The “Substantiality Test” for Form 26 Omissions: Supreme Court holds that non-disclosure of Income Tax Return particulars, absent concealment of assets, does not vitiate elections

Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of India’s decision in Ajmera Shyam v. Kova Laxmi (2025 INSC 992), a civil appeal under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RP Act), arising from the Telangana High Court’s dismissal of an election petition (EP No. 10/2024). The dispute centered on whether Respondent No.1, Smt. Kova Laxmi (the returned candidate), failed to disclose “income as per income tax returns” for four of the last five financial years in her Form 26 affidavit and whether such omission:

made the acceptance of her nomination “improper,” warranting voidance of her election under Section 100(1)(d)(i) RP Act;
constituted a corrupt practice under Section 123(2) RP Act, triggering voidance under Section 100(1)(b); and/or
amounted to non-compliance with the Act/Rules (Rule 4A and Form 26), thereby attracting Section 100(1)(d)(iv).

The factual matrix is undisputed on key elements: the returned candidate showed “Nil” against the “income as per ITR” column for four financial years (2018–19 to 2021–22), disclosed her FY 2022–23 income (Rs. 11,50,000), provided PAN details, and fully disclosed movable/immovable assets, liabilities, occupation and sources of income. She also disclosed she was the Zilla Parishad Chairperson (source of income: honorarium). The appellant alleged suppression of honorarium and an ex-MLA pension; the latter allegation was neutralised by a non-drawal certificate.

Against a decisive victory margin of 22,798 votes (83,036 vs. 60,238), the Supreme Court was called upon to balance two constitutional imperatives: the voter’s right to know (under Article 19(1)(a)) and the sanctity of the electoral mandate, while locating the disclosure duty within the statutory/judicial architecture of Sections 33A, 100 RP Act, Rule 4A and Form 26.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court affirmed dismissal of the election petition. The omission to reproduce “income as per Income Tax Returns (ITR)” for four years, when all assets, liabilities, sources of income and profession were otherwise disclosed, is a technical/procedural lapse, not a defect “of substantial character.”
Acceptance of the nomination was not “improper” under Section 100(1)(d)(i) RP Act; the omission did not constitute corrupt practice under Section 123(2) (hence no voidance under Section 100(1)(b)); and it did not amount to such non-compliance with the Act/Rules as to invite Section 100(1)(d)(iv).
The Court articulated and applied a “substantiality test” to assets-related omissions: only material/consequential nondisclosures warrant voidance; inconsequential/technical lapses do not.
ITR particulars are a fiscal reference framework tethered to the underlying assets and sources of income; where assets and sources are fully disclosed and not alleged to be disproportionate or concealed, mere non-mention of ITR entries for some years is not concealment “of assets.”
Stricter scrutiny still applies to nondisclosure of criminal antecedents (a core concern in the jurisprudence from ADR/PUCL onward). Assets/education disclosures are “attending supplementary” requirements that admit assessment for substantiality.
No objection was raised at scrutiny before the Returning Officer (RO). While not creating an estoppel, this weighed against the petitioner’s bona fides and reinforced a cautious post-election approach out of respect for the voter’s mandate (vox populi, vox dei).

