Clarifying Interim and Permanent Homelessness Duties under the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987: Commentary on Petition by Y v Glasgow City Council [2025] CSIH 30

Clarifying Interim and Permanent Homelessness Duties under the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987: Commentary on Petition by Y v Glasgow City Council [2025] CSIH 30

1. Introduction

This Inner House decision in Y v Glasgow City Council [2025] CSIH 30 is a significant addition to Scottish homelessness jurisprudence. It sits squarely in the wake of the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Glasgow City Council v X [2025] UKSC 13 and further refines:

  • the nature of the local authority’s interim duty to accommodate under section 29 of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987;
  • the scope and timing of the permanent accommodation duty under section 31(2); and
  • the proper role of the courts in granting mandatory (enforcement) orders against local authorities in this field.

The case arises from a judicial review petition by Y, a Sudanese refugee living with a large family in Glasgow, challenging Glasgow City Council’s performance of its statutory homelessness duties. The Lord Ordinary at first instance declared that the Council had breached duties under both sections 29(1)(c) and 31(2) of the 1987 Act and, crucially, granted a mandatory order compelling the Council to provide permanent accommodation to Y by a specified date.

On reclaiming (appeal), the Second Division (Lord Justice Clerk, Lord Doherty delivering the opinion, and Lord Armstrong) substantially reversed that decision:

  • They held that the Council had been in breach of its section 29 duty only for a limited seven‑month period (March–October 2023).
  • They held that by the time of the Lord Ordinary’s decision, the Council was not in breach of its section 31(2) duty to secure permanent accommodation.
  • They indicated (obiter) a much more cautious approach to mandatory orders, favouring declarators and continued supervision over immediate coercive orders.

The decision provides important guidance on:

  • the distinction between “process” duties (under section 29) and “outcome” duties (under section 31);
  • what counts as “suitable” interim accommodation, including the use of two separate flats; and
  • how long a council may, in law, take to secure permanent housing, especially during a housing emergency and severe budgetary constraints.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Procedural Background

Y sought:

  1. Declarator that the Council had failed to comply with its section 29(1)(c) duty (interim accommodation);
  2. Declarator that it had failed to comply with its section 31(2) duty (permanent accommodation); and
  3. A mandatory order ordaining the Council to make permanent accommodation available under section 31(2).

The Lord Ordinary upheld Y’s case, finding continuous breach of section 29 since March 2023, breach of section 31, and ordering the Council to provide permanent accommodation by 28 February 2025.

The Council reclaimed. By the time the appeal was heard, Y had been offered and had accepted a five‑bedroom Scottish secure tenancy via the Affordable Housing Supply Programme on 31 January 2025. The appeal was therefore largely of public law significance rather than practical relevance to Y’s circumstances, but the court exercised its discretion to hear it in the public interest (per Ex p Salem).

2.2 Key Holdings

The Inner House held that:

  • The Anniesland flat (first‑floor, 3‑bedroom) became unsuitable as interim accommodation once Y’s mobility problems significantly worsened, rendering her largely housebound without assistance. There was therefore a breach of section 29 from 3 March 2023 (when the occupational therapy report arrived) until the first offer of alternative interim accommodation on 17 October 2023.
  • However, the offers of two‑flat interim accommodation at Lincoln Avenue and Broomhill Lane were not irrationally assessed as suitable by the Council’s officers:
    • The officers had properly taken account of the household’s needs, including disability and schooling.
    • The Judge at first instance had erred by substituting her own view of suitability and focusing on whether Y’s refusal was reasonable rather than on whether the Council’s assessment was irrational.
    • Using a living room as a dual‑use room (living room by day, bedroom by night) can satisfy the requirement of “use of a living room” in article 5(e) of the 2014 Order.
  • Consequently, the section 29 duty was breached only for 7 months (3 March – 17 October 2023); it was not in breach while the two offers stood or after 19 December 2023.
  • On section 31(2), while the court proceeded (without finally deciding) on the basis that:
    • the duty arises immediately once the statutory conditions are met, but
    • breach only occurs if the authority fails to comply within a reasonable time,
    they concluded that, in the whole circumstances (housing emergency, severe scarcity of large adapted properties, and the presence of suitable interim accommodation for most of the relevant period), a reasonable time had not yet elapsed. There was therefore no breach of section 31(2) at the time of the Lord Ordinary’s decision.
  • Strictly, the issue of a mandatory order did not arise once no breach of section 31 was found. However, the court indicated that even if there had been a breach:
    • They would not have granted a mandatory order at that stage.
    • They would instead have granted a declarator and continued the case briefly to give the Council time to comply, resorting to a mandatory order only if non‑compliance persisted.
    • They expressed concern about using mandatory orders in a way that could improperly “take over” the local authority’s statutory functions and expose it to contempt proceedings inappropriately.
  • Accordingly, the court:
    • Allowed the reclaiming motion,
    • Recalled the interlocutor of 9 January 2025,
    • Refused the petition, while noting the Council’s admitted seven‑month breach of section 29 required no formal declarator.

3. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

3.1 Section 29: Interim Duty to Accommodate

Section 29(1) of the 1987 Act requires a local authority which has reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless to “secure that accommodation is made available for his occupation” pending final determination of the application. Under section 29(1)(c), where the section 31 duty arises, interim accommodation must be provided “until such accommodation becomes available”.

Crucially, under section 29(3) and (4), Scottish Ministers may, by order, exclude certain categories of accommodation from counting as “accommodation” for this purpose. The operative instrument is the Homeless Persons (Unsuitable Accommodation) (Scotland) Order 2014 (the “2014 Order”).

3.2 The 2014 Unsuitable Accommodation Order

The 2014 Order (as amended) defines when interim accommodation is automatically “unsuitable”. Key provisions include:

  • Article 4: accommodation is in all circumstances unsuitable if it is:
    • not wind and watertight;
    • not suitable for occupation by a homeless household, taking into account the needs of the household; or
    • does not meet minimum accommodation safety standards (including fire, health and safety, hygiene, furniture and electrical standards).
  • Article 5: unless exceptions in Article 6 apply, accommodation is also unsuitable if, among other things, it:
    • is not reasonably accessible to health and education facilities for the household (article 5(b));
    • lacks adequate and accessible toilets and washing facilities for the exclusive use of the household (article 5(c));
    • lacks adequate and accessible bedrooms (article 5(d)); or
    • is accommodation “within which the household does not have the use of adequate and accessible cooking facilities and the use of a living room” (article 5(e)).
  • Article 6(b): Article 5 is disapplied if the applicant has been offered accommodation that does meet Article 5 but the applicant wishes to be accommodated elsewhere.

The Order therefore both tightens and structures the section 29 duty: certain minimum standards are non‑negotiable.

3.3 Section 31: Duties to Persons Found to Be Homeless

Section 31(1) applies where a local authority is satisfied that an applicant is homeless. Under section 31(2), where the authority is not satisfied that the applicant became homeless intentionally, it must:

“secure that permanent accommodation becomes available for his occupation.”

“Permanent accommodation” is defined in section 31(5) and includes:

  • Scottish secure tenancies;
  • certain short Scottish secure tenancies (where appropriate Schedule 6 conditions are met); and
  • private residential tenancies under the Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016.

Section 29(1)(c) expressly contemplates that applicants will in many cases spend a period in interim accommodation before permanent accommodation is secured.

4. Precedents and Authorities Cited

4.1 Glasgow City Council v X [2025] UKSC 13

This UK Supreme Court decision is the central interpretive backdrop. Lady Simler JSC drew a critical distinction between:

  • Section 29 duty + Article 4(b) of the 2014 Order: here the authority must “take account of” the needs of the household when deciding whether accommodation is suitable.
  • Section 31(2) duty: this is a results or outcome-driven duty — the authority must meet those needs by securing suitable permanent accommodation.

