Single Credible Testimony Can Sustain Departmental Charges; Tribunal’s Review Confined to Process, Not Evidence Reappreciation — Delhi High Court in Director General v. Sanjeev Kumar

Introduction

The Delhi High Court’s decision in Director General v. Sanjeev Kumar (2025 DHC 8630-DB), pronounced on 26 September 2025, revisits and sharply reaffirms two core principles governing public service disciplinary proceedings: (i) the highly limited scope of judicial review by Courts/Tribunals over findings returned by departmental authorities; and (ii) the sufficiency of a single, credible complainant’s testimony—tested in cross-examination—to establish misconduct on the preponderance of probabilities in a departmental inquiry.

The case arises from allegations of ill-treatment and extortion by an Assistant Superintendent, Tihar Jail (the respondent, Sanjeev Kumar), made in 2003 by three undertrial prisoners (UTPs): Shyamu Samrat, Shankar Singh, and Sarfaraz. While only one complainant (Sarfaraz) ultimately testified in the inquiry, the Enquiry Officer found the charges proved, leading to a penalty of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) set aside the disciplinary and appellate orders in 2008. The Delhi High Court, exercising writ jurisdiction, has now quashed the CAT’s decision and restored the penalty.

Parties: - Petitioner: Director General - Respondent: Sanjeev Kumar (Assistant Superintendent, Central Jail, Tihar)

Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Navin Chawla and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Madhu Jain

Summary of the Judgment

• The Court reiterates the classic “limited judicial review” doctrine in service disciplinary matters: Courts/Tribunals do not reappreciate evidence or sit as appellate forums over departmental findings; they intervene only for procedural illegality, violation of natural justice, manifest perversity, or a “no evidence” finding.
• Even if a witness is alleged to be “interested,” in the absence of substantiated animus, the testimony cannot be discarded merely on assertion.
• Crucially, the Court holds that the sworn and cross-examined testimony of UTP Sarfaraz—clearly and consistently naming the respondent as the perpetrator of beatings and monetary demand—was sufficient to prove the charge on the civil standard of preponderance of probabilities.
• The Court assigns greater probative weight to testimony recorded in the formal inquiry over an initial complaint that did not name the respondent; the latter’s omission was not fatal when clarified and affirmed under cross-examination in the inquiry.
• Medical/administrative reports opining that allegations were “baseless” did not override direct inculpatory testimony that withstood cross-examination.
• Accordingly, the Court sets aside the CAT’s order for reappreciating evidence and restores the disciplinary penalty (stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect), with no order as to costs.

Factual Background and Procedural History

• 2003: Three complaints by UTPs (Shyamu Samrat, Shankar Singh, and Sarfaraz) reached the Jail Authorities via different trial courts, alleging ill-treatment and extortion by the respondent, then Assistant Superintendent, Tihar Jail No. 1.
• 13.12.2003 and 17.12.2003: Jail reports were forwarded to the courts; one report noted the possibility of the respondent’s involvement and recommended transfer.
• 22.01.2004: Charge-sheet issued under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965; the respondent denied the charges.
• Enquiry: Notices were issued to the three complainants; only UTP Sarfaraz appeared and testified. The Department also examined Shri S.K. Matta (Deputy Superintendent), who confirmed the relevant contemporaneous report.
• 07.08.2005: Enquiry Officer found the charge proved based on Sarfaraz’s testimony, Matta’s deposition, and documents.
• 07.11.2005: Disciplinary Authority imposed penalty: stoppage of two increments, permanently, with cumulative effect, adversely affecting pension.
• 14.09.2006: Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal.
• 21.07.2008: CAT allowed the OA and quashed the penalty; all consequential benefits were directed.
• 26.09.2025: Delhi High Court allows the writ, quashes CAT’s order, and restores the penalty.

