Substantive Posts vs. Session-Based Academic Arrangements: Scope of the “Ad Hoc Cannot Replace Ad Hoc” Doctrine

I. Introduction

The Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar, in University of Kashmir & Ors. v. Saba Manzoor & Ors. (LPA No. 169/2025 and connected LPAs), has delivered a significant judgment on the rights of contractual and academic arrangement teachers in higher educational institutions, particularly in the context of law education.

The judgment addresses the long-contested question: can a person appointed on an ad hoc, contractual or academic arrangement basis be replaced by another similarly placed person, especially in universities, pending regular recruitment?

While affirming the well-settled principle that an ad hoc/temporary/contractual appointee cannot ordinarily be replaced by another of the same kind, the Court has introduced an important refinement: this protection primarily applies where such appointees are engaged against substantive vacant posts. Where they are engaged only against “positions” created to meet short-term academic exigencies and not against sanctioned posts, their right is narrower – they cannot be arbitrarily replaced by another similar contractual person for the same requirement, but they also cannot insist on continuance “till regular selection” when no substantive post exists.

The Division Bench (Justice Sanjeev Kumar and Justice Sanjay Parihar) partly upholds and partly modifies a common judgment of the learned Single Judge, thereby recalibrating the balance between:

• the rights and protections of contractual/academic arrangement teachers; and
• the administrative autonomy and operational needs of the University of Kashmir, subject to oversight by the Bar Council of India (BCI).

II. Background and Procedural History

1. Parties

• Appellants: University of Kashmir and its authorities.
• Respondents: Multiple teachers/lecturers engaged by the University on academic arrangement or contractual basis in different departments, prominently including the Department of Law/Law School.

2. Factual Matrix

The respondents were engaged by the University of Kashmir on academic arrangement / contractual basis for various teaching positions. Key characteristics of these engagements were:

• They were for specific academic sessions.
• They were extended from time to time – some extensions were the result of interim court orders, others by administrative decisions of the University.
• Upon the end of an academic session, the University issued fresh advertisements inviting applications for the next session, intending to:
  • discontinue existing contractual staff; and
  • replace them with a new batch of contractual/academic arrangement appointees.

Aggrieved by this “session-to-session replacement” policy, the respondents filed separate writ petitions before the Single Judge, challenging:

• their discontinuance at the end of the academic session; and
• their replacement by another set of contractual/academic arrangement appointees.

3. Decision of the Writ Court

By a common judgment dated 04.07.2025, the learned Single Judge allowed all the writ petitions and:

• held that ad hoc/temporary/contractual employees cannot be replaced by another set of ad hoc/temporary/contractual employees; and
• directed that the petitioners (now respondents in appeal) be allowed to continue till regular selection is made to the posts held by them, and restrained the University from replacing them by any similar contractual/ad hoc appointees.

The University, dissatisfied with these directions, filed a batch of intra-court appeals (Letters Patent Appeals – LPAs 169/2025, 187/2025, 188/2025, etc.), which have been decided by the present Division Bench judgment.

III. Core Issues Before the Division Bench

The central legal question formulated by the Division Bench is:

Whether a person engaged on academic arrangement or contractual basis can be replaced by another person engaged on the same basis, pending regular selection to the post?

Closely intertwined with this were subsidiary issues:

• Does an academic arrangement/contractual teacher have a right to continue till a regular appointment is made?
• Does the Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench judgment in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1, overrule the earlier decision in Piara Singh to the extent it protects ad hoc employees from being replaced by other ad hoc employees?
• What is the scope of University autonomy in determining faculty requirements, particularly in light of the Bar Council of India’s Rules of Legal Education, 2008?

IV. Summary of the Judgment

1. General Principle Affirmed

The Court reiterates and upholds the settled legal proposition that:

An ad hoc, contractual, or academic arrangement appointee cannot be replaced by another ad hoc, contractual, or academic arrangement appointee; such replacement can only be by a regularly selected candidate appointed in accordance with the applicable recruitment rules.

This view of the Writ Court is declared “unexceptionable” and is expressly upheld.

