Second Bail After Supreme Court Cancellation in Dowry Death Cases: Hostile Witness Testimony as Fresh Ground

---

1. Introduction

The decision in Mukhtar Ahmad v. State of U.P. is a short but legally significant bail order that lies at the intersection of three sensitive and complex areas:

• bail in serious offences involving alleged dowry death (Section 304-B IPC),
• the effect of a prior Supreme Court order cancelling bail in the very same case, and
• the judiciary’s response to the perceived misuse of dowry-related offences when crucial witnesses turn hostile.

The applicant, Mukhtar Ahmad, stands accused—along with his mother (mother-in-law of the deceased)—of offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. A young bride’s death within two years of marriage lay at the centre of the prosecution, attracting the special statutory regime relating to dowry death.

The applicant’s first bail application had been allowed by the Allahabad High Court on 21.05.2024. However, that bail order was subsequently assailed before the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 11355 of 2024 (along with connected SLPs), leading to:

• cancellation of the bail by the Supreme Court on 03.03.2025, and
• strong observations requiring heightened judicial vigilance in cases where a young bride dies under suspicious circumstances within a short period of marriage.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directions, the applicant surrendered. Thereafter, during the course of the trial, key prosecution witnesses, including the informant and close relatives of the deceased, turned hostile and retracted the allegations of dowry demand and harassment.

Against this factual background, the Allahabad High Court entertained a second bail application and granted bail, relying mainly on the changed evidentiary situation—particularly the testimony of hostile witnesses. The judgment also contains a pointed social commentary about the rise of “fake cases” of dowry demand, as perceived by the Court in the factual matrix before it.

The crucial legal significance of this order may be summarised as follows:

• It affirms that a second bail application is maintainable even after the Supreme Court has set aside an earlier bail order, where there is a material change in circumstances, such as the subsequent testimony of key witnesses.
• It underscores that judicial vigilance against dowry deaths must coexist with a readiness to acknowledge and act upon possible misuse of dowry laws, especially when the prosecution’s own witnesses recant.

---

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Procedural History

1. An FIR was lodged as Case Crime No. 0032 of 2024 at P.S. Kotwali Nagar, District Sultanpur, alleging offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC and Sections 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act against the applicant and others in relation to the death of his wife.
2. The applicant’s first bail application (Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 5418 of 2024) was allowed by the High Court on 21.05.2024.
3. This grant of bail was challenged in the Supreme Court by way of SLP (Crl.) No. 11355 of 2024 and connected matters. On 03.03.2025, the Supreme Court:
   • set aside the High Court’s order granting bail, and
   • underscored the need for deeper scrutiny and heightened seriousness in bail decisions in dowry death cases, given their social impact.
4. The Supreme Court directed the applicant and his mother (mother-in-law of the deceased) to surrender before the trial court and also directed the trial court to conclude the trial expeditiously.
5. The applicant surrendered and was in custody from 17.03.2025.
6. During trial, crucial prosecution witnesses were examined (PWs 1 to 4) and did not support the prosecution case. On this basis, the applicant filed the present second bail application.

2.2 Evidence Considered by the High Court

The Court specifically notes the following:

• PW-1 (Informant):
  • Stated that the allegations of demand of dowry were made at the instance of members of the society.
  • Stated that at the time of the Panchnama (inquest), he had said that the victim had committed suicide.
  • Was declared a hostile witness by the prosecution.
• PW-2 (Father of the deceased):
  • Did not support the prosecution version.
  • Stated that the deceased was neither harassed for dowry nor killed.
• PW-3 (described as PW-2 in the text, likely a typographical error) – Maternal uncle of the deceased:
  • Also did not support the prosecution case.
  • Was declared hostile.
• PW-4 (Elder sister of the deceased):
  • Did not support the prosecution.

2.3 Key Observations and Findings

On the basis of the above, the High Court makes two central observations:

1. The case demonstrates the possibility of “fake cases” of demand of dowry. The Court notes that the informant had earlier challenged the grant of bail before the Supreme Court but, in court as a witness, subsequently resiled from his allegations, which the Court terms a “stark reality of the society”.
2. Given that:
   • the principal prosecution witnesses have not supported the allegations of dowry demand or killing, and
   • the applicant has been in custody since 17.03.2025,
   the applicant is entitled to be enlarged on bail.

