Obedience to Unappealed Court Orders and the Limits of Conscience:
Commentary on Board of Management of Wilson’s Hospital School v Burke (No. 1) [2025] IEHC 635

1. Introduction

This judgment by Cregan J in Board of Management of Wilson’s Hospital School v Enoch Burke [2025] IEHC 635 is the latest chapter in a long-running and high‑profile dispute between:

• The plaintiff: The Board of Management of Wilson’s Hospital School, a secondary school in Co. Westmeath; and
• The defendant: Enoch Burke, a former teacher at the school, dismissed for gross misconduct and repeatedly found in contempt of court.

The immediate subject-matter of this judgment is not transgender rights or freedom of religion, but the enforcement of a standing High Court order granted by Owens J on 17 July 2023 restraining Mr Burke from entering or trespassing upon the school premises. The school sought:

• Further attachment and committal of Mr Burke for ongoing contempt;
• Various coercive orders (sequestration of motor vehicles, garnishee of salary, and take‑down orders related to videos posted online), which are to be addressed in a later judgment (No. 2); and
• Effective protection against continued, daily trespass and disruption.

The case has become emblematic of a clash between:

• The rule of law and the authority of court orders; and
• An individual’s asserted religious conscience and political protest—here, opposition to transgender policies in a school context.

In Judgment No. 1, Cregan J:

• Orders the immediate committal of Mr Burke for continued, flagrant contempt of the Owens order;
• Formally invokes the jurisdiction in relation to criminal contempt in the face of the court against Enoch Burke and three of his close family members, and refers the matter to the President of the High Court for proceedings to be brought by the Attorney General;
• Reaffirms in strong terms that court orders must be obeyed unless and until set aside on appeal or otherwise lawfully varied, regardless of a litigant’s personal conviction that the order is unconstitutional or invalid;
• Clarifies that Mr Burke’s imprisonment is for contempt of court, not for his views on transgenderism.

The judgment is notable both for its doctrinal clarity on contempt and its unusually strong language condemning what the judge describes as a “deliberate, sustained and concerted attack” on the authority of the courts by Mr Burke and other family members.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 What the case is – and is not – about

At the outset (paras 8–10), the judge is at pains to distinguish:

• The underlying dispute about transgenderism and pronouns (the principal’s direction regarding a transgender pupil), from
• The separate and narrow issue in this motion: Mr Burke’s repeated trespass in breach of a permanent High Court injunction.

Cregan J emphasises that:

• Mr Burke is entitled to hold and articulate his views on transgender issues;
• But he is not entitled to ignore a binding court order restraining trespass;
• His committals and fines arise from contempt of court, not from his beliefs.

2.2 Procedural posture

The judgment follows a motion for attachment and committal listed initially before Nolan J on 4 September 2025. Nolan J:

• Was sceptical about the utility of further imprisonment;
• Encouraged the school to engage private security to keep Mr Burke out; and
• Adjourned the matter to Cregan J for further consideration, including alternative coercive measures.

A series of hearings then occurred:

1. 14 October 2025 – Mr Burke absent (trespassing on the school at the time). His brother Isaac appears without any right of audience. The court raises possible sequestration of vehicles.
2. 22 October 2025 – Mr Burke again absent. Isaac Burke repeatedly disrupts proceedings; the court orders his removal. Issues emerge around service and filing of Mr Burke’s legal submissions.
3. 29 October 2025 – Mr Burke appears. Multiple members of the Burke family engage in disruptive and abusive conduct towards counsel and the judge. The judge finds that their conduct prima facie constitutes contempt in facie curiae.
4. 5 November 2025 – Further hearing; the judge crystallises the issues, directs a new motion from the school, and invites additional affidavits and submissions, including on:
   • Re‑committal to prison;
   • Sequestration of two vehicles;
   • Garnisheeing Mr Burke’s salary; and
   • Orders concerning videos recorded on school property and posted to X (formerly Twitter).
5. 12 November 2025 – Hearing of the revised motion. Mr Burke does not appear and does not file the directed financial affidavit. The school and the Attorney General’s counsel make submissions. Affidavits of service confirm proper notice.