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), (2002) 5 SCC 294
– Recognized the voter’s right to know the candidate’s antecedents as part of Article 19(1)(a) and empowered the ECI to seek disclosures; laid the groundwork for asset/criminal/education disclosures via Form 26 and Rule 4A.
PUCL v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399
– Reaffirmed ADR; struck down Section 33B RP Act; explained that right to know encompasses criminal cases and assets/liabilities. P. Venkatarama Reddi, J clarified the rationale for assets disclosure as a tool to check post-election enrichment/misuse of office.
Resurgence India v. ECI, (2014) 14 SCC 189
– Operationalized Form 26 enforcement: filing affidavits with blanks is fatal; ROs can reject. Candidates must write “NIL/NA/Not known” rather than leave blanks. Here, Respondent wrote “Nil”, avoiding the “blank” vice.
Lok Prahari v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 699
– Extended “undue influence” to nondisclosure of assets/sources of income (by parity of reasoning with nondisclosure of criminal antecedents in Krishnamoorthy), recognizing that such suppression can mislead voters.
S. Rukmini Madegowda v. State Election Commission, (2022) 18 SCC 1
– Held that false declarations regarding assets of the candidate/spouse/dependents constitute corrupt practice, presumed to impact the election.
Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 519
– Clarified that not every Form 26 defect is substantial; reiterated Section 36(4) filter (“defect of a substantial character”); courts must distinguish substantial from insubstantial non-disclosures; the voter’s right to know is not a license for insisting that a candidate “lay his life threadbare.”
Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh, (1954) 1 SCC 57; Madhukar G.E. Pankakar v. Jaswant Chobbildas Rajani, (1977) 1 SCC 70; Santosh Yadav v. Narender Singh, (2002) 1 SCC 160
– Classic cautions: election verdicts should not be lightly interfered with; courts must guard the purity of elections but avoid destabilizing the electoral system with technicalities; intervene only where clear statutory violations or corrupt practices are established.
Jeet Mohinder Singh v. Harminder Singh Jassi, (1999) 9 SCC 386
– Restated rigour for corrupt practice pleadings (Section 83 RP Act and Rule 94A/ Form 25): specificity, sources, standard akin to criminal trial—proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Kisan Shankar Kathore (supra)
– Cited for the principle that disputed Form 26 disclosures often require trial and that objections may be better addressed in an election petition, not solely at scrutiny; yet, failure to object at scrutiny can weigh on bona fides.

The Court harmonizes these strands: it preserves the stern stance against falsehood and suppression (Lok Prahari, Rukmini) and the fatality of “blanks” (Resurgence India), while adopting Karikho Kri’s substantiality filter for asset-related omissions and reasserting the deference owed to the electoral mandate (Jagan Nath, Madhukar Pankakar).

Legal Reasoning: From Right to Know to Respect for Mandate

Locating the disclosure duty
– Section 33A RP Act codifies disclosure of specific criminal antecedents. By contrast, assets, liabilities and education disclosure obligations stem from Rule 4A and Form 26, crafted under judicial impetus in ADR/PUCL. This structural point matters: while criminal antecedents disclosures are core and statutory, assets/education are supplementary components of the disclosure regime, still vital but doctrinally distinct.
The Section 100 grounds dissected
- Section 100(1)(a): pre-existing qualification/disqualification defects.
- Section 100(1)(b): corrupt practices (acts during the election).
- Section 100(1)(d)(i), (iv): improper acceptance/rejection; and non-compliance with Constitution/Act/Rules/Orders, with material effect.
The case engages the latter two (improper acceptance; non-compliance) and corrupt practice. Section 36(4) overlays scrutiny with a gatekeeping criterion: nominations shall not be rejected for defects “not of a substantial character.”
The substantiality test for assets-related omissions
– The Court crafts and applies a decisive distinction: non-disclosures of criminal antecedents invite strict application; assets/education omissions are assessed for “consequential vs. inconsequential” import. Only substantial, outcome-relevant concealments justify voidance or corrupt practice findings. This dovetails with Karikho Kri and Section 36(4).
ITR particulars vs. assets: a category error corrected
– The Court conceptualizes ITR disclosures as a fiscal mirror of assets/income for taxation purposes rather than the asset facts themselves. Where all assets, liabilities, sources of income and occupation are fully and truly disclosed, non-mention of “income as per ITR” for some years (especially when one FY is disclosed and others are not shown to be discrepant) is a technical breach—not a concealment “of assets.”
No blanks, no falsehood, no evidence of concealment
– Resurgence India is complied with because “Nil” was entered; nothing was left blank. There is no case of false declaration (as in Rukmini). No evidence was led of disproportionate assets/hidden income; the petitioner examined only himself, led no corroboration, and did not rebut the non-drawal pension certificate. The source of income (honorarium) was disclosed, even if the exact amount was not quantified.
Material effect, margin, and scrutiny-stage objection
– The victory margin was substantial (22,798 votes). No objection was raised at the RO’s scrutiny—this is not an estoppel but undermines bona fides, prompting a cautious post-election approach. Courts should not overturn the people’s verdict on insubstantial technicalities.
Outcome on each ground
- Section 100(1)(d)(i) – Improper acceptance: No. The omission was not of a substantial character; RO’s acceptance stands.
- Section 100(1)(b) read with Section 123(2) – Corrupt practice (undue influence): No. Unlike Lok Prahari and Rukmini, there was no falsehood or concealment of assets; mere non-mention of ITR figures is not per se corrupt practice.
- Section 100(1)(d)(iv) – Non-compliance with Act/Rules, materially affecting result: No. The defect was technical; no material effect was shown.

