The judgment primarily references the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), particularly Section 10, which outlines the statutory assumptions regarding the origin of property in possession of a convicted individual. While the judgment does not explicitly cite previous case law, it implicitly relies on established interpretations of POCA, reinforcing the court's adherence to statutory frameworks in confiscation proceedings.

The court’s treatment of the assumptions under POCA 2002 aligns with precedents that emphasize the burden on the defendant to disprove the presumption of criminal origin of assets. This reaffirmation serves as a reinforcement of the judiciary's stance on upholding confiscation orders when adequate evidence of criminal benefit is presented.

The Court of Appeal's legal reasoning centers on the appropriate application of POCA 2002's assumptions. The court reiterated that under Section 10(2) and Section 10(3), any property acquired after the relevant day or held post-conviction is assumed to result from criminal conduct unless convincingly rebutted by the defendant. Iyamu's inability to provide credible evidence to challenge these assumptions was pivotal in the court's decision.

Specifically, in addressing Ground 1, concerning the £22,930 in her Barclays account, the court found Iyamu's explanations unconvincing due to the lack of supporting documentary evidence and the improbability of recalling numerous small cash deposits and transfers accurately after more than a decade. Similarly, regarding Grounds 2 and 3 about the Benin City property, Iyamu failed to substantiate her claims of ownership and the legitimate source of funds for property development. The judge's discretionary apportionment between land and building values was upheld as a rational assessment addressing the risk of injustice, underlining the court's balanced approach in confiscation cases.

This judgment reinforces the stringent application of POCA 2002 in confiscation proceedings, particularly emphasizing the presumption of criminal origin of assets post-conviction. For future cases, this establishes a clear expectation that defendants bear the burden of disproving such assumptions with substantial evidence. The affirmation of the confiscation order in this case underscores the judiciary's commitment to asset recovery and serves as a deterrent against attempts to obscure the financial benefits of criminal activities.

Additionally, the court's handling of the apportionment between land and building values in the absence of precise evidence sets a precedent for similar property-related confiscation cases. It illustrates the court's willingness to exercise discretion judiciously to prevent injustice, thereby ensuring that confiscation orders are both fair and reflective of the evidence presented.