2.4 Result and Conditions of Bail

The High Court allows the second bail application and directs that the applicant be released on bail in Case Crime No. 0032 of 2024 upon furnishing:

• a personal bond, and
• two reliable sureties of Rs. 20,000/- each,

to the satisfaction of the concerned court, subject to the following conditions:

1. The applicant shall execute a bond undertaking to attend the hearings.
2. He shall not commit any offence similar to the offence of which he is accused or suspected.
3. He shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case, so as to dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer, nor shall he tamper with the evidence.

---

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Higher Court Directions

3.1.1 The Supreme Court’s Order dated 03.03.2025

The primary “precedent” that frames this bail order is the Supreme Court’s earlier judgment dated 03.03.2025 in SLP (Crl.) No. 11355 of 2024 and connected matters, by which the applicant’s earlier bail was set aside.

The High Court reproduces, in substance, the Supreme Court’s key observations:

• The Court must be cognizant of the prevalence of dowry death in society.
• In such cases, courts are expected to:
  • undertake deeper scrutiny of the circumstances under which bail is granted, and
  • recognise that the social message conveyed by judicial orders in cases of young brides dying in suspicious circumstances within a short period of marriage “cannot be overstated”.
• Specifically, where a young bride dies under suspicious circumstances within about two years of marriage, the judiciary must demonstrate heightened vigilance and seriousness.
• The Supreme Court directed:
  • the applicant and the mother-in-law to surrender before the trial court, and
  • the trial court to expeditiously conclude the trial.

While the full text of the Supreme Court decision is not reproduced, the High Court treats those observations as binding guidance. The Supreme Court’s intervention placed the case in a heightened zone of scrutiny on account of:

• the nature of the allegations (dowry death),
• the short period between marriage and death, and
• the need for judicial orders to reflect society’s commitment to combatting dowry-related violence.

3.1.2 Interaction with General Bail Jurisprudence (Contextual, Not Explicitly Cited)

Although the High Court’s order itself does not cite earlier Supreme Court decisions on bail, it implicitly fits within well-established principles regarding:

• Successive bail applications, and
• Cancellation of bail and grant of fresh bail on changed circumstances.

The Supreme Court has, in various earlier decisions (e.g., Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subba Rao), held that:

• A second or subsequent bail application is maintainable only where there is a substantial change in circumstances or where new grounds arise after the earlier order.
• Bail, once cancelled by a higher court, is not an absolute bar to a future bail application if the factual or legal matrix materially changes during the course of proceedings.

While these decisions are not named in the judgment, Justice Pankaj Bhatia’s reasoning in Mukhtar Ahmad is consistent with this doctrine: the post-cancellation testimony of hostile witnesses is treated as a fresh, significant circumstance justifying reconsideration of bail.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the High Court

3.2.1 The Core Legal Question

The central legal question before the High Court can be framed as:

Whether, in a serious dowry death case where the Supreme Court has previously set aside a High Court order granting bail and directed heightened scrutiny, the subsequent hostility of key prosecution witnesses and the applicant’s continued custody for several months constitute a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant grant of bail in a second application?

3.2.2 Change in Circumstances: Hostile Witnesses

The High Court directly anchors its decision in the post-Supreme Court development that:

• PW-1 (informant),
• PW-2 (father of the deceased),
• the maternal uncle of the deceased, and
• PW-4 (elder sister of the deceased)

all refused to support the prosecution story in court.

The Court notes, in particular, that:

• The informant (PW-1) admitted that:
  • the dowry demand allegations were made at the instance of members of society, and
  • he had earlier told the authorities at the time of Panchnama that the deceased had committed suicide.
• The father, uncle and elder sister did not support allegations of dowry demand, cruelty or killing.

This collectively creates, in the Court’s view, a scenario where the prosecution’s foundational narrative is severely weakened. While the trial is still ongoing and other evidence may remain to be adduced, bail is a stage where the Court must assess:

• the strength of the prima facie case,
• likelihood of conviction on currently available evidence, and
• the justification for continued deprivation of liberty.

By recording that “considering the statements, the applicant… is entitled to bail”, the Court treats the hostile testimony as a decisive change in circumstances.

3.2.3 Reconciling Supreme Court Vigilance with Subsequent Developments

A key dimension of the reasoning is the Court’s attempt to remain faithful to the Supreme Court’s earlier caution while also responding to the altered evidentiary landscape.

The Supreme Court had emphasised:

• the gravity of dowry deaths,
• the need for deeper scrutiny at the bail stage, and
• the importance of the social message when a young bride dies under suspicious circumstances within two years of marriage.

