Bare Assertions and Historic Delay Are No Defence: Summary Judgment on a Personal Guarantee after Kirwan v Connors – Commentary on Credebt Exchange Ltd v Philip Doran [2025] IEHC 740

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the ex tempore ruling of Phelan J. in the High Court of Ireland in Credebt Exchange Ltd v Philip Doran [2025] IEHC 740, delivered on 15 December 2025. The case concerns an application for liberty to enter final judgment in summary proceedings on a personal guarantee and indemnity given by the defendant, Mr Philip Doran, in respect of the indebtedness of Rap Fast Ltd (“the Company”) to the plaintiff, Credebt Exchange Ltd.

The judgment is important in three overlapping areas:

Summary judgment on personal guarantees: it re‑affirms that where a guarantee is clear, the indebtedness is overwhelmingly established, and the guarantor offers only unparticularised and unsupported assertions, the court will grant summary judgment.
The “low but real” threshold test for resisting summary judgment: the decision applies and sharpens the jurisprudence in Anglin, Aer Rianta, Harrisrange and Feniton, stressing that “bare assertions” do not cross the threshold of a “fair and reasonable probability” of a real defence.
Delay and historic inactivity as a defence: applying the Supreme Court’s recent guidance in Kirwan v Connors [2025] IESC 26 and its implementation in Doyle v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2025] IEHC 591, the court holds that earlier periods of inactivity cannot, when proceedings are now active and no dismissal motion has been brought, be repurposed as a freestanding defence to a summary judgment application.

The defendant was a litigant in person. He challenged the plaintiff’s figures, relied on alleged business “implosion” caused by the creditor’s conduct, claimed prejudice due to delay, invoked the Statute of Limitations, and asserted procedural unfairness when a struck-out motion was reinstated the same day. None of these arguments, in the court’s view, rose above “spurious, fanciful or conjectural” contentions.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The commercial relationship and security structure

The underlying relationship between Credebt and Rap Fast was governed principally by:

a Master Agreement dated 6 May 2016;
a Repayment Agreement dated 3 January 2017 (referred to in the summary summons);
two Debentures (fixed and possibly floating security) dated 1 November 2016 and 20 March 2017;
a Personal Guarantee and Indemnity executed by Mr Doran on 16 February 2017, capped at €300,000.

Under the Master Agreement, Credebt provided a form of trade finance: it paid for raw materials from suppliers, which were delivered directly to Rap Fast, then invoiced those materials to the company. Once Rap Fast manufactured and sold the finished shrink-wrap products, the sale proceeds were to be paid to Credebt and applied first in reduction of the debt, with any balance remitted to the company.

The Master Agreement contemplated that Rap Fast’s receivables from its customers would be traded on Credebt’s exchange, and that proceeds of those traded receivables would be applied against Rap Fast’s indebtedness under the “Loan Agreements” (a term used in the correspondence to describe the operative finance documents).

Debentures were granted in November 2016 and March 2017 creating security over certain company assets. On 27 April 2017 Credebt appointed a receiver, Mr Micheál Leydon, over the charged assets, following alleged significant defaults by Rap Fast under the Master Agreement.

2.2 The personal guarantee and indemnity

On 16 February 2017, against this background of an already substantial indebtedness (approximately €470,000 as of late January 2017), the defendant executed a Personal Guarantee & Indemnity in favour of Credebt, capped at €300,000.

The key provisions included:

Definition of “Guaranteed Obligations”: all monies, obligations and liabilities of Rap Fast to Credebt:
“…all monies, obligations and liabilities (including, without limitation in respect of principal, interest, discount commission, fees and expenses, which now are or at any time in the future may be or become due, owing or incurred by the Originator [Rap Fast Limited] to Credebt Exchange pursuant to the Repayment Agreement… The Guaranteed Obligations will not exceed EUR300,000.”
Primary obligation to pay on demand (clause 2.1.1):
“[The Guarantor] irrevocably and unconditionally guarantees to Credebt Exchange, forthwith upon written demand being made by Credebt Exchange, the due and punctual payment, observance, performance and discharge of, and undertakes to pay or discharge, all of the Guaranteed Obligations.”
Consent to judgment (clause 2.5):
“In the event that the Guarantor fails to make any payment due under this Guarantee and Indemnity (the ‘Liquidated Sum’), the Guarantor consents to judgment being registered against him in respect of the Liquidated Sum.”
Independent legal advice clause (clause 4.12):
“The parties acknowledge that they have been afforded the opportunity to take independent legal advice on the terms of this Agreement prior to entering into it. Each party further acknowledges that it understands the effect and implications of this Agreement and that it has entered into this Agreement without any coercion of any description.”