The Supreme Court characterised section 29 as imposing a “process duty”: the authority must conscientiously consider all needs, but is not required to meet all of them in interim accommodation. Section 31, by contrast, imposes a duty ultimately to provide accommodation that does meet those needs as permanent accommodation.

Importantly, Lady Simler also held that:

  • The standard of review of a local authority’s assessment of “suitability” under section 29 is rationality — the court must not simply substitute its own view.
  • Temporary accommodation by its nature may be less than ideal and need not meet every need that permanent accommodation should.
  • A living room can, for the purposes of article 5(e), be a room that is used as a living room by day and a bedroom by night.

This framework is explicitly applied by the Inner House in Y’s case (see especially paras [43]–[46], [49]–[50]).

4.2 Sharif v Camden LBC [2013] UKSC 10

Sharif concerned whether the duty to provide accommodation to a household could, in principle, be satisfied by offering two separate dwelling units. The Supreme Court held that:

  • There is no absolute requirement that the whole household be accommodated in a single dwelling, but
  • The accommodation offered must allow the family to “live together in a practical sense as a family unit”.

The Inner House relies on this concept when assessing whether two flats (e.g. on the 14th and 19th floors, or on the 10th and 11th floors) could amount to suitable interim accommodation.

4.3 English Homelessness Cases

Although the legislation differs, the court engages with leading English homelessness authorities on timing and breach of homelessness duties:

  • R (Aweys) v Birmingham City Council [2009] UKHL 36:
    • Concerned section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 (the main homelessness duty in England).
    • Lord Hope and Baroness Hale emphasised that practical realities, including housing shortage and resource constraints, are relevant to assessing compliance.
    • Aweys was cited by the Lord Ordinary and Inner House in considering what is a “reasonable time” for performance of section 31(2).
  • R (Elkundi) v Birmingham City Council [2022] EWCA Civ 601:
    • Clarified that the section 193(2) duty in England arises immediately, but breach usually requires a failure to comply within a reasonable time.
    • Lewis LJ’s approach (at para 77) is adopted by analogy in the submissions and cautiously considered by the Inner House.
  • R (Imam) v Croydon LBC [2023] UKSC 45:
    • Now the leading UK authority on judicial remedies for breach of homelessness duties.
    • Lord Sales JSC stresses that mandatory orders can be appropriate but must be exercised with constitutional restraint and awareness of other statutory functions and competing claims.
    • Imam is central to the Inner House’s discussion of how, even if section 31(2) had been breached, the court should respond.
  • R (Brooks) v Islington LBC [2016] PTSR 389:
    • Held that a local authority can discharge its duty by offering suitable accommodation, even if the applicant reasonably refuses it.
    • Cited by the Inner House in concluding that the Council discharged section 29 by making suitable offers, notwithstanding Y’s refusal.

4.4 Scottish Public Law and Constitutional Remedies

  • R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Salem [1999] 1 AC 450:
    • Authority for hearing public law appeals that are “academically” moot for the parties but raise issues of general public importance.
    • Relied on at [42] to justify deciding the reclaiming motion despite Y having already been housed.
  • Craig v HM Advocate [2022] UKSC 6:
    • Emphasises that public authorities are generally presumed to respond appropriately to declarators of illegality.
    • Used to support the view that a declarator of breach (rather than a mandatory order) would ordinarily suffice, absent a history of non‑compliance.

5. Detailed Legal Analysis

5.1 The Court’s Approach to Section 29: Interim Accommodation

5.1.1 Section 29 as a “Process Duty”

Relying heavily on Glasgow City Council v X, the Inner House reiterates that section 29 (read with article 4(b)) imposes a duty to take all needs into account in assessing suitability, but it does not guarantee that all needs will be met during the interim period:

  • Section 29 accommodation is a staging post towards permanent accommodation, not the end state.
  • By its nature, interim accommodation may be less appropriate than that ultimately required under section 31.
  • The court’s role is supervisory: it examines whether the assessment of suitability was irrational, not whether the judge herself would have deemed it suitable.