2.3 The court’s findings

On the evidence—largely uncontroverted—Cregan J finds that:

• Mr Burke has attended the school every school day of the new academic year, in deliberate breach of the Owens order;
• His presence has caused significant disruption to school operations and first-year induction activities;
• The school has been forced to incur substantial ongoing costs in hiring private security (circa €900+ per week plus VAT);
• Security officers have suffered racist abuse online after Mr Burke or his family recorded and posted videos of confrontations on the school premises;
• Security companies are now reluctant to service the school because of these online consequences, and costs have increased;
• Mr Burke has repeatedly lied about his legal rights and conduct, including asserting publicly and to security staff that he has a right to attend the school when he manifestly does not.

2.4 Disposition

The court orders and/or indicates:

1. Civil contempt – Committal
   Mr Burke is found to be in clear, persistent and deliberate contempt of the Owens order and is ordered to be immediately committed to prison (para. 188). He will remain in custody until a review date is set, but:

   Mr. Burke however has the keys to his own prison and, if he wishes to purge his contempt, then he can be released.

2. Criminal contempt – In the face of the court
   There is a prima facie case that Enoch Burke and three family members (Isaac, Martina, and Ammi Burke) have committed contempt in the face of the court by their abusive and disruptive conduct during hearings. The judge:
   • States that he will invoke the criminal contempt jurisdiction;
   • Refers the matter to the President of the High Court; and
   • Asks the Attorney General to bring appropriate proceedings (paras 189, 61, conclusion para. 3).
3. Other reliefs deferred
   The court defers to a second judgment (to issue the following week) its determinations on:
   • Sequestration of two vehicles;
   • Garnishee of Mr Burke’s salary from the Department of Education to the school;
   • Orders restraining recording on school premises and requiring removal of videos from X/other platforms.

3. Precedents and Earlier Decisions Relied Upon

3.1 The Owens J trial judgment and order (17 July 2023)

The ethical and political conflict over transgender issues entered the courts via the school’s disciplinary process. Key points of that history, as summarised by Cregan J, include:

• The principal’s disciplinary report concerning:
  • Mr Burke’s refusal to comply with a direction to address a transgender pupil by a new name and the pronoun “they”; and
  • His outbursts and disruptive behaviour at a school religious service and other events.
• The Board’s suspension of Mr Burke pending a stage 4 (dismissal) disciplinary process;
• Mr Burke’s continued attendance at the school despite suspension, leading to interlocutory injunctions restraining trespass and subsequent committals for contempt.

The substantive trial of the school’s action against Mr Burke took place before Owens J over four days in March 2023. Critically:

• Mr Burke filed a defence and counterclaim asserting that:
  • The principal’s direction on pronouns was “manifestly unlawful and unconstitutional”; and
  • The disciplinary process breached his constitutional rights, including under Articles 40.6.1° (expression) and 44 (religion).
• On the first day of trial, he was so disorderly that he was found in contempt and excluded from the courtroom (para. 83). He was repeatedly offered the opportunity to return provided he complied with rulings of the court; he refused.
• Because he failed to participate and did not pursue his counterclaim, his counterclaim was dismissed (para. 84).
• The dismissal of the counterclaim operated as a final determination of the issues he might otherwise have raised, including the constitutional challenges (para. 86).
• Owens J’s order, perfected on 23 August 2023, provided inter alia:
  • Dismissal of the counterclaim;
  • A declaration that the suspension was lawful; and
  • A permanent injunction restraining Mr Burke from entering or trespassing on the school premises without the school’s consent (para. 88).

Crucially for the present motion:

• Mr Burke has never appealed the Owens judgment or order, despite having had that right and despite the passage of over two years (para. 89(5), 104);
• The injunction therefore stands as a valid, subsisting, and enforceable High Court order.

3.2 Sanfey J – Application to set aside Owens J’s order as abuse of process

Rather than appeal Owens J’s judgment, Mr Burke brought an application before Sanfey J in the High Court seeking to set aside that judgment and order. In Board of Management of Wilson’s Hospital School v Enoch Burke [2024] IEHC (citation not provided in full in this judgment), Sanfey J dismissed this attempt as an abuse of process.

Key statements (paras 90–92 of Cregan J’s judgment) include:

“The course of litigation is straightforward. The parties contest the trial; the party against whom adverse findings or orders have been made has ... a right of appeal. Mr Burke has no reasonable or plausible explanation as to why he did not avail of this right. ... There can be no doubt that ... the present application [is] a proxy appeal; it is a belated substitute for a trial which Mr Burke chose not to contest in March 2023.”

