Who Can Appeal an Acquittal in a CBI Case? Supreme Court Reaffirms Central Government’s Exclusive Locus Under Section 378(2) CrPC and Sets a Liberal Standard for Condoning CBI Delays; Victim’s Appeal Held Prospective

Introduction

The Supreme Court of India, in State of Chhattisgarh v. Amit Aishwarya Jogi, 2025 INSC 1285 (decided on 06 November 2025), has reaffirmed the settled position that appeals against acquittal in cases investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) lie exclusively at the instance of the Central Government under Section 378(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The Court also set aside the High Court’s refusal to condone a substantial delay in the CBI’s application for leave to appeal, emphasizing a liberal and pragmatic approach in serious criminal matters. Further, the Court confirmed that the victim’s right of appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is prospective and arises only for orders passed on or after 31 December 2009.

The case arises from the 4 June 2003 murder of Shri Ramavatar Jaggi, a National Congress Party leader, in Raipur. Following initial investigation and chargesheeting by the State Police, the State transferred the investigation to the CBI, which filed a fresh chargesheet implicating, inter alia, the respondent, Shri Amit Aishwarya Jogi. The trial court convicted 28 accused but acquitted the respondent on 31 May 2007. Multiple challenges to the acquittal were filed by the State, the de-facto complainant (the victim’s son), and the CBI before the High Court; all failed on maintainability or delay. The present judgment resolves the competing claims of locus and condonation and lays down procedural guidance for future cases.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court reaffirmed the three-Judge Bench decision in Lalu Prasad Yadav & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2010) 5 SCC 1, holding that Section 378(1) and Section 378(2) CrPC are mutually exclusive: in cases investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment (CBI) or any other central agency under a Central Act, only the Central Government may direct an appeal against acquittal; the State Government has no locus.
Applying Lalu Prasad Yadav, the State of Chhattisgarh’s application for leave to appeal against the respondent’s acquittal was held not maintainable; the State’s appeal was dismissed.
The de-facto complainant’s attempt to invoke the victim’s appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC failed because the acquittal order was dated 31 May 2007; under Mallikarjun Kodagali (2019) 2 SCC 752, the victim’s right of appeal is prospective with reference to the date of the order of acquittal (post-31 December 2009). The de-facto complainant’s appeals were dismissed.
The Court condoned a 1,373-day delay in the CBI’s application for leave to appeal, criticizing the High Court’s refusal to condone and directing a merits-based consideration by the High Court. The matter was remitted for fresh consideration of the CBI’s leave petition.
Although an acquitted accused is ordinarily not heard at the leave-to-appeal stage, the Court, in view of the significant condonation, directed that the respondent be heard on the CBI’s leave application. The State and the de-facto complainant were directed to be impleaded and heard.
The Court left open—expressly for a suitable future case—the nuanced question whether, in “mixed-investigation” scenarios (initial State investigation and later CBI investigation at the State’s behest), a State may ever have locus to appeal an acquittal, identifying factors that could be relevant to such an inquiry.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The principal precedent is the three-Judge Bench decision in Lalu Prasad Yadav & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2010) 5 SCC 1. The Supreme Court relied upon Lalu Prasad Yadav’s detailed construction of Section 378 CrPC:

Section 378(1) empowers the State Government to direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal against acquittal, but it opens with the exception “save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)”.
Section 378(2) governs two classes of cases: those investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment (CBI) or by any other agency under any Central Act. In such cases, only the Central Government may direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal.
The phrase “save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)”—introduced in the 1973 CrPC and absent in Section 417 of the 1898 Code—creates a deliberate, mutually exclusive division. It excludes CBI/central-agency cases from the ambit of Section 378(1). As summarized in para 54 of Lalu Prasad Yadav, the State’s authority is excluded in those two categories.

On the victim’s appeal, the Court relied on Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) through LRs v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 752, which held that a victim’s right to appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC arises only for orders of acquittal passed after 31 December 2009; the crucial date is the date of the impugned order, not the date of offence.

Legal Reasoning

1) Exclusivity of Section 378(2) CrPC: State Lacks Locus in CBI/DSPE Investigations

The Court endorsed the interpretive framework in Lalu Prasad Yadav:

The exception “save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)” in Section 378(1) makes clear that CBI/central-agency investigations fall outside the State’s appellate authority.
Reading Section 378 as granting the State Government a right to appeal even in CBI cases would render the exception redundant, contrary to established canons of statutory interpretation that give effect to all words in a statute.
Accordingly, the State of Chhattisgarh’s application for leave to appeal against the respondent’s acquittal was rightly rejected by the High Court and was not maintainable.

2) The “Mixed-Investigation” Conundrum—A Question Reserved

The State argued that because the FIR was initially registered and investigated by the State Police (with the first chargesheet filed), and only later was the investigation transferred to the CBI at the State’s behest, it should retain locus to appeal. The State invoked para 37 of Lalu Prasad Yadav to urge that the case was not one where the State had “nothing to do” with the prosecution.

The Court avoided deciding this nuanced issue, distinguishing the present case on the practical ground that the CBI had, in fact, filed its own application for leave to appeal. It signaled that a future case could examine whether the State may have locus in a mixed-investigation scenario, listing potentially relevant factors:

(a) the complaint was lodged by the State Government or its officers;
(b) investigation was partly done by State Police;
(c) prosecution was commenced at the instance of the State Government;
(d) the State Government has a stake in the criminal proceedings; and
(e) the jurisdiction of the CBI had been invoked at the instance of the State Government.

