The “Arshnoor Doctrine”: Supreme Court of India Mandates Merit-Based, Gender-Neutral Intake in the Army JAG Branch

1. Introduction

In Arshnoor Kaur v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 954, the Supreme Court was invited to decide whether, after permitting women’s entry into the Judge Advocate General (JAG) branch under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950, the Union of India could continue to cap the number of women at half (or earlier one-third) of the total vacancies and run separate male-only merit lists. Two women candidates—Ms. Astha Tyagi and Ms. Arshnoor Kaur—had scored higher than several selected male counterparts but were denied appointment because only three posts were earmarked for women. They sought (i) a declaration that the notification fixing different vacancies for men and women was unconstitutional and (ii) a direction to prepare a common merit list irrespective of sex.

Parties

Petitioners: Ms. Arshnoor Kaur & Ms. Astha Tyagi (law graduates, SSB qualified).
Respondents: Union of India, Indian Army & a successful male candidate (Mr. Himanshu Panwar).

Key Issues

Whether numbers of women officers can be restricted once a Section 12 notification has opened that branch to women.
Whether maintaining separate gender-wise merit lists is compatible with Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution.
Whether the Army’s 2023 policy purporting to be “gender-neutral” but practically enforcing a 50:50 intake is constitutionally valid.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court (Manmohan & Dipankar Datta, JJ.) allowed the petition, laid down the “Arshnoor Doctrine”, and issued five core directions:

The executive cannot, by policy or circular, limit women’s induction numbers in a branch once they are rendered eligible under Section 12 of the Army Act.
The impugned notification reserving double vacancies for men (6) vis-à-vis women (3) is violative of Articles 14, 15, 16 and ultra vires Section 12.
Future JAG recruitment must be conducted on one combined merit list; marks of all candidates shall be published.
At least 50 % of vacancies will continue to stand available to women as compensatory measure, but women cannot be capped to that figure; merit prevails.
Petitioner No. 1 (Arshnoor) to be inducted in the next training course; Respondent No. 3 (male candidate) not entitled to appointment because his selection constituted indirect discrimination.

3. Analytical Commentary

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

Secretary, MoD v. Babita Puniya (2020) 7 SCC 469 – recognised women’s right to Permanent Commission; the Court distinguished combat arms from support arms but insisted on equality wherever women are permitted. The present Bench extends that logic to recruitment numbers.
Nitisha v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 125 – elaborated indirect discrimination doctrine; used to show how facially neutral 50:50 ratios harmed meritorious women.
R. Viswan v. Union Of India (1983) 3 SCC 401 – held that, under Article 33, fundamental-right restrictions on service members must emanate from Parliamentary statute; executive instructions cannot travel beyond the statute. This principle was transposed to Section 12.
Dattatraya Motiram More v. State of Bombay (1953) ILR Bom 842 – clarified Article 15(3) enables beneficial treatment for women but not discrimination against them.
International equality jurisprudence: Action Travail des Femmes (Sup.Ct. Canada 1987) and UK & EU authorities were relied upon to explain systemic discrimination.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Textual hierarchy. Article 33 empowers Parliament—not the executive—to curtail fundamental rights of Armed Forces personnel. Section 12 of the Army Act is the sole parliamentary restriction: it bars women until a Gazette notification opens a branch. Nothing in Section 12 authorises quantitative caps.
Ultra-vires analysis. 2011 & 2012 Army circulars limiting women’s deployment are mere administrative instructions, cannot override the statute, hence unenforceable vis-à-vis entry numbers.
Equality & discrimination. Separate male vacancies create a men-only reservation category, offending Articles 14-16. Applying Nitisha, the 50:50 rule causes indirect discrimination by disproportionately excluding better-performing women.
Gender-neutral vs gender-equal. Court distinguished the two: neutrality eschews any sex-based classification, whereas equality can include symmetrical quotas. The Army’s professed neutrality could not survive a fixed gender-wise vacancy ceiling.
Merit & operational readiness. The Government’s argument that JAG officers are combatants meriting male pre-ponderance was rejected on facts and on examples from other forces (Air Force, Navy, UN missions) and on practicality: legal advisory functions are not combat-exclusive.
Waiver doctrine rejected. Candidates do not waive fundamental rights by participating in a flawed process; secrecy of marks prevented earlier challenge.

3.3 Expected Impact

Immediate: Combined merit will govern all future JAG selections; women may exceed 50 % whenever merit so dictates.
Ripple effect: Other support arms (AEC, Signals, Logistics, Medical, Dental Corps) that continue sex-segmented vacancy charts must revisit policies. The ratio logic condemned here is applicable across ministries and paramilitary agencies.
Section 12 interpretation locked-in: Once a branch is opened to women, no numerical restriction is constitutionally permissible unless Parliament amends the Act.
Operational culture: Move from “protective” or “equal numbers” mindset to meritocratically integrated forces; may hasten review of combat-arms exclusion in future.
Administrative transparency: Court’s mandate to publish marks/merit will curtail opaque selections and potential litigation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 12, Army Act: A statutory gatekeeper—women are ineligible until the Government issues a Gazette notification. Once notified, they stand equally eligible.
Article 33, Constitution: Allows Parliament (not the Executive) to limit soldiers’ fundamental rights for discipline. Thus, policies cannot override the Army Act.
Direct vs Indirect Discrimination: Direct = overt preference (“men only”). Indirect = seemingly neutral rule (e.g., 50:50 split) that disproportionately harms a group (meritorious women).
Gender-Neutral vs Gender-Equal: Neutrality ignores sex altogether; equality often means symmetrical inclusion or special measures favouring women.
Combat Arms vs Combat Support Arms: Combat arms fight on the frontline (Infantry, Armoured). Support arms (like JAG, Signals) enable operations but are not primarily frontline fighters.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court, through the “Arshnoor Doctrine”, decisively settles that once a branch of the Armed Forces is open to women, merit—not gender—must drive selection. Any cap on women’s numbers, whether one-third or half, amounts to unconstitutional reservation for men, unless expressly legislated by Parliament. The judgment deepens the Indian equality jurisprudence by:

Re-affirming the supremacy of Parliamentary statute over executive instructions under Article 33.
Applying the doctrine of indirect discrimination to military recruitment for the first time.
Clarifying the normative difference between gender-neutral and gender-equal policies.
Ordering systemic transparency (publication of marks) to guard against covert bias.

By mandating a combined merit list, the Court has signalled that efficiency in a modern military legal corps is best served not by arbitrary gender ratios but by the fullest deployment of available talent. In doing so, it also aligns national defence policy with India’s broader constitutional and international commitments to women-led development and substantive equality.