This sharply contrasts with section 31, where the authority must eventually provide permanent accommodation that does meet the household’s needs (an outcome duty).

5.1.2 When Did the Anniesland Flat Become Unsuitable?

The Council accepted, and the court agreed, that by 3 March 2023 the first‑floor Anniesland flat had become unsuitable as interim accommodation because:

  • Y’s mobility had deteriorated severely;
  • She could no longer safely manage the 16 stairs and was largely housebound without assistance;
  • Her ability to live independently and access the outside world was seriously compromised.

The Lord Ordinary had suggested additional reasons for unsuitability (e.g. inadequate toilets or inability to use necessary equipment). The Inner House found these unsupported on the evidence. The flat had:

  • a bathroom with bath, sink and toilet where equipment had been installed; and
  • a separate shower room.

The occupational therapy reports suggested difficulties using the equipment, but not utter inability to use it. The Council were therefore not obliged to treat the bathroom facilities as non‑compliant with article 5(c), and it would have been open to them (and to the court) to consider the flat suitable on that “bathroom” ground alone. The breach arose principally because of the stairs and Y’s resulting isolation.

5.1.3 The Central Error of the Lord Ordinary: Focus on Applicant’s Refusal, Not the Council’s Assessment

A key legal point is the court’s criticism of the Lord Ordinary’s approach to the two offers of alternative interim accommodation. The Lord Ordinary asked essentially:

“Was Y’s refusal of these offers reasonable?”

The Inner House emphasises that this is the wrong question. The correct legal question, under section 29 and article 4(b), is:

“Was the Council’s assessment that the accommodation was suitable irrational, given the information it had and the need to take account of all household needs?”

A refusal may be personally reasonable from the applicant’s perspective, yet the authority’s decision that the accommodation is suitable may still be fully within the bounds of rationality. The Lord Ordinary:

  • did not adequately engage with the housing officers’ affidavits setting out their reasoning;
  • substituted her own assessment of factual suitability for that of the officers; and
  • confused the question of the applicant’s reasons for refusal with the question of the authority’s compliance with its statutory duty.

This misdirection justified appellate intervention and is of great practical importance: it marks clear limits on the intensity of substantive review in homelessness judicial review.

5.1.4 Two‑Flat Accommodation and the “Practical Family Life” Test

Applying Sharif, the Inner House accepts that:

  • The section 29 duty can, in principle, be discharged by providing two separate flats for a single household.
  • The key is whether the arrangement allows the household to “live together as a family in a practical sense”.

In both Lincoln Avenue and Broomhill Lane, the Council sought to use two 2‑bedroom flats to house a large family. The primary criticisms at first instance were that:

  • Y could not access one of the flats (particularly relevant at Lincoln Avenue, where one flat was only reachable via stairs between the 18th and 19th floors);
  • the girls would again be cramped together; and
  • there might be fire safety concerns and lengthy journeys to school.

The Inner House’s response is nuanced:

  • At Lincoln Avenue:
    • All family members other than Y could without difficulty travel by lift to the 18th floor and then use the stairs to the 19th.
    • Family life could therefore practically be conducted by having Y, her husband and the girls based in the 14th‑floor flat, with the boys living in the 19th‑floor flat but able to visit freely, and vice versa.
    • The court was not persuaded it was irrational to regard Y’s personal inability to access the boys’ flat as fatal, particularly given the absence of clear evidence that she had to personally monitor O’s diabetic alarms.
  • At Broomhill Lane:
    • The flats were only one floor apart (10th and 11th floors).
    • Both were accessible by lift; Y did not need to use stairs at all.
    • Other family members could easily use the stairs between floors.
    • The case that this did not allow the family to live together “in a practical sense” was considered particularly weak.

Accordingly, the court held that in both instances the officers could rationally conclude that the arrangements permitted practical family unity, especially given that these were interim, not permanent, solutions.

