Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court acknowledged the settled approach to interference under Article 136 of the Constitution in Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2022) 8 SCC 253, emphasizing that while the power is wide, it is to be used sparingly—yet appropriately—where the impugned judgment results in grave miscarriage of justice by misreading or ignoring material evidence. This set the standard for reappraisal despite concurrent findings.

The appellant had relied on Koppula Jagdish v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2005) 12 SCC 425, to contend that a conviction under Section 302 simpliciter was impermissible without a specific charge. Although the Supreme Court did not ultimately rest its decision on the absence of a separate charge (since it acquitted on merits), the argument was recorded as part of the appellant’s submissions.

Beyond these, the Court primarily applied first principles of criminal evidence concerning the reliability of identification evidence (especially dock identification), TIP protocols, the weight of forensic results, and the prudence required when convictions rest on solitary testimony with material improvements.

Legal Reasoning

A. Dock Identification via Video Conferencing after Long Delay

The Court underscored that conviction based on a single eye-witness requires testimony of “sterling quality.” PW-18’s identification suffered from multiple vulnerabilities:

• Temporal gap: Identification was attempted 8.5 years after the incident.
• Mode: The identification occurred via video conferencing, not in-person.
• Visual capacity: PW-18 admitted weak distance vision (“dur ki nazar kamzor thi”) and was not wearing spectacles during virtual testimony.
• Material improvement: For the first time after years, she described the appellant as wearing a black shirt; her prior statement under Section 161 CrPC contained no description of the assailants’ clothing or physique. Such embellishment was central, not minor.
• Limited recollection: She consistently stated she could remember only one face and failed to identify the other accused (all of whom were acquitted).

Given these factors, the Court ruled that her dock identification did not inspire confidence and could not, by itself, sustain a conviction for murder.

B. TIP: Foundational Flaws and Adverse Inference Neutralized

The High Court had drawn an adverse inference from the appellant’s refusal to undergo TIP. The Supreme Court cautioned that such inference cannot survive when the TIP itself is doubtful:

• Baparda omission: The arrest memo did not record that the appellant’s face was kept muffled; though the IO claimed so in oral testimony, contemporaneous documents were silent. This raises real risk the accused was seen or shown prior to TIP.
• Witness presence: PW-18 stated she did not go to court or meet police after discharge (24/25 December 2008), contradicting the prosecution’s TIP narrative; no document bore her signature; the Magistrate (PW-12) only recorded that the IO said the identifying witness was outside—hardly a reliable attestation of her participation.
• Photographic exposure: The accused’s plea that he was shown to the witness and photographed by the IO, later used for identification, gained traction in light of documentary omissions.

When the authenticity of TIP is compromised, refusal to participate cannot be weaponized to prop up a frail identification case. The Court therefore declined to draw an adverse inference.

C. Recoveries and Forensic Gaps

The prosecution relied on recoveries under Section 27 of the Evidence Act (as argued), including:

• Pant with human blood: Although serology indicated “human blood,” blood grouping was inconclusive (“no reaction”) and did not match the deceased or scene samples. Mere presence of human blood, absent a match, is an insufficient nexus.
• Chheni recovery: Allegedly recovered 22 days after the incident from bushes; no independent witnesses; not photographed at recovery; not shown to PW-18; and no robust linkage to the injuries as a unique weapon.
• Looted property: The son (who reportedly identified the articles in TIP) was not examined at trial; PW-18 did not identify articles in court. Without in-court identification, such recoveries lost probative force.

Once the identification faltered and the recoveries failed to link the accused to the crime or the crime to the scene/victim, the evidentiary foundation for conviction crumbled.

D. Procedural Direction: Ensuring Fairness in Virtual Cross-Examination (BSA 147–148)

A critical procedural irregularity surfaced: during cross-examination of PW-18 by video conferencing, defence sought to confront her with prior statements (Section 161 CrPC). The trial court deferred a ruling, noting the document could not be “shown” over video, and ultimately failed to address the objection in judgment.

The Supreme Court filled this procedural gap with a binding directive for all trial courts:

• When a witness is examined via video conferencing and a party intends to confront them with a prior written statement or a relevant document, the court must ensure that a copy of such statement/document is electronically transmitted to the witness during examination.
• The court must then implement the confrontation procedure mandated by Sections 147 and 148 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (corresponding to Sections 144 and 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872), so that the witness’s attention is duly drawn to the relevant parts proposed for contradiction.

This directive safeguards the fairness and integrity of cross-examination in a digital courtroom, ensuring that neither party is disadvantaged simply because evidence is recorded remotely.

E. Interference with Concurrent Findings under Article 136

Applying the standard in Mekala Sivaiah, the Court found that the concurrent findings had overlooked material infirmities: unreliable dock identification, TIP irregularities, inconclusive forensic linkage, and non-identification of recovered articles. These amounted to misapprehension and misreading of evidence leading to grave miscarriage of justice, warranting intervention.

Impact and Prospective Significance

1) Transformative Protocol for Remote Testimony

The Court’s direction establishes a clear, nation-wide protocol for confronting witnesses examined via video conferencing with prior written statements and documents. Trial courts must now:

• Ensure real-time electronic transmission of the relevant prior statement/document to the remote witness;
• Scrupulously adhere to the confrontation steps under BSA 147–148 (Evidence Act 144–145), calling the witness’s attention to specific parts before contradiction is proved.

This will standardize virtual cross-examination practices and minimize procedural challenges or post-verdict disputes on fairness.

2) Caution on Dock Identification after Long Delay—Especially via VC

The judgment reinforces that dock identification—particularly when delayed and via video conferencing—requires extraordinary caution. Age-related visual limitations, absence of spectacles, and material improvements in testimony weigh heavily against reliability. Future prosecutions will need earlier, well-conducted TIPs and corroboration.

3) TIP Integrity and Documentation

TIPs must be beyond reproach. Prosecution agencies must:

• Maintain “baparda” from arrest until TIP;
• Generate complete contemporaneous records (including the identifying witness’s signatures where appropriate);
• Avoid pre-exposure of the accused to witnesses (in person or by photographs);
• Ensure the identifying witness’s genuine presence and participation is verifiable.

Failures on these counts may neutralize any adverse inference from refusal to participate in TIP.

4) Forensic Prudence: “Human blood” is not enough

The Court’s insistence on meaningful serological matching underscores that mere detection of human blood on an article is weak evidence absent a group match linking it to the victim or scene. Investigations must prioritize robust forensic chains, timely recoveries, and independent corroboration.

5) Transition to the New Evidence Code (BSA 2023)

By explicitly invoking BSA 147–148 while cross-referencing the Evidence Act provisions, the Court smooths the ongoing transition to the new code, signaling that familiar doctrines continue in the new statutory architecture and must be operationalized in virtual hearings.