True Justice Demands Proportionality Between Legal Costs and Claim Value: Commentary on Putniene v McDonald & Ors [2025] IEHC 682

1. Introduction

The High Court judgment in Regina Putniene v Brendan McDonald, Munster Derivatives Limited and Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Ireland [2025] IEHC 682 is ostensibly an appeal in a modest road traffic personal injuries claim, estimated at approximately €16,500. On its facts, it is a fairly typical “he said / she said” liability dispute arising from a rear-end collision on a regional road near Tipperary town. The plaintiff lost in the Circuit Court and appealed to the High Court, where she again failed.

What renders this decision significant, and likely to be much cited, is not the outcome on liability but the systemic critique of Ireland’s civil justice architecture. Mr Justice Twomey uses the case to highlight what he labels an “injustice” inflicted on the plaintiff – not because she lost, but because the cost of resolving a low-value, bona fide claim in the High Court may vastly exceed its worth. Drawing on the Supreme Court’s emphasis on “proportionality” in Delaney v The Personal Injuries Board [2024] IESC 10 and earlier authorities, he directly confronts the question: if justice requires proportionality between different awards of damages, does it not equally require proportionality between damages and legal costs?

The judgment therefore has a dual character:

At the micro level: it is a fact‑specific adjudication on liability in a road traffic accident and an application of the orthodox “costs follow the event” rule.
At the macro level: it is a pointed critique of legislative choices that channel minor civil claims into expensive courts and a normative assertion that “true justice demands proportionality between legal costs and the value/importance of the issues at stake”.

While the court ultimately affirms the Circuit Court’s dismissal and awards costs against the plaintiff, it expressly characterises this outcome as producing an “injustice” in terms of cost disproportionality. The decision thus adds a new, articulated principle to Irish judicial discourse: that the fairness of civil justice must be evaluated not only by the quantum of damages but also by the relationship between those damages (or claim value) and the costs required to obtain a court decision.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Parties and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Ms Regina Putniene, brought a personal injuries action arising out of a collision on 19 July 2021 between her car and a truck driven by the first defendant, Mr Brendan McDonald, on a road between Tipperary town and Bansha. Munster Derivatives Limited and the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Ireland (MIBI) were also defendants, though the judgment focuses on the conduct of the truck driver.

The plaintiff’s injuries were soft‑tissue injuries; medical evidence indicated she missed only one day of work. The parties’ counsels’ estimates of quantum diverged significantly: the plaintiff’s counsel suggested €30,000; the defendant’s counsel suggested €500–€3,000. For the purposes of his systemic analysis, Twomey J adopts a mid‑point estimate of €16,500.

The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed in the Circuit Court by O’Donohoe J, who also awarded costs against her. She appealed to the High Court.

2.2 Factual Dispute

The case turned on liability in a classic two‑vehicle collision with starkly conflicting accounts and no independent eyewitness:

The plaintiff claimed she was driving behind a tractor (with trailer) in a convoy of three vehicles, with the defendant’s truck behind her, on a single‑lane road with a continuous white line. As the vehicles approached a bend, she said the tractor moved into the hard shoulder and she continued straight ahead in her own lane without attempting to overtake. The defendant, she maintained, was driving too close and failed to stop when she braked due to the tractor’s “zigzagging”.
The defendant claimed that when the tractor moved into the hard shoulder, the plaintiff attempted to overtake it by crossing the continuous white line towards the oncoming lane. On seeing oncoming traffic, she allegedly aborted the manoeuvre and steered back into the lane in which his truck was travelling, braking sharply. He said he could not avoid a collision with the rear of her car.

Both parties agreed there was oncoming traffic. The plaintiff’s daughter was a passenger and gave evidence supporting her mother’s version, but she was not regarded as an independent witness.

2.3 Issues Before the High Court

The High Court had to determine:

Liability: on the balance of probabilities, had the plaintiff discharged the onus of proving that the defendant’s negligence caused the collision, or was it more likely that she had undertaken (and then aborted) an unsafe overtaking manoeuvre?
Costs: in circumstances where the claim was low‑value but litigated at Circuit and High Court levels, should the ordinary rule that “costs follow the event” be applied, notwithstanding the manifest disproportionality between claim value and likely aggregate legal costs?
Systemic concerns (obiter): what does this case reveal about the structure of the Irish courts system, monetary jurisdiction thresholds, and the relationship between costs and access to justice?

