Clarifying Culpability A and Dangerousness in Sentencing for Death by Careless Driving under the Influence of Drugs:
Commentary on R v Prodger [2025] EWCA Crim 1492

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the judgment of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in Prodger, R v [2025] EWCA Crim 1492, delivered by Mrs Justice Tipples on 31 October 2025.

The case concerns the appropriate sentencing framework for the offence of causing death by careless driving when over the prescribed limit for drugs, and in particular:

How culpability under the Sentencing Council guideline “Causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs” should be assessed; and
When it is proper to impose an extended sentence on the basis of “dangerousness”.

The appellant, Mr Prodger, pleaded guilty to:

Two counts of causing death by careless driving when over the prescribed limit for drugs (counts 2 and 3); and
One count of possession of a Class A drug (count 4).

The Crown accepted these pleas; a more serious count of causing death by dangerous driving (count 1) was left on the file with a formal not guilty verdict (para 1).

At first instance (Crown Court at Maidstone), HHJ Statman imposed:

An extended sentence of 14 years on counts 2 and 3 (12-year custodial term plus 2-year extended licence), concurrent; and
12 months’ imprisonment concurrent on count 4.

He also imposed a total driving disqualification of 17 years and various ancillary orders (para 2).

The appeal raised three central issues:

Whether the sentencing judge wrongly categorised the case as culpability A under the relevant guideline;
Whether his starting point of 12 years’ custody (pre-discount) was manifestly excessive; and
Whether it was wrong in principle to impose an extended sentence on the basis of dangerousness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, reduced the custodial term substantially, and quashed the extended sentence. In doing so, it provided important clarification on:

How to interpret “culpability A” in the death by careless driving (drink/drugs) guideline; and
The proper evidential threshold and approach to dangerousness assessments when imposing extended sentences.

2. Factual Background

2.1 The collision

On the early evening of 10 July 2021, 10-year-old Lily Lockwood was waiting to cross Watling Street in Dartford, Kent, a 30 mph road (para 3). CCTV showed:

Lily looking both ways;
Running across the road just after a white van passed on her side; and
The appellant’s Audi A1 colliding with her at approximately 6.52 pm.

CCTV analysis established that the appellant was travelling between 44 and 47 mph in a 30 mph zone immediately before impact. Weather and visibility were good; the road was dry and the car was in proper working order (para 8).

Lily suffered catastrophic injuries and, despite emergency treatment, died on 12 July 2021 (para 3). The judgment emphasises the devastating and enduring impact on Lily’s family and community.

2.2 The appellant’s condition and conduct

Immediately after the collision, the appellant stayed at the scene and was described by witnesses as “screaming and panicking and foaming from the mouth” and as appearing drunk (para 4). He told a police officer he had seen Lily “flying through the air” and asserted she had come out “straight in front of me, no warning, no nothing. I didn’t even brake” (para 4).

The appellant failed a preliminary impairment test, was arrested, and taken to hospital. A blood sample taken five hours after the collision showed:

68 μg/L cocaine (legal limit: 10 μg/L); and
1600 μg/L benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite (legal limit: 50 μg/L) (para 5).

Forensic toxicologist Dr David Berry estimated that at the time of driving, the cocaine level was likely to have been around 2000 μg/L, indicating substantial very recent use with a severe adverse effect on driving (para 7).

Police also found 57.8 grams of cocaine in the passenger footwell of the Audi (para 5).

2.3 Use of mobile phone

Examination of the appellant’s phone revealed active use “while driving right up to the point of collision” (para 9). Although the phone was connected to Bluetooth (so not necessarily hand-held), the appellant still had to look at and touch it to:

Make a call;
Open apps; and
Select and send photographs and recipients (para 9).

2.4 Vision and medical background

Evidence from the appellant’s optician and a consultant ophthalmologist at St Thomas’ Hospital showed that:

Without glasses, his eyesight did not reach DVLA standards for driving.
Even with glasses, there was a real possibility that he would still not meet the standard (para 12).