The High Court’s present order reflects that it has, indeed, undertaken a deeper and updated scrutiny—this time not just of the FIR and pre-trial material (as in the first bail order), but of actual sworn testimony of the main prosecution witnesses after the Supreme Court’s intervention.

In effect, the Court’s reasoning can be summarised thus:

The Supreme Court rightly insisted on heightened vigilance and deeper scrutiny in dowry death cases. However, when, after such vigilance and after directing an expedited trial, the key prosecution witnesses themselves disown the prosecution story and the informant admits that the accusations were socially prompted, the balance of justice tilts in favour of granting bail, at least pending the conclusion of trial.

3.2.4 Observation on “Fake” Dowry Cases

Paragraph 7 of the order is notable for its strong language:

“it is essential to notice that fake cases of demand of dowry are on the rise, as is evident from the present case where the informant, challenged the order of grant of bail before the Supreme Court and thereafter has resiled from the said statements and have not supported the prosecution version, this fact cannot be ignored by this court. This is very unfortunate case where, the informant took a different stand before the Supreme Court… and has thereafter resiled from the statements which indicates the stark reality of the society.”

The Court treats the conduct of the informant—who:

• first challenged the High Court’s grant of bail before the Supreme Court, and
• then, as PW-1, retracted the allegations in trial court

as a microcosm of a broader societal pattern of:

• misuse of dowry laws through false or exaggerated allegations, followed by
• subsequent retraction or compromise.

This observation is both:

• a comment on the credibility of the prosecution in this case, and
• a general policy concern about the integrity of dowry-related prosecutions.

From a legal standpoint, this reasoning serves two functions:

1. It weakens the weight to be attached to the original accusations in the present case, making continued custody harder to justify.
2. It constitutes an obiter dicta on the perceived rise of false dowry cases, potentially influencing future bail decisions in similar contexts.

3.2.5 Custodial Period and Proportionality

The Court also notes that the applicant has been in custody since 17.03.2025. Combined with:

• the Supreme Court’s direction for an expeditious trial, and
• the collapse (at least prima facie) of the prosecution’s testimony from close relatives,

continued incarceration would raise questions of:

• proportionality (whether continued pre-trial incarceration is proportionate to the current strength of the case), and
• fairness to the accused who is, in law, presumed innocent.

Thus, the period of custody, while not the sole basis, reinforces the conclusion that bail should be granted.

3.3 Impact and Significance

3.3.1 On Bail Jurisprudence in Dowry Death Cases

The judgment contributes to bail jurisprudence in dowry death matters by clarifying that:

• Even in cases that attract strong judicial concern—like the death of a young bride within a short time of marriage—bail decisions must ultimately respond to the evolving evidentiary record, not solely to the gravity of the allegation.
• The presumption against bail in heinous offences is not absolute. Where the complainant and close relatives turn hostile in a manner that significantly undermines the prosecution case, courts may reassess the justification for continued custody.

This maintains an important balance between:

• the symbolic and deterrent role of the law in combating dowry deaths, and
• the individual rights of an accused not to be incarcerated indefinitely when the prosecution’s own witnesses no longer sustain the allegations.

3.3.2 On Second Bail Applications after Supreme Court Cancellation

Practically, the decision sets a clear example of how a High Court may:

• entertain a second bail application even after a prior bail grant has been set aside by the Supreme Court in the same case; and
• justify such a course based on substantive, post-cancellation developments such as trial testimony.

The order thereby implicitly reaffirms two principles:

1. No absolute bar exists on further bail applications after cancellation by a superior court, provided the factual matrix has materially changed.
2. The High Court remains duty-bound to examine new circumstances affecting personal liberty, even in the shadow of a prior adverse order of the Supreme Court, so long as it does not contradict or undermine the ratio of the Supreme Court’s judgment.

3.3.3 On the Treatment of Hostile Witnesses in Bail Decisions

The case demonstrates that:

• At the trial stage, hostility of material witnesses is often seen as a serious blow to the prosecution, but
• Even at the bail stage, once such hostility is formally recorded, courts may—without prejudging the ultimate guilt—treat it as a weighty factor in favour of bail.

However, this approach also invites:

• Cautionary reflections: witnesses may turn hostile due to intimidation, social pressure or compromise, which are endemic problems in criminal trials, particularly in family and dowry-related disputes.
• Policy concern: automatically equating hostile testimony with “fake cases” may overlook such pressures and might chill genuine complainants from coming forward or sustaining their allegations over time.

The High Court’s strong inference that the present case is “fake” based primarily on witness recantation is, therefore, controversial as a broader generalisation, but it is undeniably influential in its assessment of the present bail question.

