Vince v Secretary of State for Transport (Court of Appeal, 2025)

Key Principle: Guidance issued under s.18 Traffic Management Act 2004 is wholly discretionary; its withdrawal is a matter of high-level policy attracting a “light-touch” (low-intensity) form of judicial review, absent breach of fundamental rights.

1. Introduction

The claimant, Mr Dale Vince, well-known environmental campaigner and entrepreneur, sought permission to judicially review the Secretary of State’s decision to withdraw the 2022 supplementary guidance “Traffic Management Act 2004: Network Management to Support Active Travel”. That guidance—issued during and after the COVID-19 pandemic—had urged local authorities to re-allocate road space in favour of walking and cycling through nine headline measures (e.g. cycle lanes, low-traffic neighbourhoods, 20 mph zones).

Permission was refused twice in the High Court (Lang J on the papers; Heather Williams J after oral renewal). Mr Vince appealed. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, reinforcing the legal principle that:

• Sections 16-18 of the Traffic Management Act 2004 (TMA 2004) impose network-management duties on local authorities, NOT on the Secretary of State, and
• Any guidance published under s.18 is entirely discretionary; consequently, its withdrawal lies firmly within the executive’s policy-making prerogative, reviewable only on classic Wednesbury / irrationality grounds, judged with a low intensity of scrutiny.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Holgate LJ (with whom Andrews LJ and Coulson LJ agreed) held:

1. No statutory objective was frustrated. The TMA 2004’s expressed objectives (ss.16-17) relate to the “expeditious movement of traffic” in general, not to advancing any specific mode such as cycling or walking. There is no embedded statutory aim to promote active travel.
2. Guidance under s.18 is optional. Parliament allowed, but did not mandate, the publication of guidance. Hence the Secretary of State was legally entitled to decline to publish, amend, or withdraw such guidance.
3. Grounds of challenge (statutory purpose, disproportionality, irrationality) were all unarguable. The withdrawal formed part of a broader shift in Government policy (“Plan for Drivers”) and was not limited to concerns over Low-Traffic Neighbourhoods (LTNs). No material considerations were overlooked, and no illogical reasoning was shown.
4. Standard of Review. Given the macro-political nature of national transport policy, the appropriate intensity of review is “light-touch”; the court will intervene only where a decision is irrational in the strict Wednesbury sense.
5. Permission to appeal and for judicial review was refused.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• R (Palestine Solidarity Campaign) v SoS for Communities [2020] UKSC 16 – Demonstrated how statutory guidance may mirror primary legislation; the Court distinguished it, emphasising that in the TMA 2004 guidance is merely permissive.
• For Women Scotland Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16 – Cited for orthodox principles of statutory interpretation: objectives derive from the words of the statute, not from guidance.
• R (Save Stonehenge WHS) v SoS for Transport [2024] EWCA Civ 1227 – Applied to the adequacy of ministerial briefing; court reiterated that only “obviously material” factors must be expressly drawn to a minister’s attention.
• R (Packham) v SoS for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 1005 – Authority for low-intensity review of macro-political policy choices.
• Reid v SoS for Scotland [1999] 2 AC 512 and McGrath v DWP [2012] EWHC 1042 – Cited for the proposition that disproportionality arguments collapse back into Wednesbury irrationality where no Convention right is implicated.
• Humber Landlords Assoc. v Hull CC [2019] EWHC 332 – Weight attached to considerations is a matter for the decision-maker, absent irrationality.

The Court relied on these authorities mainly to: (i) demarcate the limits of purposive interpretation; (ii) restate the difference between mandatory duties and discretionary powers; and (iii) define the appropriate intensity of judicial review in policy-rich contexts.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Statutory Analysis. Sections 16-18 TMA 2004 impose duties only on “network management authorities” (local traffic authorities). The Secretary of State’s role is limited to optionally issuing guidance (s.18) and to enforcement powers (ss.20-30). Hence, guidance cannot transform the Act’s objectives.
2. Non-Existence of a Duty to Favour Active Travel. Because “traffic” in s.16 includes all users (cars, pedestrians, cyclists), the Act is mode-neutral. The Court rejected the claimant’s attempt to elevate the 2022 Guidance into a statutory purpose.
3. Permissibility of Policy Change. Ministers are entitled to shift policy priorities (here, towards driver interests) provided the shift is rational and procedurally proper.
4. Material Considerations and Briefing. Cabinet submissions revealed concerns extending beyond LTNs (e.g., community engagement, broader re-allocation of road space). Climate-change and air-quality aims continued to be pursued through other documents (Transport Decarbonisation Plan). Thus, no “obviously material” matters were ignored.
5. Intensity of Review. Macro-level transport guidance sits in a politically sensitive arena. In that setting, the Court eschewed proportionality-based scrutiny, reserving it for ECHR/fundamental-rights contexts, and instead applied orthodox irrationality control.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Judgment

• Guidance Withdrawal Litigation. Claimants will struggle to argue that removing discretionary guidance frustrates statutory purpose unless the statute itself obliges issuance of guidance or embeds a substantive policy objective.
• Transport & Environmental Campaigning. Challenges to central Government’s recalibration between active-travel and driver-oriented priorities will face a high hurdle; campaigners may need to focus on local-authority decisions (where duties remain) rather than national guidance.
• Administrative Law Doctrine. The case re-emphasises: (a) the difference between soft-law instruments and hard statutory duties; (b) the relevance of “light-touch” review for macro-political decisions; and (c) that proportionality is not a free-standing ground in domestic judicial review absent fundamental rights.
• Practical Effect on Local Authorities. Network-management authorities must still comply with ss.16-17, but, after the withdrawal, they no longer enjoy the explicit policy steer (nor the “assumption of retention” of COVID schemes) found in the 2022 Guidance. They are, however, still subject to other documents (e.g. LTN 1/20, Manual for Streets) unless separately withdrawn.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 18 Guidance (TMA 2004)

A non-binding document issued by the Secretary of State offering advice to local traffic authorities. Authorities must “have regard” to it, but Government can issue or withdraw it at will.

Wednesbury Irrationality

A decision is unlawful if it is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached it.

Low-Traffic Neighbourhood (LTN)

A set of traffic filters and road closures designed to reduce through-traffic in residential areas, thereby encouraging walking and cycling.

Light-Touch / Low-Intensity Review

The court’s deferential approach when scrutinising high-level policy choices, recognising democratic accountability of ministers.

Discretionary vs. Mandatory Powers

A discretionary power allows (but does not oblige) the authority to act; a mandatory duty compels action. The difference is crucial to establishing whether guidance is legally necessary.

5. Conclusion

Vince v Secretary of State for Transport is significant less for its immediate effect on active-travel policy, and more for the clarity it brings to administrative-law principles:

• Statutory purposes are fixed by Parliament’s words—not by guidance or ministerial aspirations.
• The Secretary of State’s discretion to issue (or withdraw) s.18 TMA guidance is unfettered unless exercised irrationally or for an improper purpose.
• Courts will afford a high degree of deference (light-touch review) to macro-political policy shifts, especially where no fundamental rights are engaged.
• Proportionality remains inapplicable as an independent ground of domestic judicial review outside ECHR contexts.

As environmental and transport policy continues to oscillate between decarbonisation imperatives and motoring interests, Vince serves as a critical reminder of the limits of judicial intervention: campaigners must persuade Parliament or Government, not the courts, when the contested decision sits at the heart of policy discretion expressly granted by statute.