2. Critical Refinement: Substantive Posts vs. Positions

However, the Division Bench introduces a crucial limitation:

• The Supreme Court doctrine prohibiting replacement of one ad hoc/contractual employee by another applies in the context of appointments made against substantive vacant posts.
• In the present case, the respondents were not engaged against substantive vacant posts of Assistant Professors; they were engaged merely against positions created to supplement existing faculty for particular academic sessions.

Therefore:

• The Court refuses to sustain the Writ Court’s direction that such contractual/academic arrangement teachers must be continued till “the posts held by them” are filled by regular selection, because:
  • in reality there are no substantive posts “held by them”;
  • they were appointed only to non-sanctioned positions to meet a temporary or sessional need.

3. Rights of the Respondents in Such a Scenario

Even though the respondents are not on substantive posts, the Court still protects them in two key ways:

1. Right not to be replaced by another similar arrangement:
   They “may have a right not to be replaced by a similar arrangement,” i.e., the University cannot simply recruit a new set of contractual teachers to meet the same requirement while terminating the earlier contractual staff, especially by using cosmetic changes in nomenclature.
2. Preference in future engagements:
   If the University continues to require ad hoc/contractual/academic arrangement staff to supplement core faculty, it must first offer such engagements to the existing respondents who already have experience teaching in prior sessions.

4. Clarifications on Part-time and Guest Faculty

The Court clarifies that:

• Part-time and visiting/guest faculty are permissible under Rule 17 of the Rules of Legal Education, 2008 to support core faculty.
• However, such part-time or guest faculty cannot be used as a substitute for core faculty or whole-time contractual/academic arrangement faculty meant to teach multiple subjects across different years.
• The University cannot circumvent the “no ad hoc for ad hoc replacement” principle merely by:
  • changing nomenclature (e.g., calling full-day, regular-load teachers “guest” or “part-time”); or
  • splitting what is functionally a full-time teaching role into artificially labelled part-time arrangements.

5. Role of the Bar Council of India and Faculty Requirements

For the Department of Law/Law School:

• The Court recognizes that:
  • in 2023, the University itself advertised for 12 Assistant Professors on academic arrangement basis in Law, indicating a felt need for such faculty; and
  • only three substantive posts were notified for regular selection, of which only two were filled.
• However, the Court declines to itself determine the exact faculty requirement:
  • such assessment is to be made by the University in conformity with the BCI’s Rules of Legal Education, 2008; and
  • the BCI, as statutory regulator, is obliged to inspect and ensure minimum core faculty.

Accordingly, the Court directs:

• The University must place this judgment before the Bar Council of India.
• The BCI shall:
  • immediately visit the University of Kashmir;
  • assess the requirement of core faculty to run three-year and five-year law courses;
  • issue necessary directions, including for creation of posts, if required; and
  • issue guidelines for streamlining temporary arrangements to supplement core faculty.

6. Final Operative Directions (Condensed)

The Division Bench’s key directions (para 20) can be summarised as:

1. General doctrine upheld: The Writ Court’s view that ad hoc/contractual/academic appointees cannot be replaced by similar appointees and can continue till the substantive posts are filled by regular selection is upheld in principle.
2. But limited by factual context: In this case, respondents were not appointed against substantive vacant posts, but only against temporary positions; hence they cannot demand continuation until such substantive posts are filled or created.
3. Faculty requirement in Law: To be left to the Department of Law and the BCI, not determined judicially by the Court.
4. First preference for existing contractual faculty: If the University needs ad hoc/contractual/academic arrangement appointees, it must first offer such engagements to the respondents.
5. No replacement by same arrangement under different labels: The University shall not replace respondents by a similar arrangement merely by using a different nomenclature.
6. Use of part-time/guest faculty allowed but limited: They may be engaged to teach specific subjects or deliver particular lectures, not as full-time faculty in lieu of core regular faculty.
7. Scope of protection limited to departments with continuing need: Directions against replacing existing contractual arrangements apply only to departments where there is an ongoing unmet need for teaching faculty. Where such need has ceased (e.g., posts filled, scheme ended), there is no compulsion to continue contractual staff beyond their term.
8. BCI to act: The judgment is to be placed before BCI, which must conduct inspection and issue directions on core faculty and temporary arrangements.