2.4 Decision on Liability and Costs

On liability, the court:

Emphasised that the onus of proof lies on the plaintiff; there is no obligation on the defendant to establish his version. If both accounts are equally plausible, the plaintiff fails.
Considered the physical damage pattern as the only truly objective evidence: the defendant’s truck was damaged on its front right-hand side; the plaintiff’s car on its rear left-hand side. This configuration was held to be more compatible with the plaintiff’s car having been to the right of the truck, returning from an overtake, rather than both being in line in the centre of the lane.
Found the plaintiff’s and her daughter’s recollection regarding visibility of the tractor at 120m versus 100m from the bend to be illogical and unreliable, undermining their evidence.
Concluded that, on the balance of probabilities, the plaintiff attempted to overtake the tractor on a continuous white line as she approached a bend, then aborted and moved back into her lane, causing the collision.

Accordingly, the High Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the claim and held that:

The accident would not have occurred but for the plaintiff’s unsafe overtaking manoeuvre.
Applying the orthodox rule that “costs follow the event”, the plaintiff must pay the defendants’ High Court costs, in addition to the Circuit Court costs already awarded against her and her own legal fees.

The court expressly recognised that the total legal costs might exceed €50,000 for a claim worth roughly €16,500, characterising this outcome as an “injustice” but one compelled by current law.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 The Personal Injuries Dispute: Evidence and Burden of Proof

3.1.1 A classic credibility contest

The liability question is resolved using familiar civil litigation tools:

Two mutually inconsistent accounts, each facially plausible.
No independent eyewitnesses (the plaintiff’s daughter is a partisan witness).
A significant reliance on objective physical evidence (damage patterns) and logic to break the evidential deadlock.

The judgment underscores that where witness accounts conflict, the court must:

Assess credibility and reliability of recollections.
Examine objective physical or documentary evidence.
Apply the civil standard – the balance of probabilities – recognising that equal plausibility results in failure by the party bearing the onus.

3.1.2 Onus of proof on the plaintiff

The court is explicit: in a negligence action, the onus (burden) of proof rests on the plaintiff. If the evidence leaves the court in doubt, or if both versions are equally likely, the defendant must succeed because the plaintiff has not established her case.

This has practical significance in “word against word” road traffic disputes. Even if a defendant appears evasive or self‑serving, the plaintiff still fails unless her account is shown to be more likely correct. The High Court reminds practitioners and litigants that sympathy for an injured party cannot reverse this burden.

3.1.3 Objective evidence: damage to vehicles

With no independent witnesses, the court turns to the damage pattern:

Defendant’s truck: damage to the front right-hand side.
Plaintiff’s car: damage predominantly to the rear left-hand side.

Twomey J reasons that this configuration supports a scenario where the plaintiff’s vehicle was displaced slightly to the right of the truck’s centre line when contact occurred, consistent with her returning from the wrong side of the road (after an attempted overtake) rather than both vehicles simply travelling in the same lane with the truck too close behind. He notes:

Had the damage been to the rear right of the plaintiff’s car and the front left of the truck, this would have aligned better with her account of remaining entirely within the left lane.
Had the damage been centrally aligned front-to-back, that too would have supported her case of a straight‑line rear‑end impact.

This is a textbook application of the principle that physical evidence can undermine otherwise plausible sworn evidence and may be decisive where memories are unreliable.

3.1.4 Credibility and logical coherence of recollection

A striking part of the factual analysis is the court’s treatment of the plaintiff’s and her daughter’s recollection of whether the tractor was visible when the convoy was 120 metres and 100 metres from the locus. They testified that:

The tractor ahead was not visible when they were 120m away,
But it was visible when they were 100m away.

This is logically inconsistent, given that:

They accepted that the vehicles were in a convoy, with the tractor in front and all travelling in the same direction on the same side of the road for approximately two minutes.
The road segment 120m from the bend was straight; if the tractor was visible at 100m, it had to be visible at 120m.

The court concludes that their recollection in this respect “must therefore be incorrect” and that this casts doubt on the reliability of their broader account. Importantly, Twomey J expressly rejects any suggestion of deliberate lying; rather, he recognises the fallibility of memory, particularly regarding spatial and distance estimations. This nuanced approach respects witness sincerity while still rejecting their version on evidential grounds.