Key Issues

• Scope of judicial review in writ jurisdiction over departmental inquiries: Could the Tribunal reassess evidence and reach a different factual conclusion?
• Proof standard and evidentiary sufficiency: Can a single complainant’s sworn testimony, if credible and consistent under cross-examination, sustain a misconduct charge in a departmental proceeding?
• Weight to initial complaint vis-à-vis formal inquiry testimony: Does a failure to name the respondent in the initial complaint nullify later specific identification under oath?
• Effect of medical/administrative reports suggesting allegations were “baseless”: Do such reports negate direct inculpatory testimony?
• Allegation of “interested witness” (S.K. Matta): What is required to discount such testimony?

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1) B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749

The Court quotes and relies on the seminal articulation from B.C. Chaturvedi that judicial review is “not an appeal from a decision” but a review of the decision-making process. The controlling principles reinforced are:

• Disciplinary findings must rest on “some evidence” but technical rules of the Evidence Act do not strictly apply.
• Court/Tribunal does not reappreciate evidence or substitute its own conclusions.
• Interference lies only for procedural illegality, violation of natural justice, “no evidence” findings, or conclusions that no reasonable person would reach (perversity).

This precedent frames the entire analytical approach of the Delhi High Court. It anchors the conclusion that the CAT exceeded its remit by reappraising evidence, particularly where the Enquiry Officer and Disciplinary/Appellate Authorities had recorded reasoned findings grounded in evidence.

2) Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610

Cited by the petitioner and aligned with B.C. Chaturvedi, P. Gunasekaran further crystallizes the narrow supervisory role in writ jurisdiction: Courts do not act as appellate bodies to reassess facts or weigh evidence unless the inquiry suffers from procedural illegality, violation of natural justice, or patent perversity. Although the judgment’s operative discussion directly quotes B.C. Chaturvedi, the logic and outcome resonate with P. Gunasekaran’s boundaries on reappreciation.

Legal Reasoning

A. The “Some Evidence” Threshold and Limited Judicial Review

The Court restates the well-settled distinction between the role of disciplinary authorities (fact-finders applying the civil standard) and the role of Courts/Tribunals (process auditors ensuring fairness and legality). It underscores:

• As long as findings rest on “some evidence,” and the inquiry complies with applicable rules and natural justice, judicial interference is unwarranted.
• Reappraising the weight of evidence or supplanting departmental conclusions constitutes jurisdictional overreach.

B. Credibility and Sufficiency of a Single Complainant’s Testimony

The decisive factual substrate was UTP Sarfaraz’s clear, direct testimony before the Enquiry Officer. He specifically named the respondent as the person who beat him and demanded Rs. 5,000/-. Importantly:

• His testimony was subjected to cross-examination; nothing emerged to discredit it.
• He clarified that he named only the respondent and no one else.

On this basis, the Court held that—even disregarding the deposition of Shri S.K. Matta on the assumption of hostility—the testimony of Sarfaraz, standing alone, satisfied the preponderance of probabilities standard applicable to departmental inquiries. This is a pointed affirmation that a single credible, cross-examined witness can sustain a disciplinary finding.

C. Probative Priority of Formal Inquiry Testimony over Initial Complaint

The Tribunal had attached significance to an initial complaint (dated 11.12.2003) which did not name the respondent. The High Court firmly rejected this as determinative. It held that testimony recorded in a formal inquiry, especially under cross-examination, carries greater probative weight than a preliminary complaint document. Initial omissions are not fatal when clarified by consistent sworn testimony in the inquiry.

D. Medical/Administrative Reports vs. Direct Oral Testimony

The defense leaned on contemporaneous Jail reports stating that medical examination did not support the allegations and that the allegations were “baseless.” The Court acknowledged the evidentiary value of such reports but held they do not eclipse direct, credible inculpatory testimony that remains unshaken in cross-examination. In other words, the presence of administrative opinions cannot negate first-hand sworn evidence if the latter meets the threshold of reliability.

E. “Interested Witness” Allegation Against Shri S.K. Matta

The respondent claimed that Shri S.K. Matta harbored personal animosity and was therefore an “interested” witness. The Court noted the absence of factual substantiation. More critically, it reasoned that even excising Matta’s evidence, Sarfaraz’s testimony sufficed. Thus, the allegation against Matta did not bear on the ultimate outcome.