V. Precedents and Their Influence

1. Respondents’ Reliance on Supreme Court Precedents

The respondents relied on a long line of Supreme Court decisions that curbed arbitrary treatment of ad hoc/temporary employees:

• Rattan Lal v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 43
• State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118
• Hargurpratap Singh v. State of Punjab, (2007) 13 SCC 292
• Mohd. Abdul Kadir v. Director General of Police, Assam, (2009) 6 SCC 611
• Manish Gupta v. President, Jan Bhagidari Samiti, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 485

The Division Bench systematically draws from these.

(a) Rattan Lal v. State of Haryana

In Rattan Lal, the Supreme Court condemned the practice of appointing teachers on ad hoc basis at the beginning of the academic year and terminating them before summer vacation, only to re-engage them later. The Court held this to be:

• exploitative;
• contrary to Articles 14 and 16 (equality and equal opportunity in public employment); and
• inconsistent with the State’s duty as a “model employer.”

This case laid the normative foundation that hire-and-fire cycles of sessional teachers are unconstitutional and unjust.

(b) State of Haryana v. Piara Singh

In Piara Singh, the Supreme Court recognised that:

• administrative exigencies may require temporary/ad hoc appointments; but
• such employees “should not be replaced by another set of ad hoc or temporary employees”.

The replacement must be only by regularly selected candidates. This is the core doctrine the Division Bench applies and refines in the present case.

(c) Hargurpratap Singh v. State of Punjab

In Hargurpratap Singh, the Supreme Court held:

• Ad hoc teachers may not have a right to regularization per se.
• But replacing one ad hoc teacher with another ad hoc teacher is wholly impermissible.
• Continuity of experienced ad hoc teachers is beneficial for:
  • institutional functioning; and
  • students’ learning environment.

The Division Bench cites this in rejecting the University’s argument that yearly turnover brings in “new talent” and enhances quality. The Court aligns with Hargurpratap Singh to stress that continuity often serves students better than constant churn.

(d) Mohd. Abdul Kadir v. Director General of Police, Assam

In Mohd. Abdul Kadir, employees engaged under a continuing scheme were annually terminated and reappointed, merely because their appointments were styled “ad hoc.” The Supreme Court held:

• Where the scheme itself continues, such employees need not be put through the ritual of annual termination and reappointment.
• They should be allowed to continue as long as the scheme continues, subject to valid grounds like misconduct or unsuitability.

The Division Bench uses this to support the idea that where the underlying necessity (scheme/academic requirement) persists, there is no justification to discard experienced contractual employees and bring in new ones solely to reset contracts.

(e) Manish Gupta v. President, Jan Bhagidari Samiti

In Manish Gupta, decided after Uma Devi, the Supreme Court reaffirmed:

• an ad hoc employee cannot be replaced by another ad hoc employee; and
• replacement must be only by properly selected regular appointees.

This post-Uma Devi affirmation is central to the Division Bench’s rejection of the appellants’ argument that Piara Singh stands overruled.

2. Appellants’ Reliance on Other Supreme Court Precedents

The University cited:

• State of U.P. v. Raj Karan Singh, (1998) 8 SCC 529
• State of Rajasthan v. Daya Lal, (2011) 2 SCC 429

to argue that:

• contractual engagements are by nature time-bound;
• once their term expires, no vested right to continuation survives; and
• employees who accepted clear terms (no claim to regularisation or continuation) cannot later claim a right to continue beyond the contract.

The Division Bench does not deny these general principles. Rather, it harmonizes them with the Piara Singh line by:

• accepting that no right to regularisation or unlimited extension accrues merely because someone has been on contract;
• but simultaneously asserting that constitutional constraints (Articles 14 and 16) prevent the State/university from:
  • indulging in arbitrary “replacement” of one ad hoc by another; or
  • breaking continuity of experienced contractual staff where the need is ongoing, only to bring in fresh faces without legitimate reason.

3. Interaction with Uma Devi: Has Piara Singh Been Overruled?

The appellants argued that the Constitution Bench in Uma Devi overruled Piara Singh, and thus the Writ Court’s reliance on Piara Singh was misplaced.