3.2 Costs: Application of the “Costs Follow the Event” Rule

Having found against the plaintiff, the High Court applies the ordinary Irish rule that costs follow the event. In simple terms:

The losing party typically pays the winning party’s legal costs (subject to the court’s discretion).
In personal injury litigation, where liability is fully contested and the defendant entirely succeeds, costs orders against plaintiffs are routine, especially at Circuit and High Court levels.

Twomey J explicitly records that:

The plaintiff must pay the defendants’ Circuit Court and High Court costs, in addition to her own legal fees.
To do otherwise would impose a different injustice – on the defendant – by forcing him to bear his own legal costs despite winning.

Yet the judge is plainly uncomfortable with this outcome because the total financial burden on the losing party is completely out of proportion to the claim’s value. He draws a vivid analogy: requiring a party to incur €50,000 to resolve a €16,500 claim is as irrational as paying the same sum to repair, or to purchase, an item worth only €16,500.

This highlights a structural problem: even if the individual cost order is orthodox and fair as between the parties, the system‑level rules that determine which court hears which case (and at what price) can produce grossly disproportionate and arguably unjust outcomes.

3.3 Proportionality and the Influence of Delaney v PIAB

3.3.1 Internal proportionality: awards of damages

The cornerstone of the judgment’s systemic critique is the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Delaney v The Personal Injuries Board and Others [2024] IESC 10. In Delaney, Collins J (drawing heavily on Denham J in MN v SM (Damages) [2005] IESC 17, [2005] 4 IR 461) re‑emphasised that:

There must be a “rational relationship” between awards of damages in different personal injury cases;
This is required to ensure that awards are “fair to the plaintiff and to the defendant”;
A plaintiff with minor soft‑tissue injuries should not receive an award close to that of a plaintiff with life‑changing injuries, and vice versa.

This has been termed “internal proportionality” – proportionality as between different awards for different categories of injury. It focuses on the scale and consistency of awards within the system of damages.

3.3.2 Extending proportionality to costs: a new normative principle

Twomey J poses a further question: if fairness demands a rational relationship between different damages awards, should it not also demand a rational relationship between:

The value of the claim / quantum of damages, and
The legal costs required to resolve that claim?

He answers affirmatively. He reasons that:

In practice, a losing litigant cares about the total amount ordered to be paid, not the breakdown between damages and costs.
Ordering a defendant to pay €10,000 damages and €90,000 in costs for a minor injury would not, in any meaningful sense, be “fair” merely because the damages element is “internally” proportionate to other awards.
Likewise, requiring either side to pay €50,000–€66,500 to resolve a claim valued at €16,500 cannot be characterised as justice, even if the damages award is appropriate in isolation.

The judgment therefore articulates, in clear terms, a broader principle:

“True justice demands proportionality between legal costs and the value/importance of the issues at stake, even though our current laws … achieve the opposite.”

In doctrinal terms, this is a normative extension of the proportionality principle from the realm of damages (“internal proportionality”) to the relationship between damages/claim value and process costs. It does not, at this point, generate a concrete rule that costs must be capped at a certain ratio, because the judge emphasises that he remains bound by statutory provisions and existing costs jurisprudence. Nonetheless, it is a clear judicial statement of what justice requires at a systemic level.

3.4 Structural Critique of the Irish Civil Courts

3.4.1 Jurisdictional thresholds and court allocation

The core structural concern is that monetary jurisdiction thresholds and institutional design decisions push minor civil disputes into expensive fora:

Under the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013, claims above €15,000 cannot be heard in the District Court; they must go to the Circuit Court.
For personal injuries, claims above €60,000 must be commenced in the High Court (for non‑PI cases, the High Court monetary threshold is €75,001).
Certain appeals, such as those under s.123 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004, are routed directly to the High Court, irrespective of the monetary value involved – as in Abeyneh v Residential Tenancies Board [2023] IEHC 81, where a €500 deposit dispute reached the High Court.

For Ms Putniene, this meant that:

Her relatively minor personal injuries claim (estimated at €16,500) was litigated at Circuit Court level and then appealed to the High Court.
Given High Court cost levels – described as “prohibitive” by Kearns P in Bourbon v Ward [2012] IEHC 30 – the overall cost exposure became entirely detached from the claim’s economic stakes.

