New Principle: Initial Proscription Orders Are Directly Reviewable in the Administrative Court; Deproscription/POAC is not an available or adequate alternative remedy. CPR 52.8’s seven‑day time limit applies to respondents seeking permission to appeal refused JR grounds.

Introduction

This Court of Appeal judgment addresses two interlocking questions of constitutional and procedural importance arising from the proscription of “Palestine Action” under the Terrorism Act 2000:

• Substantive procedural route: whether, after an organisation is newly proscribed under section 3(3)(a) of the 2000 Act, the proper route to challenge the initial proscription is a judicial review (JR) in the Administrative Court, or instead an application for deproscription under section 4 (with appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission, “POAC,” under section 5).
• Appellate time limits: whether a claimant, as respondent to the Secretary of State’s appeal, can use the respondent’s-notice timetable to seek permission to appeal refused JR grounds, or whether CPR 52.8’s seven-day time limit applies.

The case arises from the Secretary of State’s July 2025 Order adding Palestine Action to Schedule 2 of the 2000 Act, thereby engaging multiple proscription offences (membership, support, and related fundraising/property offences). Before the Order came into force, Ms. Ammori, a founder of Palestine Action, issued a JR claim and sought interim relief (which was refused). Chamberlain J subsequently ruled that the section 4/5 deproscription scheme was not an adequate alternative remedy to a JR of the initial proscription, and granted permission on two grounds (Articles 10/11 proportionality; and failure to consult/natural justice/Article 6), refusing other grounds. The Secretary of State appealed the preliminary ruling. By respondent’s notice, Ms. Ammori sought to revive four refused grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismisses the Secretary of State’s appeal on the alternative remedy point and clarifies the procedural law on time limits: the seven-day CPR 52.8 limit applies to any application for permission to appeal against a refusal of permission to apply for JR, even when packaged within a respondent’s notice. While Ms. Ammori’s application was out of time, an extension is granted; permission to apply for JR is then granted on two additional grounds (relevant considerations and policy compliance), and refused on improper purpose and Equality Act grounds.

Summary of the Judgment

• Alternative remedy. The Court holds that the section 4/5 deproscription and POAC appeal process is not the statutory mechanism to challenge the initial decision to proscribe under section 3(3)(a). Rather, sections 4–5 are aimed at bringing a continuing proscription to an end, typically due to changed circumstances. Section 7’s prospective treatment of criminal convictions after a successful POAC appeal is a powerful signal that Parliament did not design deproscription to unwind the consequences of an unlawful initial proscription. Even if deproscription were viewed as “available,” it would not have been an adequate remedy in this case given the urgency, active criminal prosecutions, and the need for swift authoritative determination.
• Boddington defence. The Court does not decide whether defendants in “proscription offences” can run a Boddington-style defence by challenging the lawfulness of the proscription Order in criminal proceedings. It notes the issue is legally arguable and practically salient, and highlights the strong public interest in early, authoritative JR to avoid fragmented outcomes in criminal courts.
• Procedural time limits (CPR 52). Where permission to apply for JR is refused by the High Court on a ground, any application for permission to appeal that refusal must be made within seven days under CPR 52.8, even if the party is a “respondent” in a separate appeal. CPR 52.13 cannot be used to extend the time by wrapping the application into a respondent’s notice. On the facts, Ms. Ammori was out of time but obtained an extension given the lack of prior authority and the importance of prompt, consolidated adjudication.
• Permission outcomes. The Court converts the PTA into permission to apply for JR (per CPR 52.8(5)) on:
  • Ground 5: failure to have regard to specified relevant considerations (as confined to para 82 of the amended grounds);
  • Ground 6: failure to follow published policy.
  It refuses permission on:
  • Ground 1: improper purpose (unarguable in light of the statutory definition of “concerned in terrorism”);
  • Ground 7: Equality Act 2010, s.149 (Public Sector Equality Duty)—unarguable given the material before the Secretary of State and the obviousness of equality impacts being weighed.