The Division Bench firmly rejects this submission, explaining that:

• Uma Devi dealt with:
  • backdoor entrants;
  • illegal/irregular appointments without due process; and
  • general policies to regularise such appointments.
• The core holding in Uma Devi is that:
  • the State cannot, by policy decisions or court directions, regularise illegal or irregular appointees in violation of Articles 14 and 16; and
  • courts should generally refrain from issuing regularisation directions contrary to recruitment rules.
• Crucially, Uma Devi does not disapprove, discuss, or overrule the narrower principle in Piara Singh that:
  • one set of ad hoc/temporary employees should not be replaced by another set of such employees pending regular recruitment.

This reading is reinforced by the fact that:

• subsequent Supreme Court decisions like Mohd. Abdul Kadir (2009) and Manish Gupta (2022) – both post-Uma Devi – explicitly reaffirm the “no ad hoc for ad hoc replacement” doctrine.

Thus, the Division Bench concludes that Uma Devi and Piara Singh operate in distinct doctrinal spaces:

• Uma Devi: deals with regularisation of illegal/irregular appointments.
• Piara Singh line: deals with treatment and replacement of validly appointed ad hoc/temporary staff pending regular recruitment.

VI. Legal Reasoning and Doctrinal Refinement

1. The Central Doctrinal Move: “Substantive Posts” vs. “Positions”

The most important conceptual contribution of this judgment is the explicit distinction between:

• Substantive vacant posts: Sanctioned posts in the regular establishment for which recruitment is governed by statutory rules.
• Positions: Temporary, need-based slots created to supplement faculty for a particular academic session or for a limited period, not corresponding to sanctioned posts.

The Court reasons:

• The Supreme Court’s decisions upholding the right of ad hoc/contractual employees to continue till regular appointees are made, and forbidding their replacement by fresh ad hoc staff, predominantly concern employees engaged against substantive posts.
• Where an ad hoc or contractual teacher is appointed against a substantive vacant post, it is logical and fair to:
  • allow them to continue till a regular appointee is lawfully selected; and
  • prevent authorities from shuffling ad hoc appointees seasonally for the same post.
• However, in the present case, the respondents were:
  • largely not appointed against sanctioned posts but to meet short-term or session-specific needs (e.g., new subjects, increased student intake); and
  • basically holding “positions” – not “posts.”

Consequently:

• They cannot insist that they must continue till “the posts are filled up,” because there are no corresponding sanctioned posts earmarked for them.
• Nevertheless, constitutional fairness still requires that:
  • they not be arbitrarily replaced by another set of contractual/academic arrangement appointees for the same continuing requirement; and
  • if the University still needs such contractual positions in later years, the experienced incumbents should receive preference.

This nuanced refinement allows the Court to:

• protect employees from arbitrary “ad hoc-for-ad hoc” replacement; while
• avoiding a blanket rule that would ossify all temporary or position-based appointments into semi-permanent status in the absence of sanctioned posts.

2. Balancing University Autonomy and Students’ Interests

The University argued that:

• allowing existing contractual teachers to continue would:
  • prejudice “fresh talent”; and
  • negatively impact quality of education.
• frequent fresh recruitment brings in better, more qualified candidates.

The Court rejects this contention, relying on Hargurpratap Singh and related cases, and reasoning that:

• Experienced ad hoc/contractual teachers who have taught over several sessions are:
  • acquainted with institutional culture; and
  • known to the students and curriculum.
• Constantly changing teachers at the end of every academic session:
  • disrupts teaching-learning continuity;
  • harms students; and
  • is inconsistent with the educational goals of the institution.
• Thus, continuity – not churn – is more aligned with students’ and institutional interest.

At the same time, the Court does not strip the University of all flexibility. It recognises that:

• the University is best placed to assess:
  • how many faculty members are needed per session;
  • how many posts should be created; and
  • which subjects require visiting experts or part-time faculty.
• However, such autonomy must operate within:
  • the structural framework laid down by the BCI under the Advocates Act, 1961; and
  • the constitutional constraints of non-arbitrariness and equality.

3. Judicial Deference to the Bar Council of India

A further notable aspect is the Court’s institutional deference to the BCI regarding:

• assessment of core faculty requirements; and
• ensuring quality legal education.