This clause package is typical: it records that the guarantor had the opportunity for legal advice and understood the agreement, making it difficult later to argue lack of understanding, coercion, or unfairness in the formation of the guarantee.

2.3 Default, demands and receivership

By March 2018, Credebt’s position was that Rap Fast’s indebtedness had grown significantly. On 15 March 2018, Credebt issued a demand letter to the company’s directors:

Total claimed: €1,009,650.82
Breakdown: principal €886,327.33 + interest €123,323.00

Credebt characterised this as an “Event of Default” under clause 8.1(a) of the Loan Agreements and threatened to enforce security, including the personal guarantee.

Rap Fast disputed the sums, complaining in a letter of 23 March 2018 that Credebt’s “withholding all funds lodged into our account in Credebt caused the implosion of our business.” Credebt responded through Arthur Cox on 26 April 2018, enclosing reconciliation data (including emails from Rap Fast’s own accountant) showing a total value of traded receivables exceeding €2.7 million. Credebt explained that, under clause 6.19 of the Master Agreement, payments received were applied in reduction of Rap Fast’s liabilities; the amount demanded was stated to be the net balance after lawful application of these funds.

On 24 April 2018, Credebt wrote to the defendant, invoking the guarantee and demanding €300,000, the contractual cap, by reference to the company’s unpaid indebtedness.

On 27 April 2018, Credebt proceeded to appoint a receiver over Rap Fast’s assets under the Debentures.

2.4 Commencement of proceedings and subsequent delay

On 21 November 2019, Credebt issued a summary summons against the defendant, seeking €300,000 as the guaranteed sum, on the basis that:

Rap Fast was indebted in excess of €1.1 million;
security enforcement through the receiver had not satisfied the debt;
a demand of 14 March 2019 to the defendant for €300,000 remained unsatisfied.

The defendant entered an appearance in person on 8 January 2020. After that, there was almost complete inactivity until:

16 April 2021 – Notice of Intention to Proceed filed;
3 January 2024 – Notice of Motion seeking liberty to enter final judgment issued, grounded on the affidavit of Sharon Lynch sworn 19 December 2023.

In her affidavit, Ms Lynch set out:

Total traded: €2,705,121.38
Total paid: €1,806,801.70
Total outstanding: €898,319.68

Importantly, she limited the calculation for the purpose of the summary judgment application to the principal sums advanced (face value of trades and settled amounts), excluding contractual interest and sell-rate calculations. She expressly reserved Credebt’s position as to interest but relied only on the €898,319.68 principal indebtedness to demonstrate that the €300,000 guarantee was fully called upon.

2.5 The defendant’s responses

A number of steps were taken on the defendant’s side:

A document titled “Affidavit of Philip Doran” dated 24 May 2024 (apparently unfiled, but treated by consent as before the court).
A replying affidavit sworn 11 February 2025.
Subsequent correspondence raising further issues (Statute of Limitations, alleged impairment of security, documentation requests).

Across these materials, the defendant:

Disputed the accuracy of Credebt’s figures, referring to a “multitude of discrepancies” allegedly identified by former directors, but without particularising any specific discrepancy.
Alleged that Credebt’s conduct (withholding funds and appointing a receiver) “imploded” a viable business, thereby triggering the default that made the guarantee enforceable.
Claimed a denial of fair procedures and a breach of legal certainty when the summary judgment motion, struck out earlier in the day for non‑appearance, was later reinstated the same day.
Raised delay and claimed that the passage of time rendered it “exceedingly difficult, if not impossible” to resolve the parties’ disputes, allegedly risking a miscarriage of justice.
Asserted (without evidence) that assets of the company worth about €500,000 had been disposed of by the receiver for less than €50,000, amounting to wrongful impairment of security and bad faith.
Invoked the Statute of Limitations, contending that the claim was statute-barred.
Complained that key records and members of the management team were no longer available or “accessible”, but did not identify specific documents or witnesses or evidence efforts to trace them.

He also claimed ignorance of the need to substantiate his assertions with evidence, emphasising his status as a lay litigant without legal representation.

