Age-Assessment Judicial Review Not Academic Where the Finding May Have Ongoing Practical Consequences

1. Introduction

Dastan Ibrahimi against Glasgow City Council ([2026] CSIH 4) is an Inner House reclaiming motion arising from a judicial review challenge to a local authority “age assessment” of an asylum seeker. Mr Ibrahimi (the petitioner and reclaimer), an Iranian national, sought accommodation under section 25(1) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 on the basis he was under 18 (DOB claimed: 13 January 2006). Glasgow City Council refused, having decided (after an interview and “visual assessment”) that he was “significantly over 18”.

The key issues before the Inner House were:

Justiciability/academicness: whether the judicial review had become academic because Mr Ibrahimi was, by the time of litigation, accepted to be over 18.
Adequacy of reasons: whether the decision letter adequately explained why the Council treated him as an adult.
Procedural fairness: whether he was told the “gist” of the adverse case and given an opportunity to respond.
Rationality and “Tameside” inquiry duty: whether the Council’s reliance on appearance/demeanour (and limited inquiry) was irrational or based on insufficient investigation.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Inner House allowed the reclaiming motion only on the preliminary point: it held the judicial review was not academic because the age assessment could still have practical effects (notably in asylum decision-making, tribunal proceedings, and possible future support under section 25(3) of the 1995 Act while under 21).

On the merits, however, the Inner House upheld the substance of the Council’s decision and refused reduction:

The reasons in the 19 July 2023 letter were adequate applying the Wordie test.
The process was procedurally fair; Mr Ibrahimi was told the essence of the adverse conclusion and did respond.
The decision was not irrational and there was no breach of the Tameside-type duty to inquire further.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Academicness / Live controversy

Wightman v S of S for Exiting the EU [2018] CSIH 62, 2019 SC 111
Used by the Lord Ordinary to support the general rule against deciding hypothetical disputes (“no practical effect”). The Inner House accepted the principle but distinguished its application: here, the age finding could still matter.
R (SB) v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2023] EWCA Civ 924, [2024] 1 WLR 2613
Relied on by the Council as “on all fours”. The Inner House effectively declined to treat it as determinative, because Scottish statutory context (including potential support under section 25(3) while under 21) and the practical likelihood of future reliance by other decision-makers made the dispute sufficiently “live”.
Abdullah v Aberdeenshire Council [2024] CSOH 8, 2024 SLT 143
A further instance where an age-assessment judicial review was characterised as academic in similar circumstances. The Inner House treated this line of reasoning as not decisive on the facts before it.
Ahmat v Aberdeenshire Council [2025] CSOH 15, 2025 SLT 735 (and R (GE (Eritrea)) v Home Secretary [2015] 1 WLR 4123)
Important to the Inner House’s conclusion that age can remain relevant beyond 18 due to the continuing statutory framework (notably section 25(3)). The Inner House endorsed the approach in Ahmat on academicness, even while noting factual/remedial differences.
JR194 [2024] NIKB 46
Cited by the reclaimer to argue a public interest (and Article 8 interest) in accurate dates of birth. The Inner House did not adopt this as the ratio, but accepted there could be ongoing practical consequences sufficient to avoid academicness.

Age assessments, reasons, and the “obvious over 18” category

R (B) v Merton London BC [2003] EWHC 1689 (Admin), [2003] 4 All ER 280
Central authority for two propositions applied in this case: (i) in cases where it is “very obvious” a person is over 18, there is no need for a prolonged inquiry; and (ii) “judicialisation” of age assessment is deprecated. The Inner House treated the Council’s conclusion (“significantly over 18”) as equiparating to the Merton “very obvious” test, supporting both the brevity of the process and the adequacy of concise reasons.
Wordie Property Co Ltd v Secretary of State for Scotland 1984 SLT 345
Provided the governing Scottish test on adequacy of reasons (“real and substantial doubt”). The Inner House held the 19 July 2023 letter met this standard in context.
Paton, Petitioner [2019] CSOH 62
Used to confirm that reasons may legitimately be brief in appropriate cases; reinforced the conclusion that the reasons letter need not be elaborate.