On 26 June 2021, two weeks before the collision, an eye test revealed a swollen optic nerve in his right eye. He was told to attend hospital that day but did not. He later attended on 2 July 2021 but left before assessment (para 10).

Significantly, after Lily’s death, on 24 July 2021 and 13 September 2021, the appellant drove again while over the prescribed limit for cocaine. He was later charged for those offences (para 10). Those later offences powerfully influenced the first-instance judge’s view of dangerousness and remorse.

2.5 Personal circumstances

The appellant was 53 at the time of conviction and had no previous convictions (para 11). A pre-sentence report and psychiatric evidence (from Dr Waheed) were provided. The sentencing judge accepted that:

The Sentencing Council’s guideline on mentally disordered offenders did not strictly apply, but
He would nevertheless take into account the appellant’s mental health difficulties and previous suicide attempt (para 13).

3. Procedural History and Sentencing at First Instance

3.1 Plea and indictment

Plea: guilty to counts 2, 3 (causing death by careless driving while over the prescribed limit for drugs) and count 4 (possession of cocaine) after PTPH but before trial (para 1).
Count 1 (causing death by dangerous driving): not proceeded with; formal not guilty verdict (para 1).

3.2 Sentences imposed by HHJ Statman

On 23 October 2023, the judge imposed (para 2):

Counts 2 & 3: Extended sentences of 14 years each (concurrent), comprising:
- 12-year custodial term; and
- 2-year extended licence.
Count 4: 12 months’ imprisonment, concurrent.
Driving disqualification: 17 years (8-year discretionary period + 9-year extension until an extended test passed).
Deprivation orders: for the drugs and the Audi.
Victim surcharge imposed.

The judge noted that:

At the time of the offence, the maximum sentence for counts 2 and 3 was 14 years’ imprisonment.
By the time of sentence, Parliament had increased the maximum to life imprisonment.

He correctly proceeded on the basis that only the 14-year maximum applied to this case (para 15). He looked at revised guidelines, but used them only as a reference, ensuring that any sentence did not exceed the then-applicable statutory maximum.

3.3 Judge’s approach to guideline culpability and mitigation

The sentencing judge:

Referred to the Sentencing Council guideline Causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs (para 15);
Identified two culpability B factors:
- Driving at a speed inappropriate for the road conditions; and
- Driving impaired by a known medical condition (poor eyesight) in disregard of medical advice (para 16);
Nevertheless concluded that the case fell into culpability A, taking a 12-year starting point within a stated category range of 8–18 years (para 16);
Regarded Lily’s age (10 years) as an aggravating factor (para 17);
Accepted certain mitigating features:
- No previous convictions;
- Mental health difficulties and previous suicide attempt;
- Guilty plea (15% credit);
- A letter of remorse from the appellant; and
- Letters from his parents (paras 13, 17);
However, overall, found that the appellant had shown very little genuine remorse (para 14).

The judge considered the further post-collision drug-driving offences (July and September 2021) to show “no remorse whatsoever” (para 14).

3.4 Finding of dangerousness and extended sentence

Relying heavily on the pre-sentence report, the judge found the appellant to be “dangerous” within the statutory scheme and therefore imposed an extended sentence (para 17).

The report:

Suggested the appellant had “very little victim empathy”;
Noted a long history of alcohol and drug use;
Concluded he was not at a stage where he could take responsibility for his actions; and
Assessed a high likelihood of further offences within two years and a high risk of serious harm to the public (para 18).

The judge observed that the probation officer had used a test slightly different from the one required by statute—focusing on the general likelihood of serious harm rather than the specific statutory formulation of a “significant risk of serious harm from further specified offences” (para 18). Nevertheless, he decided that an extended sentence was appropriate, even though he acknowledged that for someone with no previous convictions such a measure is a “last resort” (para 18).

