Alsaleh v Residential Tenancies Board [2025] IEHC 702: Ownership Not Required for “Landlord” Status or RTB Jurisdiction

1. Introduction

This High Court judgment in Alsaleh v Residential Tenancies Board ([2025] IEHC 702, Phelan J.) is a significant addition to Irish residential tenancies jurisprudence. It clarifies the meaning of “landlord” under the Residential Tenancies Acts 2004–2021 (“RTA 2004”) and confirms that:

There is no requirement
The RTB’s jurisdiction depends on the existence of a tenancy based on contract (express, oral or implied), not on proof of title.

The case arose from a dispute between a medical practitioner, Dr Abdallah Alsaleh (the appellant), and his former patient and later employee, Ms Sharon McDonnell, together with her partner, Mr Wayne Frarey (the notice parties). The RTB Tenancy Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) found that an oral tenancy existed in a dwelling adjacent to the appellant’s surgery and that the tenants had been unlawfully evicted. It awarded €7,500 in damages for breach of landlord obligations.

On appeal to the High Court under s.123(3) RTA 2004, the appellant did not challenge the factual finding that a tenancy existed. Instead, he argued that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction because he was not the owner of the property and was, at most, acting as agent for his wife. He also attempted to deploy s.3 of the Landlord and Tenant Law Amendment Act (Ireland) 1860 (“Deasy’s Act”) and the maxim nemo dat quod non habet (no one can give what he does not have) to impose an ownership requirement on the definition of “landlord”.

Phelan J. rejected these arguments, upheld the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. The judgment provides a detailed and principled account of how the RTA 2004 interacts with historic landlord and tenant law, and it firmly limits attempts by non-compliant landlords to evade RTB scrutiny by denying ownership of the dwelling.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The factual matrix

The key factual background, largely drawn from the Tribunal’s findings and an exhibited transcript, can be summarised as follows:

July 2022 – alleged commencement of tenancy: The notice parties claimed that following a conversation in the appellant’s surgery (where Mr Frarey was a patient), the appellant offered them a nearby house to rent. Ms McDonnell stated that around 10 July 2022 she left €2,600 (one month’s rent plus deposit) at the surgery, received the keys, and moved in with her partner.
Evidence of the tenancy:
- Videos and photographs of them moving into an empty property in July 2022 and of keys being handed over;
- WhatsApp/text messages, including one stating “Rent is due on the 10th of every month” (12 August 2022) and messages about white goods delivery and key handover;
- Documentation showing electricity accounts being put into their name and substantial arrears accruing;
- A prescription from the appellant listing the Dwelling as Ms McDonnell’s address;
- Letters/emails from the former practice manager corroborating the payment of a deposit and rent at the surgery and the use of a practice safe.
October 2022 – August 2023: Ms McDonnell worked for the appellant at his surgery. Rent was allegedly paid in cash, initially via the practice manager and later directly to the appellant. No rent receipts or written lease were provided.
Late summer – autumn 2023 – deterioration and alleged eviction: Relations deteriorated after Ms McDonnell gave notice to leave her employment in August 2023. A builder was told to move into the dwelling; there were physical altercations involving the appellant and Mr Frarey.
31 October 2023 – alleged illegal eviction: The notice parties returned to find the locks changed and an unknown man in occupation. They were refused access; Gardaí attended but treated it as a civil matter. Some belongings later returned were damaged or missing; passports were left at a Garda station. No valid Notice of Termination had been served.

The appellant denied that any tenancy existed, alleging that the couple were squatters and that text messages had been fabricated. He said the property belonged to his wife, was used for storage and occasional locum accommodation, and that he was at most acting as her agent. The title evidence consisted of a redacted, undated transfer and an incomplete Land Registry printout (page 1 of 4, without ownership details). His wife did not give evidence.

2.2 RTB adjudication and Tribunal proceedings

The tenants lodged a dispute with the RTB on 1 November 2023. An adjudicator first found that the RTB lacked jurisdiction because there was insufficient evidence of rent payments or a tenancy agreement. The tenants appealed, and the matter proceeded to a de novo Tribunal hearing over two days (30 May and 9 July 2024).

