“Universal Retirement-Age Parity for all Benchmark Disabilities & the Power of Prospective Withdrawal”
Commentary on Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd., 2025 INSC 472

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India, in Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. HPSEB Ltd. (decided 03-04-2025), resolved a long-standing conflict surrounding extension of the retirement age for disabled public-sector employees. The appellant, a permanent locomotor-disabled electrician, challenged (i) his retirement at 58 despite an Office Memorandum (OM) of 29-03-2013 that pushed retirement to 60 for visually-impaired employees, and (ii) a later OM of 04-11-2019 that withdrew that very benefit. The case directly pitted equality principles under Articles 14 and 21 against the State’s power to issue and rescind executive instructions under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

Key questions that arose:

• Does confining the superannuation extension to only the visually-impaired violate the equality mandate and the Persons with Disabilities legislation?
• Can the State lawfully withdraw such a benefit by executive order, and with what temporal effect?

The judgment simultaneously enlarges substantive equality for all benchmark disabilities and confirms the State’s prospective withdrawal power, thereby striking a nuanced balance between individual rights and executive flexibility.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Equalisation of Benefit: The Court held that once the State grants an age-extension benefit to one benchmark disability (e.g., visual impairment), the same benefit must extend to all benchmark disabilities recognised under the 1995 and 2016 disability statutes.
• Validity of Withdrawal: Applying Section 21, General Clauses Act, the Court upheld the 04-11-2019 OM that rescinded the earlier extension. The authority that can issue an OM can also modify or withdraw it.
• Operative Period Relief: The appellant is entitled to service benefits from 01-10-2018 (day after putative retirement) to 04-11-2019 (date of withdrawal)—i.e., for as long as the earlier OM was validly operative.
• Prospective Effect: No right vested for the period beyond withdrawal. Thus, the appellant cannot claim service until 60 but only until the rescission date.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• State of Punjab v. Bhupinder Singh, Civil Appeal 8855/2014: Direct precedent where the Court endorsed Punjab & Haryana HC’s view that extension from 58 to 60 should cover all three Section 33 disabilities under the 1995 Act. Impact: Provided binding authority for universal extension. The present Bench “fully endorsed” it.
• Union Of India v. Devendra Kumar Pant (2009) 14 SCC 546: Distinguished. That case dealt with promotion restrictions for certain railways posts and held safety considerations could override equality. The Court clarified Pant dealt with “promotion”, not “superannuation”, and hence had limited relevance.
• K. Nagaraj v. State Of Andhra Pradesh (1985) 1 SCC 523: Upheld legislative reduction of retirement age. Cited to reiterate that retirement age is a policy matter and no employee has a fundamental right to retire at a particular age.
• Bishnu Narain Misra v. State of U.P. (1965) Sup SC 1567: Clarified that retirement on superannuation is not “removal” under Article 311(2).

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Homogenous Class under Disability Statutes
   • Both the 1995 Act and its successor, the 2016 Act, enumerate benchmark disabilities (visual, hearing, locomotor, etc.). Persons within these enumerations form a single homogenous class for benefits, unless the statute or policy explicitly differentiates for a rational purpose.
   • Restricting the extension to only the visually impaired lacked a rational nexus; therefore it violated Article 14.
2. Application of Bhupinder Singh
   The Supreme Court had already answered the same question in 2014. The Bench therefore applied stare decisis, holding that “if benefit of extension is available to the visually impaired, it must be available to all benchmark disabilities.”
3. Power to Rescind under Section 21, General Clauses Act
   • An OM is an executive instruction, not a statutory rule.
   • Under Section 21, the power to issue includes the power to “add to, amend, vary or rescind.”
   • As there was no statutory rule modification granting the benefit, the State’s rescission was competent.
4. Non-vested Right & Prospectivity
   • No court had declared the benefit applicable to the appellant prior to 04-11-2019.
   • Consequently, no vested right existed beyond the rescission date. The Court limited relief to the period when the OM subsisted.

C. Potential Impact on Future Litigation & Policy

• Uniform Benefit Obligations: States granting benefits to any single benchmark disability must extend them to all, unless they articulate a narrowly tailored, rational basis for differentiation.
• Encouragement to Amend Service Rules: Reliance on ad-hoc OMs invites uncertainty. Governments are likely to codify disability-related retirement provisions in statutory service rules to reduce litigation risk.
• Prospective Withdrawal Doctrine Clarified: Employees now know that executive benefits can be prospectively curtailed, reinforcing the need for early challenge if discrimination exists.
• Strategic Litigation Guidance: Disabled employees must secure declaratory relief before rescission if they want the full benefit. Delay may truncate relief to the date of revocation.
• Administrative Discretion Balanced by Equality: The judgment shows that while equality dictates the reach of a benefit, the State retains flexibility to change course prospectively.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Office Memorandum (OM): An internal/executive instruction issued by the government, not carrying the force of a statutory rule, yet binding within the administrative hierarchy.
• Benchmark Disability: A disability with at least 40% impairment, certified by a competent medical authority, as per the 2016 Act.
• Section 21, General Clauses Act, 1897: A default rule of interpretation that whenever a statute grants power to issue orders/rules, it equally allows amendment or withdrawal in the same manner.
• Superannuation vs. Removal: Superannuation is automatic retirement upon attaining a specified age. It is distinct from punitive “removal,” hence Article 311 safeguards do not apply.
• Vested Right: A right that has fully accrued and cannot be taken away except by due process. The Court held that Sharma had no vested right to serve up to 60 because rescission occurred before any authoritative extension order in his favour.

5. Conclusion

Kashmiri Lal Sharma crystallises a dual principle:

1. Substantive Equality: Benefits once conferred on one benchmark disability must propagate to all, absent a compelling differentiating rationale. This strengthens the jurisprudence of inclusive equality for persons with disabilities.
2. Executive Flexibility: Yet, such benefits may be prospectively withdrawn by the same authority under Section 21, emphasising that employees should not assume perpetual continuity of concessions issued via executive instructions alone.

The decision therefore harmonises disability rights with constitutional and administrative law doctrines, offering a template for states and employers: equality in extension, clarity in withdrawal. Legislatures and service-rule framers would be well advised to institutionalise these benefits to avoid the volatility of ad-hoc memoranda and to ensure enduring compliance with the mandate of the 2016 Disabilities Act.