CCRC References, Absent Appellants, and Fresh Evidence of Police Corruption: Clarifications from De Souza [2025] EWCA Crim 1145

Introduction

De Souza, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 1145) is a further chapter in the Court of Appeal’s continuing correction of convictions tainted by the discredited activities of Detective Sergeant Derek Ridgewell of the British Transport Police (BTP). The case concerns a 1972 conviction of Mr Ronald De Souza, then aged 17, for attempted robbery on the London Underground. After his application for leave to appeal was refused by the single judge in 1973, his case was referred back to the Court of Appeal by the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) more than five decades later.

The appeal was heard in the appellant’s absence after two unsuccessful adjournment applications. The respondent (the Crown) did not oppose the appeal and accepted that the case is materially indistinguishable from the appeals of four co-accused—Green, Harriott, Davison, and Johnson—whose convictions had already been quashed. The core issues were:

Whether the Court could and should proceed to hear a CCRC-referred appeal in the appellant’s absence, and on the CCRC’s grounds alone.
Whether fresh evidence of police corruption—specifically, Ridgewell’s later-proven dishonesty and criminality—rendered the 1972 conviction unsafe.
Whether a retrial was appropriate.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court exercised its power to hear and determine the appeal in the appellant’s absence, explaining the protective practice of writing to the absent appellant post-judgment to invite any additional submissions that might have affected the outcome.
The Court confirmed its jurisdiction to proceed on the grounds formulated by the CCRC; those grounds “take effect as an appeal against conviction,” and the appellant was under no obligation to add or amend them.
Fresh evidence of DS Ridgewell’s serious corruption—most notably his 1980 conviction for conspiracy to steal while serving in the BTP—was admitted under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.
Because Ridgewell’s testimony was central to the prosecution case and the fresh evidence comprehensively undermined his integrity and reliability, the conviction was declared unsafe.
The conviction was quashed; the Crown indicated there would be no application for a retrial.
The Court expressed regret at the historical failure of BTP to review the Ridgewell-affected cases sooner and acknowledged the enduring burden of wrongful conviction borne by the appellant.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Prior Case History Referenced

The Court situated this appeal within a now well-established line of “Ridgewell cases.” It expressly noted:

The prior successful appeals of Mr De Souza’s co-accused (Green, Harriott, Davison, and Johnson), all quashed on materially identical grounds.
An earlier successful appeal referred by the CCRC in 2018, which catalysed a wider investigation into Ridgewell’s conduct.
The observation by the Lord Chief Justice in one of these cases of an “accumulating body of evidence concerning the integrity of DS Ridgewell and the teams that he led.”

While the Court did not enumerate specific citations beyond these, the pattern is important: as the evidential record concerning Ridgewell’s misconduct has grown, the Court of Appeal has consistently found that convictions obtained with material reliance on his testimony are unsafe. De Souza continues and consolidates that approach, particularly where the prosecution does not resist and where the fresh evidence satisfies section 23 criteria.

Legal Reasoning

1) Jurisdiction and Procedure on a CCRC Reference

The Court re-stated, with practical clarity, that a CCRC reference “takes effect as an appeal against conviction.” The grounds advanced by the CCRC become the appellant’s grounds. The appellant may add or amend, but need not. This point directly answered Mr De Souza’s jurisdictional objection and underlines the Court’s competence to determine the appeal notwithstanding the appellant’s absence and his acting in person.

2) Proceeding in the Appellant’s Absence

The Court affirmed its power to proceed without the appellant notwithstanding his entitlement to be present. The judgment articulates a well-established but important fairness mechanism: when the Court determines an appeal in the appellant’s absence, the Registrar writes to the appellant after judgment, inviting any points the appellant would have raised that might have altered the outcome. If such points are later advanced and appear material, the case may be re-listed.

The Court explained why adjournment was refused twice. The appeal was unopposed, the interests of justice required expedition given the historical injustice, and the appellant’s reasons for adjournment did not demonstrate a procedural impediment. The Court acknowledged the appellant’s mistrust—rooted in his past experience—but emphasised that proceeding promptly was in his own interests.

3) Admission of Fresh Evidence under Section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968

The respondent accepted, and the Court agreed, that the fresh evidence—most prominently Ridgewell’s 1980 conviction for conspiracy to steal and the documented concerns about his integrity—should be admitted under section 23. The section 23 framework (in essence) asks:

Is the evidence credible and capable of belief?
Could it have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at trial? (Plainly not: the misconduct came to light later.)
Is it such that, if given, it may afford a ground for allowing the appeal (because the conviction would be unsafe)?

The Court considered these criteria satisfied. Ridgewell’s later conviction and the documented concerns about his earlier “anti-mugging” work supply probative evidence of systemic dishonesty. Because the prosecution case centrally relied on his testimony, the fresh evidence fatally undermined the verdict.