4. Grounds of Appeal and Outcome

4.1 Grounds of appeal

The appellant, represented by Mr Dein KC, advanced three grounds (para 19):

Misclassification of culpability: The case had been wrongly placed in culpability A. On the judge’s own findings, it should have been within culpability B.
Excessive starting point: Even if the categorisation were correct, a 12-year starting point (and resultant near-maximum sentence pre-discount) was manifestly excessive in light of the facts and mitigation.
Wrong in principle to impose extended sentence: There was no proper evidential basis to find the appellant “dangerous”. In particular:
- The pre-sentence report was based on a factual error (the mistaken belief that the appellant had been driving while disqualified); and
- Absent that error, there was insufficient evidence to justify an extended sentence.

The Crown argued:

On culpability, that the judge was entitled to treat the case as culpability A by aggregating multiple culpability B features, such as:
- Driving at 44–47 mph in a 30 mph zone;
- Driving with severely deficient eyesight; and
- The use of a mobile phone (brief but avoidable distraction) (para 19);
On starting point, that the judge’s approach was within the proper range of sentencing discretion (para 20); and
On dangerousness, that the judge was entitled to regard the appellant as presenting a significant risk of serious harm, particularly in light of his post-collision drug-driving offences (para 21).

4.2 The Court of Appeal’s decision

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Its key conclusions were:

Culpability and guideline category:
- The case did not fall within culpability A.
- The sentencing judge had not found (and could not have properly found) that the standard of driving was “just below dangerous driving”.
- Neither of the identified culpability B factors (excess speed and poor eyesight) was an “extreme example” of a B factor.
- It was wrong to “aggregate” those B factors to move the case into category A.
Starting point and sentence length:
- The correct starting point under the guideline was 9 years’ custody (culpability B), with a range of 6–12 years (para 26).
- Taking into account aggravating and mitigating factors, the Court adjusted this to a 10-year notional starting point (para 28).
- Applying 15% credit for the guilty plea, the correct sentence was 8 years 6 months’ custody (para 28).
Dangerousness and extended sentence:
- The pre-sentence report contained a significant factual error (wrongly suggesting the appellant had been driving while disqualified) which undermined the probation officer’s assessment of “high” risk (para 29).
- Properly viewed, the evidence did not justify a finding of dangerousness under the statutory test.
- The extended sentences on counts 2 and 3 were therefore quashed and replaced with determinate terms of 8 years 6 months, concurrent (para 29).
Driving disqualification:
- On counts 2 and 3, the Court imposed a total disqualification of 13 years 8 months, comprising:
  - 8 years’ discretionary disqualification; and
  - 5 years 8 months’ extension under s.35A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, and until passing an extended test (para 29).

In addition, the Court departed from the sentencing judge’s severe view on remorse, accepting that:

The appellant’s suicide attempts and mental health decline showed that the incident had had a profound effect on him; and
He was, in fact, “appalled” by what he had done (para 27).

5. Summary of the Judgment

5.1 Core holdings

The decision in R v Prodger establishes and reaffirms several key principles:

Narrow interpretation of “culpability A” in the relevant sentencing guideline:
- A case falls into culpability A only where:
  - The standard of driving was just below dangerous driving; or
  - There is an “extreme example” of a culpability B factor.
- Simply adding together multiple culpability B factors does not, without more, justify reclassifying the case as culpability A (paras 24–26).
Focus on the “standard of driving” at step one:
- At step one, the court’s principal focus must be on the standard of driving itself, not on intoxication levels.
- The guideline structure requires alcohol/drugs to be considered at step two, after culpability has been fixed (paras 22–23).
Speed as the determinant of culpability on the facts:
- Despite substantial drug intoxication, the forensic collision expert’s evidence that the appellant’s reaction time was “impeccable” meant that:
  - He could not have reacted any faster to Lily’s sudden movement; and
  - Culpability turned principally on his excess speed (paras 8, 25).
- That pattern of driving did not meet the “just below dangerous driving” threshold.
Correction of sentence length:
- The original 12-year starting point (and near-maximum sentence) was too high.
- After correcting the guideline category and balancing aggravation and mitigation, the correct sentence was 8 years 6 months for counts 2 and 3 (para 28).
Strictness about “dangerousness” and extended sentences:
- An extended sentence is a measure of last resort, particularly for an offender with no previous convictions (para 18).
- A flawed pre-sentence report (here, mis-stating that the appellant drove while disqualified) cannot soundly underpin a finding of dangerousness (para 29).
- On proper analysis, the statutory test of a significant risk of serious harm from further specified offences was not met (para 29).

