“Limits of Writ Jurisdiction in Seeking Transfer of Pending Matters”
Commentary on Ravneet Kaur Adv. v. Punjab & Haryana High Court (2025 PHHC 99003-DB)

1. Introduction

The Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, constituted by Chief Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Sanjiv Berry, was seized of a writ petition (CWP-22171-2025 (O&M)) filed by Ms. Ravneet Kaur, a practicing advocate. The petitioner sought:

• a writ of mandamus compelling the High Court administration to transfer three of her criminal matters (CRM-M-28149-2024, CRWP-559-2025 & CRM-M-38522-2025) from Court-room No. 64 either to another Bench within the same High Court or to any other High Court in the country; and
• a writ of prohibition restraining the Registry from listing any of her future cases before the said Court-room.

The petition was argued in person by the advocate-petitioner and opposed by the High Court through its counsel. The core issue was whether Article 226 of the Constitution empowers a High Court to direct transfer of causes:

1. From one High Court to another; or
2. From one Bench to another within the same High Court, once the administrative side of the Court has declined such transfer.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition in limine, holding that:

1. The High Court, when acting under Article 226, has no jurisdiction to transfer cases pending before it to another High Court; the petitioner may approach “the appropriate forum” (i.e., the Supreme Court).
2. The administrative request for intra-court transfer had already been examined and declined; Article 226 cannot be invoked to circumvent or sit in appeal over an administrative order of the Chief Justice.
3. Any grievance against orders passed in the pending criminal matters must be pursued through ordinary appellate or revisional remedies (Letters Patent Appeal or appeal to the Supreme Court).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (or Not Cited)

Notably, the judgment is concise and cites no specific authorities. Nonetheless, the Bench’s reasoning is traceable to a well-settled line of Supreme Court precedents:

• State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 1 SCC 1 – affirmed that allotment of business within a High Court is the prerogative and administrative domain of its Chief Justice; judicial directions should not trench upon that sphere.
• Maheshwari v. Premlata, (1998) 7 SCC 569 – underscored that transfer of civil suits between High Courts lies exclusively with the Supreme Court under Section 25 CPC.
• K. Anbazhagan v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 13 SCC 779 – reiterated the Supreme Court’s sole power, under Article 139-A and Section 406 CrPC, to transfer criminal trials between States/High Courts to safeguard fair trial principles.
• Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 – held that judicial orders of superior courts are generally not amenable to writ jurisdiction.

By not referring to other material, the Bench signals that the proposition is so self-evident in constitutional law that it requires no more than an assertion.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Scope of Article 226: Writ jurisdiction is primarily directed against the “State” or its instrumentalities. Judicial orders of the High Court itself (or intra-court administrative decisions) fall outside the ambit of that supervisory power.
2. Separation of Administrative and Judicial Functions: Transfer of business amongst Benches is an administrative decision of the Chief Justice (the Master of the Roster). Invoking Article 226 to challenge or bypass that decision would blur the constitutionally demarcated lines between:
   • the administrative capacity in which the Chief Justice allocates work, and
   • the judicial capacity wherein Benches decide disputes.
3. Lack of Power to Transfer Beyond Territorial Jurisdiction: Only the Supreme Court, under Section 25 CPC, Section 406 CrPC and Article 139-A of the Constitution, can transfer cases from one High Court to another. Consequently, a High Court’s writ directions cannot transcend its territorial bounds.
4. Alternative Remedies: If the petitioner is dissatisfied with judicial orders in her pending matters, the correct course is to file
   • a Letters Patent Appeal (for civil jurisdiction), or
   • an SLP or criminal appeal (for criminal matters) before the Supreme Court.
   Writ jurisdiction is not an appellate or revisional substitute.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

The ruling reinforces and clarifies three practical consequences:

• Curtailing Forum Shopping: Litigants (including advocates as parties) cannot shop for a “favourable Bench” via Article 226. The administrative assessment of bias apprehension remains final unless constitutional invalidity is demonstrable.
• Strengthening Administrative Autonomy of Chief Justices: By refusing to override the earlier administrative order, the Bench respects the functional separation that underpins efficient docket management.
• Guidance for Future Litigants: Practitioners are now on firmer notice that challenges to Bench allocation must (a) show structural miscarriage of justice, and (b) be routed either to the Supreme Court or through formal administrative channels, not via writ petitions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Writ of Mandamus: A command issued by a court to a public authority to perform a public duty.
• Writ of Prohibition: An order preventing an inferior court or tribunal from exceeding its jurisdiction.
• Article 226: Constitutional provision empowering High Courts to issue writs to enforce fundamental rights or for “any other purpose.”
• Letters Patent Appeal (LPA): In many chartered High Courts, an intra-court appeal to a Division Bench against a Single Judge’s judgment.
• Administrative Side vs. Judicial Side: High Courts act administratively when assigning work, promulgating rules, or managing staff; they act judicially when deciding cases.

5. Conclusion

The Division Bench’s short but significant pronouncement in Ravneet Kaur Adv. v. Punjab & Haryana High Court crystallises an important principle: Article 226 is not a vehicle to engineer transfers of pending causes within or beyond a High Court; nor can it be deployed to interfere with the Chief Justice’s administrative prerogative in roster-making.

By restating the constitutional boundaries of writ jurisdiction and channeling aggrieved parties toward correct statutory remedies, the decision promotes procedural discipline, deters forum shopping, and preserves the delicate equilibrium between the administrative and judicial facets of High Court functioning.