Ashfaq: Blended use of Street and Dwelling Robbery Guidelines for “Hybrid-Location” Robberies; Youth Discounts upheld on Unduly Lenient Sentence review

Introduction

In Ashfaq, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 1294, the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) refused an Unduly Lenient Sentence (ULS) Reference by the Solicitor General arising from sentences imposed on two sisters, Adeeba and Laiba Ashfaq, for a string of serious offences culminating in an attempted robbery and a near-fatal stabbing. The appeal raised three core issues: (i) whether the sentencing judge applied the correct robbery guideline in a case straddling a dwelling and the street; (ii) whether sufficient upward adjustment was made to reflect multiple features of culpability and harm; and (iii) whether the judge over-discounted for youth by misunderstanding the “Sentencing children and young people” guideline.

The Court endorsed a pragmatic, blended use of both the “Robbery – dwelling” and “Street and less sophisticated commercial robbery” guidelines to avoid over- or under-sentencing in a hybrid-location robbery, and it upheld substantial youth discounts (50% for a 17-year-old and one-third for an 18-year-old) as properly grounded in the Sentencing Council’s youth principles. Although the sentences were “lenient”, they were not “unduly lenient”.

Background and Parties

- Respondents: Ms Adeeba Ashfaq (aged 17 at the time of offence) and Ms Laiba Ashfaq (aged 18).
- Procedural posture: The Solicitor General sought leave to refer their sentences as unduly lenient. Leave was granted, the Reference heard, and ultimately refused.

The offending arose from Adeeba’s belief that the 17-year-old victim had caused intimate images of her to circulate on social media. After a hostile confrontation at a shop, a group entered the victim’s home, caused extensive damage, stole designer handbags, and lay in wait. When the victim returned and fled, she was chased into the street. Adeeba, having picked up a knife inside the house, stabbed the victim three times in the street; Laiba participated in the assault and urged recovery of the victim’s phone and keys, underpinning the attempted robbery convictions.

Summary of the Judgment

Guideline selection: The Court held that where an attempted robbery begins in a dwelling (including entry, ransacking, and waiting for the occupier) but culminates in the street with the use of a weapon, a judge may legitimately and, on these facts, correctly draw on both the “Robbery – dwelling” and “Street and less sophisticated” guidelines. Using only the dwelling guideline would over-sentence; using only the street guideline would under-sentence (paras 28–29).
Aggravation and harm: The sentencing judge had the relevant aggravating features well in mind, including two harm features under the dwelling guideline (serious physical harm and ransacking/soiling) (para 29).
Youth discounts: The judge did not misunderstand the youth guideline. A 50% discount for a 17-year-old and a one-third adjustment for an 18-year-old—reflecting that “18 is not a cliff edge”—were permissible and properly reasoned (paras 30–32).
Totality and calculation transparency: Judges are not required to publish granular arithmetic “workings”. On the figures inferred (a midpoint starting point around 10.5 years, reduction to roughly 9 years before youth discount, then 50% to yield 4 years 6 months), the sentences were lenient but not unduly so (paras 34–35).
Outcome: Reference refused. The sentences stood (para 35).

Factual Synopsis

- Precursor events: Earlier confrontation at the victim’s home in 2023; belief by Adeeba in July/August 2024 that the victim disseminated intimate images (police found no evidence of victim involvement).
- Entry and damage: In the early hours of 1 August, Adeeba and others broke into the victim’s house, caused approximately £7,000 damage, and stole designer handbags (valued at £2,500). Adeeba picked up a knife while inside.
- Assault and attempted robbery: When the victim returned and ran, she was chased and attacked on the street. Adeeba stabbed her three times, leading to a collapsed lung, emergency surgery, and a 10-day hospital admission. Laiba joined the assault and pressed for recovery of the phone and keys (attempted robbery).
- Forensics: Adeeba’s fingerprints and Laiba’s DNA were found in the house.

Pleas, Convictions, and Sentences

- Adeeba: Pled guilty at the outset to s18 GBH with intent (count 1), burglary with intent to steal a phone (count 3A), and two counts of criminal damage (counts 6 and 7). After trial, convicted of further burglary counts (counts 2, 3, 4) and the attempted robbery (count 5). She was not convicted of aggravated burglary. Sentence: 4 years 6 months’ imprisonment on count 5 (attempted robbery), with no separate penalties on the other matters, applying totality (para 9).

