Chief Constables can be found in civil contempt without proof of wilful intent and despite absence of a penal notice

Case commented on: Buzzard-Quashie v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 1397 (11 November 2025)

Court: Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Lord Justice Fraser (giving the judgment of the Court), Lord Justice Coulson, Lady Justice Asplin

Introduction

This appeal arises from a protracted effort by the appellant, Ms Buzzard‑Quashie, to obtain police body‑worn video (BWV) and custody footage of her arrest on 3 September 2021. Despite an ICO decision in her favour and a County Court judgment order dated 25 April 2023 (the “April 23 Order”) requiring disclosure of all relevant footage and, where unavailable, a witness statement by a police officer of at least inspector rank explaining why, the Chief Constable failed to comply.

When Ms Buzzard‑Quashie sought to commit the Chief Constable for contempt, Her Honour Judge Genn dismissed the application, holding that (i) the order carried no penal notice; (ii) the Chief Constable was not personally responsible for the acts/omissions of others in the force; and (iii) the breach was not shown to be “wilful, deliberate or contumelious.” Costs were awarded against the claimant.

On appeal, after permission was granted, the police’s factual position collapsed. Days before the hearing, undisclosed BWV files (Rideout 1, Rideout 2 and Virtue 2) were identified following audit log analysis, contradicting a series of witness statements and submissions previously advanced on behalf of the Chief Constable in both courts. The Chief Constable (through counsel) conceded the appeal and admitted contempt “for the purposes of this action.”

Although the concession meant the first‑instance factual findings could not stand, the Court of Appeal addressed important points of law with general application to public bodies and parties subject to court orders. The judgment sets clear guidance on three questions:

• Whether proof of “wilful, deliberate or contumelious” breach is required to find civil contempt;
• Whether a Chief Constable can be held responsible for contempt arising from acts/omissions within the police force;
• Whether the absence of a penal notice on an order is fatal to a finding of contempt.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on all six grounds and made the following key holdings:

• No requirement of wilful intent for a finding of civil contempt. To find a civil contempt for breach of an order, the court does not need to be satisfied that the breach was wilful, deliberate, or “contumelious.” It suffices that the contemnor knew of the order and intentionally did the act (or omission) which, as a matter of fact and law, breached it. Mens rea is relevant to sanction, not to the finding (see paras [56]–[66]).
• Chief Constable’s responsibility for the force’s acts/omissions. A Chief Constable is a corporation sole and has direction and control of the force (Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011). He or she can be the proper object of a finding of contempt for the force’s breach of a court order. The contrary High Court decision in Bush v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [2024] EWHC 690 (KB) is said to be wrongly decided (paras [76]–[83]).
• Absence of a penal notice is not fatal to a finding of contempt. A penal notice is relevant to the second stage (sanction/committal), not to the first stage (finding). There are cases where committal may even be justified absent a penal notice, but in any event its absence does not bar a contempt finding (paras [84]–[95]).
• Costs at first instance reversed. Given the police’s admitted non‑compliance and the broader circumstances, the first‑instance order awarding costs against Ms Buzzard‑Quashie was wrong in principle and set aside (para [98]).
• Contempt admitted; sanction deferred. The Court recorded the admitted contempt and directed that any sanction would be determined later in accordance with CPR Part 81, allowing for an apology and further submissions (paras [47], [100]).
• Referral to the IOPC. The matter is to be referred to the Independent Office for Police Conduct (para [99]).