5.2 Adjusted sentence in outline

Counts 2 & 3:
- Guideline starting point (culpability B): 9 years.
- Adjusted upward to 10 years for aggravating factors (vulnerability of child pedestrian, drugs in car) (para 26–28).
- 15% discount for guilty plea (late, but before trial): 10 years → 8 years 6 months (para 28).
- Final sentences: 8 years 6 months on each count, concurrent (para 29).
Extended sentence quashed:
- No extended licence period; determinate custodial sentence only (para 29).
Driving disqualification:
- 13 years 8 months in total, plus extended test requirement (para 29).

6. Analysis

6.1 Precedents and legal frameworks

6.1.1 Express citations

The written judgment provided does not expressly name any previous case authorities. The Court instead reasons directly from:

The Sentencing Council guideline Causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs (paras 15–16, 22–23);
The general statutory dangerousness regime for extended sentences (alluded to in paras 17–18); and
Section 35A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (s.35A RTOA 1988) in relation to extended driving disqualification (para 29).

While many aspects of the reasoning are consistent with existing Court of Appeal authority on dangerousness and on the use of sentencing guidelines, the judgment stands out for its detailed engagement with the structure and wording of the specific guideline in question.

6.1.2 Guideline structure as a quasi-precedential framework

The guideline itself functions as a central normative source. The Court quotes and relies upon its two-step structure for assessing culpability (para 22):

“There are two aspects to assessing culpability for this offence.

The court should first determine the standard of driving with reference to the factors below. Where there are characteristics present that fall under different levels of culpability, the court should weigh those factors in order to decide which category most resembles the offender's case.

Factors relevant to the presence of alcohol or drugs or a failure to provide a sample for analysis should then be considered at step two to identify the appropriate offence category and starting point of sentence in accordance with the sentencing table.”

The Court then notes the definition of culpability A (para 23):

“‘Culpability A’ is described as ‘Standard of driving was just below threshold for dangerous driving and/or includes extreme example of a culpability B factor’.”

This textual focus is important: the Court anchors its reasoning in the exact language and structure of the guideline, rather than in abstract impressions of seriousness.

6.2 Legal reasoning: culpability assessment

6.2.1 Proper scope of “culpability A”

The sentencing judge had attempted to justify a culpability A assessment on the basis that:

The appellant was driving 44–47 mph in a 30 mph area; and
He knowingly drove with seriously impaired eyesight in disregard of medical advice (para 16).

The Crown on appeal went further, suggesting that:

The combination of multiple culpability B factors (including mobile phone usage) could be treated as an “extreme example” or, effectively, as the functional equivalent of culpability A (para 19).

The Court of Appeal rejected this approach for three main reasons.

(a) No finding that the driving was “just below dangerous driving”

First, the Court observed that the sentencing judge had never explicitly found that the standard of driving was “just below the threshold for dangerous driving” (para 24), and that:

He was right not to make such a finding; and
The evidence did not justify it.

This was crucial. The prosecution had originally charged dangerous driving, but ultimately accepted a plea to careless driving. The forensic collision expert’s evidence was that:

“the appellant's reaction time was impeccable and that he could not have reacted any faster than he did” (para 8).