- Laiba: Convicted after trial of wounding (s20) on count 1, burglary (count 3), attempted robbery (count 5), and damage (count 7). She was not convicted of entering the house armed or planning to cause GBH. Sentence: 3 years’ detention on the attempted robbery (count 5), 2 years concurrent on the s20, and 3 months concurrent for criminal damage (para 10).

Analysis

1) The “appropriate guideline” for a hybrid-location robbery

The Solicitor General argued the judge should have sentenced under the “Robbery – dwelling” guideline alone, not in conjunction with the “Street and less sophisticated commercial robbery” guideline. The Court rejected that submission, emphasising the reality of the offending:

It would over-sentence to consider this only to be a dwelling robbery… but it would under-sentence if only the street robbery had been taken into account. (para 28)

The Court expressly approved the judge’s method: using both guidelines to capture seriousness accurately. That approach accommodated the fact that key aggravating features were anchored to the dwelling (entry, ransacking, waiting for the occupier) while the actual violence and attempted robbery were executed in the street, with a knife picked up inside the house. On these facts, the Court went beyond saying the judge was merely permitted to do this: “indeed in our judgment [she] was right to do so” (para 28).

2) Upward adjustment for multiple culpability and harm features

The Reference contended the judge under-adjusted for aggravation and for two Category 1 harm features under the dwelling guideline (serious physical harm and ransacking). The Court disagreed: although the judge did not publish step-by-step figures, it was “plain” she had the relevant features well in mind (para 29). In short, the criticism was doctrinal rather than decisional—the judge had in substance done what the guidelines require.

3) Youth discounts and the “Sentencing children and young people” guideline

The Solicitor General highlighted a transcript passage that could, in isolation, be read to imply a potential misunderstanding of youth discounts (“a half to two-thirds depending on the age”). The Court held any ambiguity was dispelled by the sentences actually imposed:

Adeeba (17): 50% youth discount was applied (paras 30–32).
Laiba (18): a one-third youth discount was applied, reflecting the principle that 18 is “not a cliff edge” (para 31).

The Court further recognised broader youth-sentencing aims beyond rigid percentages—rehabilitation and welfare take primacy, especially where Youth Offending Team (YOT) engagement and psychological evidence point to developmental immaturity and treatable difficulties (paras 20–23, 34). The judge’s reliance on the “Mental disorder or developmental disorder” guideline for Adeeba was also expressly noted (para 23).

4) Totality and the absence of “workings”

The Court reaffirmed there is no legal requirement that judges set out an arithmetical audit trail of each adjustment (para 34). Nevertheless, the Court reverse-engineered the likely pathway to Adeeba’s sentence:

Starting midpoint between Street (SP 8 years) and Dwelling (SP 13 years): c. 10 years 6 months.
Reduction to c. 9 years before youth mitigation (reflecting aggravation/mitigation and totality).
50% youth discount to reach 4 years 6 months (para 34).

On that model, the Court accepted the sentence was “lenient” but refused to characterise it as “unduly” lenient (para 35).

5) Mental health, maturity, and culpability

The judge had detailed psychological evidence concerning Adeeba: poor emotional regulation, ADHD, disruptive mood dysregulation, borderline-tendency personality traits, trauma, and a tendency to “perceive the world through a lens of negativity” (paras 21–22). Those factors bore on maturity and culpability. The Court acknowledged the judge’s reliance on the mental disorder guideline as well as positive indicators of rehabilitation (YOT engagement, low risk of re-offending, not dangerous in the statutory sense) (paras 20–23). This supported maintaining substantial youth mitigation despite the gravity of harm.

6) The Unduly Lenient Sentence standard

The Court’s reasoning mirrors the orthodox ULS test: even where a sentence is lenient, appellate intervention requires that it be outside the range of sentences that could reasonably be imposed in light of all relevant factors. Here, the sentences—though at the low end—remained within a reasonable ambit, particularly given:

The hybrid-location nature of the robbery and the judge’s justified blended-guideline approach (para 28).
Careful consideration of aggravation and two harm features (para 29).
Correct application of youth discount principles and “18 is not a cliff edge” (paras 30–32).
Psychological evidence and YOT engagement underpinning youth mitigation (paras 20–23, 34).
Appropriate restraint in not relying on the Crown’s rejected aggravated burglary theory or a plan to cause GBH for Laiba (paras 9–10, 28).