  Analysis

  Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • R (Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of Britain) v Charity Commission [2016] EWCA Civ 154; [2016] 1 WLR 2625: confirms that where alternative means of redress are “conveniently and effectively” available—particularly a statutory appeal to a specialist tribunal—judicial review is ordinarily a last resort. The Court here adopts the test but emphasises that it depends on the statutory context and the nature of the impugned decision.
  • R (Glencore Energy UK Ltd) v HMRC [2017] EWCA Civ 1716; [2017] 4 WLR 213: Sales LJ’s structured account of the alternative remedy principle underpins the Court’s approach: courts should respect Parliament’s procedural design for “the usual sort of case,” intervening by JR only where that scheme is inapt to vindicate the rule of law in the particular case. The Court distinguishes the proscription scheme: sections 4–5 are not Parliament’s designated process for initial proscription challenges.
  • In re McAleenon [2024] UKSC 31; [2024] 3 WLR 803 and The Father v Worcester CC [2025] UKSC 1: reaffirm the “suitable alternative remedy” doctrine and its status as an abuse-of-process control. Again, the Court uses these authorities to ask whether Parliament’s scheme is directed to the kind of decision being challenged. Its answer: deproscription is not directed to reviewing initial proscription.
  • In re Preston [1985] 1 AC 835: cited via Glencore for the general rule that where Parliament provides an appeal route (e.g., tax), JR will “only very rarely” be allowed. The Court’s analysis shows Preston is not a straight template; everything turns on whether the statutory scheme is actually designed for the decision under challenge.
  • Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143: principle that a defendant may defend a criminal charge by challenging the lawfulness of subordinate legislation or administrative acts. The Court neither endorses nor rejects the defence’s availability for proscription offences; rather it recognises the potential for litigation turbulence if this is contested piecemeal, bolstering the case for prompt JR.
  • R (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) v SSHD [2002] EWHC 644 (Admin): the Court respectfully declines to follow Richards J’s earlier view that POAC was the “forum of first resort.” Two decisive shifts: (i) statutory interpretation anchored in section 7’s prospective relief for convictions; (ii) the evolution of closed material procedures in JR, reducing the earlier functional gap between POAC and the Administrative Court.
  • R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28; [2012] 1 AC 663: invoked for rule of law concerns; the Court’s reasoning honours this by promoting a route (JR) that can provide authoritative and timely legality determinations for initial proscription decisions.

  Legal Reasoning

  1) Statutory interpretation: What do sections 3–7 of the 2000 Act actually do?

  The Court’s core reasoning proceeds from close reading of the Terrorism Act’s structure:

  • Distinct powers: section 3(3)(a) (add to Schedule 2) is a different decision from section 3(3)(b) (remove from Schedule 2). Section 4 applications ask the Secretary of State to exercise the removal power; they do not challenge the validity of the original addition.
  • POAC’s function: section 5 permits an appeal to POAC against a refusal to deproscribe. POAC’s task is to assess whether that refusal decision was “flawed” on JR principles and, if so, to order steps precipitating deproscription.
  • Prospective effect on convictions (section 7): in the event of a successful POAC appeal leading to deproscription, criminal convictions are only disturbed in respect of activity occurring on or after the Secretary of State’s refusal to deproscribe. Convictions linked to the earlier period remain untouched. This strongly indicates that deproscription/POAC is structured to end a lawful proscription that has become unjustified with time—not to remedy the consequences of an unlawfully made in the first place proscription order.

  Hence, the Court finds that sections 4–5 are not Parliament’s scheme for contesting the lawfulness of an initial section 3(3)(a) proscription. That task remains for judicial review, which can quash the Order ab initio if unlawful, thereby aligning with rule of law principles (unlawful measures produce no valid legal consequences).

  2) Adequacy even if “available”

  Assuming arguendo that deproscription/POAC were “available,” the Court holds it was nevertheless inadequate in this case. Key factors:

  • Expedition and public importance: JR could be heard swiftly; deproscription (90 days’ decision window plus an appeal) would introduce delay against a backdrop of active prosecutions and substantial speech/assembly implications (Articles 10–11).
  • Criminal process interaction: given live prosecutions and the potential for Boddington-style defences, authoritative resolution in JR would avert fragmented, inconsistent determinations across criminal courts.
  • Forum and procedure: While POAC has a special constitution and broader closed-material handling, modern JR can accommodate closed material (reducing the forum differential). Those advantages do not outweigh the systemic need for speed and clarity here.
  • Non-otiosity: Upholding JR as the route for initial proscription challenges will not make deproscription otiose. Sections 4–5 remain crucial where circumstances evolve and continued proscription ceases to be justified.

  3) Preliminary views on Boddington

  The Secretary of State argued that because the Order amends primary legislation (Schedule 2), a Boddington defence should not be available. The Court rejects that as a “plausible reason” at this stage: the challenge is to the lawfulness of secondary legislation (the Order), not to primary legislation. The Court stops short of a definitive ruling but underscores that, practically, the topic may arise in prosecutions—another reason for the Administrative Court to speak early and clearly in JR.

  4) CPR 52.8 vs CPR 52.13: the seven-day rule applies

  The Court undertakes a structural analysis of CPR Part 52:

  • Part III (CPR 52.8) is a specific regime for “judicial review appeals from the High Court,” including where permission to apply for JR is refused. It imposes a seven-day limit (CPR 52.8(3)–(4)). The Court of Appeal may convert permission to appeal into permission to apply for JR (CPR 52.8(5)).
  • Part IV (CPR 52.12–52.13) contains additional general rules on appellant’s and respondent’s notices. It is not designed to supplant or dilute the specific timetables in Part III. Reading CPR 52.13 to extend time would produce arbitrary and unworkable anomalies, particularly where there is no appellant’s notice by a defendant for the claimant to respond to.