The Tribunal:

Heard oral evidence from both tenants and the appellant;
Considered photographic, video, documentary and electronic message evidence; and
Considered correspondence from the former practice manager about deposit and rent payments.

On 13 July 2024, the Tribunal determined that:

An oral tenancy existed from July 2022;
By the time of the eviction, the tenancy had become a Part 4 tenancy (occupation exceeding six months);
The appellant was the “landlord” within the meaning of s.5 RTA 2004, notwithstanding his protestations about ownership;
The termination of the tenancy was unlawful as no valid notice was served and the tenants had been locked out; and
In the absence of receipts, no specific award could be made for loss of belongings, but €7,500 was awarded as damages for breach of landlord obligations, particularly illegal termination and denial of peaceful and exclusive occupation.

A Determination Order issued on 14 August 2024, and the appellant lodged a High Court appeal on 6 September 2024, limited (as required by s.123 RTA 2004) to a point of law.

2.3 Grounds of appeal to the High Court

In his Originating Notice of Motion, the appellant sought to set aside the Determination Order on essentially four grounds:

The Tribunal wrongly assumed jurisdiction on the evidence before it;
The Tribunal wrongly held that there was no need for a landlord to be the owner of the property;
The Tribunal wrongly assumed that an unspecified Act (in context, the RTA 2004) was a complete and self-contained code of residential tenancy law; and
The Tribunal gave no examples of situations where a non-owner was a landlord, allegedly rendering its reasoning incomprehensible.

On affidavit, the appellant’s solicitor asserted that a redacted deed of transfer had been given to the Tribunal to show that the appellant was not the owner and that he acted only as agent for his wife. The RTB, in sworn affidavits from the Tribunal chair and an acting deputy director, responded that:

The Tribunal’s findings were rooted in primary facts supported by ample evidence;
The correct statutory definition of “landlord” in s.5 RTA 2004 had been applied; and
The appellant had failed to prove that he was merely an agent, and that ownership was not a precondition to RTB jurisdiction.

3. Summary of the High Court Judgment

The High Court dismissed the appeal. The key holdings can be distilled as follows:

The appeal under s.123(3) RTA 2004 is confined to points of law. The court cannot re-hear the matter on the facts nor substitute its own assessment of the evidence, save in the narrow circumstances where there is literally no evidence supporting a finding or where the finding is irrational.
The Tribunal was entitled, on abundant evidence, to conclude that a tenancy existed and that the appellant was the landlord within the meaning of s.5 RTA 2004.
There is no ownership requirement in the statutory definition of “landlord”. A landlord, for RTA 2004 purposes, is the person “for the time being entitled to receive (otherwise than as agent for another person) the rent”.
The RTA 2004 is premised on the same contractual foundation as Deasy’s Act s.3: the landlord–tenant relationship arises from an agreement, not from ownership or tenure. Deasy’s Act does not introduce any requirement that a landlord must be the owner before a tenancy can arise between the parties.
The RTB Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide questions of title (s.110 RTA 2004) and does not need proof of ownership to exercise jurisdiction; it needs only to decide, on the evidence, whether a tenancy existed and who, as between the parties, was landlord and tenant.
The appellant’s reliance on the maxim nemo dat quod non habet, and on Anderson v Fitzgerald [2020] IEHC 309, was misconceived. Those principles may affect third-party property rights, but they do not preclude a contractual tenancy between the parties.
The appellant did not establish, on evidence, that he was acting merely as an agent or that the tenants were ever told that he was an agent. On the contrary, his own conduct (including evidence that he later “sold the house”) undermined this assertion.
There was no failure to give reasons. The Tribunal clearly explained its reliance on s.5 RTA 2004 and on the evidence before it; it was not required to provide illustrative examples.

Accordingly, Phelan J. held that no error of law had been demonstrated. The Tribunal’s determination stood, and the appeal was dismissed.

