3.1 Precedents Cited

MMTC Limited v. Vedanta Limited

The Court relied on this authority to restate that interference under Section 37 “cannot travel beyond” Section 34. The appellate court’s role is limited to verifying that the Section 34 court acted within its permissible boundaries; it cannot undertake an “independent assessment” of the award’s merits. This formed the backbone of the Court’s conclusion that the Division Bench’s deletion of Claim No. 7 was jurisdictionally impermissible.

Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge Project

This case was used to reinforce that Sections 34 and 37 do not confer ordinary appellate powers. Even where an alternative view on facts or contractual interpretation is possible, courts may not reverse the arbitral tribunal merely because they prefer another construction. The Supreme Court used this to characterize the Division Bench’s exercise as a merits-driven substitution—precisely what Konkan Railway disallows.

Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills

The Court extracted the principle that Section 37 is “more summary” than Section 34 and akin to a narrow superintendence/revisional scrutiny: it exists to police jurisdictional error in the Section 34 decision, not to re-appraise evidence or decide whether the arbitral tribunal was “right or wrong.” This precedent directly supported the finding that the Division Bench exceeded its remit by re-interpreting the contract and deleting the award component.

UHL Power Company Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh

The Court cited this to emphasize the gradation of restraint: Section 34 is narrow; Section 37 is narrower still. This amplified the Court’s conclusion that the Division Bench’s approach was incompatible with the statutory design of limited intervention.

Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited v. Samir Narain Bhojwani

This decision, noted as involving one of the members of the present Bench, was cited to reaffirm that the Section 37 court’s jurisdiction is even “more constrained” than the Section 34 court’s. It underlined that once the Section 34 court has found no permissible ground to set aside the award, the Section 37 court cannot reopen interpretive questions as if sitting in first appeal.

National Highways Authority of India v. M/s Hindustan Construction Company Ltd.

The Court relied on this to restate a vital arbitration principle: construction of contract terms is primarily for the Arbitral Tribunal. If the tribunal adopts a particular view after considering the material, the Section 34 court does not sit in appeal over it. The Supreme Court used this reasoning to extend the restraint logically to Section 37 as well.

Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI)

The respondent invoked this case to argue that “patent illegality” would justify interference. The Supreme Court distinguished it: Ssangyong requires establishing patent illegality on the face of the award, and notes that mere contravention of substantive law is not, by itself, sufficient under the post-amendment regime. Here, the award was reasoned, interpretive, and did not violate fundamental policy or basic notions of morality/justice; therefore, Ssangyong did not assist the respondent.

Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors.

This precedent supported the proposition that if an arbitrator construes a contractual term in a reasonable manner, the award cannot be set aside merely on that basis—even if another view is possible. The Supreme Court treated the tribunal’s reading of Clauses 38/41/51 as a “plausible view,” making interference impermissible.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Statutory design: minimal judicial intervention

The Court began with the structural premise of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: speed, finality, and minimal court interference. It anchored this in Section 5, which bars judicial intervention except where expressly permitted.

It then mapped the permitted interventions:

• Section 34: a limited set of grounds to set aside an award (incapacity, invalid agreement, due process defects, jurisdictional excess, improper composition, non-arbitrability, public policy/patent illegality within the statute’s confines).
• Section 37: an even narrower appellate scrutiny, confined to ensuring the Section 34 court did not exceed/fail its jurisdiction; not a second merits forum.

(B) The Court’s core holding on Section 37: “cannot travel beyond Section 34”

Applying the above framework and the cited precedents, the Court held that the Division Bench effectively:

• revisited the contract’s meaning,
• re-evaluated the tribunal’s approach to the claim basis (Clauses 41 vs 51), and
• substituted its own view to delete the award,

which is impermissible unless a Section 34 ground is made out. The Supreme Court noted that the challenge before the Single Judge had not been shown to fall within the surviving Section 34 grounds; nor was patent illegality established. Consequently, the Section 37 court had no warrant to interfere.

(C) Contractual interpretation: Clauses 38, 41.1, 41.2 and 51.1

Though the Supreme Court emphasized that merits re-adjudication is not the function of Section 37, it still examined the contractual basis to demonstrate the tribunal’s view was at least plausible:

• Clause 38 (Stoppage of Works): provides for stoppage instructions and contemplates idle time charges for “major dredgers” quoted in BOQ. The Court held this does not amount to an implied exclusion of compensation for other equipment if otherwise contractually supportable.
• Clauses 41.1 and 41.2 (Possession of site; failure to give possession): provide for consequences including time extension and costs. The Court rejected the argument that invoking these clauses necessarily bars idle-time compensation under other clauses.
• Clause 51.1 (Interruptions to work): specifically contemplates payment of idle time for dredger/equipment exceeding a continuous four-hour period due to interruptions, at quoted BOQ rates, with notice requirements and calculation rules. The Court treated this as a contractual source enabling compensation for idling of “equipment” (broadly), thereby accommodating the BHD as well.

Critically, the Court adopted a functional approach: if the agreement empowers the grant of relief, it is immaterial under which clause the claim is labelled. On that view, the respondent’s “wrong clause” objection could not elevate into a Section 34/37 defect.

(D) Patent illegality/public policy not made out

The Court found no “patent illegality” on the face of the award because:

• the award was reasoned,
• it reflected a contractual interpretation exercise within the tribunal’s domain, and
• no violation of fundamental policy or basic notions of morality/justice was shown.

Therefore, the Division Bench’s interference lacked a valid statutory trigger.

(E) “Major vs minor dredger” treated as non-decisive

The Court held that whether the BHD is “minor” or “major” was ultimately not determinative because:

• the tender/License Agreement contemplated deployment of a BHD,
• deployment was not contractually prohibited, and
• the entitlement to compensation was assessed through the broader contractual scheme (especially Clause 51.1).

3.3 Impact

(A) Stronger finality at the Section 37 stage

The judgment consolidates a stringent appellate discipline: once an award survives Section 34 scrutiny, a Section 37 court must be exceptionally reluctant to interfere. This reduces incentives for “appeal-as-a-second-arbitration” and supports arbitration’s finality.

(B) Deference to arbitral contract interpretation

The decision further entrenches the principle that contract interpretation is generally for the tribunal, not for courts—especially not for an appellate court under Section 37. Future litigants will face a high bar to reframe interpretive disagreement as patent illegality.

(C) Practical guidance for drafting and claims in infrastructure/port contracts

The Court’s reading that Clause 38 does not implicitly exclude compensation for other equipment signals to employers that if they intend to limit idle-time payments strictly to certain plant categories, they must draft explicit exclusionary language. Conversely, contractors may rely on broader “equipment” language (such as in Clause 51.1) to support claims, provided procedural conditions (like notice) are satisfied and the arbitral tribunal accepts the factual foundation.

(D) Systemic message: avoid frustration of the Act’s object

The Court’s closing observations explicitly warn that multi-tier judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards frustrates the Act’s purpose. This will likely be cited to resist expansive appellate interventions and to encourage courts to preserve arbitral outcomes unless clear Section 34 grounds exist.