5.1.5 Article 5(e): “Use of a Living Room” and Dual‑Use Rooms

The Lord Ordinary held that having to use all three rooms in a two‑bedroom flat as bedrooms meant that there was “no living room”, thereby infringing article 5(e) of the 2014 Order.

The Inner House expressly rejects this interpretation, aligning with Glasgow City Council v X:

  • A room can serve as a living room by day and as a bedroom by night.
  • Where such dual use is adopted, the household can be said to “have the use of a living room”.
  • In this case, using:
    • 3 rooms as bedrooms and 1 as a living room (plus a dual‑use room); or
    • 2 living rooms in two separate flats,
    provided more living space than the Anniesland flat.

This clarification is important for local authorities managing space in scarce, high‑demand urban housing markets: the law does not demand an exclusively designated living room in interim accommodation, only that the household has effective use of such a space.

5.1.6 Fire Safety and School Distance

At Broomhill Lane the Lord Ordinary relied on:

  • “potential risks in the event of fire”; and
  • the increased walking distance and travel complexity to the youngest child’s school.

The Inner House treats these as for finding the Council’s decision irrational:

  • The fire risk argument:
    • was not pleaded in the petition;
    • was raised only in a later affidavit; and
    • directly contradicted the evidence that the accommodation met minimum safety standards (including fire safety) as per article 4(c).
  • The school distance point:
    • accepted that Anniesland was closer, but
    • did not establish that schools were not reasonably accessible from Broomhill Lane, including via public transport, as article 5(b) requires.

The court stresses that suitability under section 29 must be assessed with practicality and legislative standards in mind, not with an expectation of optimal conditions in every respect.

5.1.7 Result: Narrowing the Section 29 Breach

Drawing all this together, the court concludes that:

  • The Council was in breach of section 29 only between 3 March 2023 (when they were aware, via the first OT report, that Anniesland was unsuitable) and 17 October 2023 (when they offered Lincoln Avenue).
  • By then offering Lincoln Avenue, and later Broomhill Lane, they discharged their interim duty despite Y’s decision to decline those offers (per Brooks).

5.2 The Section 31 Duty: Permanent Accommodation and “Reasonable Time”

5.2.1 Immediate Duty, Reasonable Time for Performance

Both parties and the Lord Ordinary proceeded on the basis that:

  • The duty under section 31(2) arises immediately once:
    • the applicant is found homeless; and
    • the authority is not satisfied that the homelessness is intentional.
  • However, the authority is not in breach of that duty unless it fails to comply within a reasonable time.

The Inner House does not finally decide the doctrinal question of whether this is the correct construction but proceeds on that assumption (reserving its position). It notes that:

  • Section 29(1)(c) itself contemplates a period of interim accommodation until permanent accommodation is available.
  • It would be artificial and practically impossible to treat a council as automatically in breach the very instant the section 31 duty arises.

This approach harmonises with the English jurisprudence in Elkundi and Imam, while recognising structural differences between the Scottish and English statutory schemes.

5.2.2 Distinguishing Section 31(2) from Section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996

The court is careful to underline that section 31(2) of the 1987 Act and section 193(2) of the 1996 Act are not equivalent:

  • Section 193(2) (England) imposes a duty to “secure that accommodation is available”, which may itself be temporary or transitional. It is described as another “staging post” on the way to permanent accommodation.
  • Section 31(2) (Scotland) requires the authority to secure that “permanent accommodation” becomes available.
  • The English scheme also has an initial section 189B duty (56‑day relief duty) before section 193(2) engages.

As a result:

  • The time reasonably required to secure permanent accommodation under section 31 may be longer than that required to comply with section 193(2), which does not itself demand permanent housing.
  • Judicial observations that the reasonable time under section 193(2) is typically “short” (Imam, para 38) cannot be imported wholesale to section 31(2) without caution.

This is a key doctrinal point: Scotland cannot simply mirror the English “short reasonable time” standard for permanent rehousing. The bar for establishing breach of section 31(2) may, in some circumstances, be appreciably higher.