“It is for repeated breach of this order, and for no other reason, that Mr Burke has been imprisoned. ... It is not open to Mr Burke to conclude unilaterally that the order of the court breaches his constitutional rights and is thus ‘void ab initio’, such that he does not have to comply with it. He does not get to pick and choose which order of the court ... that he will obey.”

Cregan J relies heavily on these principles:

• Finality and proper process: challenges to a judgment must be pursued by appeal, not via collateral or “proxy” proceedings;
• Obedience to orders: a belief that an order breaches constitutional rights does not unilaterally nullify that order.

3.3 Court of Appeal 2023 – Interlocutory injunctions

In Board of Management of Wilson’s Hospital v Enoch Burke [2023] IECA 52, the Court of Appeal (Whelan J delivering a substantial judgment) dismissed Mr Burke’s appeal against interlocutory injunctions and committal orders.

The Court of Appeal:

• Confirmed that the injunctions and committals were not about transgenderism as such, but about restraining trespass and enforcing compliance with court orders (para. 76);
• Expressed strong criticism of Mr Burke’s verbal aggression, lack of insight, and contumelious conduct towards the principal, culminating in his disruption of a religious service (paras 22, 25, 27–28);
• Considered that Mr Burke’s continued attendance at the school constituted a wilful contempt of court that inflicted “anguish and ongoing stress and anxiety” on the minor pupil and those who care about them (para. 78, quoting para. 33 of Whelan J’s judgment).

This Court of Appeal decision functions here as:

• Confirmation that even at the interlocutory stage the court regarded Mr Burke’s conduct as extraordinarily inappropriate and disruptive;
• A backdrop to the present finding that his continued trespass and verbal aggression are part of a consistent pattern of behaviour.

3.4 Court of Appeal 2025 – O’Longain/Christie bias decision

The most legally intricate aspect of Mr Burke’s defence in the present motion is his reliance on Enoch Burke v Sean O’Longain, Kieran Christie and Jack Cleary [2025] IECA 148 (the “Christie” decision). In that case:

• Mr Burke challenged the participation of the second-named defendant (Mr Christie) on a Disciplinary Appeal Panel (DAP) on grounds of objective bias;
• The Court of Appeal accepted his bias claim and ordered Mr Christie’s replacement, focusing on the need for impartiality in the DAP;
• The school itself was not a party to those proceedings (para. 102).

Mr Burke argued that this Court of Appeal judgment:

• Characterised the principal’s “overarching complaint” as relating to his refusal to comply with an instruction regarding pronouns;
• Indicated that the DAP must rule on the legitimacy of that instruction;
• Thereby “seriously undermined” the lawfulness of the Owens suspension order and thus the injunction against trespass (paras 95–99).

Cregan J firmly rejects this:

• The issue before the Court of Appeal in Christie was objective bias, not the lawfulness of the principal’s instruction or the Owens order (para. 101);
• At no point did the Court of Appeal suggest any infirmity in Owens J’s order (para. 103);
• Mr Burke has not appealed Owens J’s order, and it is not for a fellow High Court judge to treat that order as undermined or invalid because of a separate Court of Appeal judgment in different proceedings (paras 104–105).

In doctrinal terms, this reinforces two things:

1. The independence and finality of a High Court order within its own cause unless and until overturned on appeal or set aside; and
2. A warning against using later, separate proceedings as a kind of collateral attack on that order.

3.5 Ross Company Ltd v Swan (1981) and the constitutional framework

To frame the broader rule-of-law issues, the judgment invokes:

• Ross Company Ltd (In Receivership) v Swan (unreported, High Court, 19 May 1981, O’Hanlon J), which emphasises that:

  When the Court makes an order and that order is wilfully disobeyed ... an act of contempt is committed not merely against the Court but against the community as a whole, and the rule of law is undermined...

  and that those who now defy court orders may tomorrow need the court’s protection.
• The Preamble to the Constitution and the judicial oath in Article 34.5.1°, to rebut the Burke family’s assumption of superior religious or moral authority over the courts (paras 174–176).