3.4.2 Decline in “affordable” courts and concentration in the High Court

Citing his own earlier decision in Shannon v Shannon [2024] IEHC 291, Twomey J points to a dramatic reduction in the relative number of judges (or “courts”) at lower levels:

A 359% reduction in the number of District Courts relative to the number of High Courts in recent decades.
A 54% reduction in the number of Circuit Courts relative to the number of High Courts.

While emphasising that this is a simplification (more properly, it is judge‑numbers rather than courts), he uses these figures to illustrate that:

There has been a structural shift away from “affordable” forums (District and, to a lesser extent, Circuit Courts) towards a greater concentration of litigation in the High Court.
This is “out of step” with other comparative jurisdictions where lower courts play a more substantial role in resolving minor civil disputes.

The practical effect is that:

Minor disputes that could be resolved in the District Court for roughly €1,000–€2,000 in costs instead go to the Circuit Court or High Court, where costs may run into many multiples of the claim’s value.
High Court hearings routinely cost “tens of thousands of euros”.

The judge offers a stark comparison: in the criminal division of the High Court (the Central Criminal Court), only the most serious offences (rape, murder) are tried; minor offences such as speeding are never heard there. Yet in the civil division of the High Court, minor civil disputes are “heard on a daily basis”.

3.4.3 Winners and losers in the current system

Twomey J is unambiguous in identifying who benefits and who loses from this configuration:

The “primary winners” are lawyers, who are paid costs “out of all proportion” to the value of the claims.
The “primary losers” are consumers of legal services – litigants like Ms Putniene – who must pay those costs.

He also makes a more general observation: one cannot realistically expect any profession – including the legal profession – to act against its own financial interests by voluntarily drawing attention to systemic arrangements that increase its income at the expense of clients.

This analysis is forceful and may be controversial, but it is firmly grounded in concrete case examples:

Gannon v Road Safety Authority [2022/544/JR], where Meenan J described as an “utter waste of time” a High Court judicial review about a missed driving licence renewal.
Tennant v Reidy [2022] IECA 137, where Noonan J observed that a €20,000 dispute “should never have come before the High Court at all”.
Nolan v County Registrar for County Waterford [2024] IEHC 253, where a proposed Circuit Court costs bill of €32,986 was four times an €8,000 award.
The clamping judicial review (referred to from media coverage), where Meenan J questioned how it could be “proportional” for the High Court to hear a judicial review concerning an €80 clamp removal fee.
Burke v Lawless [2016] IEHC 259, where an elderly woman faced summary judgment for €176,433.65 in High Court costs, feared losing her home to meet them, and could not afford representation in the costs proceedings.

Collectively, these cases illustrate that the Putniene scenario is not an outlier but symptomatic of a systemic design flaw.

3.5 Rule of Law and Accessible Judgments

Twomey J explicitly anchors his analysis in the rule of law, invoking Lord Bingham’s well‑known formulation that:

“The law must be accessible and so far as possible, intelligible, clear and predictable.”

He also refers to the Supreme Court’s decision in Scully v Coucal [2025] IESC 20 as a recent example of the rule of law being applied in the Irish courts.

The judge then links this to the style and content of judicial reasoning:

Although judgments are not “the law” in the same sense as statutes, they apply and interpret legislation and therefore form a key part of “the law” from the citizen’s perspective.
For the rule of law to be realised, judgments themselves must be accessible – not only to lawyers but to the public.

The judgment’s rhetorical style – employing analogies to car repair and property purchase, referencing numerical data about court structures, and candidly quantifying costs – reflects a deliberate choice to make complex institutional critiques comprehensible to non‑lawyers. This is reinforced by references to:

The Minister for Justice’s speech at the New Legal Year ceremony (6 October 2025), stressing that “the administration of justice is not about judges and lawyers” but “serving the interests of those who seek justice”.
Former President of the High Court Mary Irvine’s remarks (in a 2022 interview) about the responsibility to improve the system for litigants, who must be “front and central in the administration of justice”.

These extra‑judicial references, while not sources of law, bolster the court’s argument that judicial decision‑making should be evaluated from the litigant’s perspective, not the system’s or the profession’s.