2.6 The struck-out and reinstated motion

The summary judgment motion initially came before the Master’s Court on 7 March 2024. Counsel for the plaintiff was delayed; the motion was struck out in the defendant’s presence. However, according to the affidavit of Neil Byrne (18 November 2024), the Deputy Master indicated that the matter was only conditionally struck out and could be reinstated if counsel or a representative appeared before the end of the day and applied to reinstate. This occurred; the application was reinstated that same day.

The defendant argued that once struck out he was entitled to assume the matter was closed, citing legitimate expectation, legal certainty and the court’s duty to prevent abuse of process. The court later rejected this account as implausible.

2.7 Transfer to the Non‑Jury/Judicial Review list and full hearing

After the exchange of affidavits, the matter was transferred to the Non‑Jury/Judicial Review list and listed for hearing on 11 December 2025. Directions were given regarding written submissions.

3. Summary of the Judgment

Phelan J. granted summary judgment to the plaintiff for €300,000, the full amount of the capped guarantee.

Her core findings may be summarised as follows:

Binding guarantee and established indebtedness:
- The defendant executed a clear and enforceable guarantee and indemnity in favour of Credebt in February 2017, with a cap of €300,000, and consented to judgment if payment was not made on demand.
- The company’s indebtedness to Credebt, even on the limited principal-only basis advanced, stood at €898,319.68. Even if the receiver had realised Rap Fast’s assets for the defendant’s alleged valuation of €500,000 (for which there was no evidence), the residual debt would still exceed the €300,000 cap. Consequently, the defendant’s exposure on the guarantee could not be eliminated by any plausible level of realisations via receivership.
No arguable defence to the debt or guarantee:
- The defendant’s challenges to the computations were entirely unparticularised; he identified no concrete error. On the evidence before the court, including reconciliation involving the company’s accountant, there was no indication of material miscalculation.
- By limiting the claim to principal and excluding interest and contractual “sell-rate” calculations, the plaintiff simplified the computation and provided a straightforward documentary trail.
- This was a classic “documents case”: money advanced and secured by a guarantee, a demand made, and no payment received.
Bare assertions do not surmount the summary judgment threshold:
- Applying Anglin, Aer Rianta, Harrisrange, Feniton and related authorities, the court held that the defendant had not shown a “fair and reasonable probability” of a real defence on law or facts.
- His allegations of bad faith, wrongful impairment of security, unfair receivership, and disputed figures were unsupported by evidence or realistic prospects of evidence. As such, they amounted to “spurious, fanciful or conjectural contentions” designed to postpone “the evil day”.
Delay and want of prosecution jurisprudence do not assist the defendant:
- There had been significant inactivity between the appearance in early 2020 and the motion in January 2024, but the defendant never applied to dismiss the proceedings for want of prosecution.
- By reference to Kirwan v Connors and Dignam J.’s application of it in Doyle, the court held that:
  - a dismissal application generally requires an immediately preceding period of at least two years of inactivity;
  - once the plaintiff has resumed active prosecution, historic inactivity alone cannot ground dismissal; and
  - it would be “illogical and unfair” to allow a defendant to sit back during renewed activity and then seek dismissal solely by reference to earlier inactivity.
- Given that the case had been active since January 2024, and the defendant himself had contributed to subsequent delays by seeking time to file affidavits, there was no realistic prospect of a successful dismissal for want of prosecution, let alone a basis to bar summary judgment.
- Furthermore, the defendant adduced no specific, evidentially grounded prejudice caused by delay, particularly in a documents‑based debt claim.
Other asserted defences rejected:
- Statute of Limitations: the defendant misunderstood the operation of the statute. Once proceedings were issued in November 2019, time stopped running. There was no viable limitation defence.
- Alleged impairment of security and under‑value sale: these claims rested on the defendant’s “understanding” that assets worth €500,000 were sold for less than €50,000, but were unsupported by any evidence of asset values, marketing, offers, or complaints against the receiver. No proceedings appear to have been pursued against the receiver by the company or the defendant. In any event, even taking the defendant’s figures at their highest, they could not reduce the residual debt below €300,000.
- Fair procedures / reinstatement of the struck‑out motion: the court accepted the account given by the plaintiff’s deponent, Mr Byrne, concerning how the Master’s Court dealt with the matter. The defendant’s assertion that he believed the proceedings were finally over was found implausible; he had every reason to understand the possibility of reinstatement and was given full opportunity to respond on affidavit thereafter.
- Litigant-in-person status: the court was not persuaded that the defendant’s lack of legal representation excused his failure to adduce evidence. He had litigation experience, including reaching the Supreme Court in Stapleton v Doran [2019] IESC 19, and he had been repeatedly given time to assemble evidence. His professed ignorance of what was required to resist summary judgment was not accepted as credible.

