“Chain-of-Title Scrutiny” – Fitzwilliam Loan Management v Conneally and the New Threshold for Summary Judgment in Assigned Loan Litigation

1. Introduction

Fitzwilliam Loan Management Unlimited Company v Conneally ([2025] IEHC 315) is a High Court decision that will reverberate through Irish debt-enforcement and credit-servicing practice. Mr Justice Mark Heslin refused the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on a commercial loan, not because the borrower proved a substantive defence, but because the plaintiff failed to lay prima facie evidence of title and quantum. The ruling sets a demanding evidential standard where a loan has passed through multiple assignees, and it clarifies how:

Transfer documentation and statutory notices under s.28(6) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act 1877 must be exhibited, not merely averred to;
Business-record admissibility under ss.14–15 of the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Misc. Provisions) Act 2020 operates in summary applications;
A substitution order does not cure defects in the plaintiff’s proof of assignment;
Evidence generated by solicitors, or by un-proved third-party correspondence, is insufficient;
Questions about the credit-servicing authorisation of an original plaintiff (GDP) are triable and cannot be brushed aside by later assignment to an authorised entity.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The plaintiff, Fitzwilliam, sought €660,409.77 on foot of a 2008 “interest-only” facility originally granted by Bank of Scotland (Ireland) Limited (BOSI). The loan had allegedly travelled through four transfers (BOSI→BoS→Ennis→GDP→Fitzwilliam). The defendant resisted summary judgment, challenging title, quantum, statute-bar, and credit-servicing compliance.

Justice Heslin held that:

The plaintiff failed to produce prima facie evidence of the second transfer (BoS→Ennis) – no deed, no notice, and contradictory dates (July 2015 Loan Purchase Deed vs. November 2015 Conveyance).
Without that link the “chain of title” was broken, so the plaintiff had not proven that it was the ultimate successor to BOSI.
The “Statement of Account” was largely a solicitor-generated spreadsheet. Its admissibility under the 2020 Act was dubious; therefore quantum was unproven.
Disputed Pepper Finance correspondence could not be relied on because it was not proved by an authorised deponent, and was potentially inadmissible hearsay.
Open questions on whether GDP breached the credit-servicing regime in Part V of the Central Bank Act 1997, and if later assignment cures any illegality, necessitated a plenary hearing.
Applying the Harrisrange principles, and echoing Supreme Court guidance in O’Malley and O’Brien, the borrower had surmounted the “low threshold” for leave to defend.
The motion was dismissed; proceedings were remitted to plenary hearing; costs of the motion were made “costs in the cause”.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and their Influence

Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank v O’Malley [2019] IESC 84 – Clarke CJ confirmed the two-step test: (i) plaintiff must show prima facie debt; (ii) only then must defendant show an arguable defence. Justice Heslin used this framework to hold that Fitzwilliam failed at step (i).
Ulster Bank v O’Brien [2015] IESC 96 – McMenamin J’s restatement that summary judgment is improper where plaintiff’s evidence is internally inconsistent. The judge relied on this to treat the contradictory July / November 2015 transfer dates as fatal.
Harrisrange Ltd v Duncan [2003] 4 IR 1 – McKechnie J’s 12 guiding principles on summary process, especially the need for “discernible caution” and to refuse judgment unless “very clear that there is no defence”. Those principles underpinned the leave-to-defend order.
Permanent TSB v Doheny [2019] IEHC 414 – on substitution of plaintiffs. Heslin J distinguished Doheny, stressing that substitution does not dispense with proof of all transfer documents.
Promontoria v Burns [2020] IECA 87 – Baker J rejected spreadsheet evidence unsupported by original bank statements. This authority was directly applied to the “Statement of Account”.
Cave v Gilhooley [2025] IESC 3 – addressed un-pleaded credit-servicing illegality on appeal. Fitzwilliam argued Cave barred the defence, but Heslin J clarified that Cave turned on timing and pleading, leaving the substantive issue open.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Prima facie Title Requirement
• The loan is a “legal chose in action”. • Under s.28(6) of the 1877 Judicature Act, an absolute assignment in writing plus written notice to the debtor transfers legal title.
• Plaintiff exhibited transfer deeds for stages 3 and 4, but supplied only bare averments for stage 2, and those averments conflicted with recital B in the stage 3 deed.
• Without the stage 2 deed and notice, the chain snapped, so the plaintiff failed step 1 of O’Malley.
Admissibility of Business Records
• s.14–15 2020 Act lets business records in, if compiled “in the ordinary course of a business”. • The spreadsheet relied heavily on inputs from LK Shields Solicitors and “Mount Street” servicer, outside the ordinary record-keeping of the then-lender, and contained unexplained rate calculations. • The plaintiff did not serve a 21-day notice under s.15. • Therefore the court was not satisfied as to admissibility or reliability.
Third-Party Correspondence
• Pepper Finance letters claiming ownership created uncertainty. • Plaintiff exhibited a Pepper apology letter via its own solicitor, but no affidavit from Pepper—rendering it hearsay. • The court could not resolve ownership conflicts sans oral evidence.
Credit-Servicing Compliance
• GDP, the original plaintiff, was not authorised under the Central Bank Act 1997. • Whether unlicensed servicing renders its demand and proceedings void is unsettled post-Cave. • Justice Heslin held the issue is substantial and novel, warranting plenary trial.
Statute of Limitations (rejected defence)
• The loan was “on demand” and secured by a charge; cause of action accrued on first demand in 2018; twelve-year period applies – so not statute-barred.

3.3 Potential Impact

The judgment will likely influence all summary debt actions involving loan sales, especially NPL portfolios:

Expect more demands for full documentary evidence of every assignment (including notices). Litigants can no longer rely on blanket averments.
Solicitor-constructed “running accounts” or global reconciliations will face stringent Promontoria v Burns-style scrutiny—original bank statements and system prints should be filed.
Substitution orders will be treated as procedural; they do not cement title for summary judgment purposes.
Unresolved credit-servicing compliance (Part V, Central Bank Act 1997) moves centre stage; plaintiffs may seek retrospective authorisations or restructure litigation strategies.
The judgment deepens application of the 2020 Act: courts will test whether each component record truly arose “in the ordinary course”.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Judgment – a fast-track procedure where a creditor asks the court to give final judgment without a full trial, arguing the debtor has “no bona fide defence”.
Prima Facie Evidence – evidence which, if uncontradicted, would be sufficient to prove a fact (here, debt and title).
Chain of Title – the sequence of assignments transferring ownership of a loan from the original lender to the current claimant.
Absolute Assignment – transfer of the entire right, leaving nothing with the assignor, once written notice reaches the debtor (s.28(6) 1877 Act).
Business Records (2020 Act) – documents admissible without calling the maker, provided they were produced during routine business operations and proper notice is served.
Credit Servicing Firm – under Part V of the Central Bank Act 1997, a firm that manages or enforces credit on behalf of a non-bank owner must be authorised by the Central Bank.

5. Conclusion

Fitzwilliam v Conneally erects a higher bar for plaintiffs seeking summary judgment on loans that have changed hands. The court insists on documentary specificity for every assignment, careful compliance with the 2020 business-records regime, and candid engagement with credit-servicing regulation. The decision underscores the judiciary’s reluctance to terminate a borrower’s defence summarily where evidential gaps, however technical, persist. Going forward, lenders, funds and their solicitors must prepare “litigation ready” files—complete transfer deeds, notices, authentic account statements—and be ready to call witnesses or face plenary hearings.