Clarifying Costs Discretion and Judicial Jurisdiction under Irish Law
Commentary on Corcoran v Eassda Group Ltd & Ors & connected actions [2025] IEHC 359

Introduction

The High Court decision of Mr Justice Brian O’Moore in Corcoran v Eassda Group Ltd & Ors, together with its two connected plenary actions, is the latest instalment of a long-running property and enforcement dispute that began as far back as 2008. The April 2025 judgment, following an earlier substantive judgment delivered in December 2024, deals with three residual issues:

• Allocation of costs in light of s.169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (“LSRA 2015”).
• The precise form of the Court orders, including whether the judge could or should rule on the purchasers’ entitlement to the return of deposits which had not been pleaded.
• An application to appoint a receiver over common-area open space within the Glenair Manor housing estate.

On its face the ruling looks procedural, yet it lays down important clarifications on:

1. How Irish courts should exercise the statutory discretion under s.169 LSRA 2015 when deciding whether to depart from the default rule that “costs follow the event”.
2. The limits of a court’s jurisdiction to grant relief that was never pleaded, and how (if at all) those limits may subsequently be overcome by the parties’ consent.
3. The evidential interaction between plenary proceedings tried with oral evidence and subsequent interlocutory or motion hearings dealt with primarily on affidavit.

Parties in brief

• Joseph & Katherine Corcoran – original purchasers of property No. 6 Glenair Manor who refused to complete the sale after a 2012 specific-performance order (Murphy J.).
• Promontoria Eagle Ltd – assignee of the vendor’s loan/security interests; victor in the proceedings.
• Ken Fennell – receiver appointed by Promontoria over certain assets.
• Eassda Group Ltd / Eassda Ireland Ltd & Alistair Jackson – vendors/developers of the property.
• Gerard Murray – proposed equitable receiver over estate open space.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Costs: The Promontoria interests, having been “entirely successful” in the substantive litigation and in the motion concerning No. 6 Glenair Manor, were awarded all their costs. The judge rejected detailed submissions by the Corcorans that s.169(1) LSRA 2015 required a different outcome. Misconduct alleged against Promontoria was either unfounded or immaterial when weighed against the Corcorans’ own “profoundly damaging, harmful and baseless allegations”.
2. Form of Order:
   • The plenary proceedings were decided on oral evidence plus those documents “properly admissible” at trial; motions were decided on the affidavits plus the findings from the plenary hearing.
   • The Court refused, for the moment, to decide the un-pleaded issue of whether the Corcorans’ deposits should be returned. The judge invited the parties to agree to vest him with jurisdiction for a focused later hearing; otherwise he would issue a short ruling declining jurisdiction, relying on RL v Henehan.
3. Receiver over Open Space: An equitable receiver (Gerard Murray) was appointed over defined open space within Glenair Manor. Occupiers and the local authority are to be notified and may apply within 10 weeks to vary or discharge the order.

The ruling concludes with a timetable for parties to state by 17 April 2025 whether they consent to the Court determining the deposit issue.

Analysis

Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, s.169 – Core statutory provision on costs. Requires the court to consider:
  1. conduct before and during proceedings,
  2. whether it was reasonable to raise or contest issues, and
  3. the manner in which the parties conducted their case.
  The judge stressed that these factors must be applied symmetrically; a court may weigh both sides’ conduct even where only one side invokes the section.
• RL v Henehan [2015] IECA 120 – Re-affirmed that a court’s jurisdiction is confined to issues raised by the pleadings. An order outside that compass is ultra vires unless consequential or ancillary. This authority underpinned the judge’s reluctance to pronounce on the deposits.
• Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 – Rule against re-litigating matters that could and should have been raised earlier. Mentioned as a potential defence if fresh proceedings about the deposits are later launched.
• Mahon v Celbridge Spinning Co. [1967] IR 1 – Cited in Henehan for the purpose of pleadings defining issues.