4) The “Unsafe” Test and the Centrality of the Discredited Witness

Applying the overarching “unsafe” test (the statutory standard governing the Court’s power to allow an appeal), the Court reasoned that where a case is substantially dependent on a now-discredited police witness, the integrity of the entire prosecution is compromised. The fresh evidence not only impeaches Ridgewell’s reliability but also provides positive support for the defence accounts given at the time—accounts alleging that the defendants were set up and coerced.

5) Parity with Co-Accused and the Absence of a Retrial

The Crown acknowledged that the case was “materially indistinguishable” from the already-allowed appeals of the co-accused. That parity weighed heavily: the consistent quashing of equivalent convictions promotes equal treatment for participants in the same trial affected by the same defective evidential foundation. The Crown’s indication that it would not seek a retrial removed the need for further remedial analysis; the conviction was simply quashed.

Impact and Future Significance

Consolidation of the Ridgewell line: The case reinforces the position that convictions materially reliant on Ridgewell’s evidence are unsafe when post-trial corruption evidence is admitted. It will continue to guide the quashing of similarly tainted convictions.
Procedural clarity for CCRC references: The Court’s crisp statements that (i) a CCRC reference takes effect as an appeal against conviction, and (ii) the CCRC’s grounds suffice for jurisdiction even if the appellant is absent or unrepresented, will assist future case management of historical injustice appeals.
Hearing appeals in the appellant’s absence: The articulation of the “protective letter” practice offers a clear template for ensuring fairness while not delaying unopposed appeals that correct longstanding wrongs. This is significant for ageing appellants and posthumous or near-posthumous contexts.
Institutional learning and review: The judgment again highlights the systemic failure of the BTP to review Ridgewell-affected convictions in the early 1980s. Its tone and reasoning may stimulate further proactive scrutiny where officer integrity is later discredited.
Evidential threshold in corruption cases: De Souza exemplifies that later-proved and serious dishonesty by a central police witness—especially where an “accumulating body of evidence” has been recognised by the courts—will ordinarily tip the balance towards “unsafe,” even if the original trial contained corroborative strands (which, here, were not independent of Ridgewell’s narrative).

Complex Concepts Simplified

CCRC Reference: The Criminal Cases Review Commission can refer a case back to the Court of Appeal when it considers that there is a real possibility the conviction would not be upheld. When it does, the reference “takes effect as an appeal,” supplying grounds that the Court can decide.
Single Judge Refusal and Renewal: In criminal appeals, a single judge first decides whether to grant leave to appeal. If refused, the applicant can normally “renew” the application to the full court. In 1973, Mr De Souza did not renew.
Fresh Evidence (Section 23, Criminal Appeal Act 1968): The Court can admit new evidence that wasn’t available at the trial if it is credible and could affect the safety of the conviction. Here, Ridgewell’s later criminal conviction and related materials met that test.
Unsafe Conviction: The Court allows an appeal if the conviction is unsafe. It is a broad safety jurisdiction: if later evidence shows the trial’s foundation was unreliable, the conviction must be quashed.
Proceeding in Absence: An appellant is entitled to be present, but the Court can proceed without them—especially where the appeal is unopposed and delay would perpetuate injustice—while protecting fairness by inviting post-judgment submissions that might warrant a further hearing.
No Retrial: After quashing, the Court can order a retrial if appropriate. Here, the Crown did not seek one—likely reflecting the passage of time, the undermined evidence base, and the public interest.

Practical Takeaways for Practitioners

Where later-discovered evidence discredits a central police witness, assemble a section 23 application focusing on (i) why the evidence was unavailable at trial, (ii) credibility, and (iii) how it undermines the prosecution case as a whole.
In CCRC referrals, be aware that the reference itself supplies jurisdiction and grounds. An appellant’s absence does not bar determination; ensure the Court is apprised if additional points might be material.
Parity arguments matter: where co-accused in the same trial have had convictions quashed on the same basis, expect a strong presumption towards equal treatment absent differentiating features.
Expect the Court to push unopposed historical-injustice appeals forward in the interests of justice, especially when the evidence base for the original conviction has collapsed.

Conclusion

De Souza [2025] EWCA Crim 1145 is a careful but firm consolidation of principles for unwinding historical miscarriages of justice caused by discredited police evidence. Substantively, it reiterates that later-proved corruption by a central witness makes convictions unsafe when the fresh evidence is admitted under section 23 of the 1968 Act. Procedurally, it clarifies that the Court can proceed on a CCRC reference in the absence of the appellant, using a fair post-judgment invitation for further submissions. The decision ensures parity with co-accused appeals, declines a retrial given the undermined evidential foundations, and underscores the Court’s commitment to rectifying entrenched wrongs with urgency and fairness. Its wider significance lies in both restoring individual justice and reinforcing public confidence that the appellate system will respond decisively when institutional integrity is later shown to have failed.