4. Legal Framework

4.1 Residential Tenancies Acts 2004–2021

Key provisions considered include:

Long Title: The Acts are designed to provide security of tenure for tenants, to codify basic landlord and tenant rights and obligations, and to establish a mechanism for the “cheap and speedy resolution of disputes”.
Section 5(1) – Definitions:
- “Landlord” means “the person for the time being entitled to receive (otherwise than as agent for another person) the rent paid in respect of a dwelling by the tenant thereof”.
- “Tenancy” includes oral, written and implied agreements, and applies even after termination.
- “Tenant” means the person entitled to occupy a dwelling under a tenancy (including, where context admits, a former tenant).
Section 12(1)(e): A landlord must notify the tenant of the identity of any person authorised to act on the landlord’s behalf in relation to the tenancy.
Section 34 and Part 4: Provide for Part 4 tenancies (tenancies of more than six months) and exhaustively list the permissible grounds and procedures for lawful termination by a landlord.
Part 5 (Termination) and s.59: Displaces certain pre-existing rules of law on the termination of tenancies.
Part 6 (Dispute resolution; ss.76–78): Creates a statutory regime for referring disputes about compliance with landlord or tenant obligations (including allegations of unlawful termination).
Section 110: “The title to any lands or property shall not be drawn into question in any proceedings before ... the Tribunal.”
Section 123(3) and (4): Provide for an appeal to the High Court on a point of law only, and make the High Court’s decision “final and conclusive”.
Section 193: Disapplies specified older landlord and tenant enactments to dwellings within the scope of the RTA 2004; notably, s.3 of Deasy’s Act is not disapplied.

4.2 Deasy’s Act, s.3

Section 3 of the Landlord and Tenant Law Amendment Act (Ireland) 1860 provides:

“The relation of landlord and tenant shall be deemed to be founded on the express or implied contract of the parties, and not upon tenure or service, and a reversion shall not be necessary to such relation, which shall be deemed to subsist in all cases in which there shall be an agreement by one party to hold land from or under another in consideration of any rent.”

Phelan J. emphasised that this provision, far from introducing an ownership requirement, simply confirms that the landlord–tenant relationship is contractual in nature. It is entirely consistent with the RTA 2004’s definition of “tenancy”.

4.3 Procedural rules on statutory appeals

Order 84C, r.2(3) of the Rules of the Superior Courts requires that where a statute permits appeal on a point of law only, the Notice of Motion must “state concisely the point of law” relied upon. This underscores the limited scope of appeals under s.123(3) RTA 2004.

5. Precedents and Authorities Cited

5.1 Standard of review on an appeal “on a point of law”

The judgment situates itself within a consistent line of authority on s.123 RTA 2004 appeals:

Fitzgibbon v Law Society [2014] IESC 48; [2015] 1 I.R. 516 (citing Deely v Information Commissioner [2001] 3 I.R. 439): Clarke J. set out the framework for appellate review on a point of law:
- Primary findings of fact cannot be set aside unless no evidence supports them;
- Inferences from facts will stand unless no reasonable decision-maker could have drawn them;
- Inferences based on interpretation of documents can be revisited if incorrect; and
- Any decision showing an erroneous view of the law can be set aside.
Marwaha v RTB [2016] IEHC 308 (Barrett J.): distilled the principles:
- The court reviews the determination and the process of determination for legal error;
- Findings of fact are sacrosanct unless unsupported by evidence;
- Mistakes of law, misdirections, or unreasonable inferences from primary facts can justify intervention.
Stulpinaite v RTB [2021] IEHC 178 (Barr J.): endorsed Marwaha and Fitzgibbon as accurately reflecting the limited appellate jurisdiction.
Nowak v RTB [2017] IEHC 111; Doyle v RTB [2015] IEHC 724; Gunn v RTB [2020] IEHC 635; Carroll v RTB [2022] IEHC 326; Ó Laoire v RTB [2025] IEHC 384; Pszonka v RTB [2025] IEHC 291; O’Sheehan v RTB [2024] IEHC 409; WebSummit v RTB [2023] IEHC 634; Iyaba v RTB [2023] IEHC 491:
- These decisions repeatedly stress the “very high bar” for overturning findings of fact;
- Tribunals enjoy a “significant margin of appreciation” (O’Sheehan, para. 90);
- Assessment of evidence is “quintessentially a matter for the Tribunal” (Iyaba).

