Mandatory but Qualified Entry of Patent Proceedings into the Commercial IP & Technology List under Order 63A Rule 4(7): A Commentary on Glaxosmithkline Biologicals SA v Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals Unlimited Company & Ors [2025] IEHC 660

---

1. Introduction

This judgment of Mr Justice Mark Sanfey, delivered on 14 November 2025 in the High Court (Commercial), addresses a focused but important procedural question: when and to what extent must patent proceedings be admitted to the Commercial List and, more specifically, to the newly created Intellectual Property and Technology List.

The underlying substantive dispute concerns alleged infringement by the defendants – Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals Unlimited Company, Pfizer Healthcare Ireland Unlimited Company, and BioNTech Manufacturing GmbH – of three European patents held by the plaintiff, Glaxosmithkline Biologicals SA (“GSK”). The patents relate to technologies allegedly used in the defendants’ SARS-CoV-2 Covid‑19 vaccine, “Comirnaty”.

However, this ruling does not address the merits of the patent infringement claims. Instead, it deals solely with an interlocutory procedural application: whether the proceedings should be entered into the Commercial List of the High Court and assigned to the Intellectual Property and Technology List, pursuant to Order 63A of the Rules of the Superior Courts (“RSC”).

The judgment creates an important clarification – effectively a new procedural precedent – on the interpretation of Order 63A, rule 4(7) in its post‑2025 form, and its interaction with the court’s traditional discretion to refuse entry to the Commercial List in cases of delay or other conduct inconsistent with the ethos of that List.

---

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1. The core issue

The central question was the meaning and effect of Order 63A rule 4(7) RSC, as amended by the Rules of the Superior Courts (Planning and Environment) 2025 (S.I. 246/2025), which provides that:

“Where the proceedings which are the subject of an application pursuant to sub-rule (2) are proceedings falling within sub-paragraph (d) of the definition of ‘commercial proceedings’ in rule 1, the proceedings shall be entered in the Commercial List and assigned to the Intellectual Property and Technology List, save where such entry and assignment of the proceedings would be contrary to the interests of the efficient and just conduct of the Commercial List or the Intellectual Property and Technology List.”

Rule 1(d), in its current form, restricts this “automatic” category to:

“(d) any proceedings instituted, or any application or reference made, or appeal lodged, under the provisions of the Patents Act 1992, not including an application under section 108(4) of that Act”.

GSK argued that, because its proceedings were plainly “proceedings under the Patents Act 1992”, entry into the Commercial List and assignment to the Intellectual Property and Technology List was effectively mandatory, unless doing so would harm the efficient and just conduct of the List. Pfizer and BioNTech argued that the court retained a broad discretion, including an ability to refuse entry on grounds such as culpable delay and protection of court resources.

2.2. Key holdings

The Court held, in essence, that:

• Order 63A rule 4(7) is indeed a “carve‑out” from the more general and discretionary provisions of Order 63A, particularly rules 4(1) and 4(5), which are framed in permissive terms (“may”).
• For proceedings within rule 1(d) (i.e. patent proceedings under the Patents Act 1992, save for s.108(4) applications), there is a strong presumption of entry and assignment to the Intellectual Property and Technology List; the use of “shall” in rule 4(7) is deliberately mandatory in tone.
• Nonetheless, this presumption is not absolute. The proviso – that entry must not be “contrary to the interests of the efficient and just conduct” of the Lists – preserves a limited, residual discretion for the court to refuse entry, but only in rare and compelling cases.
• Conduct justifying refusal must exceed the normal concept of “culpable delay” typically considered in entry applications. It would require something more “exceptional”, such as exceptionally excessive delay coupled with serious prejudice, or other conduct inimical to the proper functioning of the Commercial and IP & Technology Lists.
• On the facts, while there had been significant delay by GSK in instituting proceedings, the delay did not rise to the level that would justify exclusion under rule 4(7). There was no evidence of misconduct or prejudice sufficient to threaten the “efficient and just conduct” of the Lists.

Accordingly, the Court granted the application and ordered that the proceedings be entered into the Commercial List and assigned to the Intellectual Property and Technology List.