The Court:

• acknowledges that:
  • the Department of Law might be functioning at or above the minimum core faculty prescribed by the Rules of Legal Education, 2008; but
  • the actual requirement may be higher, considering student intake and new subjects.
• explicitly declines to itself compute or fix the required number of faculty, noting:
  • this is within the BCI’s statutory remit as regulator; and
  • the BCI conducts inspections and enforces standards.

By directing the University to place this judgment before the BCI, and requiring the BCI to:

• undertake inspection;
• determine core faculty requirements; and
• issue directions including creation of posts and norms for temporary arrangements,

the Court steers the matter into the institutional hands of the sectoral regulator, rather than micro-managing academic governance.

4. Non-Circumvention Principle: Nomenclature vs. Substance

The Court is particularly alert to the risk that institutions might:

• dress up full-time teaching requirements as “part-time” or “guest faculty”; or
• split continuous teaching loads into a series of visiting engagements;

simply to avoid giving any sort of continuity or preference to existing contractual employees.

Hence, it lays down that:

• The University cannot:
  • replace the respondents by other similarly placed contractual appointees “by resorting to a change of nomenclature.”
• Part-time/guest faculty must remain:
  • truly part-time;
  • engaged for specific subjects or occasional lectures; and
  • not a disguised substitute for whole-time faculty.

This is a substantive “anti-evasion” rule, ensuring that the protective doctrine is not defeated by mere labels.

5. Limiting the Reach of the Writ Court’s Directions

The Writ Court had issued broad directions that could have been understood to mean:

• once a person is engaged on academic arrangement, he/she must continue until regular selection is made; and
• no such faculty can ever be discontinued so long as there is any teaching need.

The Division Bench tempers this:

• The “no replacement by similar arrangement” rule is:
  • restricted to departments where there is continuing need of teaching faculty that the University has failed to fill by regular selection or creation of posts.
• Where:
  • the temporary need has ceased; or
  • regular faculty have been appointed; or
  • the scheme/requirement itself has ended,
  there is no obligation to continue ad hoc/contractual staff beyond their contractual term.

This ensures that:

• the doctrine does not fossilize obsolete temporary arrangements; but
• it still prevents arbitrary replacement during periods of continuing need.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Ad hoc”, “Temporary”, “Contractual”, “Academic Arrangement”

• Ad hoc / Temporary Appointment: A stop-gap, short-term engagement, usually for a limited period or until a regular appointment is made.
• Contractual Appointment: Employment based on a written contract specifying duration and terms; generally, it ends automatically on expiry of the term.
• Academic Arrangement: A term often used in universities to denote session-based appointments of teachers to meet urgent shortages of faculty without going through full-scale regular recruitment.

In practice, these three categories often overlap. The critical doctrinal point is that: even if contractual/ad hoc employees have no right to be regularised, they are still protected from arbitrary replacement by another similar ad hoc/contractual employee.

2. Substantive Post vs. Position

• Substantive Post: A permanent, sanctioned post forming part of the regular cadre (e.g., sanctioned post of Assistant Professor in the Law Department).
• Position: A non-sanctioned, need-based slot created to address temporary or session-specific demands (e.g., extra faculty needed due to a special batch or new subject). It does not correspond to a regular sanctioned post on the establishment.

Rights of temporary employees are stronger when they are appointed against a substantive post, especially in terms of continuity until that post is filled by regular recruitment. Where they serve only in a “position”, their primary protection is against arbitrary replacement by a similar arrangement for the same ongoing requirement.

3. Regularisation and Backdoor Appointments

• Regularisation: The process of absorbing irregular/temporary appointees into permanent service, treating them as if they were properly appointed.
• Backdoor Appointment: Appointment to public service without following open, competitive, or prescribed recruitment procedures (e.g., without advertisement, merit-based selection, or reservation policies).

Uma Devi prohibits courts and governments from regularising backdoor or irregular appointees as a matter of course. However, preventing “ad hoc-for-ad hoc” replacement does not amount to regularisation; it simply enforces fairness in managing temporary appointments.

4. Core Faculty vs. Part-time / Guest Faculty (in Law Colleges)

• Core Faculty: Full-time, regular teaching staff mandated by the BCI’s Rules of Legal Education, 2008; essential for running law courses and ensuring quality.
• Part-time / Visiting Faculty: Professionals or experts who teach specific papers or deliver occasional lectures, supplementing core faculty but not replacing them.
• Guest Faculty: A subset of visiting faculty, often invited for specific lectures, seminars, or to cover specialised topics.