These references are used to underscore that:

• The courts administer justice “for the people of Ireland” under a democratically enacted constitutional order;
• Judges too are bound by their oath before God to uphold the Constitution and the laws, and no private individual holds a religious licence to disregard lawful court orders.

4. Legal Reasoning

4.1 Central doctrinal principle: Unappealed orders must be obeyed

The core legal principle reaffirmed in this judgment is straightforward but crucial:

A party must obey a court order that is valid on its face unless and until it is set aside on appeal or by some proper legal process.

Even if the party:

• Believes the order is unconstitutional;
• Believes the underlying directive (here, the principal’s transgender policy) is unlawful; or
• Points to other litigation suggesting flaws in a related process (e.g., the DAP’s composition),

that belief does not constitute a legal defence to contempt. As Sanfey J put it (quoted by Cregan J), it is not open to Mr Burke to treat the Owens order as “void ab initio” and therefore ignorable.

On this basis, Mr Burke’s “constitutional rights” defence fails at the threshold: he has chosen not to appeal Owens J’s order and cannot now re‑litigate its validity in contempt proceedings.

4.2 Distinguishing the substantive transgender dispute from contempt

A recurrent public misunderstanding of this litigation is that Mr Burke is imprisoned “for his beliefs” about transgenderism. Cregan J goes to some length to dispel this (paras 8–10, 52–53):

• If a court order required Mr Burke to say or do something that directly contravened his religious beliefs (e.g., use particular pronouns), a different set of constitutional and human‑rights issues would arise;
• But the only operative order at issue here is the Owens injunction not to trespass on the school premises after his suspension/dismissal;
• Obeying that injunction does not require him either to affirm or to deny any belief about gender; it simply requires him to stay away from the school unless invited.

This distinction is vital to the reasoning on contempt:

• The court is not adjudicating the correctness of his doctrinal or moral position on transgender issues;
• It is enforcing compliance with a neutral property‑based injunction grounded in employment and trespass law.

4.3 Evaluation of Mr Burke’s arguments based on the Christie/O’Longain decision

As summarised earlier, Mr Burke contends that the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Christie has “seriously undermined” the Owens order because it:

• Identifies the principal’s pronoun instruction as the “overarching complaint”; and
• Requires the DAP to determine the legitimacy of that instruction.

From this, he argues that Owens J could not lawfully uphold his suspension without adjudicating the legitimacy of the principal’s instruction, and that the present court must now treat Owens J’s judgment as invalid.

Cregan J rejects this on multiple levels:

1. Jurisdictional point: The present court is not an appellate court over Owens J. It cannot sit in review of another High Court judge’s final order (para. 105).
2. Procedural point: Mr Burke chose not to participate in the trial before Owens J, causing his constitutional counterclaim to be dismissed (para. 89(2), 106). It is not open to him now to resurrect those arguments collaterally.
3. Scope of Christie: The Court of Appeal decision in Christie is confined to the issue of objective bias in DAP membership. It does not purport to:
   • Invalidate the principal’s instruction as a matter of law; or
   • Cast doubt on the validity, lawfulness or enforceability of Owens J’s injunction (paras 101–103).
4. Continuing force of Owens order: In the absence of an appeal, the injunction remains fully binding.

Accordingly, Mr Burke’s sole substantive defence to the committal motion is held to be “unstateable” (para. 107).

4.4 Fact‑finding on contempt

The court’s factual findings rest heavily on a series of detailed affidavits from:

• Christopher Woods (Chair of the Board);
• Noel Cunningham (Principal); and
• Security officers engaged by the school.

These affidavits describe:

• Daily attendance by Mr Burke on school property from the start of term;
• Repeated entry to the “Croi na Scoile” (central area) and corridors;
• Interactions with students, including signing yearbooks and posing for selfies;
• Forced relocation of induction activities to avoid him;
• Regular confrontations with security staff;
• Repeated video‑recording of those confrontations and subsequent posting to X;
• Online racist abuse directed at a security guard after such postings;
• Increased security costs and operational difficulties recruiting security staff willing to work at the school.

Mr Burke’s own affidavit, while quibbling about minor factual details (e.g., whether he or someone else was driving a particular car), does not deny the core facts of trespass. Indeed, he effectively confirms them (paras 132–134).