---

3. Legal and Procedural Framework

3.1. The Commercial List and Intellectual Property and Technology List

The Commercial List of the High Court was created to provide a fast‑track, case‑managed forum for substantial commercial disputes. Admission is not automatic: ordinarily, proceedings are entered only by order of the Judge of the Commercial List, following an application.

Over time, the Commercial List developed a distinct “ethos”: active judicial case management, strict adherence to timetables, and an expectation that litigants themselves will act with expedition and efficiency. This ethos is crucial because the List operates within limited judicial resources; to preserve the system’s integrity, the court may refuse entry where parties have unduly delayed or otherwise failed to treat their case as urgent or commercially pressing.

More recently, in line with recommendations from the Review of the Administration of Civil Justice (2020), a specialist Intellectual Property and Technology List was established as an adjunct to the Commercial Court, to consolidate IP and technology‑heavy cases before judges with appropriate expertise and to make Ireland a competitive and predictable forum for such disputes.

3.2. The relevant rules of Order 63A

Several provisions of Order 63A RSC are central to this ruling.

(a) Rules 4(1) and 4(5): the general discretionary regime

Rule 4(1) provides:

“Upon application made in accordance with sub-rule (2), commercial proceedings may be entered in the Commercial List by order of the Judge of the Commercial List and, in an appropriate case, may be assigned to the Intellectual Property and Technology List.”

Rule 4(5) similarly states:

“Upon the hearing of the motion referred to in sub-rule (2), the Judge of the Commercial List may direct that the proceedings be entered in the Commercial List, or may direct that the proceedings be entered in the Commercial List and assigned to the Intellectual Property and Technology List.”

The repeated use of “may” signals a broad judicial discretion under the general regime: not all qualifying commercial cases automatically gain entry. The Judge may refuse entry for reasons including delay, improper conduct, or pressure on court resources.

(b) The special rule for patent proceedings: rule 4(7) and rule 1(d)

Rule 4(7), however, is different in form and tone. It applies where the proceedings fall within sub‑paragraph (d) of the definition of “commercial proceedings” in rule 1.

As amended by S.I. 246/2025, rule 1(d) is limited to:

“any proceedings instituted, or any application or reference made, or appeal lodged, under the provisions of the Patents Act 1992, not including an application under section 108(4) of that Act”.

This represents a significant narrowing from the previous iteration in S.I. 530/2021, where intellectual property proceedings were broadly defined to include a wide array of statutory IP causes of action (trademarks, copyright, patents, etc). Now, only Patents Act proceedings attract the rule 4(7) mechanism.

Rule 4(7) then provides that such proceedings “shall be entered” in the Commercial List and assigned to the IP & Technology List, “save where” that would be contrary to the efficient and just conduct of the Lists. The contrast in language – “shall” versus “may” – lies at the heart of the dispute in this case.

3.3. The nature of these proceedings

The action is a plenary patent infringement claim. GSK alleges that three European patents (the “626”, “856” and “941” patents) – all patents of which it is the registered proprietor – have been infringed by the defendants by reason of the manufacture and marketing of Comirnaty.

The reliefs sought include:

• Damages for infringement;
• An injunction restraining further infringement;
• Other consequential relief.

The proceedings are part of a much broader, multi‑jurisdictional dispute between GSK and various Pfizer/BioNTech entities, including:

• Proceedings initiated in the US District Court (District of Delaware) in April 2024 (relating to US patents);
• Two proceedings commenced in July 2025 before the Unified Patent Court (not including Ireland or the UK);
• Opposition proceedings before the European Patent Office concerning the same patent family.

There is no dispute that the present Irish proceedings are “proceedings under the Patents Act 1992” within rule 1(d). The question is whether GSK’s application for Commercial List entry must nonetheless be scrutinised for delay and conduct in the usual way.

---

4. Parties’ Positions on the Listing Application

4.1. The plaintiff’s (GSK’s) position

(a) No culpable delay and pandemic context

GSK’s affidavit evidence asserted that there had been “no culpable delay” in seeking entry to the Commercial List. While Comirnaty received conditional marketing authorisation in December 2020 and was administered in Ireland from late December 2020, GSK pointed to the context of the Covid‑19 pandemic:

• The world was in the grip of a global health emergency throughout 2020–2022.
• The WHO only declared an end to Covid‑19 as a public health emergency on 5 May 2023.
• GSK itself was engaged in efforts to combat Covid‑19.

