a clear, instructive application of the Sentencing Council’s Unlawful Act Manslaughter Guidelines and the Discount for Guilty Plea Guidelines. Even though the trial judge exercised leniency based on several mitigating features, the Court of Appeal considered that the defendant’s culpability was far higher given the circumstances of the fatal second blow. Moreover, the timing of the guilty plea did not justify a reduction beyond a minimal level.

The Court’s ruling emphasizes that sentencing must reflect both the seriousness of the offending conduct and the strict approach outlined in sentencing guidelines for manslaughter. When a life is lost as a result of deliberate and violent actions—particularly involving a weapon—the interests of justice require a sentence commensurate with the severity of the offense. Thus, this Judgment stands as a reminder that undue leniency in circumstances involving high or upper-mid culpability and late pleas to manslaughter will not be upheld on appeal.

In practical terms, the substituted sentence of six years’ imprisonment affirms the principle that courts must respond firmly where lethal force is employed with clear risk of severe harm. The commentary herein thus signals that those who cause death through retaliatory or disproportionate violence, and who fail to offer a timely admission of guilt, should expect robust sentences under the modern statutory and guideline framework.