3.6 Limits of Judicial Power and Deference to the Oireachtas

Although the judgment is sharply critical of existing legal arrangements, it is equally clear about the limits of judicial power. Twomey J repeatedly acknowledges:

The High Court must apply laws enacted by the Oireachtas, even when they cause “systemic unfairness”.
The court cannot unilaterally reduce High Court legal costs, introduce new fee scales, or re‑draw jurisdictional lines.
Requests for reform have long gone unheeded: judges have, for 60 years, urged reductions in High Court legal costs, as noted in Beakonford Limited v Stokes [2025] IEHC 22, and Clarke C.J. called in SPV Osus Limited v HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Ireland) Limited [2019] 1 IR 1 for “urgent consideration” of the “cost of going to court”.

The judgment’s institutional message is twofold:

The judiciary’s role is to identify and publicly articulate systemic injustices, even when they cannot themselves remedy them in a given case.
The legislature’s role is to take “urgent consideration” of how to make justice affordable, for example by:
- Raising monetary thresholds for High Court jurisdiction;
- Increasing the relative number (or capacity) of District and Circuit Courts;
- Ensuring minor civil claims (by value or importance) are heard in more affordable fora.

The decision therefore functions as a constitutional conversation starter between the judiciary, the Oireachtas, and the executive on the design of the civil justice system, grounded in specific, real‑world consequences for litigants such as Ms Putniene.

4. Precedents and Authorities Cited

4.1 Delaney v The Personal Injuries Board & Ors [2024] IESC 10

In Delaney, the Supreme Court, per Collins J, affirmed that:

Damages awards must be assessed with regard to consistency and proportionality across the spectrum of injuries.
There must be a “rational relationship between awards of damages in personal injuries cases”, to ensure fairness both to plaintiffs and defendants.

Twomey J relies on Delaney to:

Underscore the central importance of proportionality in evaluating fairness in damages awards.
Provide the conceptual springboard for extending the proportionality inquiry beyond damages to the costs of litigation.

4.2 MN v SM (Damages) [2005] IESC 17; [2005] 4 IR 461

Denham J’s reasoning in MN v SM is cited in Delaney and adopted by Twomey J. It provides the foundational proposition that there must be a rational relationship between awards in different injury categories. Twomey J’s analysis of proportionality between damages and costs can be seen as a logical development of this line of authority into a new dimension.

4.3 McKeown v Crosby [2020] IECA 242

Noonan J in McKeown similarly endorsed the need for a rational, proportionate scale of damages. The case is invoked to demonstrate that proportionality is not a new concept but a consistently emphasised doctrine in appellate decisions, lending weight to its extension to costs.

4.4 SPV Osus Ltd v HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Ireland) Ltd [2019] 1 IR 1

In SPV Osus, Clarke C.J. called for “urgent consideration” of the “cost of going to court”. Twomey J references this to highlight that:

The highest court has already flagged the problem of high litigation costs as an issue of systemic concern.
Despite this, reform has not been implemented, reinforcing his scepticism that cost levels will reduce in the foreseeable future without legislative action.

4.5 Bourbon v Ward [2012] IEHC 30

Kearns P’s description of High Court costs as “prohibitive” is used to underline the economic reality that litigants face in that jurisdiction. This bolsters Twomey J’s analysis of why minor-value cases being funnelled into the High Court generates profound disproportionality.

4.6 Burke v Lawless [2016] IEHC 259

Burke is cited as a vivid illustration of the human consequences of high High Court costs. An elderly defendant facing judgment for €176,433.65 in legal costs, fearing the loss of her home and lacking resources to be legally represented, exemplifies the “hidden” but enormous impact of costs orders on ordinary lives.

4.7 Shannon v Shannon [2024] IEHC 291

In Shannon, Twomey J analysed comparative numbers of judges across court levels and developed the statistical observation of the 359% and 54% reductions in lower‑court capacity relative to the High Court. He re‑deploys this in Putniene to demonstrate that the concentration of litigation in the High Court is not accidental but structurally embedded.

4.8 Beakonford Ltd v Stokes [2025] IEHC 22

Beakonford is referenced for the proposition that the judiciary has, for six decades, been calling unsuccessfully for reductions in legal costs. This history frames the judge’s pessimism about cost reform and his search for alternative ways to make justice affordable, namely re‑allocating minor cases to lower courts.

