Beyond Chronological Age: Brzozowski and the Nuanced Assessment of “Significant Age Disparity” in Sentencing for Sexual Activity with a Child

1. Introduction

In Brzozowski, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 1113), the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) was asked by His Majesty’s Solicitor General to review a suspended sentence of 21 months’ imprisonment imposed for an offence of sexual activity with a child contrary to s. 9 Sexual Offences Act 2003. The prosecution contended the sentence was unduly lenient, urging that the conduct fell within Category 1A of the Sentencing Council’s “Sexual Activity with a Child” guideline, which would normally attract a starting point of five years’ immediate custody. The trial judge, however, placed the offence in Category 1B—towards its upper end—thereby enabling her to suspend the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the reference, holding that the judge’s assessment was properly open on the facts. Crucially, the Court elaborated that “significant disparity in age” under the guideline is not a purely mathematical exercise; account may be taken of the offender’s cognitive functioning and maturity. Although the Court was careful to stress that its decision turned on highly unusual facts and “cannot be relied upon as setting any form of precedent”, the judgment inevitably illuminates how future courts might approach age-gap assessments where an offender’s intellectual or developmental limitations narrow the effective maturity distance between adult and child.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Solicitor General sought leave to refer the sentence as unduly lenient on the basis that the offence was Category 1A (penile penetration, Culpability A).
• The Court accepted the trial judge was entitled to treat the offence as Category 1B, identifying:

• no direct supply of alcohol by the offender;
• no proven “specific targeting” by him;
• a borderline—though not inevitably “significant”—age disparity once his borderline intellectual functioning (IQ 75) was weighed.

• The 21-month sentence, though lenient, lay within the permissible range; therefore, the Court granted leave but dismissed the reference.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

While the judgment references no earlier case by name, it relies on four key sources of authority:

1. Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 – confirming lifelong anonymity of the complainant.
2. Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 9 – creating the substantive offence of sexual activity with a child.
3. Criminal Justice Act 1988, s. 36 – empowering the Solicitor General to refer unduly lenient sentences.
4. Sentencing Council Guidelines – specifically the guideline for Sexual Activity with a Child and the Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences guideline.

The Court’s discussion of “significant age disparity” implicitly drew upon earlier appellate guidance (e.g., R v Cockburn [2018] EWCA Crim 944 and R v Privett [2020] EWCA Crim 557) which emphasise structured use of the guidelines but permit nuanced fact-sensitive departures. However, Brzozowski uniquely foregrounds intellectual functioning as a legitimate dimension of disparity analysis.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Guideline Categorisation. Harm was inevitably Category 1 because penetration occurred. The controversy lay in Culpability.
   • Culpability A requires at least one of: (i) use of alcohol/drugs to facilitate; (ii) specific targeting of a particularly vulnerable child; (iii) significant age disparity.
   • The Court upheld the judge’s findings that each of these factors was at best borderline or absent on the facts.
2. Alcohol. Although the victim was intoxicated, the offender did not supply the alcohol. Her consumption remained an aggravating factor but did not automatically place the offence in Culpability A.
3. Specific Targeting. Grooming and targeting were primarily the co-defendants’ enterprise; the offender “was kept out of the loop.” Absence of deliberate targeting militated against Culpability A.
4. Age Disparity.
   • Statistically, 21 vs 15 is normally “significant.”
   • However, the offender’s borderline intellectual functioning (FSIQ 75) and contemporaneous immaturity narrowed the developmental gap.
   • The Court accepted the trial judge’s entitlement to conclude the disparity was not sufficiently significant for guideline purposes on these unusual facts.
5. Suspension of Custody. Having selected a headline of 21 months (after 10 % trial-stage plea credit), the judge considered the Imposition guideline and found:
   • a realistic prospect of rehabilitation;
   • strong personal mitigation (first offence, caring role, mental health);
   • 14-year delay with no subsequent offending.
   These reasons justified suspension, a decision the Court described as “humane and carefully considered.”

3.3 Impact on Future Cases

1. Functional vs Chronological Age. Although the Court disclaimed making any precedent, the explicit statement that “chronological age may not tell the whole story” will likely be invoked by defence advocates whenever neuro-developmental evidence suggests reduced maturity. Courts may require fuller psychiatric or psychological assessments before concluding a disparity is “significant.”

2. Guideline Flexibility. Brzozowski reaffirms that Sentencing Council categories are starting points, not strait-jackets. Trial judges retain discretion—especially where prosecution concessions or evidential gaps undermine the presence of Culpability A factors.

3. Unduly Lenient Reference Threshold. The Court signalled restraint: even if a sentence is arguably unduly lenient, intervention remains discretionary. This moderates expectations that every marginally deficient sentence will be increased on reference.

4. Prosecution Concessions. Brzozowski illustrates that concessions made by crown counsel at sentencing can powerfully shape appellate outcomes. Prosecutors must therefore ensure any concessions are consistent with policy and fully reasoned.

5. Multi-offender Context. Where an offender’s conduct is eclipsed by co-defendants’ graver wrongdoing, courts may isolate his culpability rather than allow “guilt by association” to inflate sentence length.

3.4 Complex Concepts Simplified

• Unduly Lenient Sentence Reference (ULS). A special power enabling the Attorney-General or Solicitor General to ask the Court of Appeal to increase a Crown Court sentence perceived as excessively mild.
• Category 1A vs 1B. Sentencing Council guidelines divide offences by harm (the result) and culpability (the offender’s blameworthiness). Category 1 offences involve penetration (highest harm). • Culpability A—aggravated features present—yields far higher sentences. • Culpability B—no such features—yields substantially lower ranges.
• Significant Age Disparity. A guideline factor signalling elevated culpability where an adult’s age magnifies power imbalance. Brzozowski clarifies that intellectual or emotional maturity can be relevant to measuring that disparity.
• Borderline Intellectual Functioning. An IQ score between 70-79. Individuals may struggle with complex reasoning, impulse control, and understanding consequences, potentially reducing culpability where directly linked to the offending behaviour.
• Suspended Sentence. Custodial term held “in abeyance” for a specified period; if the offender commits no further offence and complies with requirements, he does not serve the term.

4. Conclusion

Brzozowski underscores the importance of nuanced, fact-sensitive sentencing in sexual offences involving children. The Court of Appeal affirmed that, while a 21-month suspended sentence was lenient, it fell within the generous ambit of the judge’s discretion because: (1) the offender’s role lacked hallmark Culpability A features; (2) his intellectual limitations blurred the otherwise stark age gap; and (3) he displayed genuine prospects of rehabilitation after 14 offence-free years.

The judgment cautiously opens the door for courts to look beyond chronological age when evaluating “significant disparity,” signalling that cognitive maturity evidence may matter. Though declared non-precedential, the reasoning will doubtless inform future submissions in cases where psychological evidence sheds light on an offender’s functional age. Ultimately, Brzozowski illustrates the judiciary’s continuing commitment to individualised justice within the structured framework of sentencing guidelines.