Implicitly, GSK suggested it would have been unreasonable to expect it to divert resources to contentious litigation during the height of the pandemic and its immediate aftermath.

(b) Attempts at global resolution

GSK further argued that it had been attempting to resolve matters on a global basis through discussions and the US litigation, claiming that engagement with Pfizer and BioNTech continued up to July 2025 without resolution. Against that background, the Irish proceedings and the application for Commercial List entry were timely and strategically justified.

(c) Interpretation of rule 4(7): near‑mandatory entry

On the construction of Order 63A rule 4(7), GSK made two key contentions:

1. The rule is drafted in mandatory terms – “shall be entered” – and is intended to override the broad discretion implicit in rules 4(1) and 4(5), at least for cases falling within rule 1(d). In other words, once a case is “proceedings under the Patents Act 1992”, the court is bound to admit it to the Commercial List and assign it to the IP & Technology List, unless the interests of efficient and just conduct would be compromised.
2. The proviso (“save where such entry… would be contrary to the interests of the efficient and just conduct of the List”) was said to be mainly about the capacity of the court and the need to protect the efficient functioning of the List, rather than about any detailed review of the applicant’s past conduct. If the List has capacity, the patent case should ordinarily be admitted.

GSK also invoked the policy rationale for the IP & Technology List, referring to the Review of the Administration of Civil Justice (2020) and its recognition of:

“the benefits which are likely to result from the introduction of a specialised intellectual property list… [to ensure] that the courts of Ireland remain an attractive forum for parties seeking to resolve such disputes in as timely and cost-effective manner as possible”.

From this perspective, rule 4(7) was presented as a deliberate legislative choice to create a “natural home” for patent disputes, with streamlined access and minimal gate‑keeping.

4.2. The defendants’ (Pfizer/BioNTech’s) position

(a) Asserted delay and litigation strategy

The defendants contested GSK’s claim of “no culpable delay”, pointing to:

• The timeline: Comirnaty obtained conditional marketing authorisation on 21 December 2020 and was administered from 29 December 2020.
• The 626 patent could have been sued upon from late 2020/early 2021, yet proceedings were not issued until July 2025 – a delay of about four years and seven months.
• Proceedings for infringement of the 856 patent, granted in October 2022, could have been commenced much earlier than July 2025 – a delay of about two years and nine months.
• The 941 patent, granted in October 2024, could likewise have been litigated earlier – a delay of about nine months.

They portrayed GSK’s overall litigation strategy as “self‑fragmented” and leisurely: excluding the UK and Ireland from UPC claims and commencing UPC proceedings only in July 2025, long after Comirnaty was on the market, while delaying Irish proceedings and seeking Commercial List entry only in late August 2025.

They also emphasised the absence of pre‑action correspondence and the fact that GSK currently had no competing product in the market, suggesting that the case is predominantly a claim for damages rather than an urgent market‑share or injunctive contest.

(b) Preservation of discretion under rules 4(1) and 4(5)

Pfizer and BioNTech argued that:

• The words “may” in rules 4(1) and 4(5) preserve the familiar discretionary standard for entry into the Commercial List.
• Rule 4(7) cannot be read as entirely removing the court’s discretion where the applicant has exhibited serious delay or other conduct inconsistent with the Commercial List’s ethos of expedition.
• The function of the entry power is not to reward parties who themselves have delayed, at the expense of other litigants who have acted promptly.

Defence counsel stressed that the power to refuse entry exists to protect the court’s own resources and the fair treatment of other litigants. They rejected the notion that prejudice to the defendants is a necessary precondition to refusal: the mere fact of having to divert scarce judicial resources to manage a case where the plaintiff has clearly not treated its own claim with urgency is itself a legitimate concern.

(c) “Self‑fragmentation” and strategic delay

The third defendant in particular highlighted what it described as GSK’s “self‑fragmentation” of its litigation campaign: carving the UK and Ireland out of the UPC proceedings and deciding to bring separate actions in these jurisdictions later, after having already initiated other proceedings.

The implication was that GSK had consciously chosen a slower and more disjointed litigation route, and should not now be entitled to the benefits of the Commercial List’s expedited procedures.