4.9 Nolan v County Registrar for County Waterford [2024] IEHC 253

Nolan concretely demonstrates cost/value disproportionality in the Circuit Court: a costs bill of nearly €33,000 on an €8,000 award. Twomey J uses it as a comparator to show that the problem is not confined to the High Court, though it is aggravated there.

4.10 Tennant v Reidy [2022] IECA 137

In Tennant, Noonan J remarked that a €20,000 dispute “should never have come before the High Court”. This appellate commentary is harnessed to support the proposition that channeling low-value disputes to the High Court is structurally inappropriate.

4.11 Abeyneh v Residential Tenancies Board [2023] IEHC 81

Abeyneh exemplifies how statutory design (s.123 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004) forces trivial monetary disputes – in that case a €500 deposit – into the High Court, with the attendant risk of ruinous costs. Putniene uses this as evidence that the problem is not limited to personal injuries.

4.12 Gannon v Road Safety Authority [2022/544/JR]

Meenan J’s description of a High Court judicial review over a driving licence renewal as an “utter waste of time” underscores judicial concern that High Court resources (and litigant funds) are being consumed by matters of minor importance or trivial monetary value.

4.13 Clamping judicial review (Meenan J, 2022)

Though referred to via media reporting, the clamping judicial review where an €80 clamp removal fee led to High Court litigation serves to demonstrate judicial unease about proportionality of procedure to stakes.

4.14 Scully v Coucal [2025] IESC 20

Scully is invoked as a contemporary example of the Supreme Court applying rule-of-law standards. While Putniene does not rely on any specific doctrinal holding from Scully, it serves to situate the proportionality and accessibility concerns within a broader constitutional context.

5. Impact and Future Significance

5.1 Doctrinal status: ratio vs obiter

The binding legal outcome (ratio decidendi) of Putniene is relatively narrow:

The plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proof on liability in a road traffic collision.
The High Court properly applied the ordinary “costs follow the event” rule.

The extended exploration of proportionality between costs and claim value, court structure, and legislative design is obiter dicta: it was not strictly necessary to decide the case. Nonetheless, such obiter from a High Court judge – particularly one building on Supreme Court pronouncements and a series of other authorities – is likely to be regarded as persuasive and may shape future judicial reasoning, legislative debate, and professional practice.

5.2 Potential influence on costs jurisprudence

While the decision does not itself change the costs regime, it may:

Encourage judges, within existing discretion, to consider proportionality between costs and claim value when deciding on:
- Whether to award full, reduced, or no costs;
- Whether to depart from the “costs follow the event” rule in exceptional cases;
- Whether to use case management and other tools to control costs in lower‑value High Court litigation.
Provide a doctrinal hook for arguments that in extreme cases of disproportionality, some moderation or tailoring of costs orders may be required to ensure fairness.

Any such development would need to be carefully balanced against:

The risk of undermining the successful party’s entitlement to be indemnified for costs reasonably incurred.
The need for predictability in costs outcomes.

5.3 Legislative and policy implications

The judgment is, in substance, an invitation to the Oireachtas and policymakers to reconsider:

Monetary jurisdiction thresholds for District, Circuit, and High Courts, especially for personal injuries and statutory appeals.
The allocation of judicial resources and the relative numbers of judges at each court level.
The routing of low‑value statutory appeals (e.g., from the Residential Tenancies Board) directly to the High Court.

It also strengthens the policy case for:

Greater use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (e.g., mediation, statutory boards, small claims processes) for modest disputes.
Enhanced pre‑action protocols and early settlement incentives to avoid high‑cost trials where the economic stakes are low.

5.4 Impact on litigation strategy and risk assessment

For practitioners and litigants, Putniene is a stark reminder that:

Pursuing or defending low‑value claims through to a full hearing in higher courts carries a risk of catastrophic cost disproportionality.
Advising clients must now more explicitly factor in not only prospects of success but also the potential for costs to exceed claim value several times over.

By emphasising that even a bona fide claimant like Ms Putniene – with a minor, entirely understandable claim – can end up worse off for having sought justice, the judgment may deter some litigants from pursuing legitimate claims and encourage earlier settlement in others.