Thus, the relevant question became: given that the reaction to Lily’s sudden movement was optimal, did the overall manner of driving still reach a standard “just below” dangerous driving?

The Court held that it did not. The driving was careless and seriously so, but not on the borderline of dangerousness.

(b) No “extreme example” of a culpability B factor

Second, the Court accepted the judge’s identification of the two applicable B factors:

Driving at an inappropriate speed for the road conditions; and
Driving impaired by a known medical condition (poor eyesight) in disregard of medical advice (para 24).

However, it underlined that:

The judge had not found that either factor was an “extreme example” of a B factor; and
The evidence available would not have justified such a finding (para 24).

In other words, neither the speed, nor the eyesight impairment, nor their combined effect was so exceptional as to transmute a B-level case into an A-level one.

(c) Impropriety of “aggregating” B factors into A

Third, the Court addressed, at a more general level, the concept of “aggregation”:

“We recognise that there may be cases where, under the generality of guidelines, the presence of several factors may justify moving up to a more serious category of culpability or harm. But this was not one of those cases.” (para 26)

In the specific context of this guideline, the Court drew a line:

Where culpability A is narrowly defined as borderline dangerous driving or extreme B factors,
A mere accumulation of standard B factors does not suffice to move into category A (paras 25–26).

Thus, the Court set a clear interpretative constraint: culpability A is reserved for truly exceptional levels of bad driving or extreme aggravating circumstances.

6.2.2 Role of intoxication in the guideline’s two-step approach

A significant part of the Court’s reasoning involved re-emphasising the two-step structure (para 22):

First, determine the standard of driving (culpability A/B/C) based on driving behaviour.
Second, consider alcohol and drugs to identify the appropriate offence category and starting point in the sentencing table.

By insisting on this structure, the Court effectively:

Prevented the sentencing judge from “importing” the appellant’s very high level of intoxication into the first step (culpability); and
Confined the effect of intoxication to the second step, where it can properly influence the final sentence, but without distorting the categorical assessment of driving standard.

This avoids double counting intoxication and ensures conceptual clarity in sentencing for death by careless driving under the influence.

6.2.3 Centrality of speed and the expert evidence on reaction time

The Court highlighted (para 25):

“Despite his level of intoxication the appellant stopped the car quickly. It is a crucial point that the agreed evidence was that the defendant could not have reacted any quicker than he did and it is the speed at which he was driving that is determinative of his culpability.”

The analysis can be broken down as follows:

The appellant’s driving, though careless, did not involve a prolonged pattern of erratic or grossly incompetent driving.
The reaction time was, according to expert evidence, optimal.
CCTV showed Lily moving suddenly into the path of the Audi after a van had passed her side of the road.
Thus, the key culpable choice was his decision to drive at 44–47 mph in a 30 mph zone in an urban environment where pedestrians, including children, might be expected.

The Court recognised the profound tragedy of Lily’s death but stressed the importance of accurately characterising the negligence: excessive speed and impaired vision, but not driving on the cusp of dangerousness.

6.3 Sentence length: balancing aggravation and mitigation

6.3.1 Starting from 9 years (culpability B)

Once the Court concluded that the case belonged in culpability B, the guideline starting point became 9 years’ custody, with a range of 6–12 years (para 19, para 26).

6.3.2 Aggravating factors

The Court accepted several aggravating features, including:

Lily’s vulnerability as a 10-year-old child and pedestrian (para 26);
The presence of a large quantity of Class A drugs in the car, which added context and risk to the driving (para 26);
Continued post-collision drug-driving offences in July and September 2021 (para 10, para 17) – these bore mainly on risk and attitude but also on the appellant’s disregard of the law even after a fatal incident.

6.3.3 Mitigating factors, remorse and mental health

Mitigation included:

No previous convictions, particularly significant for someone aged 53 (para 17);
Guilty pleas (although not at the earliest opportunity, meriting 15% credit, para 13);
Evidence of mental health difficulties and a suicide attempt (para 13);
Letters from the appellant and his parents indicating deep remorse (paras 13, 27).