---

5. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

5.1. The status of Chancery versus Commercial List

As a preliminary matter, the Court emphasised that refusal of entry to the Commercial List does not threaten the existence of the claim:

• The proceedings would simply continue in the Chancery List, where case management is increasingly available and used, and trials can proceed without undue delay.
• If special expertise is needed, arrangements can be made for a Commercial List judge to sit in the Chancery List.

This contextual point tempers the apparent stakes of the listing decision: entry into the Commercial List offers procedural advantages, but refusal is not fatal to the plaintiff’s claim.

5.2. Acknowledgment of the general discretion to refuse entry

The Judge confirmed that, despite not being expressly spelled out in Order 63A, the Commercial Court does possess a general discretion to refuse entry to the List. In practice, this discretion has been exercised primarily:

• To uphold the ethos of expedition and efficient case management; and
• To ensure that limited judicial resources are reserved for litigants who themselves have acted with dispatch.

The Court stressed that:

“Given the necessarily limited court resources, only litigants who themselves demonstrate expedition by their actions are entitled to be accommodated by the system.”

This reflects long‑standing practice: for most commercial cases, delay or lack of urgency can justify refusal of entry.

5.3. Rule 4(7) as a “carve‑out” for patent proceedings

The core interpretative step is the Court’s characterisation of rule 4(7) as a “carve‑out” from the general regime:

• Rules 4(1) and 4(5) apply to all qualifying “commercial proceedings”, and are cast in discretionary terms.
• Rule 4(7), however, is specific and mandatory in tone, and applies only to the subset of cases within rule 1(d) – now confined to patent proceedings under the Patents Act 1992 (excluding s.108(4)).
• The Judge accepted that the new drafting must be taken seriously: the legislature has chosen to single out patent proceedings for this special treatment, however narrow in scope that category may now be compared to prior versions of Order 63A.

In short, the Court recognised that r.4(7) alters the usual balance: for patent cases, the starting point is not pure judicial discretion but a strong statutory presumption of entry and assignment.

5.4. The scope of the proviso: “interests of the efficient and just conduct”

The next question was how to read the saving clause in rule 4(7):

“…save where such entry and assignment of the proceedings would be contrary to the interests of the efficient and just conduct of the Commercial List or the Intellectual Property and Technology List.”

GSK contended that this was essentially about the court’s capacity, i.e. whether the List has the time and judicial resources to absorb the case. The Judge expressly rejected that narrow construction.

Instead, he interpreted the phrase as entitling the court to examine:

• Whether, in the particular case, the applicant’s conduct is such that admitting the case would be inconsistent with the efficient and just operation of the Lists.
• Whether the applicant has behaved in a way “which conflicts to a significant degree with the spirit and intendment of the Commercial Court’s procedures”.

The protection of “the interests of the efficient and just conduct” is not confined to an abstract calendar‑management exercise; it includes upholding the ethos of diligence and fairness that underpins the Commercial and IP & Technology Lists.

5.5. The threshold of misconduct: beyond ordinary “culpable delay”

However, the Court was careful to set a high threshold for reliance on this proviso. It distinguished the ordinary concept of “culpable delay” – which may justify refusal under the general regime – from the more serious conduct needed to displace the mandatory presumption for patent proceedings under rule 4(7).

The Judge stated that to invoke the proviso:

• The applicant’s conduct must go beyond “usual criteria” of culpable delay.
• It might include, “without intending to be prescriptive”, exceptionally excessive delay, particularly that which has caused “particular and significant prejudice” to the other parties.
• The key consideration is whether admitting the proceedings would be “potentially injurious to the interests of the court and other litigants” who depend on the List’s resources and procedures.

Importantly, the Court stressed that refusal of entry in a rule 4(7) case:

• Should be a rare event;
• Should only occur in compelling circumstances;
• Is justified only where inclusion “cannot be justified in the interests of the integrity and procedures of the List itself”.

Thus, the residual discretion is preserved but heavily constrained: patent proceedings have a privileged route into the Commercial/IP & Technology Lists, reflecting their designated “natural home”.