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Were Used

• Cuciurean v Secretary of State for Transport [2021] EWCA Civ 357 (Warby LJ) — The Court re‑affirmed that civil contempt focuses on disobedience of a court order, that proceedings are brought in civil courts, and that sanction may include fines or committal. Critically, Warby LJ’s synthesis (at [58]) was adopted to clarify that there is no further mens rea requirement beyond intentionally doing the act that breaches the order (paras [48], [57]–[58]).
• Varma v Atkinson [2020] EWCA Civ 1602; Heatons Transport (St Helens) (as quoted); and Fairclough v Manchester Ship Canal Co [1897] WN 7 — Taken together, these authorities demonstrate that once knowledge of the order and the intentional act/omission are proved to the criminal standard, the breach is made out; whether the disobedience was casual or accidental goes to penalty, not to liability (paras [61]–[62]).
• R (ex parte Bempoa) v London Borough of Southwark [2002] EWHC 153 (Admin) — Munby J found contempt where an “administrative oversight” defence masked systemic failures amounting to recklessness. Applied here to show that non‑wilful but blameworthy failures can still constitute contempt; reasons matter chiefly at sanction (para [63]).
• Cuadrilla (Caudrilla) Bowman Ltd v Persons Unknown [2020] EWCA Civ 9 (Leggatt LJ) — The Court reiterated the three elements for contempt on breach of an injunction: notice of the order, intention to do the act, and knowledge of facts making it a breach. Intention was relevant in that case because the injunction itself proscribed acts with a specified intention; that feature does not transform the general law of contempt (paras [65]–[68]).
• ADM International SARL v Grain House International SA [2024] EWCA Civ 33 — Popplewell LJ emphasised that the contemnor’s subjective construction or understanding of an order does not negate contempt; the question is objective breach of the order as construed by the court (para [70]).
• JS (by KS) v Cardiff City Council [2022] EWHC 707 (Admin) — A public body’s belief that it has complied does not prevent a finding of contempt; such belief may be relevant only to penalty (para [72]).
• Serious Organised Crime Agency v Hymans [2011] EWHC 3599 (QB) — Absence of a penal notice was not fatal to committal in the circumstances; if committal can be ordered without a penal notice in rare cases, it follows a finding of contempt is certainly not barred by the absence of such notice (para [86]).
• MSA v London Borough of Croydon [2009] EWHC 2474 (Admin) — The Administrative Court’s practice does not require penal notices; orders against public authorities are expected to be obeyed and contempt findings may be made absent such notices (paras [91]–[94]).
• M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377 (HL) — A minister can be held in contempt in an official capacity. The point is to vindicate the rule of law; a declaratory finding may suffice, with costs to mark the breach. This logic directly informs the Court’s conclusion that a Chief Constable (as a corporation sole with direction and control) is the proper subject of a contempt finding for force‑wide non‑compliance (paras [59], [78]–[81]).
• Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 — Section 2(3) (direction and control) and Schedule 2, para 2 (corporation sole) underpin the attribution of responsibility to a Chief Constable for the force’s acts/omissions (paras [76]–[82]).
• Paul Bush v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [2024] EWHC 690 (KB) — Disapproved. The High Court’s conclusion that a Chief Constable could not be liable for contempt for officers’ acts/omissions was held to be wrong in law (para [83]).

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning is structured around the two stages of contempt and three key legal questions.

Two stages: finding vs sanction. The Court emphasised that contempt proceedings have a distinct first stage (liability/finding) and second stage (sanction). Several doctrines invoked below — notably the requirement of a penal notice and the degree of wilfulness — belong to the second stage. Their misapplication at the first stage led to error (paras [87]–[95]).

1) Nature of the breach: no requirement of “wilful, deliberate or contumelious” conduct to find contempt.

• The constituent elements of civil contempt for breach of an order are:
  • Notice/service of the order;
  • Deliberate performance of the act or omission which, as a matter of fact and law, breaches the order;
  • Knowledge of the facts making the act/omission a breach.
• The contemnor’s intention to interfere with justice or to breach the order is not an element of liability; it may affect sanction (paras [56]–[66], [70]–[73]).
• “Contumelious” is a label sometimes used in older authorities; it is neither necessary nor sufficient for liability. The question is objective breach proved to the criminal standard (paras [74]–[75]).

2) Responsibility of the Chief Constable for acts/omissions of the force.

• By statute, a Chief Constable is a corporation sole with direction and control over the force and its civilian staff (2011 Act). The force’s non‑compliance is attributable to the Chief Constable in his official capacity.
• The Court drew a firm analogy with M v Home Office, where a minister could be held in contempt to vindicate the rule of law. Likewise, findings against a Chief Constable vindicate justice, even where personal culpability is not alleged (paras [76]–[82]).
• The contrary view in Bush was rejected (para [83]).

3) Absence of a penal notice: no bar to a finding of contempt.

• Penal notices are relevant to enforcement by committal (CPR 81.9(1)), not to the existence of a contempt. They alert a respondent to the potential consequences at the sanction stage but are not a jurisdictional prerequisite for a finding (paras [84]–[90], [95]).
• Public law practice often dispenses with penal notices; orders against public bodies are nonetheless expectantly enforceable and capable of grounding contempt proceedings (paras [91]–[94]).

Application to the facts. On any proper analysis, the April 23 Order was breached both in form (no statement by an officer of at least inspector rank within time) and in substance (failure to undertake a proper search and disclose BWV, later shown to exist). The suggestion that no further footage existed was repeatedly advanced through erroneous evidence and submissions, later acknowledged to be wrong. The police’s subjective belief in compliance could not defeat a finding of contempt; at most, it could affect sanction (paras [69]–[73], [100]).

Costs. In the light of the admitted non‑compliance, the history of delay, the production of erroneous evidence, and the clear misapplication of legal principles below, the costs order against Ms Buzzard‑Quashie was wrong in principle and set aside (para [98]).