5.5 Judicial writing and the litigant’s perspective

Finally, the judgment may influence judicial writing style and judicial self‑conception. It models:

Use of accessible language and real‑world analogies to explain complex structural issues.
A litigant‑centred lens in evaluating whether the justice system is functioning properly, echoing the Minister for Justice and President Irvine’s extra‑judicial comments.

Even if its doctrinal innovations emerge slowly, Putniene is likely to be cited in future as an exemplar of transparent, system‑aware judging.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 Proportionality

Proportionality in this context means that legal outcomes should bear a sensible, reasonable relationship to the underlying stakes:

Between different damages awards (more serious injuries should receive significantly higher awards than minor injuries).
Between claim value / damages and the costs required to resolve the dispute.

If a minor injury claim costs several times its own value to litigate, that offends proportionality in the second sense, even if the damages figure itself is correct relative to other awards.

6.2 “Internal proportionality”

Internal proportionality is the term used (following Delaney) to describe proportionality between awards of damages themselves. It ensures that:

Minor and major injuries are placed appropriately on a scale of compensation.
Similar injuries attract similar awards, and different injuries attract proportionately different awards.

6.3 “Costs follow the event”

The rule that “costs follow the event” means:

Whoever wins the case (the “event”) usually recovers their legal costs from the loser.
Courts have discretion to depart from this rule, but the starting point is that the successful party should not be out‑of‑pocket for having to vindicate their rights or defend themselves.

In Putniene, even though the judge views the overall outcome as unjust at a systemic level, he applies this rule to avoid inflicting a separate injustice on the successful defendant.

6.4 Jurisdictional thresholds

Jurisdictional thresholds are monetary limits that determine which court can hear a case:

Up to a certain amount, a case may be brought in the District Court (the least expensive).
Above that limit, it must be brought in the Circuit Court.
Above a higher limit, it must be brought in the High Court (the most expensive).

Because these thresholds are set by statute, judges cannot unilaterally change them even if they believe they produce unjust outcomes.

6.5 Rule of law and accessibility

The rule of law requires, among other things, that:

Law should be accessible – people must be able to find out what it is.
Law should be intelligible, clear, and predictable so that people can plan their affairs.

By insisting that judgments themselves must be accessible, Twomey J emphasises that the explanation of law in court decisions is part of what gives the rule of law practical life.

6.6 Balance of probabilities and onus of proof

In civil cases, like personal injury claims, the standard is the balance of probabilities:

The court must decide which version of events is more likely than not (i.e., more than 50% probable).

The onus (burden) of proof lies with the plaintiff. If the evidence is finely balanced or equally plausible on both sides, the plaintiff loses because she has not proved her case to the required standard.

7. Conclusion

Putniene v McDonald & Ors is, at one level, a straightforward affirmation of a Circuit Court decision in a low‑value road traffic personal injuries claim. The High Court finds that the plaintiff, on the balance of probabilities, attempted an unsafe overtaking manoeuvre on a continuous white line as she approached a bend, and that this caused the collision. Applying the standard “costs follow the event” rule, the court orders her to pay the defendants’ Circuit and High Court costs.

At another level, however, the case is a powerful indictment of a civil justice structure that allows – indeed compels – a litigant with a bona fide, modest claim to face legal costs several times the value of that claim. Building on the Supreme Court’s emphasis on proportionality in Delaney v PIAB, Twomey J articulates a broader principle: true justice requires proportionality not only between different damages awards, but also between claim value and legal costs. He concludes that the current system routinely fails this test.

Constrained by statutory jurisdictional rules and entrenched costs structures, the court cannot itself rectify the injustice visited on Ms Putniene. It instead uses the judgment to bring the issue into sharp public and institutional focus, calling implicitly for legislative reconsideration of court allocation, jurisdictional thresholds, and the cost of going to court. In doing so, it places litigants – not lawyers or judges – “front and central” in the assessment of whether our system truly administers justice.

The lasting significance of Putniene is therefore less about its specific holding on liability and more about its articulation of a new, explicit proportionality benchmark for legal costs in relation to claim value. Whether this benchmark will evolve into a concrete doctrine shaping future costs decisions, or remain primarily a spur to legislative and policy reform, it has already enriched the Irish legal conversation about what “fair” and “affordable” justice should mean in practice.