Introduction

This commentary analyses the decision in BPR, R v ([2025] EWCA Crim 1147), a judgment of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) sitting as the Court Martial Appeal Court (CMAC). The case addresses the sentencing of a senior non-commissioned officer who, while on an approved career break, deliberately contravened a Standing Order prohibiting service personnel from travelling to or supporting the conflict in Ukraine. The Court upheld a sentence of service detention and dismissal from the Service.

The decision is notable for three reasons:

• It clarifies the authoritative status of the Judge Advocate General’s Guidance on Sentencing in the Service Courts (GSSC), 7th edition, effective 1 January 2025. Although not statutory, the CMAC holds that “good reason is needed” before a Court Martial can properly depart from it.
• It affirms that a deliberate breach of a clear Standing Order of the type issued here—especially where international security and reputational risks are foreseeable—falls within Category A (high culpability) and Category 1 (highest harm) for the purposes of the GSSC.
• It confirms that dismissal from the Service, alongside service detention, is not an impermissible “double punishment” and may be “unavoidably necessary” for maintaining discipline, particularly where a senior NCO sets a poor example and risks serious diplomatic consequences.

The parties were anonymised: the applicant is referred to as “BPR” pursuant to Rule 153 of the Court Martial Rules and section 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, and the CMAC continued this reporting restriction on appeal.

Summary of the Judgment

BPR pleaded guilty to an offence under section 13 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (AFA 2006) for breaching a Standing Order issued on 8 March 2022, which prohibited service personnel from travelling to Ukraine except on official duty. While on a career intermission starting 1 August 2023, BPR travelled to Ukraine and joined the Ukrainian Armed Forces in a training capacity. Upon contact by his Commanding Officer, he immediately admitted his actions and returned to the UK. He pleaded guilty at the first opportunity.

The Court Martial assessed:

• Culpability as Category A (deliberate and premeditated contravention), and
• Harm as Category 1 (significant personal risk and potential security/reputational risks to the UK, and impact on discipline/chain of command).

Applying the GSSC, with a Category A1 starting point of 12 months and a range of 12 months’ detention to two years’ imprisonment, the Court Martial imposed 12 months’ service detention, reduced by one-third for the early guilty plea to eight months, and ordered dismissal from the Service.

On appeal, BPR argued that culpability and harm had been miscategorised (urging B2: reckless/medium harm) and that dismissal was disproportionate. The CMAC (Vice-President giving judgment) rejected these arguments, holding that:

• The breach was plainly deliberate and premeditated, not reckless.
• Harm was correctly placed in Category 1 due to the security and reputational risks posed to the UK and the significant personal risk to the soldier.
• The Court Martial properly applied the GSSC, which—although non-statutory—constitutes considered and authoritative guidance requiring good reason for departure.
• Dismissal was justified and not an improper additional punishment given the serious disciplinary implications and international ramifications.

The application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Guidance on Sentencing in the Service Courts (GSSC), 7th ed. (effective 1 January 2025):
  • States it aids consistency and is not prescriptive, but recognises that the CMAC has consistently given it “due regard.”
  • Contains offence-specific guidance for s.13 AFA 2006 (maximum two years’ imprisonment), emphasising s.237 AFA’s purpose of maintaining discipline.
  • Highlights the breadth of s.13 and the risk to the chain of command when orders are disobeyed. For Culpability A cases, Courts must consider reduction in rank, loss of seniority, and—in the most serious cases—dismissal.
  • Defines deliberate contravention as Category A (high culpability) and reckless as Category B (medium).
  • Category 1 harm factors include security risks, safety risks, and significant impact on discipline and unit cohesion.
• R v Love (1998) 1 Cr App R 458:
  • Reaffirmed by the CMAC as the foundation for appellate deference in service sentencing. While the appellate court corrects injustice, it recognises that service courts are uniquely placed to assess seriousness in the context of service life and the needs of discipline and efficiency.
• Rule 153 of the Court Martial Rules and section 11 Contempt of Court Act 1981:
  • Support the maintenance of anonymity granted in the Court Martial into the appellate proceedings, prohibiting publication of the applicant’s identifying details.

Key Legal Reasoning

1. Applicability of Standing Orders during a Career Break:

   The applicant’s written career intermission (CI) acknowledgments explicitly recognised his continuing status as a serving member subject to military law and the need for permission to undertake employment. The CMAC treated this as fatal to any suggestion that Standing Orders did not bind him while on CI. He remained under the Armed Forces Act and the chain of command.

2. Deliberate vs Reckless Contravention:

   The Court endorsed the Board’s finding that the breach was deliberate and premeditated. The sequence of purposeful actions (arranging travel to Poland, crossing into Ukraine, engaging with Ukrainian authorities, signing military documentation, submitting to a foreign chain of command) knowing the Standing Order existed, compelled a Category A finding. The appellant’s personal distress and relationship breakdown—accepted as substantial mitigation—did not transform the conduct into recklessness.

3. Harm Assessment: Category 1

   Harm was rightly Category 1 because the conduct:

   • Placed the soldier at significant personal risk in a live conflict zone.
   • Carried serious security and reputational risks to the UK, including the potential for diplomatic incident or propaganda exploitation if he were killed, wounded, or captured.
   • Threatened discipline and the integrity of the chain of command by normalising unilateral deployments contrary to orders.

   The Court emphasised that harm assessment in service law justifiably extends beyond direct, realised harm to individuals to include credible risks to national security interests and discipline.

4. Status of the GSSC: Authoritative, Departed From Only for Good Reason:

   Although the GSSC is not statutory (unlike civilian Sentencing Council guidelines), the CMAC described it as “considered and authoritative guidance.” The Court stated that “good reason is needed” before a Court Martial can properly depart. Here, the Court Martial applied the guideline correctly and sentenced at the bottom of the applicable range; there was no misapprehension that the guidance was legally binding in a strict sense, and no basis for departure.