Procedural fairness / gist of the case

Reg v Home Secretary Ex p Doody [1994] 1 AC 531
The classic statement that fairness often requires notice of the gist of the case and opportunity to respond. The Inner House applied this flexibly: the notes showed he was told he was not believed and he responded.
Pyaneandee v Leen [2024] UKPC 27 and Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs v Ramjohn [2011] UKPC 20 (with R v Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police, Ex p Cotton [1990] IRLR 344)
Cited for the proposition that procedural fairness is context-specific, not immutable. Supported the court’s approach that not every adverse sub-point required separate “prior notice” where the decision rested primarily on direct observation.
R (HAM) v Brent LBC [2022] EWHC 1924 (Admin), [2022] PTSR 1779
Used (below and in the Inner House’s analysis) to distinguish cases where the decision-maker is concluding the person is lying on particular matters and should explain that view; the court held this was not that kind of case because appearance/demeanour were decisive.

Rationality, evidence, and post hoc reasoning

Chief Constable v Lothian and Borders Police Board [2005] CSOH 32, 2005 SLT 315
Cited by the reclaimer for caution against ex post facto justification. The Inner House accepted, in principle, that later affidavits may carry less weight than contemporaneous notes, but held there was no material divergence from the reasons letter.
R (MVN) v London Borough of Greenwich [2015] EWHC 1942 (Admin)
Cited to emphasise social workers are not “expert witnesses”. The Inner House nonetheless treated reliance on observed physical characteristics and professional experience as legitimate and not irrational.

The inquiry duty (“Tameside”)

Education Secretary v Tameside BC [1977] AC 1014 (and the Scottish reference via Gender Recognition Reform Order 2023 [2023] CSOH 89, 2024 SC 173)
Provided the framework for assessing whether the authority took reasonable steps to inform itself before deciding. The Inner House held further inquiries (e.g., verifying the “uncle” account with the Home Office/police) were not required, because that issue was not central to a decision grounded primarily in appearance/demeanour.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Why the judicial review was not academic

The Inner House reframed “practical effect” broadly. Even if Mr Ibrahimi was now over 18, the age assessment remained an extant public authority decision capable of being used against him. The court identified concrete pathways of potential reliance:

The Home Office may treat the Council’s assessment as relevant in asylum decision-making (explicitly recognising R (BM) v LB Hackney [2016] EWHC 3338 (Admin)).
The First-tier Tribunal may have regard to it on an asylum appeal.
While under 21, he might seek further assistance under section 25(3) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, where the Council’s prior position could again matter.

The court also dealt robustly with the Council’s litigation stance that it had “offered to withdraw” the assessment: since the offer was not accepted and the decision remained, it did not eliminate practical consequences; and the terms of the offer (maintaining the Council did nothing wrong and did not accept his claimed age) suggested limited reassurance about future openness.

(b) Adequacy of reasons: brevity permitted in “obvious over 18” cases

Applying Wordie Property Co Ltd v Secretary of State for Scotland 1984 SLT 345, the Inner House held that an informed reader would not be left in real and substantial doubt: the Council disbelieved the claimed DOB because “appearance and demeanour” strongly suggested he was “significantly over 18”.

Crucially, the court treated this as falling within the Merton category where it is “very obvious” a person is over 18. That classification did normative work: it justified (i) the Council’s decision not to conduct a prolonged inquiry and (ii) concise reasoning. The court rejected an argument that internal notes/affidavits created inconsistency: credibility concerns were contextual/supportive and not shown to have displaced the stated decisive basis (appearance/demeanour).

