Supreme Court Reaffirms “Conscious Possession” Standard Under NDPS Act

Introduction

The recent judgment in Rakesh Kumar Raghuvanshi v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (2025 INSC 96) examines the scope of “possession” under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) in close detail, specifically focusing on the notion of “conscious possession.” The appellant, charged under Section 8 read with Section 15 of the NDPS Act for possession of poppy husk (alleged to be 50 kilograms), challenged his conviction on the ground that he was unaware of the contraband nature of the goods he was carrying.

Both the Trial Court and the High Court found against the appellant and held that the prosecution had established conscious possession, triggering the statutory presumption of culpable mental state. On further appeal, the Supreme Court addressed various arguments regarding the meaning of “possession,” particularly the requirement of knowledge and awareness for NDPS offences. The Court ultimately reaffirmed the convictions of the lower courts, thereby strengthening the principle that where the prosecution proves conscious possession, the burden shifts to the accused under Section 54 of the NDPS Act to provide a satisfactory account or explanation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant, upholding the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court. The key observations and conclusions can be summarized as follows:

• The appellant was apprehended carrying three cartons of poppy husk, weighing a total of 50 kilograms.
• The Court held that the appellant was in “conscious possession” of the contraband, as he was found physically sitting on one of the cartons while the remaining two cartons were next to him.
• A statutory presumption under Section 54 of the NDPS Act arose, shifting the burden to the appellant to account for his possession. His defense—that he acted only under the instructions of the police and had no idea of the nature of the goods—was deemed implausible.
• The Court concluded that the mere presence of other passengers could not exonerate the accused, given the self-evident nature of his dominion and control over the cartons.
• The appellant was ordered to surrender within eight weeks to serve the remainder of his sentence of 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and to pay the fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The Court cited several important rulings that shaped its reasoning on conscious possession:

• Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab (2002) 7 SCC 419: The appellant attempted to rely on this decision to argue that mere physical presence near contraband is insufficient to establish “possession.” However, the Supreme Court pointed out that the ratio of Avtar Singh actually disfavors the appellant because it underscores the importance of “possession” requiring custody or control over the contraband. If the prosecution proves that the accused was in conscious possession, the presumption arises, and a corresponding burden shifts to the accused to disprove his knowledge of the contraband.
• Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2000) 2 SCC 513: This case clarified that once the prosecution proves that narcotics were found in the physical possession of an accused, it becomes the accused’s duty to demonstrate he had no knowledge or intent, thereby negating the presumption of criminal liability under the NDPS Act.
• Madan Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2003) 7 SCC 465: The Supreme Court reiterated that “conscious possession” should be inferred when the accused has knowledge and control over the substance, especially if they are traveling together or exerting control over the substance.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s central inquiry revolved around whether the appellant had “conscious possession” of the contraband. The following factors were pivotal in reaching the conclusion:

• Physical and Proximate Control: The appellant was found literally seated on one of the cartons, with the other two cartons within immediate reach. This physical and direct control strongly suggested awareness.
• Conscious Awareness: The appellant did not provide any credible explanation for why he was in such close proximity to three large cartons of poppy husk. Absent a satisfactory explanation, Section 54 of the NDPS Act dictates a presumption that he knew the cartons contained illegal substances.
• Section 35: Mental State Presumption: The NDPS Act establishes that the accused is presumed to have the requisite mental state once possession is demonstrated. The Court found no evidence to rebut that presumption of a culpable mental state.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the appellant, by virtue of sitting on the contraband and having no compelling explanation for his behavior, knowingly possessed poppy husk in violation of the NDPS Act.

C. Impact

This judgment solidifies the rule that once the prosecution proves the fact of possession, especially under circumstances indicating awareness and control, the onus shifts to the accused to disprove “conscious possession.” It aligns with existing precedent while clearly reinforcing that knowledge or conscious awareness is a critical element. Going forward, courts are likely to take an even stricter stance in NDPS cases where there is meaningful evidence of physical control over contraband, and a defendant’s “lack of knowledge” defense must be substantive and convincing to overcome the statutory presumptions under Sections 35 and 54.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Conscious Possession: This term means that the accused not only physically has the contraband but is also aware of its presence and its nature as a prohibited substance. Even if the accused does not “own” the contraband, if he is exercising control over it with an understanding of its illegality, the law attributes possession to him.
2. Section 54 Presumption: Under the NDPS Act, if the prosecution can prove the accused was in possession of narcotics or psychotropic substances, the court may presume that the accused committed the offense unless the accused can offer a satisfactory explanation to the contrary.
3. Section 35 Presumption: This provision presumes the existence of a “culpable mental state” in NDPS prosecutions; that is, the accused is presumed to have the requisite intention or knowledge unless he proves otherwise. This provision is designed to prevent easy denials of knowledge when someone is physically in possession of contraband.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of India’s ruling in Rakesh Kumar Raghuvanshi v. The State of Madhya Pradesh supplies a detailed affirmation of established principles regarding “conscious possession.” It clarifies that in matters under the NDPS Act, while the prosecution must prove that contraband was within the domain of the accused’s knowledge and control, once physical possession is demonstrated in circumstances suggesting awareness, Section 54 activates a pivotal presumption. This decision underscores the high threshold of scrutiny courts apply to NDPS cases, reflecting the gravity of drug-related offenses and the special statutory framework designed to effectively combat illicit trafficking. Crucially, the judgment serves as a caution that defendants cannot treat lack of knowledge or intent as a perfunctory defense; any proposed exonerating explanation must withstand rigorous judicial examination.