On this evidence, the court concludes:

• Mr Burke has been in flagrant, continuous breach of the Owens injunction since at least 21 August 2025;
• The trespass is deliberate, sustained, and strategic, with a defined pattern of confrontation aimed at the principal, security staff, and the courts;
• The consequent burden on the school is significant, both financially and in terms of disruption to pupils and teaching staff (paras 155–160, 141–152).

4.5 Choice of sanction: Why imprisonment rather than further fines

Prior judges (O’Moore J and Nolan J) experimented with both:

• Imprisonment for contempt; and
• Substantial daily fines (€700, later increased to €1,400 and then €2,000 per day), which are now in excess of €225,000 and have been partly collected via:
  • A garnishee order diverting Mr Burke’s Department of Education salary to the Courts Service; and
  • Appointment of a receiver by way of equitable execution, recovering about €40,000 from his bank account.

Cregan J concludes that:

• Fines have no deterrent effect; Mr Burke has not voluntarily paid a cent (para. 185);
• Security guards, while desirable, cannot entirely prevent trespass and have themselves become targets of online abuse, leading to rising costs and difficulties in recruitment (paras 186, 143–145);
• Mr Burke has been repeatedly afforded liberty and has repeatedly abused it by returning to trespass (para. 187);
• He has refused, even when directly asked in court, to purge his contempt or undertake to comply (para. 161).

Hence:

“There is now, in my view, no longer any option left to enforce the order of the court, other than to imprison Mr. Burke again for contempt of court...” (para. 188)

The committal is framed as coercive, not purely punitive. Mr Burke “has the keys to his own prison”: he may secure release by purging his contempt—i.e. by undertaking to obey the injunction.

4.6 Criminal contempt in the face of the court

Separate from the civil contempt for disobeying the Owens order, the judgment deals with what the judge describes as an unprecedented level of:

• “Threatening, abusive and verbally aggressive” accusations against the court and counsel;
• Repeated disruptions by multiple family members, despite warnings;
• Direct personal insults to the judge, including “Take that smirk off your face,” accusations of lying, and declarations that “God will judge your wickedness” (paras 31, 46, 52–55).

This conduct is characterised as:

• A prima facie contempt in facie curiae (in the face of the court) by:
  • Enoch Burke;
  • Dr Isaac Burke;
  • Mrs Martina Burke; and
  • Ms Ammi Burke.
• Part of a “concerted, organised, and systematic” campaign to disrupt and undermine court proceedings (para. 164);
• A threat not merely to judicial dignity but to the effective functioning of the court system, given that Garda presence is now routinely required whenever Mr Burke appears (para. 165).

Rather than summarily punishing them himself, Cregan J:

• Indicates that all four will be given an opportunity to:
  • Obtain legal representation and, if necessary, legal aid; and
  • Make submissions on whether their conduct constitutes contempt and, if so, what sanction (imprisonment, fine, or both) is appropriate (paras 60–61);
• Refers the matter to the President of the High Court and requests the Attorney General to bring the appropriate application (para. 189 and conclusion para. 3).

This approach aligns with the higher procedural safeguards expected in cases of criminal contempt—especially where significant liberty interests are at stake.

4.7 The rule of law and civil disobedience

The judgment is also a strong normative statement about the rule of law in a constitutional democracy. Key themes include:

• Universality of the rule of law: All are equally subject to law and court orders—judges, the President, the Taoiseach, and ordinary citizens alike (para. 167).
• Limited role of conscience in contempt proceedings:
  • Freedom of conscience is constitutionally protected;
  • But it does not confer a unilateral veto over court orders or the authority to decide which laws or judgments one will obey (paras 168, 176–177).
• Analogies to everyday property rights:
  • The judge invites the reader to imagine Mr Burke’s reaction if protesters trespassed on the Burke family home and refused to obey court injunctions, on the ground of their own beliefs (para. 171).
  • The point: the erosion of court authority in one politically charged case risks undermining everyone’s protection tomorrow.
• Comparison with other contempt cases:
  • The judge notes that he has sent to prison individuals in mortgage/possession cases—often in difficult personal circumstances—who breached possession orders, yet those individuals did not engage in abusive conduct towards the Bench (para. 172).
  • This underlines that Mr Burke’s case is not uniquely harsh; it is his conduct that is uniquely defiant and abusive.

