The Two-Hour Rule and Written Grounds of Arrest: Supreme Court’s Pan-Statutory Framework under Article 22(1)

The Two-Hour Rule and Written Grounds of Arrest: A Pan-Statutory Framework under Article 22(1)

Introduction

In a landmark judgment in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another (2025 INSC 1288), a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India (B.R. Gavai, CJI; Augustine George Masih, J.) has crystallized and universalized the constitutional safeguard under Article 22(1): every arrestee must be informed of the grounds of arrest in writing, in a language they understand, across all offences and statutes, including offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), formerly the IPC. The Court additionally sets a bright-line “two-hour” pre-remand rule to ensure meaningful access to legal counsel and the ability to oppose remand or seek bail.

The appeals arose from a widely publicized motor vehicle incident (FIR No. 378/2024, Worli Police Station) where the appellant, alleged to be the driver of a BMW involved in a fatal collision, challenged the legality of his arrest on the ground that the “grounds of arrest” were not furnished to him in writing as required by Article 22(1) and Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) (formerly Section 50 CrPC). The Bombay High Court had acknowledged a procedural lapse but upheld the arrest. The Supreme Court granted leave to settle the questions of law, clubbed connected matters, appointed an amicus, and issued ad interim relief in some connected cases.

Key Issues

  • Whether grounds of arrest must be furnished to an accused in all cases (including BNS/IPC offences), and whether they must be in writing.
  • Whether, in exceptional situations where immediate written communication is not practicable, non-furnishing of written grounds before or immediately after arrest vitiates the arrest.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court lays down a uniform, pan-statute framework for Article 22(1) compliance:

  • The constitutional mandate to inform the grounds of arrest applies to all offences under all statutes, including BNS/IPC (para 56(i)).
  • The grounds must be communicated in writing, in a language the arrestee understands (paras 42–46; 56(ii)).
  • Exigent exception: where immediate written communication is impracticable (e.g., in flagrante delicto), oral communication at arrest suffices temporarily, but written grounds must follow “within a reasonable time” and in any event at least two hours before production for remand (paras 52–54; 56(iii)).
  • Non-compliance renders the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, entitling release (paras 54–55; 56(iv)).
  • Complementary duties under BNSS Section 48 (formerly Section 50A CrPC) to inform a nominated person of the arrest and the place of detention are reaffirmed, alongside the Magistrate’s obligation to verify compliance (paras 20, 47).
  • To promote certainty and uniformity, the Court clarifies that this procedure “shall govern arrests henceforth” (para 58).

Relief: The lead appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 2195 of 2025) was disposed of as the Court had not entertained merits; interim bail in the connected appeals continues, with liberty to the prosecution to move for remand after supplying written grounds; the tagged SLP’s interim relief continues (paras 59–63).

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2024) 7 SCC 576

  • Under PMLA, the Court held that Article 22(1) requires “meaningful” communication of grounds and that furnishing a written copy is the correct and advisable course “as a matter of course and without exception.” Reasons included avoiding “word vs. word” disputes and enabling effective bail opposition (paras 22–23 of the present judgment; quoted paras 38, 42–45 of Pankaj Bansal).
  • Permitted redaction of sensitive material to protect the integrity of investigations, while still furnishing grounds to the arrestee.

Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254

  • Extended Pankaj Bansal’s logic to UAPA and, crucially, “any other offence,” emphasizing that Article 22(1) and Section 50 CrPC (now Section 47 BNSS) protect the arrestee’s right to be informed in writing—vital to consult counsel, oppose remand, and seek bail (paras 24–25 of the present judgment).
  • Declared that breach vitiates arrest and remand; subsequent filing of a charge-sheet does not cure initial constitutional illegality (para 21 quoted in Vihaan and reaffirmed here).

Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana (2025) 5 SCC 799

  • Reiterated that failure to inform “soon after arrest” renders arrest illegal. Acknowledged that while written communication is ideal, practicality varies; nonetheless, conformity with Article 22(1) is non-negotiable.
  • Supplemental opinion emphasized communicating grounds to nominated relatives/friends (Section 50A CrPC/Section 48 BNSS) to make the safeguard meaningful (para 27 of the present judgment quoting Vihaan’s supplement).

Harikisan (Constitution Bench) and Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel (1981) 2 SCC 427

  • In preventive detention context (Article 22(5)), the Court held that “communication” requires furnishing grounds in a language the detenue understands, and in a script he can read if literate. Oral translation by a police officer is insufficient.
  • The present judgment transposes these principles to arrests under Article 22(1), anchoring the “language understood” requirement (paras 42–45).