5.2.3 Relevant Factors in Assessing “Reasonable Time”

The court confirms that whether a local authority has failed to comply with section 31(2) within a reasonable time depends on all the circumstances, including:

  • whether suitable interim accommodation has been provided under section 29;
  • the scarcity of permanent accommodation that meets the household’s specific needs (e.g. a large, accessible, ground‑floor property);
  • competing demands, including other households:
    • with similar or greater needs, and
    • who have been waiting longer;
  • the severity of the housing emergency or local housing market conditions; and
  • budgetary and resource constraints, in the sense recognised by higher courts (not as a reason to ignore the duty, but as context to what is practically reasonable).

5.2.4 Application to Y’s Case

On the facts:

  • Y was accepted as homeless and not intentionally homeless in September 2019. At her request, progress was paused pending arrival of her family (September 2020).
  • Her household is large (seven or eight persons) and has particular disability‑related requirements (Y’s mobility, O’s diabetes); effectively it needs a large, largely accessible, family‑sized home.
  • Such properties are extremely scarce in Glasgow; Mr Howe’s affidavit evidenced very low turnover of large properties and long waiting lists with many households having waited longer than Y.
  • The Council does not own its own stock and relies heavily on RSLs and limited private sector options.
  • Glasgow had declared a housing emergency, further burdened by an influx of asylum‑related homelessness cases and shrinking development budgets.

The Inner House emphasises that this was not a case of the Council “sitting on its hands”. Rather:

  • The Council was:
    • actively managing allocations from RSLs;
    • pressing RSLs to devote high percentages of lets to homeless households;
    • operating acquisition and incentive schemes (AHSP, transfer incentive); and
    • deploying strategic housing planning measures.
  • Given the extreme scarcity of exactly the sort of property Y needed (large, accessible, family property), it was inevitable there would be a significant delay before such permanent accommodation could be found.

Critically, once the mistake about section 29 is corrected, the period during which Y was in unsuitable interim accommodation is reduced to seven months. Before and after that:

  • she had either suitable interim accommodation or offers of such accommodation; and
  • the Council’s section 29 duty was being discharged.

On that basis, the court concludes that, by the date of the Lord Ordinary’s decision, the Council’s delay in providing permanent accommodation had not yet exceeded a reasonable time in the statutory and factual context. There was therefore no breach of section 31(2).

5.2.5 The Time Factor: Not Necessarily a “Short” Period in Scotland

The judgment implicitly suggests that:

  • In some Scottish cases, particularly those involving complex needs and large families, the “reasonable time” to secure permanent accommodation may be:
    • measured in years rather than months; and
    • longer than that contemplated in the English section 193 context.
  • This is not carte blanche for indefinite delay, but it recognises that permanent rehousing under section 31 is a materially more challenging obligation than securing temporary accommodation under section 193(2).

5.3 Judicial Remedies: Declarator, Mandatory Orders, and Constitutional Limits

5.3.1 The Lord Ordinary’s Mandatory Order

Having found a breach of section 31(2), the Lord Ordinary:

  • granted a declarator of breach; and
  • made a mandatory order ordaining the Council to provide permanent accommodation by a fixed deadline (28 February 2025).

She relied on Imam and reasoned that once breach is established:

  • the onus lies on the authority to show why a mandatory order should not be granted; and
  • the authority must demonstrate it has taken “all reasonable steps” to discharge the duty.

She was not persuaded that:

  • the Council’s recourse to general reserves was unavailable; or
  • the Council’s allocation rules necessarily prevented exercising discretion to prioritise Y ahead of others on the list.

5.3.2 The Inner House’s Alternative Vision

The Inner House ultimately did not need to decide the correctness of a mandatory order, since it found no section 31 breach. However, it set out how it would have exercised its discretion if breach had been established:

  • They would not have granted a mandatory order at that stage.
  • They would have instead:
    • issued a declarator of breach;
    • continued the case for a short period (2–3 months) to allow the Council to comply; and
    • only revisited a mandatory order if there were ongoing or imminent non‑compliance.