5. Sentence Selection and Credit:

   The Board indicated that, absent plea, the seriousness could have justified imprisonment. In light of the early guilty plea and strong mitigation, the Court Martial imposed service detention at 12 months and then applied a one-third reduction to eight months. The CMAC endorsed this approach within the A1 range (12 months’ detention to two years’ imprisonment) and underscored that service detention is a distinct disposal from imprisonment.

6. Dismissal from the Service: Not Double Punishment:

   The CMAC held that dismissal is not an impermissible second punishment; it serves the statutory purpose of maintaining discipline and safeguarding the chain of command. In this case, deliberate disobedience by a senior NCO—who ought to set the standard—created real risks of international consequence. The Court Martial was entitled to find dismissal “unavoidably necessary.” The CMAC, applying the deference articulated in R v Love, would not interfere.

7. Anonymity Continuity from Court Martial to Appeal:

   The CMAC continued the anonymity order under s.11 of the 1981 Act, reflecting continuity of protective measures where the Court Martial has properly restricted identification, especially where publication might generate broader risks or compromise ongoing service interests.

Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

• Sentencing Baseline for Ukraine-Related Disobedience: Where a clear Standing Order bars travel to a conflict zone and a serving person nevertheless joins a foreign military—even in a training capacity—the default categorisation is likely to be A1 unless highly unusual features are shown. Counsel should anticipate detention at or above 12 months and that dismissal will be a live issue, especially for NCOs and officers.
• GSSC’s Quasi-Binding Force: The articulation that “good reason is needed” to depart from the GSSC will likely harden sentencing consistency across Service Courts, reduce variance, and shape submissions. It also offers appellate predictability: departures must be reasoned and exceptional.
• Discipline Over Personal Mitigation: Even substantial personal mitigation (mental health stressors, relationship breakdown) and exemplary service history may not avert categorisation at A1 or avoid dismissal where the misconduct strikes at the chain of command or risks international complications. Mitigation may still be reflected by selecting detention over imprisonment and by plea-based reductions within the A1 range.
• Career Intermission Does Not Dilute Obligations: The judgment firmly signals that career breaks do not reduce the applicability of Standing Orders or military law. Written CI acknowledgments will be used to rebut arguments about diminished obligations or misunderstandings over civilian-like freedom to work abroad.
• International and Reputational Harm as Core Harm Factors: The Court recognises non-physical harms (diplomatic, reputational, propaganda) as central to Category 1 harm analysis in the service context. Commanders drafting Standing Orders should clearly articulate such risks; courts will give them weight at sentence.
• Appellate Deference Reinforced: R v Love’s principle remains robust: the CMAC will be slow to alter service sentences that reasonably pursue discipline, cohesion, and operational effectiveness, particularly where the Court Martial has applied the GSSC faithfully.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Standing Order: A formal directive issued within the Armed Forces that personnel must follow. Breaching it can be a criminal offence under s.13 AFA 2006.
• Section 13, Armed Forces Act 2006: Creates the offence of breaching Standing Orders. Maximum penalty is two years’ imprisonment.
• GSSC (Guidance on Sentencing in the Service Courts): Non-statutory guidance by the Judge Advocate General. Courts should follow it unless there’s a good reason not to; departures must be explained.
• Culpability and Harm Categories:
  • Culpability A = deliberate contravention (high blameworthiness).
  • Culpability B = reckless contravention (medium blameworthiness).
  • Harm Category 1 = highest level of harm or risk, including security/reputational risk and significant impact on discipline.
• Service Detention vs Imprisonment: Both are custodial, but service detention is a distinct military disposal served in a military corrective environment. It is different in nature and purpose from civilian imprisonment.
• Dismissal from the Service: A sentence that ends a person’s service career. In military sentencing it can be imposed alongside detention or imprisonment where necessary to maintain discipline; it is not an unlawful “second punishment.”
• Section 237 AFA 2006: Sets out that a key purpose of service sentencing is the maintenance of discipline across the Armed Forces.
• R v Love (1998): A foundational case confirming that appellate courts defer to service courts’ judgment about what penalties are needed to maintain discipline and efficiency, intervening only to correct injustice or manifest excess.
• Section 11 Contempt of Court Act 1981 & Rule 153 CMR: Enable courts to restrict publication of identifying information about a party; here used to preserve the applicant’s anonymity (“BPR”) throughout.

Conclusion

BPR, R v [2025] EWCA Crim 1147 consolidates several important service sentencing principles. First, it elevates the GSSC’s practical authority: while non-statutory, service courts should treat it as the primary framework and depart only for articulated, good reasons. Second, where a serving person—even on a career break—deliberately contravenes a clear Standing Order to join a foreign force in a live conflict, the correct categorisation is ordinarily A1: high culpability and highest harm, given the risks to the individual, to the UK’s security and reputation, and to discipline and cohesion. Third, dismissal from the Service is neither exceptional nor duplicative punishment where the offence undermines the chain of command and risks international consequences; it may be “unavoidably necessary,” particularly for senior ranks whose conduct sets the tone for subordinates.

The case also demonstrates that personal mitigation and exemplary service, while important, will not displace the central service need to maintain discipline and safeguard national interests. The CMAC’s refusal of leave affirms a deferential, disciplined approach to service sentencing, anchored by the GSSC and the enduring principle in R v Love. Commanders, advocates, and sentencers should expect the reasoning in BPR to guide future cases involving breaches of operationally sensitive Standing Orders, especially those with potential international ramifications.