5. Complex Concepts Explained

5.1 Attachment and committal for contempt

Contempt of court occurs when someone disobeys a court order or otherwise interferes with the administration of justice. There are two main forms relevant here:

1. Civil contempt (coercive):
   • Arises where a person breaches an order made in civil proceedings (e.g., an injunction);
   • Sanctions (usually imprisonment or fines) aim to coerce compliance, not to punish past behaviour;
   • The contemnor typically “holds the keys of the prison”: if they comply (purge their contempt), they may be released.
2. Criminal contempt (punitive), including contempt in facie curiae:
   • Arises where conduct attacks or undermines the administration of justice itself, e.g. by abusing the judge, threatening witnesses, or wilfully disrupting proceedings;
   • Sanctions are punitive: they punish the affront to justice and deter similar behaviour;
   • Procedural safeguards closer to criminal trials (including representation, standard of proof, and sometimes prosecution by the Attorney General) are typically required.

Attachment is the process by which a court orders a person to be brought before it to answer for contempt, and committal is the actual order sending the person to prison.

5.2 Sequestration

Sequestration (discussed but not decided in this judgment) is a process where the court takes custody of a person’s property (here, motor vehicles) to:

• Enforce its orders; and/or
• Prevent that property being used to facilitate ongoing contempt (e.g., driving vehicles onto the school premises to trespass).

It is an ancillary enforcement tool, distinct from fines or imprisonment.

5.3 Garnishee orders and receivers by way of equitable execution

A garnishee order is an order directing a third party who owes money to the contemnor (here, the Department of Education paying Mr Burke’s salary) to pay that money instead to the creditor (in earlier orders, the Courts Service, and in the present motion, possibly to the school).

A receiver by way of equitable execution is a court‑appointed officer who takes control of certain assets (e.g., bank accounts) to realise funds to satisfy a judgment or fine.

5.4 Objective bias and the DAP

Objective bias concerns whether a fair‑minded and informed observer would have a reasonable apprehension that a decision‑maker might not bring an impartial mind to the case, regardless of actual bias.

In Christie [2025] IECA 148, the Court of Appeal found objective bias in the membership of the Disciplinary Appeal Panel (DAP) reviewing Mr Burke’s dismissal and ordered that a particular member be replaced.

However, as Cregan J emphasises:

• That decision does not overturn or undermine the existing High Court injunction against trespass;
• Issues of bias in the DAP are distinct from the validity and enforceability of Owens J’s order in the High Court proceedings.

5.5 “Void ab initio” and collateral attack

Mr Burke argued that the Owens order was “void ab initio” (“void from the beginning”) due to alleged constitutional infirmities. This is legally significant because:

• If an order were truly void, it would have no legal effect and might not need to be obeyed;
• However, courts are extremely reluctant to treat an existing, unappealed order of a superior court as void on its face, particularly when regular appeal routes existed but were not used.

Trying to undermine such an order indirectly—via new proceedings or by invoking decisions in other litigation—constitutes a collateral attack or “proxy appeal,” which is generally prohibited for reasons of finality, certainty, and respect for judicial hierarchy.

6. Likely Impact and Broader Significance

6.1 Reinforcing the principle that court orders must be obeyed

The judgment is a powerful restatement of a foundational principle: no individual is above the law, and court orders are not optional. It clarifies that:

• Even deeply held religious or moral convictions do not exempt a person from compliance;
• Challenges to the lawfulness of orders must be made by appeal or proper applications, not by unilateral refusals or public campaigns.

While this principle is not new, the case provides a prominent and detailed modern illustration in a politically charged context. Future courts dealing with litigants who invoke conscience or constitutional rights as a justification for disobeying orders are likely to cite this judgment (alongside Sanfey J and the Court of Appeal decisions) as authority.

6.2 Contempt and courtroom behaviour

The judgment also marks a robust stance against:

• Systematic verbal abuse of judges and counsel;
• Organised disruption of court proceedings by supporters or family members; and
• Attempts to delegitimise courts by religious or moral denunciation.

By invoking the criminal contempt jurisdiction and involving the Attorney General and the President of the High Court, the judgment signals that:

• Persistent in‑court misconduct will be treated as a serious affront to the administration of justice;
• Sanctions, including imprisonment or fines, may be imposed even beyond the coercive context of civil contempt.

This could influence how Irish courts manage increasingly heated and politicised litigation, especially where litigants appear determined to use courtrooms as platforms for protest rather than forums for adjudication.

