Sheikh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025 INSC 529): The Supreme Court Re‑defines the Duty to Confront the Accused under Section 313 CrPC and the Appellate Obligation to Cure Omissions Promptly

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Aejaz Ahmad Sheikh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 INSC 529, is more than the final word in a tragic five‑fold homicide; it forges a robust procedural precedent on how and when incriminating circumstances must be put to an accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).

The case concerned the alleged burning to death of Amina, three minor daughters, and the subsequent demise of a cousin, Aslam, all suffering fatal burn injuries on 26 December 2008. The sole surviving adult male in the household—Hasim Sheikh—was convicted and sentenced to death by the Trial Court. The Allahabad High Court, however, set him free. Appeals by the State (Criminal Appeals 2143‑44/2017) and by the complainant‑brother (Criminal Appeal 2142/2017) culminated in the present Supreme Court judgment delivered by Abhay S. Oka, J. (with Pankaj Mithal and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ.).

Beyond its immediate facts, the judgment addresses systemic lapses in:

• Recording and relying upon dying declarations,
• Evaluating testimony of a minor eye‑witness, and
• Ensuring compliance with Section 313 CrPC—the statutory opportunity for the accused to explain every material circumstance against him.

2. Summary of the Judgment

1. The Court dismissed the appeals, thereby affirming the High Court’s acquittal of Hasim Sheikh.
2. The prosecution’s two central pillars—dying declarations of Amina and her daughter Fatima, and the testimony of 15‑year‑old son Kamar Hasim—were found unreliable.
3. A fatal procedural lapse occurred because the substance of those dying declarations was never put to the accused during his Section 313 examination. The Court held that this omission caused prejudice that could not be cured 14 years later.
4. The Supreme Court highlighted the accused’s own un‑explained burn injuries and the death of co‑accused Aslam (also burnt) as additional doubts upsetting the prosecution narrative.
5. Most significantly, the Court laid down a new normative framework:
   Trial Courts must put “each material circumstance” to the accused; High Courts, at the very threshold of an appeal, must examine the adequacy of the Section 313 statement and, if defective, cure it themselves or remit promptly.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Raj Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) 17 SCC 95
  – Provided the template for determining when non‑compliance with Section 313 vitiates a trial and the principles for curative steps. Sheikh builds on, reiterates, and operationalises this template.
• P. Ramesh v. State (2019) 20 SCC 593 & Pradeep v. State of Haryana (2023) SCC OnLine SC 777
  – Discussed competency and reliability of child witnesses. The Court relied on these to hold that the minor witness was examined without preliminary testing of capacity, making his testimony unsafe.
• Raju Devade v. State Of Maharashtra (2016) 11 SCC 673, J. Ramulu v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 432, Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab (2006) 12 SCC 283, and Baleshwar Mahto v. State Of Bihar (2017) 3 SCC 152
  – Cited by the complainant to bolster the primacy of ocular testimony and dying declaration; ultimately distinguished because the foundational procedural safeguard (Section 313) was missing.
• Tara Singh v. State (1951) SCC 903
  – Earlier jurisprudence lamenting routine neglect of Section 342 of the 1898 CrPC (predecessor to Section 313). The Court invoked this to show the persisting nature of the problem.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Competency of the Minor Witness (PW‑5)
   – The Trial Court administered oath and recorded evidence without preliminary questions to gauge understanding, contrary to Section 118 Indian Evidence Act and P. Ramesh standards. Coupled with substantial contradictions proved under Section 161 CrPC, PW‑5’s evidence could not sustain conviction.
2. Validity of Dying Declarations
   – Recorded by a Tahsildar without endorsement that the victims were conscious and in a fit state to narrate; not read back to them; and, crucially, not put to the accused in Section 313. This prejudiced defence irretrievably.
3. Section 313 CrPC as a Constitutional Bulwark
   – Borrowing from Raj Kumar, the Court enumerated seven principles: every material circumstance must be distinctly put; default is a serious irregularity; may vitiate trial if prejudice shown; curable if detected early; appellate court can itself cure; remand possible; prejudice analysis is contextual. In Sheikh, 14 years had elapsed and accused had faced the spectre of death sentence—remand would be unjust.
4. Benefit of Doubt Regime in Appeals against Acquittal
   – Reiterated that if the High Court’s view is “possible”, Supreme Court will not interfere merely because another view is also possible (Art. 136 jurisprudence).
5. Systemic Directions
   – Judicial Academies to sensitise judges on practical compliance with Section 313 and usage of sub‑section (5) (written questionnaire prepared with assistance of counsel).
   – High Courts to verify Section 313 adequacy at the admission stage of every criminal appeal, forestalling irreversible prejudice.

3.3 Anticipated Impact

• Trial Practice: Judges are now on notice: failure to conduct a meticulous Section 313 examination may collapse the prosecution case entirely.
• Appellate Procedure: High Courts must institute a “first‑look” scrutiny for Section 313 defects. This is a new duty articulated in clear terms.
• Training & Administration: National and State Judicial Academies are tasked with embedding this discipline into curriculum, signalling an institutional response rather than ad‑hoc corrections.
• Litigation Strategy: Defence counsel will more aggressively challenge Section 313 lapses; prosecutors must prepare comprehensive questionnaires and push Trial Courts to incorporate all incriminating material.
• Substantive Justice: By reinforcing procedural fairness, the judgment seeks to minimise wrongful convictions and also avoid later-stage acquittals that result from curable oversights.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Dying Declaration

A statement made by a person on the brink of death regarding the cause or circumstances of their impending demise. Under Section 32(1) Evidence Act, it is admissible even though hearsay, but must be voluntary, conscious, and recorded with requisite safeguards.

Section 313 CrPC Examination

An obligatory post‑prosecution stage where the Court confronts the accused with every piece of evidence that appears incriminatory, enabling him to explain or rebut. It is neither cross‑examination nor evidence on oath, but a safeguard integral to a fair trial.

“Rarest of the Rare”

The judicial threshold for awarding capital punishment (originating from Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980). It demands that both crime and criminal exhibit exceptional depravity with no alternate sentence serving justice.

Curable vs. Incurable Irregularity

Some procedural defects (e.g., incomplete Section 313) can be rectified by further questioning or remand—hence “curable”—provided it does not cause irremediable prejudice or excessive delay.

Appeal against Acquittal Standard

When reviewing an acquittal, appellate courts require the prosecution to show that the lower court’s view is not merely wrong but perverse or impossible; if two views are possible, deference is owed to the acquittal.

5. Conclusion

Sheikh v. State of U.P. crystallises and amplifies the jurisprudence on Section 313 CrPC. The Supreme Court has unequivocally declared that an accused must be confronted with each incriminating circumstance—especially dying declarations—failing which convictions are vulnerable to being quashed even in heinous crimes. Importantly, the Court shifts part of the curative responsibility to appellate forums and to institutional judicial training, aiming to rectify systemic lapses in real time rather than retrospectively.

For practitioners, judges, and academicians, the ruling is a clarion call: procedural diligence is not pedantry; it is the cornerstone of substantive justice. The judgment ensures that while society’s need for accountability remains paramount, the constitutional promise of a fair trial stands inviolable.