F. The Tribunal’s Jurisdictional Error

Having found that there was “some evidence” (indeed, direct testimony under cross-examination) supporting the charge, the Court concluded that the Tribunal exceeded its bounds by reappreciating evidence and substituting its conclusions for those of the Enquiry Officer/Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities. This was characterized as a jurisdictional error warranting writ intervention.

Impact and Significance

1) Reinforcement of Review Limits for CAT and High Courts

The judgment robustly restates that CAT and constitutional courts must not act as second appellate forums over disciplinary findings. The touchstones remain procedural regularity, adherence to rules and natural justice, and the presence of “some evidence.” This will guide future service matters, particularly where CAT orders are perceived to have crossed into merits re-evaluation.

2) Evidentiary Sufficiency: Single Witness Can Be Enough

The explicit articulation that a single, credible complainant’s testimony—especially when tested in cross-examination—can prove misconduct on the preponderance of probabilities will influence a wide range of departmental inquiries. It reduces undue insistence on multiple witnesses or documentary corroboration when reliable direct testimony exists.

3) Weight of Inquiry Testimony Over Preliminary Complaints

Investigators and disciplinary authorities gain clarity that omissions or non-specificities in initial complaints do not trump sworn testimony recorded in the inquiry. This principle will particularly matter in institutional contexts (e.g., prisons, hospitals, security services) where initial complaints may be brief, informal, or anonymized, but later sworn evidence becomes specific and reliable.

4) Administrative/Medical Reports Are Not Conclusive

While such reports remain relevant, they do not per se nullify credible oral testimony. Departments should therefore present comprehensive cases, but they need not regard an adverse medical note as fatal if testimony is otherwise cogent and withstands cross-examination.

5) Practical Guidance for Disciplinary Authorities

• Ensure that key complainants are examined and made available for cross-examination; recording clear, consistent testimony is pivotal.
• Address allegations of witness interest or bias with facts; lack of substantiation weakens such objections.
• Reasoned concurrence by Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities, explicitly engaging with evidence, will withstand judicial scrutiny.
• Document why formal inquiry testimony is preferred over preliminary or administrative reports where they conflict.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Preponderance of Probabilities: The standard of proof in departmental proceedings. It means the charge is more likely true than not (i.e., greater than 50% likelihood), unlike the criminal standard of “beyond reasonable doubt.”
• “Some Evidence” Test: For judicial review, the question is whether there is at least some material that reasonably supports the findings. If yes, Courts/Tribunals will not reweigh it like an appellate court.
• Limited Judicial Review: Courts examine the fairness of process, adherence to rules, and legality. They do not retry the case or reassess witness credibility unless the findings are perverse, procedurally illegal, or based on no evidence.
• Jurisdictional Error: When a tribunal exceeds the limits of its legal authority—here, by reappreciating evidence and substituting factual conclusions contrary to established constraints.
• Cumulative Effect (Penalty): Stoppage of increments with cumulative effect means the employee’s future pay progression and, ultimately, pension gets adversely impacted, not merely a temporary stoppage.
• Interested Witness: A witness alleged to have bias or motive. Mere allegation is insufficient; there must be concrete evidence of bias. Even then, the testimony is not automatically discarded but weighed cautiously.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s judgment in Director General v. Sanjeev Kumar firmly restores orthodoxy to service jurisprudence on two fronts. First, it re-emphasizes the narrow corridor within which Courts/Tribunals scrutinize departmental inquiries—looking at process, not reassessing factual determinations supported by some evidence. Second, it clarifies evidentiary sufficiency in disciplinary proceedings: a single, credible, cross-examined complainant’s testimony can, by itself, satisfy the preponderance of probabilities.

By according primacy to sworn testimony recorded in the formal inquiry over preliminary complaint documents, and by treating administrative/medical reports as relevant but not decisive against direct oral evidence, the Court provides practical and doctrinal clarity. The reinstatement of the penalty reflects deference to reasoned disciplinary conclusions and a rejection of the Tribunal’s merits-based reassessment. This decision will guide future adjudication of service misconduct—especially in institutional settings—by reaffirming that discipline can be sustained on credible, singular testimony, and that judicial fora must resist the temptation to retry departmental cases under the guise of judicial review.