Authorities and Precedents Cited

No specific earlier case authorities are cited in the judgment. The Court’s analysis is rooted in the Sentencing Council Guidelines, including:

Robbery – dwelling guideline
Street and less sophisticated commercial robbery guideline
Sentencing children and young people guideline (including the principle that custody is a last resort and the focus is on welfare and preventing reoffending)
Overarching guideline on offenders with mental disorders, developmental disorders, or neurological impairments
Totality principle

The Court’s endorsement of a blended-guideline approach in hybrid-location robberies is the principal doctrinal contribution.

Impact and Practical Implications

A. Guideline selection in “straddling” offences

Ashfaq confirms that rigidly forcing an offence into a single guideline where the facts straddle distinct contexts can distort proportionality. Where a robbery begins in a dwelling (entry, ransacking, lying in wait) but is consummated in the street (chase, violence, weapon use), judges may:

Draw on both the dwelling and street robbery guidelines.
Identify aggravating features tied to the dwelling (waiting in the house; ransacking and soiling; broken entry).
Recognise that deploying only one guideline risks over- or under-sentencing; a blended starting point may be justified.

B. Youth sentencing—beyond arithmetic

The Court underscores that youth discounts are not purely numerical. Decision-makers should:

Prioritise welfare and rehabilitation, particularly with YOT engagement and positive progress on remand.
Treat “18 is not a cliff edge” as a real calibrating principle for just-18-year-olds.
Integrate psychological and developmental evidence into culpability and mitigation assessments.

C. ULS References in youth cases

Prosecutors should note the high threshold for ULS intervention where a sentencing judge has:

Carefully tailored guideline selection to the facts.
Considered aggravation and harm features, including multiple harm dimensions under the dwelling guideline.
Grounded youth discounts in the purpose of youth sentencing and in clinical evidence.
Avoided reliance on theories rejected by the jury (e.g., aggravated burglary or intent to cause GBH for a co-defendant).

D. Practice points for sentencers

In hybrid-location robberies, explain why a blended approach prevents distortion and reference the specific aggravating features present both inside and outside the dwelling.
Record the presence of multiple harm features (e.g., serious physical harm and ransacking/soiling) to justify upward movement within the range.
Articulate youth-sentencing aims (rehabilitation, welfare) and relate them to concrete indicators (YOT assessments, therapy, education, engagement, risk evaluations).
Be explicit that any unproven allegations are not being treated as aggravation; sentence based on verdicts and admissible facts.
Although granular arithmetic is not required, ensure there is a transparent narrative showing how seriousness, mitigation, and totality were weighed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Unduly Lenient Sentence (ULS) Reference: A mechanism allowing the Law Officers (e.g., Solicitor General) to ask the Court of Appeal to increase a sentence that is so low it falls outside the reasonable range. “Lenient” is not enough; it must be “unduly” lenient.
Robbery guidelines—Street vs Dwelling: Two distinct Sentencing Council frameworks. Dwelling robbery is generally treated as more serious due to invasion of the home; street robbery addresses public place robberies. Hybrid cases may justify drawing on both.
Culpability and Harm categories: Sentencing Council matrices grade offender’s blameworthiness (culpability) and the harm caused/intended. Higher culpability (e.g., use or production of weapons, leading role, planning) and Category 1 harm (serious injury) typically increase the sentence.
Youth discount and “18 is not a cliff edge”: Youth sentencing emphasises welfare and rehabilitation. Discounts from adult levels often apply, with a recognition that turning 18 does not instantly erase immaturity.
Totality principle: When an offender faces multiple convictions, the court ensures the overall sentence is just and proportionate for the totality of offending, not simply the sum of parts.
Mental disorder/developmental disorder guideline: Where an offender has conditions (e.g., ADHD, trauma-related dysregulation), this may reduce culpability and support rehabilitative disposals, especially in children and young people.

Conclusion

Ashfaq is significant for two reasons. First, it crystallises a pragmatic rule for hybrid-location robberies: when an offence begins in a dwelling but culminates in the street, judges may legitimately use both the dwelling and street robbery guidelines, calibrating a blended starting point to avoid systematic over- or under-sentencing. Second, it reaffirms the integrity of youth sentencing principles in ULS reviews: substantial youth discounts—anchored in welfare, maturity, YOT engagement, and psychological evidence—will be respected unless they produce a sentence outside the reasonable range.

The Court described the sentences as “lenient” but not “unduly lenient.” That evaluative distinction underscores the ULS threshold and affirms sentencing discretion where judges conscientiously apply the guidelines to complex facts, resist reliance on unproven allegations, and squarely address youth-related mitigation. For practitioners and sentencers, Ashfaq provides a structured blueprint for fact-sensitive guideline selection in robbery and for principled youth sentencing amidst very serious harm.