The key reasons include:

  • Respect for constitutional roles:
    • Local authorities are the democratically accountable bodies charged by Parliament with allocating scarce housing resources.
    • The court should be slow to step into the role of primary decision‑maker by dictating specific allocations or spending choices.
  • Financial constraints and general reserves:
    • Ms Hogg’s affidavit made clear that:
      • the IJB’s reserves (0.5%) were already below accepted prudential levels;
      • the homelessness budget was overspent; and
      • major risks (e.g. an £18m overspend) were looming.
    • Using general reserves to fund an individual case could be fiscally irresponsible and undermine the IJB’s financial resilience.
    • The Lord Ordinary’s view that it had not been explained why reserves could not be used is treated as incorrect on the evidence.
  • Fairness to other applicants:
    • A mandatory order risks giving the litigant an artificial priority over others with similar or greater needs who have been waiting longer.
    • This was one of the dangers flagged by Lord Sales in Imam and is echoed here.
  • Contempt and coercion:
    • Mandatory orders, if not complied with, raise the spectre of contempt of court and potential sanctions against the authority or its officers.
    • Such measures must be reserved for clear, sustained, and unjustified non‑compliance, not deployed at the first sign of breach.
  • Presumption of good faith compliance:
    • Following Craig v HM Advocate, the court emphasises it is generally entitled to presume public authorities will act in good faith and comply with declarators of illegality.
    • There was no evidence of Glasgow routinely ignoring court decisions in homelessness matters.

The implicit message is that mandatory orders in homelessness cases are exceptional remedies, justified only where:

  • softer tools (such as declarators and case management) have failed; or
  • there is strong evidence of systemic or persistent disregard for legal duties.

6. Impact and Significance

6.1 For Local Authorities

The decision is, in large measure, reassuring to local authorities grappling with severe housing pressures:

  • It confirms that interim accommodation need not be perfect; what matters is a rational, documented assessment that all needs have been considered and that the offer is suitable as a temporary measure.
  • It endorses the use of two‑flat solutions for large families where necessary, provided the “practical family life” test is satisfied.
  • It clarifies that dual‑use living/bedroom spaces can satisfy article 5(e).
  • It acknowledges that, especially in a housing emergency, the “reasonable time” to secure permanent accommodation for complex or large households may be lengthy, particularly where interim accommodation is being provided.
  • It limits the ready availability of mandatory orders and suggests courts will usually start with declarators and monitoring rather than immediate coercion.

However, it also underscores:

  • the need for prompt reaction when interim accommodation becomes unsuitable (as with the seven‑month uncovered breach); and
  • the importance of careful record‑keeping and reasoned decisions by officers, whose affidavits can be decisive in defending challenges.

6.2 For Homeless Applicants and Advisers

For applicants and their representatives, the decision draws some hard lines:

  • To challenge interim accommodation, it is necessary to:
    • identify specific breaches of the 2014 Order and/or
    • demonstrate that the Council’s assessment of suitability was irrational, not just that the accommodation is far from ideal.
  • Arguments that focus on the reasonableness of the applicant’s refusal will not, by themselves, show a breach of section 29.
  • Health and disability‑related concerns must be clearly evidenced and, ideally, notified to the council in real time; late‑emerging concerns (e.g. fire safety) that contradict other evidence are less likely to carry weight.
  • Establishing a breach of section 31(2) will often require:
    • showing that a substantial period has passed;
    • that interim accommodation has been unsuitable or borderline for a long time; and
    • that the authority has failed to take reasonable steps to use the mechanisms and resources available to it.
  • Even where a breach is established, the primary remedy is likely to be a declarator, not an immediate mandatory order compelling allocation of a specific property.