Impact and Implications

A. Public bodies and police forces

• Accountability at the top. Chief Constables can be the subject of contempt findings for force‑wide non‑compliance with court orders. This will materially affect litigation risk and governance standards across forces.
• Orders must be obeyed, penal notice or not. Public authorities cannot treat orders without penal notices as “optional.” The absence of a penal notice does not immunise them from contempt findings.
• Truthful evidence and proper searches. Affidavits/witness statements filed in response to orders must be accurate. The Court’s recital of multiple false statements underscores the risk of aggravated sanction and reputational damage when the court is misled, even inadvertently.
• Digital evidence discipline. BWV search protocols must be robust (e.g., audit‑log interrogation; searching by officer as well as incident number; error‑proof metadata practices). Mis‑indexing or “standard search” limitations will not excuse non‑compliance.
• Rank‑appropriate deponents. Where orders stipulate the rank and status of the deponent (e.g., inspector or above), civilian staff statements will not suffice.

B. Litigants and practitioners

• Contempt as a compliance lever. Where orders and ICO decisions are ignored, contempt remains a vital remedy to vindicate rights, even if committal is not sought. An explicit plea for a finding (leaving sanction to the court) may be appropriate.
• Evidence curation. Audit trails, data logs, and metadata are pivotal in digital disclosure disputes. Early requests for such materials can decisively test compliance assertions.
• Costs consequences. Courts are prepared to reverse adverse costs orders where applicants were justified in pursuing contempt for serious non‑compliance.

C. The law of contempt

• Clarified elements. The Court distils the elements for civil contempt for breach: notice, intentional act/omission, and knowledge of the facts constituting breach, all proved to the criminal standard. No additional mens rea is required.
• Finding vs committal. Penal notices and degrees of culpability are principally relevant at the sanction stage. The separation of stages should avoid conflating threshold liability with punishment.
• Public law practice reaffirmed. Orders against public authorities are enforceable without penal notices; contempt findings can be made to vindicate the rule of law, with sanctions ranging from declaratory relief and costs to more coercive measures in appropriate cases.

D. Data protection and BWV governance

• Interplay with the ICO. Even after a favourable ICO decision, court orders may be required to secure compliance. Failure to comply with court‑mandated disclosure notwithstanding an ICO decision can attract contempt.
• Retention and indexing. The judgment highlights systemic risks in BWV retention and indexing (e.g., mis‑allocation to the wrong occurrence). Forces should audit systems to ensure discoverability across multiple keys (officer ID, time stamp, location, incident/OCC number).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Civil vs criminal contempt: Civil contempt typically concerns disobedience of court orders in civil proceedings. Although “civil,” it can lead to punitive sanctions (fines, committal). Criminal contempt usually addresses conduct that scandalises or interferes with the administration of justice independently of any order (some categories have been abolished or subsumed into general contempt).
• Mens rea in contempt: For a finding of civil contempt for breach of an order, the court does not need proof of an intent to defy the court; it needs proof that the contemnor intentionally did (or failed to do) the act which, objectively, breached the order. Intention and culpability primarily inform the sanction.
• Penal notice: A warning on an order that breach may lead to committal, fines, or other sanctions. Useful, often required for committal, but its absence does not bar a finding that contempt has occurred.
• Corporation sole: A legal status where an office and its holder constitute a single legal person (e.g., a Chief Constable). It facilitates continuity and legal responsibility irrespective of the individual post‑holder.
• Standard of proof: Alleged contempt must be proved to the criminal standard (beyond reasonable doubt), even in civil proceedings.
• Inherent jurisdiction: Powers the court has by virtue of being a court of law, not conferred by statute, used to protect the administration of justice (including controlling contempt).
• ICO and IOPC: The ICO enforces data rights and privacy; the IOPC is the independent police complaints body. An ICO decision does not displace the court’s orders; breach of either can have serious consequences.

Conclusion

Buzzard‑Quashie is a significant Court of Appeal decision that recalibrates and clarifies the practical law of civil contempt in three ways of broad importance:

• It confirms that a finding of civil contempt for breach of a court order does not require proof of wilful or contumelious intent; intention is relevant to sanction, not liability.
• It holds that a Chief Constable, as a corporation sole with direction and control of a force, can be the proper subject of a contempt finding for the force’s acts or omissions, disapproving the contrary first‑instance view in Bush.
• It clarifies that the absence of a penal notice does not bar a finding of contempt; penal notices principally bear on committal and sanction, not the threshold finding.

The judgment also serves as a cautionary tale about the rigour required in digital evidence management and litigation conduct. Repeated inaccurate statements and inadequate searches will not withstand scrutiny, especially when audit logs and metadata expose omissions. For public bodies, especially police forces, the decision underscores that court orders are to be obeyed promptly and exactly, that truthful and rank‑appropriate evidence must be provided, and that systemic weaknesses are no defence to liability (though they may influence sanction). For claimants and practitioners, the decision affirms contempt as an effective mechanism to enforce compliance and vindicate rights where other levers fail.

Sanction for the admitted contempt has been deferred under CPR Pt 81 to allow for further process and to consider apologies — aligning with the Court’s emphasis that findings and penalties are distinct, and that apologies and remedial steps can be materially relevant to outcome. Finally, the referral to the IOPC signals that where systemic failures obstruct transparency and justice, independent oversight may follow.