Concluding that there was no genuine issue to be tried and that the defendant had not met even the relatively low threshold required to resist summary judgment, Phelan J. granted judgment for €300,000 in favour of the plaintiff.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Key Legal Issues

The judgment engages with several distinct, though interrelated, legal questions:

Enforceability of the personal guarantee and indemnity: Was the guarantee binding, and was the indebtedness of the company sufficient to trigger liability up to the €300,000 cap?
Threshold for resisting summary judgment: Did the defendant show a “fair and reasonable probability” of a real, bona fide defence in law or on the facts, thereby justifying a plenary hearing?
Effect of delay and want of prosecution principles: Could the plaintiff’s historic inactivity bar summary judgment, or give rise to a de facto dismissal defence, absent a formal motion to dismiss?
Statute of Limitations: Was the claim time‑barred in whole or in part?
Procedural fairness and reinstatement of a struck‑out motion: Did the reinstatement of the summary judgment motion breach fair procedures or legal certainty?
Allegations of bad faith, wrongful appointment of a receiver, and impairment of security: Were these allegations sufficiently supported and, even if true, could they realistically extinguish or reduce the defendant’s liability under the guarantee?

4.2 Precedents and Their Influence on the Court’s Decision

4.2.1 Summary judgment jurisprudence

The judge grounds her analysis in well-established Irish and English case-law on summary judgment:

First National Commercial Bank v Anglin [1996] IESC 1, [1996] 1 I.R. 75
Banque de Paris v De Naray [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 21
National Westminster Bank plc v Daniel [1993] 1 WLR 1453
Aer Rianta CPT v Ryanair Ltd [2001] 4 I.R. 607
Harrisrange Ltd v Duncan [2003] 4 I.R. 1
Feniton Property Finance dac v McCool [2022] IECA 217
IBRC Ltd v McCaughey [2014] 1 I.R. 749
Prendergast v Biddle (Unreported, Supreme Court, 31 July 1957)
Promontoria (Aran) Ltd v Burns [2020] IECA 87
Allied Irish Banks plc v Killoran [2015] IEHC 850

The central thread from these cases is that, although summary judgment is a drastic remedy (in that it denies a defendant a full oral trial), it is nonetheless appropriate where the defendant cannot demonstrate:

a fair or reasonable probability of a real defence, and
a real issue to be tried that is neither simple nor easily determined on affidavit.

Some key passages adopted by Phelan J. are:

Anglin (following Banque de Paris and Daniel):
“The mere assertion in an affidavit of a given situation which was to be the basis of a defence did not of itself provide leave to defend; the Court had to look at the whole situation to see whether the defendant had satisfied the Court that there was a fair or reasonable probability of the defendants having a real or bona fide defence.”
Aer Rianta v Ryanair:
“… the fundamental questions to be posed on an application such as this remain: is it ‘very clear’ that the defendant has no case? Is there either no issue to be tried or only issues which are simple and easily determined? Do the defendants’ affidavits fail to disclose even an arguable case?”
Feniton v McCool:
“The fundamental question to be addressed is whether there is a fair and reasonable probability of the defendant having a real bona fide defence, in law, on the facts or both.”
and, further:
“… the requirement that a defendant establish a fair and reasonable probability of the defendant having a defence is a relatively low threshold, [but] it is a threshold… The defendant must, accordingly, lay a basis on which the court can conclude that there is in truth an issue to be tried… Thus … the type of factual assertions which may not provide an arguable defence are those that amount to a mere assertion unsupported either by evidence or by any realistic suggestion that evidence may be available, or which comprise facts which are in and of themselves inconsistent or contradictory.”

These authorities collectively shape the core analytical framework applied by the judge: bare assertions, even if sincerely held by the defendant, do not cross the threshold unless they are grounded in evidence or at least a credible prospect of evidence.

The decision also cites Barr J. in Digan v O’Brien [2025] IEHC 23, who in turn referenced Moriarty J. in AIB v Killoran to emphasise that courts must be alert to defendants seeking simply to “defer the evil day” by raising claims that “do not pass muster” and should apply a de minimis approach to trivial or speculative defences.