5.6. Application to the facts: delay but no disqualifying misconduct

On the specific facts, the Court accepted that there had been “undoubtedly significant delays”:

• GSK could have sued much earlier on each of the three patents;
• The overall pace of GSK’s multi‑jurisdictional campaign was described as “somewhat leisurely”.

However, several counterbalancing factors influenced the Court’s assessment:

• The delays, while notable, did not reach the level of “exceptionally excessive” coupled with “particular and significant prejudice” required to trigger the proviso.
• There was no evidence of misconduct by GSK that would undermine the efficient and just conduct of the Lists or injure other litigants.
• The defendants had not adduced any concrete evidence of prejudice arising from the delay, beyond general criticisms of litigation strategy.
• The case had to be managed somewhere; and, by its subject matter, the IP & Technology List is the most appropriate “home” for it.

The Court underlined that if the defendants believe the delay has legal consequences (e.g. for interim relief, limitation, laches, or costs), they remain free to bring appropriate applications within the IP & Technology List. Entry does not immunise GSK from any substantive or procedural consequences of its timing; it only determines the procedural forum.

5.7. Outcome

Concluding that this case does not present the kind of “exceptional” or “compelling” circumstances envisaged by the proviso, the Court held that rule 4(7) mandates entry:

• The proceedings constitute “commercial proceedings” within rule 1(d);
• The presumption of entry and assignment stands;
• There are no adequate grounds, in the interests of efficient and just conduct of the Lists, to justify refusal.

Accordingly, the Court ordered that the case be entered into the Commercial List and assigned to the Intellectual Property and Technology List. The Judge reserved the question of any ancillary orders for a subsequent hearing.

---

6. Precedents and Contextual Sources

6.1. Absence of direct case-law citations

The judgment, as provided, does not cite specific earlier cases by name. Instead, it relies on:

• The wording and evolution of Order 63A itself;
• Established practice and ethos in the Commercial List;
• Policy materials, in particular the Review of the Administration of Civil Justice (2020).

The lack of explicit case citation does not mean there is no relevant jurisprudence on Commercial List entry or culpable delay; rather, the Judge chose to rest this ruling primarily on textual interpretation of the rules and a description of existing practice.

6.2. The 2020 Review of the Administration of Civil Justice

The judgment refers to paragraph 10.4.9 of the 2020 Review, which recommended:

“the establishment of a dedicated list, by way of adjunct to the Commercial Court, to hear and determine intellectual property disputes and disputes concerning technology.”

Key elements of that recommendation, as acknowledged by the Court, include:

• Recognition of the benefits of a specialised IP/technology list – including expertise, consistency and procedural efficiency.
• The objective of making Irish courts an attractive forum for IP and technology disputes, particularly in a post‑Brexit environment.
• A call for adequate resources to ensure the list can operate in “as timely and cost‑effective manner as possible”.

Rule 4(7) – particularly as it now specifically favours Patents Act proceedings – can be seen as a legislative implementation of part of that policy vision: channelling patent disputes to a specialist list swiftly and with minimal procedural friction.

6.3. Evolution of Order 63A: from broad “intellectual property proceedings” to patents-only

The judgment also highlights the significant narrowing of rule 1(d):

• Under S.I. 530/2021, “intellectual property proceedings” were broadly defined and automatically eligible (under the then r.4(7)) for Commercial List entry and IP List assignment.
• Under S.I. 246/2025, rule 1(d) is confined to Patents Act 1992 proceedings (save for s.108(4) applications).

The Court declines to speculate on whether this narrowing is a deliberate policy choice or a drafting anomaly. However, it treats the current text as binding: for now, only Patents Act matters enjoy the rule 4(7) “shall be entered” mechanism. Other IP disputes (e.g. trademarks, copyright, designs) will fall back into the general “may” regime and remain more vulnerable to refusal for reasons such as delay, complexity, or resource constraints.

---

7. Likely Impact and Significance

7.1. Clarification of the entry regime for patent cases

The judgment establishes a clear procedural principle:

• Patent proceedings under the Patents Act 1992 are presumptively entitled to entry into the Commercial List and assignment to the Intellectual Property and Technology List under Order 63A rule 4(7).
• The court’s discretion to refuse such entry is narrow and should be exercised sparingly, only in “rare” and “compelling” circumstances, where admission would undermine the efficient and just operation of the Lists themselves.