The Court notably departed from the sentencing judge’s bleak view on remorse. It said (para 27):

“The appellant's attempts at suicide and decline in mental health show that what has happened has had a significant impact on him. We accept Mr Dein’s submissions that this is a man who is appalled at what he has caused. The judge's finding that the appellant has not shown remorse is also inconsistent with the letters written by his parents to the court... they say in clear terms that the appellant was full of remorse.”

This is an important reminder that:

Remorse is not confined to formal statements in court; and
Objective indicators such as mental collapse, suicide attempts and third-party testimony can be powerful evidence of genuine remorse.

6.3.4 Adjusted starting point and final sentence

Weighing aggravation and mitigation, the Court concluded that:

The aggravating features (particularly vulnerability of the victim and drug context) outweighed the mitigation (para 28);
But not so as to justify a move to the 12-year end of the guideline range.

It therefore:

Adjusted the 9-year starting point to 10 years to reflect the net aggravation (para 28); and
Applied a 15% discount for the guilty plea, producing a final sentence of 8 years 6 months’ custody (para 28).

This approach is methodical and tightly tied to the guideline structure, ensuring transparency in how the final term was derived.

6.4 Dangerousness and the quashing of the extended sentence

6.4.1 The statutory concept of dangerousness (simplified)

Under the dangerousness provisions in the sentencing legislation, an extended sentence can be imposed only where:

The offence is a specified offence (which causing death by careless driving when over the limit is); and
The court assesses the offender as presenting a “significant risk of serious harm” to members of the public, by the commission of further such offences.

An extended sentence consists of:

A custodial term; and
An extended licence period on top of the usual licence, during which the offender remains subject to recall and supervision.

The Court in Prodger emphasised that extended sentences are to be used as a “last resort”, especially for a person with no previous convictions (para 18).

6.4.2 The flawed pre-sentence report

The pre-sentence report had two key features:

Use of a statistical risk assessment tool which placed the appellant as a low likelihood of committing a seriously harmful offence within two years (para 18);
A probation officer’s override of that conclusion, upgrading the risk to “high” based on assumptions including the belief that the appellant had been driving while disqualified (para 21).

It was later accepted that:

The appellant had not been driving while disqualified; and
This error was “an important error” which materially influenced the risk assessment (para 29).

6.4.3 Insufficient basis for a finding of dangerousness

The Court recognised that:

The appellant had committed two further drug-driving offences after Lily’s death, which was a grave concern; but
Those offences alone did not automatically demonstrate a significant long-term risk of serious harm within the meaning of the statutory test, especially where:
- There were no previous convictions;
- The statistical tool assessed the serious harm risk as low; and
- The probation officer’s upgrade to “high risk” was infected by a serious factual error (para 29).

Given the centrality of that error, and the lack of a robust independent basis for a dangerousness finding, the Court concluded that the threshold for an extended sentence was not crossed:

The extended sentences on counts 2 and 3 were quashed.
The Court substituted determinate sentences of 8 years 6 months (para 29).

This aspect of the judgment sends a strong signal on the necessity of:

Accuracy and scrutiny in risk assessments;
Guarding against over-reliance on flawed pre-sentence reports; and
Using extended sentences only where a clearly evidenced significant risk of serious harm is shown.

6.5 Driving disqualification and s.35A RTOA 1988

Under s.35A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, where an offender receives a custodial sentence for certain serious driving offences, the court can impose an additional period of disqualification (to ensure that the total ban extends beyond the custodial term, and that the offender faces heightened safeguards upon return to driving).

The Court restructured the disqualification to reflect the reduced custodial term:

Discretionary disqualification: 8 years;
Extension under s.35A: 5 years 8 months; and
Requirement to pass an extended driving test before regaining a licence (para 29).