6.3 For the Development of Scottish Homelessness Law

Doctrinally, the decision:

  • integrates and applies Glasgow City Council v X’s process/outcome distinction in a complex factual setting;
  • clarifies that English jurisprudence under the Housing Act 1996 is persuasive but not determinative, especially due to differences between section 31(2) and section 193(2);
  • gives clear content to the rationality standard in suitability decisions; and
  • articulates a more structured, staged approach to judicial remedies in homelessness cases in Scotland, consistent with Imam and Craig.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

7.1 “Process Duty” vs “Outcome Duty”

  • Process duty (section 29 + 2014 Order):
    • The Council must think about and consider all of the household’s needs when choosing interim accommodation.
    • They do not have to fully meet every need at this stage; some needs may go unmet temporarily.
  • Outcome duty (section 31(2)):
    • At the end of the process, the Council must secure that permanent accommodation is available which does meet the needs of the household.
    • This is the final goal, not a temporary holding position.

7.2 Rationality and Judicial Review

In this context, “rationality” means:

  • The decision must be based on the right legal test; and
  • It must be within the range of decisions that a reasonable decision‑maker could reach, given the evidence.

The court does not ask, “Would I have made the same decision?”. Instead it asks, “Is this decision so unreasonable that no reasonable council could have made it?”.

7.3 Reasonable Time

A “reasonable time” to comply with a duty such as section 31(2) depends on:

  • the nature of the duty (here, providing permanent housing);
  • the complexity of the household’s needs;
  • the current availability and scarcity of suitable properties; and
  • whether acceptable interim accommodation is already being provided.

There is no fixed ceiling (e.g. 6 months or 12 months) written into the statute. It is a case‑by‑case assessment.

7.4 Declarator vs Mandatory Order

  • Declarator:
    • A formal declaration by the court that the authority has acted unlawfully or is in breach of a duty.
    • Relies on the authority to respond appropriately and put matters right.
    • Usually the starting point in public law remedies.
  • Mandatory order:
    • A command from the court requiring the authority to do something specific, such as provide accommodation by a certain date.
    • Non‑compliance can amount to contempt of court, with serious legal consequences.
    • Used sparingly, especially where they might interfere with wider statutory functions and allocation decisions affecting many people.

7.5 The 2014 Unsuitable Accommodation Order: Article 5(e)

Article 5(e) says accommodation is unsuitable if the household lacks:

“the use of adequate and accessible cooking facilities and the use of a living room.”

Key points from this and related case law:

  • “Use of a living room” does not require a room designated and used exclusively as a living room 24/7.
  • A room that is a living room by day and a bedroom by night can satisfy the test.
  • The focus is on whether the household has a space where they can eat, sit, gather, and live together during the day, not on strict architectural labelling.

8. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

Y v Glasgow City Council is a pivotal decision in Scottish homelessness law. Its key contributions can be summarised as follows:

  • Interim vs permanent duties: The court cements the distinction between:
    • a process‑based interim duty under section 29; and
    • a more demanding outcome‑oriented permanent duty under section 31(2).
  • Scope of interim suitability: The threshold for “suitable” interim accommodation is realistic and grounded in the temporary, staging‑post nature of such housing. Two‑flat arrangements and dual‑use rooms can lawfully be used, provided the family can live together in a practical sense.
  • Judicial deference and rationality: Courts must respect the expertise of housing officers and interfere only if an assessment of suitability is irrational. Judges must avoid substituting their own views of what is best for those of the democratically accountable decision‑makers.
  • Reasonable time for permanent rehousing: The “reasonable time” to comply with section 31(2) may be substantial, especially where:
    • suitable permanent properties are extremely scarce;
    • there is a documented housing emergency; and
    • the authority is providing suitable interim accommodation in the meantime.
  • Remedies and restraint: Mandatory orders will remain the exception, not the rule. Declarators, continued hearings, and a measured escalation of judicial involvement align with the court’s understanding of its constitutional role and the realities of local government finance and housing allocation.

The decision thus offers a more structured and realistic framework for assessing both the content and the timing of homelessness duties, balancing the rights and needs of homeless households against the profound constraints under which local authorities currently operate. It will be a leading authority for future Scottish homelessness litigation, particularly where large families, disability, and acute housing shortages intersect.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Scottish Court of Session

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