4.2.2 Delay and dismissal for want of prosecution

On the topic of delay, the court relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s then‑recent guidance in Kirwan v Connors & Ors [2025] IESC 26, as synthesised by O’Donnell C.J., and its application by Dignam J. in Doyle v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána & Ors [2025] IEHC 591.

From Kirwan, the court extracts a structured approach:

Up to 2 years’ inactivity: A claim should only be dismissed if it is an abuse of process or if the defendant can establish prejudice at the level required under the O’Domhnaill line of authority.
After 2 years’ inactivity: A claim may be dismissed, but the defendant must typically show additional prejudice or some other factor. Alternatively, the court may choose to give strict case-management directions instead of dismissal.
Around 4 years’ inactivity: Where a claim depends on oral evidence, the court should tend to dismiss unless the plaintiff can show why justice requires a trial.
More than 5 years’ cumulative complete inactivity: The Supreme Court endorses a “generous power” to dismiss, such that the court should feel free to do so unless a very pressing justice-based reason demands a trial.

In Doyle, Dignam J. distilled this into a working principle that a dismissal application should be preceded by a period of about two years’ inactivity and that it would be:

“illogical and unfair to a plaintiff for a defendant to be able to allow the plaintiff to take steps in the proceedings and, indeed, perhaps to take steps itself, and, in the absence of any fresh period of inactivity, to be entitled to an Order dismissing the proceedings solely on the basis of a period or periods of inactivity at some point earlier in the proceedings.”

Phelan J. adopts this logic. Although she accepts that there was a significant period of inactivity in the present case, she emphasises that:

there was no motion to dismiss for want of prosecution, and
by the time the summary judgment application was being determined, the proceedings had been active for some time.

Therefore, even if a dismissal application had been brought at that point, it would likely have failed. Hence, mere delay could not be repurposed into a substantive defence to a summary judgment application.

4.3 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.3.1 Enforceability of the guarantee and establishment of the debt

The starting point for the court was straightforward: the defendant signed a personal guarantee and indemnity in favour of Credebt on 16 February 2017, clearly capping his liability at €300,000. He acknowledged in writing both the opportunity for independent legal advice and his understanding of the guarantee’s implications.

The Guaranteed Obligations are broadly defined, covering all present and future monies and liabilities of Rap Fast to Credebt under the Repayment Agreement, including principal, interest, fees, and expenses. The guarantee also contains an express consent to judgment.

Crucially:

The defendant did not dispute that he signed the guarantee.
He did not plead any defence based on misrepresentation, undue influence, lack of capacity, or non est factum.
He did not contest the demand mechanism (i.e. the fact of a valid written demand on him in March 2019).

As to the company’s debt, the plaintiff produced:

documentary statements of trading;
a trading summary (total traded, total paid, total outstanding);
evidence of prior reconciliations including material from the company’s own accountant.

The plaintiff went further than required to simplify matters: it excluded interest and more complex contractual elements such as “sell rates”, claiming only the face value of traded sums (€898,319.68). This left an overwhelming margin above the €300,000 guarantee cap.

Thus, even if one accepted the defendant’s own unsubstantiated assertion that the receiver had sold €500,000 worth of assets for less than €50,000, the guarantee would still bite:

€898,319.68 (principal debt) – €500,000 (hypothetical optimal recovery) = c. €398,319.68 remaining debt
That figure still exceeds the €300,000 cap.

On these facts, the judge had no difficulty concluding that the guarantee was enforceable and that the quantum of Rap Fast’s indebtedness sufficed to trigger the defendant’s full liability.

4.3.2 Assessment of the factual disputes and alleged “implosion” of the business

The defendant’s main factual strategy was to contest the figures and blame Credebt’s conduct for the collapse of a supposedly viable business. However:

He did not identify any specific invoice, transaction, or reconciliation entry as incorrect.
He did not exhibit any alternative accounting, expert report, or correspondence from the company’s accountants suggesting material error.
The only concrete historical material in the evidence (the company accountant’s emails relied on by Credebt) tended to corroborate, not undermine, the plaintiff’s numbers.

The allegation that Credebt’s withholding of funds “caused the implosion” of the business was expressed in broad, emotive terms but not tied to:

any contractual provisions breached by Credebt;
any quantified loss distinct from the company’s own default in repaying its debts; or
any causation chain linking alleged misconduct to specific financial consequences.