This gives a degree of procedural certainty to patent litigants: absent highly unusual misconduct or prejudice, they can expect their disputes to be heard in the specialist IP & Technology List.

7.2. Reinforcement of the “natural home” concept for IP disputes

Even while confined by the current wording of rule 1(d) to patents, the Court repeatedly refers to the IP & Technology List as the “natural home” for IP matters. That language is important:

• It reinforces the institutional expectation that IP disputes should be heard in that specialist forum, whenever the rules permit.
• It supports a broader trend towards specialisation and concentration of IP expertise within the Commercial Court structure.
• It enhances Ireland’s profile as a forum where high‑value, complex technology and patent disputes can be heard efficiently and competently.

7.3. Balancing forum attractiveness with protection of court resources

A key tension in the judgment is between:

• The desire to attract and efficiently resolve sophisticated patent disputes; and
• The need to preserve judicial resources and protect other litigants from being displaced or delayed by parties who have not themselves acted with urgency.

The Court seeks to reconcile this by:

• Giving rule 4(7) real weight and recognising a strong presumption in favour of entry for patent cases; but
• Maintaining a to refuse entry where the conduct of the applicant would significantly undermine the List’s fairness or efficiency.

This nuanced balance avoids two extremes:

• It does not reduce rule 4(7) to a dead letter by subjecting patent cases to the same open‑ended discretion as other commercial disputes.
• Nor does it turn rule 4(7) into a rigid, automatic right of entry that disregards egregious litigation behaviour.

7.4. Implications for litigation strategy in multi-jurisdictional patent disputes

For parties engaged in international patent litigation campaigns (as in this case), the ruling signals that:

• It is acceptable, and indeed “absolutely routine”, to stage litigation across different jurisdictions over time; such staging, by itself, will not normally bar entry to the Irish Commercial IP List.
• However, extreme delay in commencing Irish proceedings, particularly if it causes concrete prejudice to Irish defendants (for example, in terms of lost evidence, regulatory commitments, or reliance interests), may still provide grounds for refusal of entry.
• Plaintiffs cannot assume that the Commercial List will always accommodate them regardless of their own conduct: if their behaviour seriously conflicts with the ethos of expedition, they risk being confined to the Chancery List.

Defendants, for their part, now know that attacking a plaintiff’s delay can be relevant, but only rarely decisive, in resisting list entry where rule 4(7) applies. They may need to focus on demonstrating specific prejudice and the broader impact on the justice system, rather than general complaints about leisurely strategy.

7.5. Consequences for non-patent IP litigation

Because rule 1(d) in its current form is limited to Patents Act proceedings, this judgment implicitly underscores a distinction:

• Patent actions enjoy a statutory presumption of entry via rule 4(7); and
• Other IP actions (e.g. trade marks, copyright, passing off) remain under the general discretionary “may” regime.

For non‑patent IP litigants, this means:

• Entry into the IP & Technology List will still depend on the usual factors (complexity, value, urgency, conduct); and
• Culpable delay may more easily justify refusal, because the protective umbrella of rule 4(7) is not available.

In policy terms, if the legislature in future wishes to bring other categories of IP back under the rule 4(7) mechanism, this judgment will serve as an interpretative guide: the courts will likely treat any such inclusion as creating a similarly strong presumption of entry, subject only to exceptional carve‑outs.

---

8. Complex Concepts Explained in Plain Terms

8.1. Commercial List

The Commercial List is a special “fast lane” within the High Court for substantial business disputes. Cases admitted to this List:

• Are managed by a judge with commercial expertise;
• Receive close case management, including tight timetables;
• Generally move to trial much faster than ordinary cases.

However, because court time is limited, not every case that qualifies as “commercial” gets into the List. The judge decides whether to admit each case, usually based on factors like value, complexity, and urgency, as well as the conduct of the parties.

8.2. Intellectual Property and Technology List

The Intellectual Property and Technology List is a specialised subset of the Commercial List. It deals mainly with:

• Patent disputes;
• Trade mark, copyright and design disputes;
• Technology, IT, and data‑related disputes (depending on the rules in force).

The goal is to have such cases heard by judges familiar with IP and technology issues, and to handle them efficiently and consistently.