Other Foundational Authorities

2) Legal Reasoning

  • Constitutional bedrock: Article 21’s “procedure established by law” and Article 22(1)’s “as soon as may be” safeguard jointly require that an arrestee is provided sufficient knowledge of the grounds to meaningfully exercise the right to counsel and to contest remand (paras 17–19, 33–41).
  • Statutory embodiment: Section 47 BNSS (formerly Section 50 CrPC) mandates “forthwith” communication of full particulars or other grounds; Section 48 BNSS (formerly Section 50A CrPC) ensures that relatives/friends are informed of arrest and place of custody, and the Magistrate verifies compliance (paras 19–21, 47).
  • Language understood: Drawing from preventive detention jurisprudence, the Court holds that “communication” means imparting effective knowledge. Therefore, the grounds must be in writing and in a language the arrestee understands (paras 42–46).
  • Two-hour pre-remand rule: To balance constitutional rights with investigative exigencies, the Court sets a minimum interval—written grounds must reach the arrestee at least two hours before production for remand, enabling counsel to prepare and oppose remand meaningfully (paras 52–54). This temporal floor operationalizes “as soon as may be” into a workable, justiciable standard.
  • Exigent exception: For offences committed in flagrante delicto or other urgent situations making immediate written communication impracticable, oral communication at arrest is permissible, provided written grounds follow within a reasonable time and in any event two hours before remand (para 52).
  • Remedy and non-curability: Non-compliance renders the arrest and remand illegal, entitling release; later steps like filing a charge-sheet do not “cure” the initial constitutional breach (paras 54–56, drawing on Vihaan and Prabir Purkayastha).
  • Prospective clarity: Recognizing past inconsistency across statutes and cases, the Court states that the clarified procedure “shall govern arrests henceforth,” bringing uniformity and predictability (para 58).

3) Impact and Implications

Immediate Doctrinal Shifts

  • Universalization: Written grounds of arrest, in a language understood by the arrestee, are now mandatory across all offences and statutes, not just under special Acts such as PMLA or UAPA.
  • Operational timeline: The “two-hour pre-remand” rule creates a clear, enforceable time standard. Any shorter interval risks vitiating arrest/remand.
  • Language and translation: Investigating agencies must ensure accurate translation and service. This includes vernacular scripts and simplified versions where literacy levels require.

For Police and Investigating Agencies

  • Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) must be updated to include:
    • Drafting and serving written grounds at arrest when documentary material is already available (e.g., white-collar/economic offences, document-centric investigations).
    • For exigent circumstances, a protocol to orally communicate grounds immediately and serve written grounds promptly thereafter, tracking the two-hour pre-remand minimum.
    • Translation workflows and quality control.
    • Documenting service with acknowledgment, time-stamping, and preserving proof (including digital service where appropriate).
    • Recording reasons for any delay in remand papers (as directed in para 52).
  • Training and Templates: Develop standard templates for “grounds of arrest” with space for redactions (as permitted in Pankaj Bansal) and language selection.
  • Section 48 BNSS compliance: Ensure the nominated person is promptly informed of the arrest and place of detention, and that entries are made in the station register; Magistrates will verify compliance.

For Magistrates

  • Gatekeeping role strengthened: Magistrates must verify:
    • That written grounds were furnished in a language understood by the arrestee.
    • That service occurred at least two hours prior to production for remand.
    • That the nominated person was informed and that entries exist as per Section 48 BNSS.
    • Any explanatory note for delay (where exigency was pleaded).
  • Judicial mind application: Remand cannot be granted mechanically; the legality of arrest is foundational to authorizing custody.

For Defence Counsel and Legal Aid

  • Immediate demand and verification: Ask for the written grounds; check language comprehensibility and timing of service.
  • Remand challenge: Non-compliance with the two-hour rule or language requirement supports immediate challenge to custody and request for release.
  • NALSA Coordination: Ensure early access to counsel pre-remand; secure translated documents in time for hearing (paras 35–36).