Phelan J. adopts and applies these principles, concluding that the appellant’s attack on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction was, in reality, a dissatisfaction with its factual findings and credibility assessments, something which is not revisitable on a s.123 appeal absent irrationality or complete lack of evidential support.

5.2 Raising new arguments on appeal: Hyland v RTB

In Hyland v RTB [2017] IEHC 557 (Noonan J.), the High Court held that a party cannot generally base an appeal on a point of law regarding an issue that was never put to the Tribunal, nor asked of it for determination. Where an issue was not ventilated below, it cannot ordinarily form the basis of a s.123 appeal.

In Alsaleh, the appellant’s reliance on Deasy’s Act s.3 and nemo dat was new in the High Court and had not been pleaded as such before the Tribunal. Nonetheless, Phelan J., while noting this procedural objection, decided to address the arguments substantively because:

The appellant had pursued an alternative case before the Tribunal that he acted only as an agent for his wife as owner; and
The core point—whether ownership is a jurisdictional precondition—was intertwined with that alternative case.

5.3 Jurisdictional facts and Anderson v Fitzgerald

The appellant invoked Anderson v Fitzgerald & Ors [2020] IEHC 309 to argue that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction in the absence of proof of ownership. Phelan J. rejected this reading. She clarified that:

Anderson confirms that the existence of a tenancy is a “condition precedent” or jurisdictional fact for the RTB’s jurisdiction;
The Tribunal is entitled to determine that jurisdictional fact on the evidence, but its conclusion is not “conclusive” or “exclusive” in the sense that a court can review it for legal error; and
Anderson actually illustrates that a tenancy can operate inter partes (between landlord and tenant) while not necessarily binding third parties such as a mortgagee whose consent has not been obtained.

Thus, Anderson does not support the proposition that only a legal owner can be a landlord for RTA 2004 purposes, nor that proof of title is a precondition to Tribunal jurisdiction.

5.4 Agency and landlord transparency: Gunn v RTB

In Gunn v RTB [2020] IEHC 635, Simons J. discussed the statutory scheme’s insistence on transparency as to the identity of the landlord and any authorised agent. He emphasised that:

“the scheme of the legislation is that there must be transparency in respect of the identity of the landlord and his or her authorized agent. This makes perfect sense: it is important that a tenant can have confidence that the person to whom they are paying rent is in a position to provide a valid receipt for same. Similarly, a tenant is entitled to know the identity of the person who is authorized to serve a notice of termination.”

Phelan J. cites this passage to underline that if a person is genuinely acting as agent for a landlord, that status and the principal’s identity must be disclosed to the tenant (as also required by s.12(1)(e) RTA 2004). In Alsaleh, no such disclosure occurred, and the evidence strongly suggested that the appellant acted as landlord in his own right, not as a mere intermediary.

6. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

6.1 Admissibility and role of the Tribunal transcript

The appellant objected during the High Court hearing to reliance on the Tribunal transcript, arguing that it might improperly “buttress” the Tribunal’s reasoning. Phelan J. rejected this, noting:

The first ground of appeal alleged a want of jurisdiction “on the evidence before it”;
The transcript is the best record of that evidence; and
The appellant did not dispute its accuracy.

She emphasised that the transcript’s role was evidentiary (showing what the Tribunal heard), not to supplement or repair the written Decision. The Tribunal’s determination still had to stand or fall on its own reasoning.

6.2 The contractual foundation of tenancies under the RTA 2004 and Deasy’s Act

The appellant’s central legal thesis was that the Tribunal could not find a tenancy without proof that the landlord owned the property, purportedly because:

Deasy’s Act s.3 made tenancies dependent on a landlord having an interest to grant;
The nemo dat principle meant that only a person with a proprietary estate could grant a lease; and
The RTA 2004 must be read subject to that underlying property law.