Legal Reasoning

1. Costs: Symmetrical Scrutiny under s.169 LSRA 2015

Justice O’Moore accepted in principle that the discretionary factors in s.169(1) could, in an appropriate case, compel the court to refuse costs to a technically successful litigant whose conduct was reprehensible. Crucially, however, he clarified that:

“It would be unreal … to refuse to award costs to a successful party on the basis of its conduct while turning a blind eye to equally pernicious (or worse) conduct on the part of the unsuccessful litigant.”

This articulation crystallises a balancing approach: the court must survey the whole litigation landscape, not only the behaviour of the party seeking costs. After applying that balance, the judge found the complaints against Promontoria “wanting”, while the Corcorans’ conduct included unfounded allegations against multiple individuals. Accordingly, the orthodox “costs follow the event” rule prevailed.

2. Pleadings as Jurisdictional Fence

Relying on RL v Henehan, the Court underscored that it cannot unilaterally expand its remit beyond the pleadings. The request to adjudicate on the un-pleaded deposit issue therefore raised a jurisdictional deficit. However, the judge outlined a pragmatic escape route: if all parties expressly agree, the Court may obtain jurisdiction to decide that discrete question in a future, tightly managed hearing. This invites parties to avoid satellite litigation without violating procedural orthodoxy.

3. Evidential Segregation between Plenary Trial and Motions

The Court clarified the relationship between evidence at the main trial and subsequent interlocutory motions. Plenary findings—especially the validity of Mr Fennell’s receiver appointment—were treated as binding substrata when deciding later motions (e.g., the failed receiver application for No. 6). Yet for each motion the Court still looked to the specific affidavits filed. The formal order had to reflect that evidential demarcation.

Likely Impact on Future Litigation

• Costs Decisions: Litigants invoking s.169 LSRA 2015 should expect courts to conduct a comparative assessment of conduct. Merely pointing to the opponent’s tactics will not suffice where the applicant’s own behaviour is blameworthy. Solicitors should advise clients that unsubstantiated personal attacks risk not only defeat but adverse costs.
• Pleadings Discipline: The judgment reinforces that parties must plead all reliefs—or at least plead in the alternative—before trial. Attempting to tack on un-pleaded claims post-judgment will generally fail unless the other side consents.
• Efficient Case Management: The Court’s invitation to deal with the deposit issue via a focused subsequent hearing (subject to consent) offers a template for resolving ancillary matters without launching fresh proceedings. Expect judges to propose similar “opt-in” jurisdiction solutions where appropriate.
• Equitable Receivers over Common Areas: The receiver appointment, though fact-specific, confirms that Irish courts remain willing to grant equitable execution over estate amenities where developers’ obligations remain unfulfilled.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Costs Follow the Event: The default common-law rule that the loser pays the winner’s legal costs.
• Section 169 LSRA 2015: Modern statutory overlay giving courts explicit discretion to depart from that default after considering parties’ conduct and reasonableness.
• Equitable Receiver by Way of Execution: A court-appointed agent empowered to manage or realise property, usually where ordinary execution methods would be ineffective. It does not vest title but gives control to enforce judgments.
• Henderson v Henderson Rule: A party cannot raise in later proceedings matters which were, or could and should have been, raised earlier between the same parties.
• Ultra Vires Order (Henehan): A court order made without jurisdiction because the relief was outside the pleadings and not ancillary to issues tried.

Conclusion

Corcoran v Eassda Group Ltd & Ors may not attract headlines like constitutional cases, yet its practical ramifications for day-to-day civil litigation are significant:

1. It clarifies that s.169 LSRA 2015 is a two-way lens: the court will scrutinise the conduct of both the party seeking costs and the party resisting them before deciding whether to depart from the usual rule.
2. It reiterates the jurisdictional boundary created by pleadings: un-pleaded relief will not be granted save by party consent, safeguarding procedural fairness.
3. It demonstrates judicial willingness to craft pragmatic post-trial solutions (the proposed consensual hearing on deposits) to avoid protracted, duplicative litigation.
4. It affirms that equitable receivership remains a versatile tool, especially in the context of unfinished housing-estate infrastructure.

Overall, the judgment provides a well-reasoned blueprint for balancing fairness, efficiency, and procedural integrity in civil litigation—principles likely to guide Irish courts long after the specific facts of Glenair Manor fade into obscurity.