Broader Systemic Effects

  • Reduction in “word against word” disputes: Written service with acknowledgment should reduce litigation over compliance.
  • Enhanced fairness and dignity: The Court expressly ties the rule to the stigma and mental health impacts of arrest and the need to safeguard personal liberty (paras 28–31).
  • Legislative alignment: While BNSS Sections 47 and 48 do not themselves specify “written” or timeframes, this judicial gloss now supplies enforceable standards. Policymakers may consider codifying the two-hour rule and language requirements for clarity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Grounds of Arrest vs. FIR: Grounds of arrest are the specific reasons and materials justifying the decision to arrest a particular person at a particular point in time. They are not merely a copy of the FIR (which narrates the complaint). Grounds should connect facts to the arrestee’s suspected role.
  • “As soon as may be” (Article 22(1)): Not strictly “immediately,” but as early as feasible. The Court operationalizes this by insisting on written service “within a reasonable time” and, in all cases, at least two hours before remand.
  • Exigent Circumstances: Situations where immediate written service is impracticable (e.g., violent offences witnessed by police, on-the-spot arrests). Oral communication at arrest is allowed, but written grounds must follow promptly and, in any event, two hours before remand.
  • Language Understood: The arrestee must actually comprehend the grounds. Furnishing in a language not understood, or relying only on an officer’s oral translation, does not suffice. Written translations are required where needed.
  • Remand: Court authorization to keep an arrestee in custody beyond 24 hours. The legality of arrest is a precondition; if arrest is illegal, remand cannot lawfully continue.
  • Effect of Non-Compliance: Arrest and remand are rendered illegal; the arrestee is entitled to be set at liberty. Filing a charge-sheet later does not cure the initial invalidity.

Application to the Present Case(s)

  • Lead appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 2195 of 2025): Decided only on questions of law; no adjudication on facts/merits (para 59).
  • Connected appeals (Nos. 2189 and 2190 of 2025): Interim bail continues; prosecution may seek remand after supplying written grounds of arrest (para 60).
  • Tagged SLP (Crl.) No. 8704 of 2025: Interim relief continues; to be listed before an appropriate bench (para 63).

Compliance Checklist (Practical Guide)

For Investigating Officers:

  • At or soon after arrest:
    • If practicable, serve written grounds immediately; obtain acknowledgment and time-stamp.
    • If not practicable (exigency), orally inform grounds; record this fact contemporaneously and prepare written grounds for service as soon as possible thereafter.
  • Before remand:
    • Ensure written grounds are served in a language understood by the arrestee at least two hours before production for remand.
    • Include in remand papers: the written grounds, proof of service, and if there was delay, a note explaining the cause.
    • Comply with Section 48 BNSS: inform the nominated person of the arrest and place of custody; make requisite station entries.
  • Translation:
    • Provide accurate translated copies where needed; keep originals and translations on record.

Open Questions and Areas for Further Clarification

  • Scope of communication to nominated persons: Section 48 BNSS textually requires informing the fact of arrest and place of detention. While Vihaan’s supplement advocated sharing grounds for meaningful access, the statute and the present judgment at minimum require timely intimation of arrest and place; the present decision also speaks of informing “reasons” to the nominated person (para 47). Clear SOPs will be needed to harmonize practice with privacy and investigative concerns.
  • E-remand and virtual production: Courts and police will need protocols to ensure the two-hour window is respected in digital environments.
  • Re-arrest after release: The judgment allows the prosecution to move for remand after supplying written grounds post-release (para 55, 60). Courts will scrutinize good faith, necessity, and compliance.

Conclusion

Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra establishes a uniform national standard for the protection of personal liberty at the point of arrest. It decisively answers two longstanding uncertainties: first, that grounds of arrest must be furnished in writing, in a language the arrestee understands, in all cases across all statutes; second, that while immediate written service may yield to exigency in truly urgent situations, written grounds must still be supplied within a reasonable time—and, in every case, at least two hours before the remand hearing.

By marrying constitutional doctrine with a clear operational timeline, the Supreme Court has transformed Article 22(1)’s “as soon as may be” into a concrete and justiciable safeguard. This “two-hour rule,” together with the insistence on language comprehensibility and Magistrate oversight, is poised to recalibrate arrest and remand practices across the country. Its impact will be felt not only in special-statute investigations but, crucially, in everyday BNS/IPC policing, where the risks of routine or mechanical arrests are greatest. The decision fortifies early access to counsel, sharpens the Magistrate’s gatekeeping role, and reaffirms that personal liberty cannot be compromised by procedural laxity.

In sum, the judgment is a watershed in arrest jurisprudence: it operationalizes constitutional guarantees into actionable procedures, reduces scope for dispute and arbitrariness, and restores primacy to the dignity, agency, and legal preparedness of the individual at the most vulnerable moment of the criminal process.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court Of India

Judge(s)

Justice Dipankar DattaJustice Augustine George Masih

Advocates

SIDDHARTH SHARMA

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