The total period of disqualification (13 years 8 months) broadly tracks the overall reduced seriousness once the original 14-year sentence and extended licence were replaced with an 8½-year determinate term.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

7.1 “Causing death by careless driving when over the prescribed limit for drugs”

This offence combines two elements:

Careless driving: The driving falls below the standard of a competent and careful driver, but does not necessarily reach the level of dangerous driving.
Over the drug limit: The driver’s blood or urine contains drugs over a legally set limit.

To convict:

There must be a causal link between the careless driving and the death; and
The prosecution must prove that the driver was over the prescribed legal limit for the relevant drug.

In Prodger, the careless driving consisted mainly of:

Driving significantly above the speed limit;
Driving despite known, untreated visual impairment; and
Using a mobile phone while driving.

7.2 Culpability categories in sentencing guidelines

In sentencing, “culpability” refers to how blameworthy the offender’s conduct was. The relevant guideline divides culpability into:

A – Most serious:
- Driving just below dangerous driving; or
- An extreme example of a culpability B factor.
B – Medium level (includes a range of factors such as speeding, distraction, known medical issues);
C – Lowest level (not relevant here).

The Court of Appeal stressed that:

Not every bad case is culpability A; and
There must be something very close to dangerous driving, or a truly extreme version of a B factor, to justify A.

7.3 “Starting point” and “category range”

Once a culpability category (e.g., A, B, or C) and a harm category (where relevant) are determined, the guideline provides:

A starting point – a reference sentence for a case with no aggravating or mitigating factors.
A category range – the range within which sentences can typically fall, depending on aggravation and mitigation.

In Prodger:

Culpability B carried a starting point of 9 years and a range of 6–12 years (para 26).
The Court moved up slightly from the 9-year starting point (to 10 years) to reflect aggravation (para 28).
It then applied a guilty-plea discount to arrive at 8 years 6 months (para 28).

7.4 Extended sentences and “dangerousness”

An extended sentence is different from an ordinary prison sentence. It consists of:

A custodial part (imprisonment); and
An extended licence period (beyond the usual licence), during which the person is supervised and may be recalled to prison.

Extended sentences are reserved for offenders who:

Have committed certain serious (“specified”) offences; and
Pose a significant risk of serious harm to the public through further such offences.

“Significant risk of serious harm” is more than a bare possibility of reoffending; it is a prediction of:

Further offences that are themselves sufficiently serious; and
A real, substantial chance of those offences actually being committed.

In Prodger, the Court held that:

Because the pre-sentence report contained a major factual error (suggesting the appellant had driven while disqualified),
And there were otherwise indications of low risk on a statistical tool,
The evidence did not support the conclusion that he presented a significant risk of serious harm justifying an extended sentence (para 29).

7.5 Driving disqualification and extended test

For serious driving offences causing death, the court can:

Impose a long period of disqualification from driving; and
Require the offender to pass an extended driving test before regaining a licence.

Under s.35A RTOA 1988, where there is a custodial sentence, there can also be an extension period to ensure that the ban outlasts the prison term and that the offender’s return to driving is more tightly controlled.

In Prodger, the Court imposed:

8 years’ discretionary disqualification; plus
5 years 8 months’ extension (to reflect the reduced term of imprisonment); and
An extended test requirement (para 29).

8. Impact and Significance

8.1 Sentencing for death by careless driving (drink/drugs)

R v Prodger provides important clarification of how to apply the Sentencing Council guideline for causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Its likely implications include:

More disciplined use of culpability A:
- Sentencers are reminded not to treat appalling outcomes or multiple B factors as automatically warranting culpability A.
- They must ask: did the driving come close to dangerous, or was there an extreme B-level feature?
Clear separation between driving standard and intoxication:
- Intoxication is relevant and seriously aggravating but is channelled through the guideline’s second step rather than by inflating the culpability category at step one.
- This protects against “double counting” and promotes consistency.
Enhanced transparency in how starting points are adjusted:
- The Court’s methodical move from 9 to 10 years, then applying 15% credit, illustrates best practice in guideline application.