Phelan J. found this misconceived at multiple levels:

Deasy’s Act also emphasises contract, not title. Section 3 explicitly states that the landlord–tenant relationship is founded on “express or implied contract” and that a reversion is not necessary. It is “deemed to subsist in all cases” where one party agrees to hold land from another in consideration of rent.
The RTA 2004 is harmonious with Deasy’s Act. The statutory definitions of “tenancy” and “tenant” in s.5 RTA 2004, expressly including oral and implied agreements, are consistent with Deasy’s contractual model. Both treat the relationship between landlord and tenant as matters of agreement, not of strict proprietary title.
Ownership is not written into the definition of “landlord”. Section 5(1) defines “landlord” functionally, not proprietarily: the landlord is “the person for the time being entitled to receive (otherwise than as agent for another person) the rent”.
Statutory overlay. The RTA 2004 overlays the contractual tenancy with statutory rights and obligations (e.g. security of tenure under Part 4, constraints on termination). These are implied into the agreement “by operation of law”, not by virtue of ownership.

Accordingly, there is no textual or doctrinal basisan agreement to occupy in return for rent and who, as between the parties, stood in the landlord’s shoes.

6.3 RTB’s jurisdiction, title, and “nemo dat quod non habet”

Phelan J. emphasised:

The Tribunal is “a creature of statute” with “prescribed, limited jurisdiction”;
Section 110 RTA 2004 expressly forbids the drawing into question of “the title to any lands or property” in RTB proceedings;
Its task is limited to determining whether a tenancy existed so as to found jurisdiction and to resolve related landlord–tenant disputes.

On this footing:

Proof of ownership is irrelevant to the RTB’s jurisdiction once a tenancy is found on the evidence; and
The maxim nemo dat quod non habet concerns property entitlements enforceable against third parties, not the existence of a contractual relationship inter partes.

Thus, even if a person who is not the registered owner purports to grant a tenancy, that arrangement will still be a tenancy between landlord and tenant and will attract the protections and obligations of the RTA 2004 as between them. It may be vulnerable as against a freeholder or mortgagee, but that is beyond RTB jurisdiction and lies in the realm of property and banking law.

6.4 The “agency” defence and burden of proof

The appellant’s secondary position—advanced in the alternative to his denial that any tenancy ever existed—was that he had, if at all, acted only as an agent for his wife, the alleged owner. From this he sought to argue:

That he was not a “landlord” under s.5, because he received rent as “agent for another person”; and
That the RTB therefore lacked jurisdiction over him.

Phelan J. identified several fatal weaknesses in this line of argument:

No disclosure of agency to the tenants. Section 12(1)(e) RTA 2004 requires landlords to notify tenants of any authorised agent. Gunn confirms that transparency about landlord/agent identity is central. The appellant produced no evidence that he ever told the tenants he was acting merely as agent. To the contrary, the evidence portrayed him as the operative decision-maker: arranging viewings, handing over keys, purchasing appliances, demanding rent, and later admitting he had “sold the house”.
Evidential burden on the person asserting agency. If a party seeks to rely on the s.5 carve-out—i.e. that he receives rent “as agent for another person”—it is for that party to establish, on evidence, that such an agency relationship existed and was disclosed. The appellant:
- Did not call his wife to give evidence;
- Produced only incomplete and redacted title documents (no full folio, no clear proof of ownership at the relevant time); and
- Initially told the Tribunal he did not know who owned the house next door to his surgery, before later saying he had bought it for his wife.
Credibility and inconsistent assertions. The Tribunal expressly found the appellant’s evidence “not plausible” and “inconsistent”. It preferred the tenants’ account, supported by extensive contemporaneous documentation. On appeal, the appellant did not, and could not, challenge those credibility findings as legally unsustainable.

Given this evidential and credibility landscape, the Tribunal was fully entitled to conclude that the appellant had not established that he was acting “merely” as agent, and thus he fell squarely within the statutory definition of “landlord”.

6.5 Factual sufficiency and the limits of appellate interference

The appellant’s Notice of Motion complained that the Tribunal wrongly assumed jurisdiction “on the evidence before it”. Phelan J. interpreted this as, in reality, a challenge to:

The Tribunal’s weighing of evidence; and
Its decision to prefer the tenants’ narrative over that of the appellant.