6.3 Practical guidance for schools and public bodies

For school boards and employers confronted with employees who:

• Defy disciplinary processes;
• Trespass on premises after dismissal; or
• Publicly mischaracterise court decisions,

the case provides:

• A template for escalating enforcement measures:
  • Interlocutory injunctions;
  • Final injunctions after trial;
  • Attachment and committal for contempt;
  • Financial sanctions (fines, garnishee orders, receivers);
  • Potential sequestration of assets used to facilitate trespass.
• Judicial endorsement of the need to protect pupils and staff from harassing or destabilising conduct, especially in educational settings.

It also highlights the practical and financial burdens that long‑term contempt litigation places on public bodies and, ultimately, taxpayers.

6.4 Religious freedom, conscience, and civil obedience

Although the constitutional issues around transgender policies remain largely unresolved on the merits (because Mr Burke’s counterclaim was dismissed without being argued), this judgment contributes to the emerging jurisprudence on:

• The limits of civil disobedience in a constitutional system; and
• The relationship between freedom of conscience and obedience to court orders.

By invoking both the Preamble and the judicial oath, the court suggests that:

• Civil obedience to law is itself compatible with—and even required by—Christian teaching, as traditionally interpreted (“Render unto Caesar ...”);
• Religious conviction cannot be wielded as a unilateral trump card against the binding force of judicial decisions.

Future litigation involving conscientious objectors, whether in healthcare, education, or other fields, will have to grapple with this robust articulation of the rule-of-law side of the balance.

6.5 Use of social media and contempt

Although final orders on videos and social media postings are reserved for Judgment No. 2, this judgment already indicates judicial concern about:

• The weaponisation of social media against individuals (like security guards) caught up in enforcement of court orders;
• The knock‑on effects on the administration of justice and compliance with court orders, where:
  • Those enforcing orders become targets of online harassment; and
  • Public misrepresentations of court decisions (e.g. that Mr Burke is “jailed for his beliefs”) erode public understanding of the rule of law.

The eventual take‑down orders sought by the school, if granted, may further develop Irish law on the intersection of contempt, privacy, and online platforms.

7. Conclusion

Board of Management of Wilson’s Hospital School v Burke (No. 1) [2025] IEHC 635 is not the end of the Burke litigation, but it is a significant marker in Ireland’s law of contempt and in the public understanding of the rule of law.

The key legal takeaways are:

1. Unappealed orders bind: A final High Court order, such as Owens J’s 2023 injunction, must be obeyed unless and until set aside on appeal or by proper application. Personal conviction about its invalidity is no legal defence to contempt.
2. Substantive rights vs. procedural obedience: One can strongly contest the underlying law or policy (here, transgender pronouns), but one must do so through lawful channels. Disobeying court orders is not an acceptable mode of protest in a constitutional democracy.
3. Civil and criminal contempt distinguished: This judgment uses civil contempt (coercive committal) to enforce compliance with an injunction and initiates criminal contempt proceedings to address abusive in‑court behaviour. This dual track emphasises that the courts will both enforce their orders and protect their own proceedings.
4. Rule of law rhetoric backed by enforcement: Cregan J’s strong language about mendacity, aggression, and a “concerted attack” on the courts is matched by concrete enforcement actions—committal, referral to the President of the High Court, and involvement of the Attorney General.
5. Religious freedom has limits in enforcement contexts: While Mr Burke remains free to hold and express his religious views, those views do not permit him to ignore injunctions, trespass at will, or disrupt court proceedings under cover of conscience.

Beyond Mr Burke’s individual case, the judgment stands as a clear warning to any litigant—left, right, religious, secular, or otherwise—that:

• Court orders are not invitations to debate; they are commands binding until lawfully changed;
• Attempts to erode the authority of the courts through systematic disobedience and abuse will provoke a firm institutional response; and
• The rule of law—“foundational to the proper functioning” of the State (para. 166)—will be defended even, and especially, in cases that arouse intense public passion.

In short, Burke (No. 1) is less about the merits of debates over gender identity and more about the institutional settlement that makes such debates possible in an orderly way: a legal system in which orders of the courts are obeyed until lawfully overturned, and where conscience and protest operate within, rather than against, the framework of the Constitution.