The “Singh Clarification”: Correcting Statutory-Maximum Breaches and Disqualification Calculations in Dangerous-Driving Sentences

1. Introduction

Singh, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 828) arises from a tragic road-traffic incident in Tottenham in which Mr John Heneghan was killed by a speeding driver who then attempted to mislead the police. The appellant, Mr Singh, was convicted on three counts:

Count 1 – Causing death by dangerous driving (maximum 14 years);
Count 2 – Dangerous driving (maximum 2 years);
Count 3 – Doing an act tending and intending to pervert the course of justice (maximum life, but often 2-4 years on facts such as these).

He received an aggregate sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment and an eight-year driving disqualification with a six-year extension period. The present decision deals with Mr Singh’s renewed application for leave to appeal out of time and, crucially, with the lawfulness of the 30-month sentence imposed on Count 2.

Although most grounds were rejected, the Court of Appeal seized the opportunity to clarify two important points:

The absolute necessity of keeping individual sentences within their statutory maxima, even where the overall sentence is otherwise deemed appropriate; and
The correct method for calculating the extension of driving-disqualification periods when consecutive sentences are imposed – and the limits of the Court of Appeal’s power to “re-uplift”.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Extension of Time: Refused. The applicant’s nearly two-year delay was inadequately explained and, in any event, the complaints about Counts 1 and 3 were “not reasonably arguable”.
Counts 1 & 3: Leave to appeal refused. The 12-year sentence for causing death by dangerous driving and the consecutive 2-year sentence for perverting justice were upheld as fully justified under the Sentencing Council Definitive Guideline and the evidence.
Count 2: The Court quashed the 30-month sentence because it exceeded the statutory maximum of 24 months for dangerous driving (s.2 Road Traffic Act 1988). It substituted the lawful maximum of 24 months.
Driving Disqualification: Although the trial judge mis-calculated the uplift for the consecutive sentence, the Court of Appeal declined to interfere because doing so would worsen the overall position, contrary to the prohibition on increasing sentence on appeal (Criminal Appeal Act 1968, s.11(3)).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents & Authorities Cited or Applied

While the judgment is relatively short on express citations, the Court’s reasoning stands on well-established authorities:

Statutory-Maximum Principle: R. v. Docherty [2016] UKSC 62 and Booth [2020] EWCA Crim 575 confirm that any sentence that exceeds a statutory maximum is ipso facto unlawful and must be corrected.
Totality & Dangerous-Driving Guideline: The Court echoed the approach in R. v. Cooksley [2003] EWCA Crim 996 (leading case on causing death by dangerous driving) and the Sentencing Council’s Guideline (effective 2008, still operative) which divides seriousness into three “levels”.
Extension of Time: The hurdles described in R. v. Thorsby (Court of Appeal, 2015) and reiterated in R. v. Nunn [2014] EWCA Crim 542 – mental-health difficulties or ignorance of the time limit rarely justify a delay unless supported by clear evidence.
No Increase on Appeal: R. v. Campbell [1994] 1 WLR 1169 and R. v. Uthayakumar [2019] EWCA Crim 1013 emphasise that, save for specified exceptions (Attorney-General’s references), the Court of Appeal cannot aggravate the overall penalty (Criminal Appeal Act 1968, s.11(3)).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Level-1 Categorisation: The trial judge’s placement of Count 1 in Level 1 (starting point 8 yrs, range 7-14 yrs) was upheld because: (a) the speed (47-76 mph in a 30 mph zone); (b) the deliberate second impact; (c) alcohol and drugs; (d) extensive aggravating features (fleeing scene, lying, insurance, prior convictions). All hallmarks of “flagrant disregard” under the Guideline.
Totality & Aggregation: The trial judge “aggregated” the dangerous driving in Count 2 into the seriousness of Count 1, then nonetheless imposed a separate concurrent term. The Court of Appeal confirmed the legitimacy of that approach but noted that the concurrent term must still respect the statutory ceiling.
Statutory Limit Overshoot: Once the Full Court reviewed the papers, it recognised that 30 months exceeded the 24-month limit. Under s.13 Criminal Appeal Act 1968, an unlawful sentence must be quashed and a lawful one substituted, regardless of procedural posture or defence submissions.
Disqualification Calculation: Under s.35A Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, the disqualification period is extended by the “relevant period of custody”. Where sentences are consecutive, each custodial term should be added. The trial judge uplifted for the 12-year term but omitted the extra two. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal refused to increase it, citing the “no harsher disposal” rule.
Extension of Time & Fresh Evidence: The applicant’s explanation (mental-health crisis, carer responsibilities) lacked medical or documentary support. Fresh evidence (GP letters in 2024) failed the R. v. Ladd v Marshall test: it could and should have been adduced below.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Judgment

Sentencers’ Vigilance: Crown Court judges are reminded that concurrent or consecutive terms on each count must never exceed statutory maxima—even where the sentence for another count stays within limits.
Appellate Intervention: Defence practitioners gain a potent ground of appeal: any sentence that slips over the maximum is automatically quashable, even if the rest of the grounds are weak or out of time.
Driving-Ban Calculations: The case highlights a technical—but common—pitfall in adding consecutive sentences to the disqualification “extension period”. Prosecutors and judges must perform that arithmetic explicitly to avoid future challenge.
Delay Excuses Tightened: The Court reiterates that uncorroborated claims of psychological distress or caring duties rarely justify extensions of many months, still less years. This may discourage speculative late applications.
Victim-Blaming Discouraged: The Court’s comments on the appellant’s attempt to blame the deceased underscore that lack of remorse can neutralise, though not aggravate, mitigation—a nuance likely to appear in future sentencing submissions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Statutory Maximum: Parliament sets the longest sentence a judge may impose for each individual offence. Any higher figure is void and can be corrected at any time.
Concurrent vs. Consecutive: Concurrent sentences run at the same time; consecutive sentences are added back-to-back, lengthening total custody.
Totality Principle: Judges must step back and ask, “Is the overall sentence proportionate?” They can raise or lower individual counts to get the right total – but still must respect each maximum.
Extension Period (Driving): When prison and a driving ban are imposed, the ban is “paused” during custody, then extended by the time spent inside, to ensure the offender is banned while at liberty.
Leave to Appeal Out of Time: Normally 28 days after sentence; the Court may extend time if there is a good reason (e.g., new evidence, incapacity) and if the proposed grounds are arguable.

5. Conclusion

Singh is not earth-shattering in its facts but is doctrinally important. It cements a two-fold precedent: (1) appellate courts must correct any sentence that breaches a statutory maximum, even in the absence of broader merit; and (2) where consecutive custodial sentences are imposed alongside driving bans, judges must add all custodial periods when setting the disqualification extension—though the Court of Appeal cannot revisit the figure if that would worsen the appellant’s position.

Practitioners should therefore scrutinise every count for statutory ceilings, and sentencing judges must perform meticulous arithmetic when combining custody with disqualification. By drawing clear lines around these technical but pivotal issues, the Court has provided welcome certainty and avoided the spectre of unlawful sentences lurking uncorrected in the system.