8.3. “Culpable delay”

“Culpable delay” is a legal phrase for delay that:

• Is not adequately justified; and
• Reflects a failure by a party to pursue its claim or defence diligently.

If a party sits on its rights for a long time without good reason, a court may deem that delay culpable. Consequences can include:

• Refusal of certain interlocutory relief (like injunctions);
• Refusal of entry into expedited lists (like the Commercial List);
• Cost sanctions or, in extreme cases, dismissal for want of prosecution (though that is a separate doctrine).

8.4. “Efficient and just conduct” of the List

When the rules speak of the “interests of the efficient and just conduct” of the List, they refer to:

• Ensuring cases are processed quickly and in an orderly fashion;
• Allocating limited judicial time fairly among all litigants;
• Maintaining the integrity and reputation of the List as a forum for prompt resolution of serious disputes.

Admitting a case where the applicant has grossly abused the process, or where the case would monopolise resources unjustifiably, might be seen as contrary to these interests.

8.5. “Proceedings under the Patents Act 1992”

This encompasses court proceedings brought under powers or causes of action created by the Patents Act 1992, such as:

• Patent infringement actions;
• Declarations of non‑infringement;
• Challenges to patent validity (in some contexts);
• Appeals or references arising from decisions of the Controller or other bodies under the Act.

The rules explicitly exclude applications under s.108(4) from the mandatory regime, indicating that not all Patents Act applications are treated identically for listing purposes.

8.6. Multi‑jurisdictional patent litigation and the UPC

High‑value patent disputes often span multiple countries. Parties may:

• File infringement or invalidity actions in several national courts;
• Use the Unified Patent Court (UPC) – which covers participating EU Member States – for centralised relief (though Ireland and the UK are currently outside that framework as litigating venues);
• Pursue parallel opposition proceedings at the European Patent Office.

Strategic choices about where and when to sue are common. The present case illustrates this: GSK sued in Delaware, then the UPC, and later initiated Irish proceedings. The Court acknowledges such staging as “absolutely routine” in multinational patent disputes, though it still scrutinises whether the delay in any particular jurisdiction is excessive.

---

9. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

This judgment in Glaxosmithkline Biologicals SA v Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals Unlimited Company & Ors [2025] IEHC 660 is a significant procedural ruling for patent litigation in Ireland.

Its central contributions can be summarised as follows:

1. Rule 4(7 as a genuine carve‑out. Order 63A rule 4(7) is not merely a restatement of the general discretion found in rules 4(1) and 4(5). It creates a distinct, mandatory‑leaning regime for proceedings under the Patents Act 1992 (other than s.108(4) applications).
2. Presumption of Commercial/IP & Technology List entry for patent cases. Patent actions that fall within rule 1(d) shall be entered in the Commercial List and assigned to the Intellectual Property and Technology List, save in exceptional cases.
3. Residual discretion preserved but strictly limited. The Court retains a power to refuse entry where admission would be contrary to the “efficient and just conduct” of the Lists. However, this power:
   • Must be applied sparingly;
   • Requires conduct more serious than ordinary culpable delay;
   • Should be invoked only in rare, compelling circumstances, e.g. exceptionally excessive delay with serious prejudice.
4. Ethos of expedition still matters. Even within this more protective regime, litigants are not given a blank cheque. The ethos of prompt and efficient litigation in the Commercial Court remains relevant, particularly to the exercise of the proviso and to other procedural applications the defendants might bring (for example, resisting urgent interim relief).
5. Institutional affirmation of the IP & Technology List as the “natural home” for patent disputes. The judgment underscores the policy aim of concentrating patent disputes in a specialist forum, thereby supporting the international attractiveness and internal coherence of Irish IP adjudication.

On the facts, GSK’s delays were criticised but not found sufficiently egregious or prejudicial to override the statutory presumption. The action will proceed in the Commercial List and the Intellectual Property and Technology List, leaving any consequences of delay to be explored in subsequent procedural steps or at trial.

Going forward, parties to patent litigation in Ireland can regard this decision as a clear signpost: if your case is a Patents Act proceeding, the Commercial IP & Technology List is your default destination, and only truly exceptional misconduct will block that path.