She meticulously recited the “copious” evidence supporting the existence of a tenancy, including:

The initial offer of accommodation in the surgery;
The payment of deposit and rent and handover of keys in July 2022;
The corroborative testimony and written statement of the practice manager;
Videos of moving in; text messages arranging viewings, keys, rent reminders, and appliance delivery; utility account transfers; and the appellant’s own prescription listing the Dwelling as Ms McDonnell’s address;
Evidence of 15 months’ continuous occupation and the context of the alleged lock-out.

Against this, she noted that the appellant’s evidence was internally inconsistent and poorly supported by documents. Applying the Marwaha/Fitzgibbon/Deely test, she concluded:

There was clearly evidence to support the Tribunal’s findings of fact; and
It could not be said that the inferences drawn were ones that “no reasonable decision-maker” could have drawn.

Accordingly, there was no basis for the High Court to disturb the Tribunal’s factual determinations or its conclusion that it had jurisdiction.

6.6 Adequacy of reasons and the “no examples” complaint

One of the appellant’s grounds of appeal was that the Tribunal failed to provide “examples” of situations where a non-owner might nonetheless be a landlord, allegedly rendering its reasoning opaque.

Phelan J. accepted, in line with O’Sheehan v RTB, that a failure to provide adequate reasons can constitute an error of law. However, she held that the Tribunal’s decision in this case was perfectly clear:

The Tribunal expressly relied on s.5 RTA 2004;
It stated that “nowhere is it stated in the Act that a landlord has to own the property” and observed that “in practice many landlords are not the actual owners of property they are renting to tenants”;
It explained that the incomplete Land Registry documents did not prove ownership by anyone else; and
It clearly set out why it preferred the tenants' evidence on the existence of a tenancy and on rent payments.

There is no legal requirement that a tribunal must illustrate a legal proposition with hypothetical “examples” for its reasoning to be intelligible. The absence of examples did not amount to a failure to give reasons.

7. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

7.1 Part 4 tenancy

Under the RTA 2004, if a tenant has been in occupation of a dwelling for more than six months and no valid termination has been effected, the tenancy automatically becomes a “Part 4 tenancy”. This grants the tenant enhanced security of tenure: the landlord may terminate only on specific statutory grounds (s.34), and must comply with formal notice requirements and notice periods.

7.2 Appeal “on a point of law”

An appeal “on a point of law” (s.123(3) RTA 2004) is not a full rehearing. The High Court:

Does not re-evaluate witness credibility;
Does not substitute its view of the facts; and
Interferes only where:
- No evidence supports a finding of fact;
- The inference drawn is one no reasonable tribunal could draw; or
- The tribunal has misdirected itself in law or applied the wrong legal test.

7.3 Jurisdictional fact

A “jurisdictional fact” is a factual condition that must exist before a decision-maker has power to act. For the RTB Tribunal, the existence of a “tenancy” is such a jurisdictional fact. The Tribunal itself decides, at first instance, whether a tenancy existed, but its view can be reviewed in the High Court for legal error.

7.4 Nemo dat quod non habet

The maxim nemo dat quod non habet (“no one can give what he does not have”) generally means that a person cannot transfer a greater property interest than he or she possesses. In this context, the appellant tried to argue that:

Without a proprietary estate in the dwelling, he could not grant a tenancy; therefore
No valid tenancy could have arisen; and
The Tribunal could not have jurisdiction.

The High Court implicitly rejected this, holding that:

As between the parties, a contractual tenancy can exist based on agreement and rent, irrespective of ultimate legal title;
Any limitations arising from nemo dat affect third-party property rights (e.g. owners, mortgagees), not the operation of the RTA 2004 inter partes; and
The RTB is statutorily barred from adjudicating title in any event (s.110).