The Court emphasises that:

• Part-time or guest faculty can only supplement, not replace, core or whole-time faculty;
• relabeling full-time teaching work as “guest/part-time” to avoid continuity rights of contractual faculty is impermissible.

VIII. Impact and Future Implications

1. For Contractual and Academic Arrangement Teachers

The judgment gives contractual/academic arrangement teachers a mixed outcome:

• Positive:
  • They cannot be casually replaced by another set of contractual appointees for the same continuing need.
  • They are entitled to preference in future contractual engagements when the University continues to require such positions.
• Limitation:
  • They do not acquire a right to continue indefinitely till substantive posts are created or filled when they were never appointed against such posts.
  • Where the need genuinely ceases, their contracts can come to an end without the University being obliged to perpetuate the arrangement.

2. For Universities and Educational Institutions

Universities are put on notice that:

• They cannot indulge in:
  • cyclical termination and fresh recruitment of contractual teachers every session,
  • simply for reshuffling or patronage,
  • when the underlying requirement remains the same.
• When they continue to need temporary/contractual faculty:
  • they must give first preference to earlier incumbents;
  • they must not mask full workloads under the labels “guest” or “part-time” to deny continuity.
• They remain free to:
  • assess faculty requirements;
  • create or discontinue positions or posts; and
  • decide subjects requiring external experts,
  but subject to:
  • BCI norms (in legal education); and
  • constitutional principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness.

3. For the Bar Council of India and Regulatory Framework

By directing the BCI to:

• inspect;
• determine core faculty requirements; and
• streamline norms for temporary arrangements,

the judgment:

• strengthens the role of professional regulators in ensuring both:
  • quality education; and
  • fair employment practices;
• may prompt:
  • clearer guidelines on the use of academic arrangements in law colleges; and
  • possible directions for creation of additional substantive posts where chronic dependence on ad hoc faculty is detected.

4. For Service Jurisprudence Generally

This judgment contributes to Indian service jurisprudence by:

• affirming the continuing vitality of the “no ad hoc for ad hoc replacement” doctrine post-Uma Devi;
• clarifying that:
  • this doctrine primarily protects employees working against substantive posts; but
  • even those on purely position-based appointments enjoy a right against arbitrary replacement and a right of preference;
• drawing a clear conceptual line between:
  • prohibition of arbitrary replacement; and
  • prohibition of regularisation of irregular appointments.

Courts in other States are likely to cite this reasoning when faced with challenges involving academic arrangement teachers, contractual staff in educational institutions, and session-based appointments.

IX. Conclusion

The Division Bench in University of Kashmir & Ors. v. Saba Manzoor & Ors. strikes a carefully calibrated balance between:

• the protection of contractual/academic arrangement teachers from exploitative “hire and fire” practices; and
• the legitimate need of universities to retain flexibility in managing faculty requirements, particularly when engaged on positions rather than substantive posts.

Key takeaways include:

• The doctrinal rule that an ad hoc/temporary/contractual employee cannot be replaced by another of the same kind is reaffirmed as good law, not overruled by Uma Devi.
• This rule is context-sensitive: it applies fully where engagement is against substantive posts, and more modestly where appointment is only to temporary positions.
• Universities must:
  • avoid cyclical replacements of contractual faculty for continuing needs;
  • offer first preference to existing contractual teachers when re-engaging academic arrangement faculty;
  • not misuse “part-time” or “guest” labels to circumvent protections.
• The Bar Council of India is tasked with a proactive regulatory role to:
  • ensure adequate core faculty;
  • guide the use of temporary/contractual academic arrangements; and
  • prevent over-reliance on ad hoc faculty in law schools.

In the broader legal landscape, the judgment stands as a noteworthy precedent on the nuanced rights of contractual educators and the institutional limits of ad hocism in higher education, particularly in professional courses like law. It preserves the constitutional commitment to fairness and non-arbitrariness in public employment, while respecting the institutional autonomy of universities and the statutory authority of professional regulators.