Moreover, there was an underlying contradiction:

On the one hand, the defendant asserted that the business was viable and that Credebt precipitated its collapse.
On the other hand, he provided no factual basis to suggest that, absent Credebt’s actions, the company could or would have discharged even a substantial part of the debt, much less enough to reduce the indebtedness below the guarantee cap.

In short, even if there had been some controversy about business viability or the timing of receivership, the defendant did not show how this could constitute a legal defence to the clear obligation under the guarantee on the facts of this case.

4.3.3 Bare assertions, evidential burden, and the “low but real” threshold

A central feature of the judgment is its rigorous application of the principle that bare assertions are not enough to resist summary judgment.

The defendant raised multiple themes—disputed figures, business collapse, bad faith, impaired security, lack of documents, absent witnesses—but:

he exhibited no letters seeking particular documents or witnesses;
he did not identify which documents were missing or how they would support a defence;
he did not name the allegedly “inaccessible” management team members or explain efforts to locate them;
he did not point to any realistic plan to adduce evidence at a plenary hearing.

Faced with this, and guided by Feniton and IBRC v McCaughey, the court held that such unsubstantiated assertions do not clear the threshold of a “fair and reasonable probability” of a real defence. They are exactly the kind of speculative contentions that the summary judgment regime is designed to filter out.

The judge emphasised:

The threshold for resisting summary judgment is relatively low, but it is still a threshold.
Courts must prevent defendants from turning straightforward debt claims into unnecessarily complex plenary hearings by advancing “spurious, fanciful or conjectural” defences.
Summary judgment is particularly appropriate where the case is “documents based” and the central facts (existence of a guarantee, amount advanced, demand, non‑payment) are not genuinely in dispute.

4.3.4 Delay and the interaction with want of prosecution jurisprudence

The defendant did not issue a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution; instead, he sought to rely on delay as a general fairness argument and as part of his supposed defence.

The court accepted that the period between the entry of appearance (January 2020) and the summary judgment motion (January 2024) involved significant inactivity, discounting only the filing of a Notice of Intention to Proceed in April 2021. Counsel for the plaintiff referred (from the Bar) to Covid‑related adjournments of summary judgment motions, and acknowledged some unexplained delay in 2023.

However, applying Kirwan and Doyle, Phelan J. reasoned that:

By the time the application for summary judgment was heard, the proceedings had been actively prosecuted for nearly two years (since early 2024).
Any dismissal motion would have to be assessed as of the date it was brought, and would generally need to be preceded by a fresh two‑year period of inactivity—which did not exist here.
It would be unfair to a plaintiff to be subjected to dismissal based solely on historic inactivity once it had resumed active prosecution and the defendant had also engaged with the proceedings.

Critically, the defendant:

never took the initiative to seek dismissal;
could not show specific, concrete prejudice to his ability to defend the claim (as opposed to a generalised assertion that delay made matters “difficult”);
was facing a claim that turned primarily on documentary evidence, not on fading oral recollections.

Thus, delay was insufficient to bar summary judgment. The judgment underscores that want of prosecution principles cannot be “smuggled in” as a defence to a debt claim where there is no live dismissal application and no recent inactivity of the magnitude contemplated in Kirwan.

4.3.5 Litigants in person and procedural fairness

The defendant repeatedly invoked his status as a litigant in person to justify his failure to produce evidence and his alleged misunderstanding of procedural requirements.

The court was sympathetic to the general position of lay litigants but was unwilling to accept, on the facts, that this explained the defendant’s conduct:

He had prior experience litigating to Supreme Court level (Stapleton v Doran [2019] IESC 19).
He had been given multiple adjournments, expressly for the purpose of preparing affidavits and gathering witness evidence.
Despite this, he did not produce any substantial evidential foundation for his alleged defences.

The judge therefore found implausible his claim that he did not know he had to substantiate assertions with evidence. The court emphasised that basic evidential duties apply even to litigants in person, particularly when they have experience and have been given generous procedural leeway.

4.3.6 Statute of Limitations

The Statute of Limitations issue was disposed of relatively briefly. The defendant’s argument rested on the idea that the passage of time had rendered the claim out of time. However:

Proceedings were issued on 21 November 2019;
The key demand on the defendant was dated 14 March 2019;
In Irish law, the issuing of proceedings stops the limitation period running.