8.2 Dangerousness findings and extended sentences

On dangerousness, the judgment reinforces that:

Extended sentences are exceptional and should not be imposed unless the statutory criteria are clearly met and properly evidenced.
Pre-sentence reports must be approached with a critical eye:
- If a report is built on incorrect facts, its risk conclusions are undermined.
Offenders with no previous convictions, even where the instant offence is tragic and serious, will not automatically qualify for an extended sentence.

Future sentencing courts will likely cite Prodger as a reminder that:

Dangerousness is not a proxy for moral outrage or the gravity of harm caused; it is a specific forward-looking risk assessment problem.
Mischaracterisation of facts in pre-sentence reports must be corrected before making such a finding.

8.3 Recognition of remorse and mental health consequences

The Court’s willingness to revisit the first-instance judge’s scepticism about remorse is also notable. It underscores that:

Remorse can manifest in psychological collapse and suicide attempts, not merely in articulate expressions at sentencing.
Letters from family, describing the offender’s enduring distress, can be persuasive corroboration of genuine remorse.

While this is unlikely to create a formal legal rule, it provides a practical and humane example of how appellate courts will consider personal mitigation in tragic driving cases.

8.4 Overall sentencing climate in road-death cases

Recent legislative changes (including the increase of the maximum sentence for this offence from 14 years to life) have signalled a policy move toward tougher sanctions for death caused by serious driving misconduct. Prodger fits within that context but emphasises that:

Even amidst political and public pressure for higher sentences in fatal driving cases,
Sentences must remain grounded in a clear, principled application of guidelines and statutes.

The Court’s recalibration of a very high sentence underlines that stronger maxima do not displace:

Proportionality;
Accurate categorisation under guidelines; and
Proper evidential standards for dangerousness.

9. Conclusion

R v Prodger [2025] EWCA Crim 1492 is a significant decision in the law of sentencing for causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drugs. It arises out of a profoundly tragic event—the death of a 10-year-old child, Lily Lockwood—and confronts the sentencing court with the particularly difficult task of balancing individual culpability, the catastrophic consequences of the offence, and the protection of the public.

The judgment’s key contributions can be summarised as follows:

It clarifies the boundaries of culpability A under the relevant Sentencing Council guideline, insisting that:
- Culpability A is reserved for cases where the driving is just below dangerous driving; or
- There is an extreme example of a culpability B factor.
Accumulating several B factors does not automatically elevate a case into category A.
It reaffirms the two-step structure of the guideline, making clear that:
- The standard of driving is assessed at step one; and
- Intoxication is then addressed at step two.
This guards against double counting and maintains conceptual clarity.
It provides a worked example of resetting a sentence:
- From an incorrectly assumed 12-year starting point under culpability A;
- To a 9-year starting point under culpability B, adjusted to 10 years for aggravation;
- Then discounted to 8 years 6 months for the guilty plea.
On extended sentences, it sends a clear message that:
- Dangerousness findings must be evidence-based and free from factual error;
- Extended sentences are a last resort, especially for those with no prior convictions; and
- Flawed pre-sentence reports cannot sustain such a severe measure.
It also underlines the importance of properly evaluating remorse and mental health consequences, and recognises that profound personal devastation can be a legitimate form of mitigation in cases of this kind.

In the broader legal context, Prodger should be read as a careful calibration of the criminal justice system’s response to fatal driving under the influence of drugs, ensuring that sentences, while severe where appropriate, remain principled, proportionate and grounded in the actual evidence of culpability and future risk. It will likely serve as an important reference point for sentencing judges and appellate courts in future road-death cases involving intoxication, medical impairment, and allegations of dangerousness.

Clarifying Culpability A and Dangerousness in Sentencing for Death by Careless Driving under the Influence of Drugs: Commentary on R v Prodger [2025] EWCA Crim 1492