Balancing Deterrence and Individualised Sentencing for Youth Offenders: Clarifying the Role of Section 250 and Totality in R v Martin [2025] EWCA Crim 494

Introduction

R v Martin [2025] EWCA Crim 494 is a landmark Court of Appeal decision on the principles governing the sentencing of children and young persons. The appellant, Mason Martin, was 17 when he pleaded guilty to two offences—possession of an offensive weapon under the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 and violent disorder under the Public Order Act 1986. The judge in the Crown Court imposed a 22-month detention and training order (DTO). Martin sought leave to appeal on five grounds, focusing on the sentencing judge’s application of child‐specific guidelines, the balance between welfare and deterrence, the starting points for each offence, credit for mitigation and totality. The Court of Appeal was asked to clarify how deterrence, section 250 of the Sentencing Act 2020 and the totality principle apply when sentencing young offenders.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed Martin’s application for leave to appeal. It held that:

The judge had not disadvantaged Martin by failing to address his youth and immaturity; his sentence was substantially lower than that of his co-defendant, despite similar culpability.
The pre-sentence report and proposed youth rehabilitation order (YRO) had been appropriately considered and rejected as insufficient in light of the violent, knife-driven nature of the offence.
There was no error in the judge’s reference to starting points; he did not apply adult guideline starting points but followed category 1A culpability as a reference.
The reduction for Martin’s guilty pleas and the totality principle had been properly applied to arrive at a 22-month DTO, within the statutory maximum and consistent with section 250 constraints.
Deterrence remains a permissible factor in sentencing children, properly balanced against welfare and maturity considerations under the guideline on Sentencing Children and Young People.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

R v ZA [2023] EWCA Crim 596: Emphasised an individualised, child-centred approach and the need to focus on maturity, personal circumstances and the principal aim of preventing reoffending.
R v Smickele [2012] EWCA Crim 1470: Confirmed that deterrence may play a part in youth sentences, especially for serious, planned offences, provided welfare considerations are not overshadowed.
R v March [2002] EWCA Crim 551 and R v Dalby [2005] EWCA Crim 1292: Established that reductions for guilty pleas must be applied to a total sentence not exceeding 24 months when section 250 does not permit a longer starting point.

Legal Reasoning

The Court of Appeal’s reasoning unfolded along several key themes:

Child-Centred Sentencing
The court reaffirmed that R v ZA requires an “individualistic and focused” approach. Although the sentencing judge’s remarks were brief, the outcome—Martin’s sentence being less than half that of his adult co-defendant—demonstrated proper weight to youth and mitigation.
Deterrence for Young Offenders
Deterrence is not expressly listed among the statutory purposes of youth sentencing under Crime and Disorder Act 1988 s.37, but it is not excluded. R v Smickele authorises deterrence as one factor, particularly where the offence exhibits planning and use of dangerous weapons.
Section 250 and Totality
Section 250 of the Sentencing Act 2020 does not apply to either offence Martin pleaded guilty to, so the combined DTO cannot exceed 24 months before guilty-plea reductions. The judge’s notional sums and subsequent 10% and totality reductions resulted in a lawful 22-month DTO. The Court of Appeal found no arguable error in this arithmetic or approach.
Guideline Consistency
The judge referred to adult guideline category 1A culpability for both offences but ensured that the sentence overall reflected child-specific guidance on bladed articles and youth sentencing. The principle of totality was observed by capping the DTO at two years.

Impact

This decision provides clarity on several fronts:

Deterrence remains a valid, though not predominant, consideration in youth sentences involving serious weapon-related offences.
Section 250 constraints on DTOs are strictly enforced; judges must ensure pre-guilty-plea totals do not exceed 24 months when the section does not apply.
Brief sentencing remarks may suffice if the result clearly reflects the required child-centred balancing of factors.
Co-defendant comparisons can demonstrate proper youth mitigation in appellate review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Detention and Training Order (DTO): A custodial sentence for 12–24 months for offenders aged 12–17, combining detention with rehabilitative training.
Totality Principle: The requirement that consecutive sentences should be proportionate, ensuring the overall sentence is not excessive.
Starting Point: A guideline-derived baseline sentence for an offence, adjusted up or down by aggravating or mitigating factors.
Section 250, Sentencing Act 2020: Limits the pre-reduction term of a DTO to 24 months for offences that would otherwise attract longer sentences under earlier law—but only where the section applies.
Guilty Plea Reduction: A discount (typically up to 10–33%) applied to reflect the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and savings in court time.

Conclusion

R v Martin [2025] EWCA Crim 494 confirms that sentencing young offenders requires a delicate balance: welfare and individual circumstances remain paramount, but deterrence and public protection may legitimately inform a youth’s sentence, particularly for planned, weapon-involved offences. The judgment also underscores strict compliance with section 250 limits and the totality principle when imposing a DTO. By comparing co-defendant outcomes and affirming the calculation of guilty-plea reductions, the Court of Appeal provides practical guidance to lower courts. This decision will shape future youth sentencing, ensuring consistency with statutory aims and established guidelines while preserving judicial discretion to address the gravity of violent conduct.