The court found that the defendant’s approach betrayed a “fundamental misunderstanding” of how the statute operates. There was no colourable limitation defence whatsoever.

4.3.7 Alleged impairment of security and bad faith

The defendant’s allegation that the receiver sold assets worth €500,000 for less than €50,000 was particularly stark, but also wholly unsubstantiated. He supplied:

no valuation reports;
no marketing reports;
no details of bids received or offers turned down;
no correspondence complaining to the receiver;
no evidence of any legal proceedings against the receiver by either the company or himself.

Even hypothesising for argument’s sake that there had been an under‑value sale, the judge observed that this could not reduce the company’s indebtedness below the guarantee cap. Accordingly, even if developed further, the point lacked the capacity to constitute a complete or even partial defence to the summary claim for €300,000.

This illustrates that a defendant must not only show some arguable wrongdoing; they must also demonstrate a credible causal impact on their own liability under the instrument sued upon.

4.3.8 Reinstatement of the struck‑out motion

The defendant argued that fair procedures and legal certainty were undermined when the summary judgment motion—struck out for non‑appearance—was reinstated the same day without his presence.

Phelan J. accepted the account of events in the affidavit of Neil Byrne, which:

described the motion as being struck out “conditionally” in the morning;
recorded that the Deputy Master had expressly indicated that the application could be reinstated if counsel or a representative appeared before the end of the day;
confirmed that such appearance occurred and the matter was duly reinstated;
recorded that, on the subsequent adjourned date, the defendant attended, raised concerns, and was granted time until 1 July 2024 to file his replying affidavit.

On these facts, the court held:

there was no breach of fair procedures—the defendant was fully given an opportunity to respond to the reinstated motion;
his suggestion that he had a legitimate expectation that proceedings were conclusively over was “wholly implausible” given what the Deputy Master had said and the usual practice of the court;
his failure to engage with the Deputy Master’s account in his own affidavit undermined his credibility on this issue.

4.4 Impact and Future Significance

The decision in Credebt v Doran is likely to be cited in several recurring contexts.

4.4.1 Summary enforcement of personal guarantees

The judgment reinforces the position that:

Clear, professionally drafted guarantees with caps and independent-advice clauses will be enforced summarily where there is strong documentary evidence of indebtedness and a prior demand.
A guarantor who seeks to dispute the underlying indebtedness must do so with specific, evidentially supported challenges, not general dissatisfaction or unparticularised criticisms of calculations.
Arguments about commercial fairness, alleged bank (or funder) aggression, or business viability will not, without more, block summary judgment where the debt itself is largely undisputed in quantum and existence.

4.4.2 The “low but real” threshold after Feniton

The judgment provides a practical example of the Feniton approach in action. It shows that:

Courts remain cautious and alive to the seriousness of denying a plenary trial, but
they will not hesitate to grant summary judgment where defendants put forward nothing more than assertions, suspicions, or conjecture without evidential foothold.

This is likely to be of comfort to financial institutions and trade financiers dealing with guarantor defences that are high on rhetoric but thin on evidence.

4.4.3 Delay as a shield to enforcement

By carefully integrating Kirwan and Doyle into a summary judgment context, the judgment clarifies that:

Historic inactivity, even if arguably inordinate, does not in itself grant defendants an automatic substantive defence to enforcement.
Defendants who wish to rely on delay must act proactively by seeking dismissal, and must usually be able to point to an immediately preceding period (of ~2 years or more) of inactivity at the date of such an application.
The combination of no dismissal motion, resumed activity, and lack of demonstrated prejudice will typically sink any attempt to use delay as an implicit bar to summary judgment.

In other words, creditors who have delayed but later re‑activate their proceedings are not automatically disarmed; defendants cannot simply “bank” the delay as a permanent complete defence.

4.4.4 Expectations of litigants in person

While Irish courts have long shown sensitivity to litigants in person, this judgment illustrates a limit to such indulgence:

Experience and prior litigation history will be taken into account.
Where the court has repeatedly afforded time to gather evidence and the litigant still produces only bare assertions, the court may draw adverse inferences as to the substance of any alleged defence.

This is likely to be referenced in future where experienced self-represented defendants seek to use their lay status as a shield against ordinary evidential expectations.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Summary judgment

Summary judgment is a procedure that allows the court to give final judgment without a full trial where it is clear that:

the plaintiff has a strong documentary case (e.g. a debt, loan, or guarantee), and
the defendant has no real defence that justifies a trial.