This calibrated reservation keeps the door ajar for a narrowly tailored exception, but until such a reference is resolved, Lalu Prasad Yadav’s exclusivity remains the law.

3) Condonation of Delay: Liberal and Pragmatic Approach in Grave Matters

The CBI filed its leave to appeal after a substantial delay (1,373 days), explaining that it initially believed the State’s challenge sufficed and later decided to appeal when the State’s locus was questioned. The High Court refused condonation, thereby closing the door to merits. The Supreme Court:

Emphasized the gravity of the charges (alleged political conspiracy to murder), and the overarching principle that serious criminal allegations should be decided on merits rather than dismissed on “mere technicalities”.
Noted that the proceedings were “still alive” due to the State and de-facto complainant’s pending challenges, mitigating prejudice from the CBI’s delay.
Condoned the delay and remitted the case to the High Court to consider the CBI’s application for leave to appeal on merits.
Directed, given the significant condonation, that the respondent (acquitted accused) be heard at the leave stage—an exception to the usual practice of not hearing the accused at that stage.
Directed impleadment of the State and the de-facto complainant in the CBI’s leave application so they can assist the High Court.

Importantly, the Court did not endorse the CBI’s explanation per se but prioritized a merits-first adjudication in line with the ends of justice.

4) Victim’s Appeal Under Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is Prospective

The de-facto complainant sought to convert a pending revision into a victim’s appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. Because the acquittal was dated 31 May 2007, the right had not yet come into force. Relying on Mallikarjun Kodagali, the Court reiterated that the right arises only if the order of acquittal is dated 31 December 2009 or later. The de-facto complainant’s challenge was therefore not maintainable.

Impact

Appeals in CBI/DSPE Cases: High Courts must reject State-filed appeals against acquittal in cases investigated by the CBI or a central agency under a Central Act. The Central Government alone may direct such appeals under Section 378(2) CrPC, preserving the legislative design and the federal allocation implicit in the DSPE framework.
Mixed-Investigation Cases: The Court has flagged, but not resolved, whether a State might ever retain locus in cases where it initiated the complaint, conducted part of the investigation, commenced prosecution, and invoked the CBI. Future litigation may refine a narrow exception, if any.
Condonation Practice: High Courts are encouraged to adopt a liberal, pragmatic stance when the gravity of allegations and overall case posture warrant a merits hearing—particularly where related proceedings keep the matter “alive” and where public interest in adjudication is significant. This could influence condonation jurisprudence in serious crimes, especially inter-agency matters.
Procedural Fairness at Leave Stage: In exceptional cases involving extraordinary delay, courts may, in their discretion, hear the acquitted respondent even at the leave-to-appeal stage and permit impleadment of interested stakeholders (State, victim) in a CBI-filed leave petition to ensure comprehensive assistance to the court.
Victims’ Rights: Victims cannot use the proviso to Section 372 CrPC to reopen acquittals rendered before 31 December 2009. This maintains legal certainty and limits retrospective disruption of finality.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 378 CrPC—Appeals Against Acquittal:
- Section 378(1): State Government may direct an appeal against acquittal, but this is “subject to” the exception in sub-section (2).
- Section 378(2): In cases investigated by the CBI (DSPE) or other central agencies under a Central Act, only the Central Government can direct an appeal. This is an express carve-out.
DSPE/CBI:
- The Delhi Special Police Establishment (now CBI) is a central investigative body created under a Central Act. Where it investigates, the statute assigns the Central Government the authority to appeal an acquittal.
Leave to Appeal:
- Before appealing an acquittal, the appellant (State/Central Government/others with statutory right) must typically obtain “leave” from the High Court, which is a preliminary permission granted after a threshold assessment.
Condonation of Delay:
- If an appeal or leave application is filed after the limitation period, the court may condone the delay on sufficient cause being shown. Courts often adopt a liberal approach in grave criminal matters to ensure decisions on merits rather than technical dismissals.
Proviso to Section 372 CrPC—Victim’s Appeal:
- Introduced with effect from 31 December 2009, it grants a victim a substantive right to appeal against acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence, or inadequate compensation. The right arises only for orders passed on or after that date.
Mixed-Investigation Scenario:
- Refers to cases where the State Police initially investigates and perhaps prosecutes, but the investigation is later transferred to the CBI. Whether the State may still appeal an acquittal is an open question, reserved for a suitable case with specific features identified by the Court.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in State of Chhattisgarh v. Amit Aishwarya Jogi consolidates three important principles in criminal appellate practice:

Section 378’s architecture is mutually exclusive: appeals against acquittal in CBI/central-agency investigations lie only at the instance of the Central Government under Section 378(2). State appeals in such cases are not maintainable.
The right of a victim to appeal under the proviso to Section 372 is prospective with reference to the date of the impugned order; it does not revive appeals against acquittals passed before 31 December 2009.
High Courts should adopt a liberal and pragmatic approach to condonation of delay by public agencies in serious criminal matters to ensure adjudication on merits; in exceptional cases involving significant condonation, courts may hear the acquitted respondent at the leave stage and implead stakeholders to aid a fair and comprehensive decision.

While reaffirming Lalu Prasad Yadav, the Court prudently flagged, without deciding, a nuanced question about State locus in mixed-investigation cases—signaling a possible, narrowly tailored exception that may be examined by a larger bench or a suited bench in the future. For now, the controlling rule is clear: in CBI-investigated cases, only the Central Government can pursue an appeal against acquittal; victims cannot invoke the 2009 proviso to Section 372 to reopen earlier acquittals; and condonation in the public interest should not be stymied by technical rigidity when serious offences are at stake.