7.5 Agency versus landlord status

An agent acts on behalf of a principal. Under s.5 RTA 2004, a person who receives rent “as agent for another person” is not the “landlord”. Placing reliance on this exclusion requires:

Evidence that the principal (the real landlord) exists and has authorised the agent;
Transparency: tenants must be told who the landlord is (s.12(1)(e)); and
Consistency of conduct: if the agent behaves as if he were the landlord (controlling occupation, selling the property, etc.), a tribunal may conclude he is, in substance, the landlord.

8. Impact and Significance

8.1 Clarifying the definition of “landlord”

The judgment cements an important principle: for the purposes of the RTA 2004, a landlord need not be the legal owner of the dwelling. The definition in s.5 is functional, not proprietary; it focuses on the entitlement to receive rent. This has several practical implications:

Tenants are protected even where the person they deal with is not the registered owner, provided there is a genuine contractual arrangement of occupation for rent;
Individuals cannot easily evade RTB jurisdiction by asserting that “the house is in my spouse’s/company’s name” while in practice acting as landlord; and
Ownership disputes and title issues remain outside the RTB’s remit and must be litigated, if necessary, in other fora.

8.2 Protection against “cat and mouse” strategies

Phelan J. characterises the appellant’s approach as a “proverbial game of ‘cat and mouse’” aimed at avoiding accountability under the RTA 2004. The judgment sends a clear signal that:

Contradictory defences (denying any tenancy while simultaneously claiming to be purely an agent) will attract close scrutiny;
Incomplete or strategically redacted title documentation may undermine credibility; and
Attempts to displace RTB jurisdiction by belatedly invoking ownership complexities will not succeed where the evidence shows a substantive landlord–tenant relationship.

8.3 Guidance for landlords and agents

For legitimate landlords and property managers, the case underscores:

The importance of:
- Providing written agreements and rent receipts;
- Complying with s.12(1)(e) by clearly notifying tenants if you act as agent and who the principal landlord is; and
- Serving valid Notices of Termination in accordance with Part 4 and Part 5 before regaining possession.
That “informal” arrangements, especially where rent is paid in cash without receipts, do not lie outside the RTA 2004—on the contrary, they can still generate full statutory obligations.

Agents must beware: if they fail to make their agency role explicit and act indistinguishably from landlords, tribunals may treat them as landlords with all attendant liabilities.

8.4 Guidance for tenants and their advisers

For tenants, the decision is reassuring:

You do not have to prove who legally owns a property to bring a dispute to the RTB;
You only need to show that someone with whom you dealt gave you occupation of the property in return for rent and behaved as landlord;
Evidence such as messages, videos, utility bills, prescriptions, and third-party corroboration can be crucial where there is no written lease or receipts.

The judgment lowers the procedural barriers for vulnerable tenants who may have entered into informal or undocumented arrangements with landlords.

8.5 Doctrinal harmony between RTA 2004 and Deasy’s Act

Finally, the case contributes to doctrinal clarity:

It confirms that Deasy’s Act s.3 and the RTA 2004 are complementary: both rest tenancies on contract, not tenure or title;
It rejects attempts to use older property doctrines to undermine the modern statutory regime of tenant protection; and
It preserves the distinction between:
- Contractual landlord–tenant relations (within the RTB’s sphere); and
- Broader property and security rights (beyond the RTB’s jurisdiction).

9. Conclusion

Alsaleh v RTB is a careful and robust affirmation of the RTB Tenancy Tribunal’s role and of the contractual–statutory nature of residential tenancies under Irish law. The High Court holds that:

The existence of a tenancy is a matter of contract and evidence; it does not depend on proof of legal ownership;
The statutory definition of “landlord” focuses on the right to receive rent, not on title;
The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is not ousted by unresolved or disputed ownership issues, which are outside its statutory remit; and
Appeals on a point of law cannot be used to re-litigate credibility findings or factual assessments where there is ample evidence to support the Tribunal’s conclusions.

The judgment will be of lasting importance in cases where landlords seek to obscure ownership arrangements or rely on informal tenancies. It reinforces tenant protections against unlawful eviction and underscores that the RTB system is designed to look at the reality of occupation and rent, rather than formalities of title. As such, it stands as a clear precedent that ownership is not a precondition to landlord status or RTB jurisdiction under the Residential Tenancies Acts.