It is commonly used in debt and guarantee cases because the key question is often simply “Is the money owed or not?”, which can usually be answered from documents.

5.2 The “fair and reasonable probability” test

To avoid summary judgment, a defendant does not have to prove that they will win at trial, but they must cross a low but real threshold:

They must show there is a fair and reasonable probability that they have a real defence.
This means they should:
- identify the legal basis of the defence (e.g. misrepresentation, duress, limitation), and
- support it with some evidence or at least a credible indication that evidence exists (e.g. documents, witnesses, expert reports).

“Mere assertion” – simply stating “I dispute the debt” – is not enough.

5.3 “Documents case”

A “documents case” is one that can be decided largely on the basis of written documents (already before the court) without needing to hear extensive oral testimony. Debt recovery actions based on written contracts, statements of account, guarantees and demands are classic examples.

The more a case is a documents case, the more suitable it is for summary judgment.

5.4 Guarantee vs indemnity

A guarantee is a promise by a third party (the guarantor) to pay someone else’s debt if that other person (the principal debtor) does not pay. It is usually “secondary”: liability arises upon the default of the principal debtor.

An indemnity is a promise to compensate another for loss or damage they suffer, and it can be “primary”: liability may arise independently of the principal debtor’s obligation.

Many commercial “guarantee and indemnity” documents combine both, so that even if the guarantee element failed for some reason, the indemnity might still stand.

5.5 Want of prosecution and dismissal for delay

Want of prosecution refers to a situation where a plaintiff has failed to progress their case for an extended period of time. A defendant can apply to have the proceedings dismissed on this ground.

The courts consider:

length of delay;
reasons for the delay;
whether the delay is inordinate (too long) and inexcusable; and
whether the delay causes prejudice to the defendant (e.g. lost witnesses, missing documents) such that a fair trial is no longer possible.

The recent guidance in Kirwan v Connors introduces indicative thresholds – 2, 4, and 5 years of inactivity – as points at which the court’s approach to dismissal becomes progressively stricter.

5.6 Statute of Limitations – how “time stops”

The Statute of Limitations sets time-limits within which legal claims must be brought. For contract-based claims (like debt recovery), the limitation period usually runs from:

the date of breach, or
the date a cause of action accrues (e.g. when payment falls due under a demand guarantee).

Crucially, once proceedings are issued, time under the statute stops running for that claim. Delay after proceedings have been issued is a matter for want of prosecution, not limitation.

5.7 Ex tempore judgment

An ex tempore judgment is one delivered orally by the judge at the conclusion of the hearing, rather than reserved and delivered in writing at a later date. Such judgments are later transcribed and “approved” to form the official written version.

6. Conclusion

Credebt Exchange Ltd v Doran [2025] IEHC 740 stands as a clear reaffirmation of the modern Irish approach to summary judgment in debt and guarantee cases.

Key takeaways include:

Guarantees will be enforced where they are clearly drafted, supported by documentary evidence of indebtedness, and followed by a proper demand, unless the guarantor can identify a genuine factual or legal defence with some evidential basis.
The threshold for resisting summary judgment is indeed low, but it is not illusory. Bare assertions, generalised dissatisfaction, and speculative allegations do not suffice.
Historic delay in prosecuting proceedings does not, without more, bar summary judgment. A defendant must actively seek dismissal for want of prosecution, and such an application must generally be preceded by a substantial period of fresh inactivity and be supported by specific proof of prejudice.
Litigant-in-person status does not remove the obligation to provide evidence. Courts will give reasonable procedural latitude, but experienced lay litigants cannot rely on ignorance to justify a total absence of evidential support for alleged defences.
Alleged impairment of security or bad faith in receivership must be particularised and supported; and even then, a defendant must demonstrate that any proven wrongdoing could logically impact the enforceability or quantum of their guaranteed liability.

In a wider sense, the judgment underlines that the purpose of the summary judgment jurisdiction is to ensure that straightforward, document-based debt claims are not forced into full plenary trials by defendants raising unfocused or speculative contentions. By meticulously applying established principles and recent Supreme Court guidance on delay, Phelan J.’s ruling provides a robust, practically oriented precedent for future enforcement actions on personal guarantees in Ireland.