Impact and Prospective Effects

Calibrated enforcement of Form 26
The decision firmly rejects mechanical invalidation of elections for technical Form 26 lapses when assets, liabilities, sources, and occupation are otherwise fully disclosed. It preserves the fatality of blanks and falsity but protects against overzealous nullification based on inconsequential errors.
“Substantiality test” crystallized
Courts and ROs must assess whether an omission is consequential to the voter’s right to know, i.e., whether it conceals assets/sources or could mislead the electorate. Only substantial omissions qualify for rejection/voidance.
Distinction sharpened: criminal antecedents vs. assets/education
Breaches in criminal antecedents disclosures remain at the strict end of scrutiny, reflecting the core mischief addressed since ADR/PUCL. Assets/education omissions are assessed contextually.
Litigation strategy recalibrated
Election petitioners alleging corrupt practice/non-compliance based on asset/income omissions must plead and prove with specificity:
- what asset/income was concealed (not merely ITR entries);
- how the concealment is substantial and misleading; and
- material effect on the result.
Absent such proof, post-election challenges premised on technical defects are unlikely to succeed.
Guidance for Returning Officers
ROs should continue to:
- reject nominations with blank Form 26 fields (Resurgence India);
- seek rectification where feasible; and
- apply Section 36(4) to distinguish substantial vs. insubstantial defects.
Failure to object at scrutiny, though not an estoppel, will matter in later judicial evaluation of bona fides.
Electoral stability and respect for mandate
The judgment fortifies the principle that the “vox populi” deserves great deference and that courts must avoid overturning electoral verdicts for minor mistakes unless the integrity of the process is impugned by fraud, falsity, or substantial suppression.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Form 26 Affidavit: A sworn disclosure (Rule 4A, Conduct of Election Rules, 1961) covering criminal cases, assets and liabilities (self, spouse, dependents), income tax particulars, and education.
“Blanks” vs. “NIL”: Leaving fields blank makes the affidavit nugatory and invites rejection (Resurgence India). Writing “NIL/Not Applicable/Not Known” is compliant for fields where nothing exists to disclose.
“Defect of a substantial character” (Section 36(4)): Only substantial defects warrant rejection of nomination; trivial/technical lapses do not.
Improper acceptance (Section 100(1)(d)(i)): Post-election annulment based on an RO’s error in accepting a nomination marred by substantial defects.
Corrupt practice—“undue influence” (Section 123(2)): Acts that interfere with the free exercise of electoral rights (including misleading suppression of material facts about the candidate). Proven like a criminal charge.
Materially affected (Section 100(1)(d)(iv)): The non-compliance must be shown to have impacted the election result qua the returned candidate.
ITR particulars vs. asset disclosure: ITR entries reflect taxable income; they are distinct from the factual disclosure of assets/income sources. Failure to copy ITR figures is not, by itself, suppression of assets.

Conclusion

Ajmera Shyam v. Kova Laxmi re-centers the jurisprudence on a pragmatic axis: it preserves the voter’s right to know and the anti-corruption objectives of ADR/PUCL, while introducing a disciplined “substantiality test” for asset- and income-related omissions in Form 26. The Court differentiates between core (criminal antecedents) and supplementary (assets/education) disclosures; rejects “blank” fatality but tolerates technical lapses where full asset and source disclosures exist; and refuses to dethrone the people’s mandate except where omissions are truly consequential.

Practically, the decision:

insulates elections from post-hoc technical challenges around ITR entries when no concealment of assets exists;
preserves robust remedies where falsehood or substantial suppression is proved (Lok Prahari; Rukmini); and
guides ROs and courts to apply Section 36(4) sensibly, protecting both transparency and electoral stability.

The key takeaway is the Court’s distilled test: ask whether the non-disclosure is consequential or inconsequential. Only the former justifies judicial nullification. In this case, with assets, sources, and occupation duly disclosed, no falsity shown, and no evidence of disproportionate or hidden wealth, the omission of ITR figures for four years was held to be a technical irregularity—insufficient to overturn the verdict of the people.