  Thus, any party wishing to challenge a refusal of permission to apply for JR—whether viewed as “appellant” or “respondent” in another appeal—must comply with CPR 52.8’s seven-day limit. On the facts, although out of time, Ms. Ammori obtained an extension due to genuine uncertainty, absence of prior authority, and the case management benefits of resolving all arguable grounds together quickly.

  Impact and Forward Look

  On terrorism proscription litigation

  • Immediate route clarified: Parties seeking to challenge a fresh proscription under section 3(3)(a) should proceed by judicial review, not by a deproscription application to the Secretary of State with POAC appeal.
  • Rule of law alignment: JR can deliver a quashing order that eliminates unlawful orders ab initio, an outcome purpose-built to remove criminal and civil consequences of invalid executive action—something the deproscription/POAC route cannot provide because section 7 makes relief prospective only.
  • Criminal proceedings coherence: This route reduces the risk of inconsistent determinations across criminal cases, by enabling a timely, authoritative ruling on legality.
  • POAC’s continuing role: Deproscription remains the proper route to end ongoing proscription when circumstances change post‑proscription.

  On public law procedure and appellate practice

  • Seven-day stopwatch: Any party wishing to challenge a High Court refusal of permission to apply for JR on one or more grounds must file within seven days under CPR 52.8—even if, at the same time, that party is a “respondent” in another party’s appeal on a different issue.
  • Case management flexibility: The Court can convert PTA into permission to apply for JR under CPR 52.8(5), aiding swift resolution without procedural detours.
  • Professional practice point: Practitioners should treat the seven-day limit as hard-edged and independent of any parallel appeals and should not rely on respondent’s notice timetables to revive or extend time for refused grounds.

  Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Proscription vs deproscription: Proscription (section 3(3)(a)) is the Home Secretary’s act of adding an organisation to Schedule 2, triggering offences (e.g., membership, support). Deproscription (sections 4–5) is a later application/appeal process aimed at removing an organisation from the list—typically when it is no longer “concerned in terrorism.”
  • POAC: A specialised tribunal that hears appeals against a refusal to deproscribe, applying judicial review principles to the refusal decision.
  • “Available” vs “adequate” alternative remedy: A remedy is “available” if the statute gives you a route to challenge the decision under attack. It is “adequate” if that route is suitably equipped—legally and practically—to vindicate your rights in the case at hand. Here, the Court says the deproscription route is not even the right kind of remedy for initial proscription. If it were, it would still be inadequate on these facts.
  • Prospective vs retrospective effect (section 7): After a successful POAC appeal and deproscription, only convictions for conduct occurring after the Secretary of State’s refusal to deproscribe can be revisited. That prospectivity signals Parliament did not intend deproscription to correct an unlawful initial proscription.
  • Closed material procedures (CMP): Historically, POAC’s ability to handle secret material distinguished it from JR. Now, modern JR can also accommodate CMP in appropriate circumstances, narrowing that functional gap.
  • Boddington defence: In general, a defendant can defend a criminal charge by showing that the subordinate legislation or administrative act they allegedly contravened was unlawful. Whether and how that applies to proscription offences remains open, but the Court flags the practical risks of litigating that issue piecemeal in criminal courts.
  • CPR 52.8 vs 52.13: CPR 52.8 sets a strict seven-day timetable for applying for permission to appeal a refusal of permission to apply for JR. CPR 52.13 governs respondent’s notices generally; it cannot be used to sidestep CPR 52.8’s specific seven-day rule for JR permissions.

  Conclusion

  This is a constitutionally significant decision in two respects. First, it repositions the statutory architecture of proscription challenges: the Administrative Court’s judicial review is the correct mechanism to contest the initial legality of a proscription order; the deproscription/POAC route remains vital but for a different purpose—bringing continuing proscription to an end when circumstances have changed. The Court’s reliance on section 7’s prospective treatment of convictions is the interpretive linchpin, as it would be incoherent for Parliament to intend deproscription to be the remedy for an unlawful initial proscription yet leave earlier criminal convictions intact.

  Second, the Court clarifies an important appellate procedural point: where permission to apply for JR is refused on any ground, the seven-day limit in CPR 52.8 governs any application for permission to appeal that refusal, regardless of whether the party is labelled a “respondent” in another appeal. This clear rule will streamline future public law litigation, promote prompt challenges, and avoid procedural gamesmanship.

  Practically, the judgment will shape how proscription is litigated henceforth: claimants will turn directly to JR to challenge fresh proscription orders; deproscription and POAC will remain available and important for later-stage challenges; and criminal prosecutions brought in the interim will proceed against the backdrop of the Administrative Court’s early, authoritative rulings on lawfulness. On the procedural front, practitioners should now treat CPR 52.8 as the default, hard-edged timetable for any attempt to revive grounds refused at the permission stage in JR.