(c) Procedural fairness: “gist” satisfied on the facts

The Inner House accepted the general Doody principle but emphasised its fact-sensitivity (using Pyaneandee and Ramjohn). The contemporaneous notes showed Mr Ibrahimi was told he was not believed about being 17 and he insisted on his claimed DOB. That was held sufficient notice of the gist and opportunity to respond, especially where the decision rested on direct observation rather than contested documentary or inferential findings requiring a more elaborate “putting of the case”.

(d) Rationality and the scope of permissible reliance on appearance

The Inner House treated the rationality challenge as failing to meet the high threshold: the decision was not one no reasonable authority could reach. It endorsed reliance on observed physical characteristics (broad shoulders/hands, height/build, “fully developed Adam’s apple”, facial features, acne scarring) and demeanour, as recorded in contemporaneous notes. The court also stated that exhaustive listing of every observed feature was not required in the reasons letter.

(e) “Tameside” inquiries: proportionality to decisiveness

The court rejected the argument that the Council had to verify collateral factual matters (such as the “uncle” narrative) with external agencies. Given appearance/demeanour were sufficient to conclude he was “significantly over 18”, additional investigation into a minor credibility strand was not required to satisfy the decision-maker’s duty to inform itself.

3.3 Impact

Scottish justiciability: The case sets a clear Inner House marker that age-assessment challenges may remain live even once the individual is over 18, where the decision can realistically be relied upon in asylum/tribunal contexts or in later statutory support decisions (notably under section 25(3) up to age 21). This narrows the circumstances in which defenders can defeat such claims on “academicness” alone.
Reasons and process design for councils: The decision reinforces that, in “obviously over 18” cases, concise reasons focused on appearance/demeanour can suffice and a “full” Merton-style inquiry is not mandatory. That may incentivise councils to frame decisions explicitly within the “obvious” category to resist reasons/fairness challenges.
Litigation posture: The Inner House’s scepticism about an unaccepted “withdrawal offer” suggests that attempts to moot challenges informally may not assist where reputational/ongoing reliance consequences remain, and particularly where the authority maintains its adverse position.
Practical caution for applicants: Even where academicness is overcome, this case shows that reasons/fairness/rationality challenges will still be difficult where the authority can plausibly characterise the case as “very obvious” and contemporaneous notes show the individual was told the bottom-line adverse view.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Reclaiming motion”: An appeal in the Court of Session from a Lord Ordinary’s decision.
“Reduction”: A Scottish remedy setting aside (quashing) an unlawful decision.
“Academic” (or “hypothetical”) case: A dispute the court will not decide because the outcome would have no practical effect on the parties. Here, the Inner House held the age assessment could still matter in real-world decision-making, so it was not academic.
“Adequate reasons” (Wordie test): Reasons must be sufficient so that an informed reader is not left in real and substantial doubt why the decision was made and what mattered.
Procedural fairness / “gist” (Doody): Often requires telling a person the essence of what is going against them and letting them respond before deciding.
“Irrationality”: A very high threshold in judicial review—more than showing the decision was wrong; it must be one no reasonable decision-maker could reach.
“Tameside duty”: The duty to take reasonable steps to inform oneself before making a decision. What is “reasonable” depends on what is central to the decision.
Merton “obvious over 18” approach: Where it is very obvious someone is an adult, a prolonged inquiry is not required and an informal approach is permitted.
Section 50 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022: Provides for certain age assessments to have binding effect if carried out by a “designated person”. The Inner House noted the Council’s assessment here was not made under that regime (so not automatically binding), yet could still be practically influential.

5. Conclusion

[2026] CSIH 4 establishes (at Inner House level) that a local authority age-assessment judicial review may remain non-academic even after the claimant turns 18, where the challenged finding may still carry practical consequences in immigration/tribunal proceedings or future support decisions under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995.

At the same time, the court reaffirmed a restrained merits review: where the authority treats the case as an “obvious adult” situation in line with R (B) v Merton London BC [2003] EWHC 1689 (Admin), [2003] 4 All ER 280, concise reasons may satisfy the Wordie standard, and fairness/inquiry challenges will fail absent clear procedural or investigative deficiency.