3.3.4 On the Discourse of Misuse of Dowry Laws

The judgment adds judicial weight to the ongoing debate on the misuse of dowry-related offences:

• By expressly stating that fake dowry demand cases are “on the rise”, it aligns with a segment of judicial and scholarly opinion that has repeatedly flagged misuse—particularly under Section 498-A IPC.
• At the same time, the Supreme Court’s earlier order in this very case underscores the ongoing prevalence of genuine dowry deaths and the need for courts not to trivialise such allegations.

Together, these two judicial voices (Supreme Court and High Court) illustrate the duality of the challenge for criminal justice in dowry-related offences:

• On one hand, the system must protect vulnerable women and deliver a strong social message against dowry deaths.
• On the other, it must guard against the weaponisation of these laws in situations where allegations may be exaggerated or manipulated—especially when followed by later compromises.

The Mukhtar Ahmad order leans towards giving substantial weight to the latter concern, at least on the facts before it.

---

4. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

4.1 Dowry Death (Section 304-B IPC) and Related Provisions

Dowry death (Section 304-B IPC) typically involves:

• The death of a woman within seven years of her marriage,
• Under circumstances other than normal (e.g., burns, bodily injury, suicide, suspicious conditions), and
• Evidence that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives “soon before her death” in connection with a demand for dowry.

If these conditions are met, Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act creates a presumption that the husband or his relatives caused the dowry death, shifting a significant evidentiary burden onto the accused.

Section 498-A IPC deals with cruelty by the husband or his relatives, including:

• Any wilful conduct likely to drive a woman to suicide or cause grave injury to her life, limb or health, or
• Harassment with a view to coercing her or her relatives to meet unlawful demands for property or valuable security (i.e., dowry).

Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act criminalise:

• Giving, taking or abetting the giving or taking of dowry (Section 3), and
• Demanding dowry (Section 4).

4.2 Bail and Second Bail Applications

Bail is the release of an accused person from custody, subject to conditions, pending trial or appeal. It does not amount to an acquittal; the trial continues.

A second bail application is a fresh request for bail made after an earlier bail application has been rejected or an earlier grant of bail has been cancelled. Courts generally require:

• a substantial change in circumstances since the earlier decision (e.g., new evidence, prolonged custody, change in charges), or
• demonstration that the earlier order proceeded on an incomplete or incorrect understanding that has since been clarified.

Where bail was cancelled by a higher court (like the Supreme Court), subsequent bail can be considered only if new circumstances arise that were not and could not have been considered earlier.

4.3 Cancellation of Bail vs. Rejection of Bail

• Rejection of bail occurs when a court, for the first time, refuses to grant bail.
• Cancellation of bail occurs when a court sets aside an earlier order that had granted bail, often on the grounds of:
  • misuse of liberty by the accused (e.g., tampering with evidence), or
  • incorrect or incomplete appreciation of the relevant factors by the court that granted bail.

In Mukhtar Ahmad, the Supreme Court cancelled the High Court’s earlier bail order, emphasising that the earlier scrutiny was inadequate in view of the seriousness and social context of dowry deaths.

4.4 Hostile Witness

A hostile witness is a witness called by a party (usually the prosecution) who:

• deviates from their previous statement, or
• gives evidence unfavourable to the party that called them,

to such an extent that the party seeks permission from the court to:

• cross-examine their own witness (an exception to the usual rule), and
• treat prior inconsistent statements as impeaching their credibility.

The testimony of a hostile witness is not automatically discarded; courts may still rely on parts of it that appear truthful. But when all key witnesses become hostile in a serious case, it significantly weakens the prosecution’s prospects, which in turn can affect bail decisions.

4.5 Panchnama

A Panchnama (or panchayatnama) is a record or memorandum prepared at the scene of an incident—often an inquest or recovery—attested by panch witnesses. In death cases, an inquest Panchnama typically records:

• the apparent condition of the body,
• visible injuries, and
• preliminary observations about cause of death.

The High Court notes that in this case, at the time of Panchnama, the informant had stated that the victim died by suicide, which conflicts with later allegations of dowry death and homicide.

4.6 Bail Bonds and Conditions

A personal bond is a written undertaking by the accused to appear in court and comply with conditions. Sureties are other persons who pledge a specified amount, liable to forfeiture if the accused absconds or violates conditions.

Typical bail conditions, as seen here, include:

• Regular attendance at court hearings,
• Not committing similar offences, and
• Not tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses.

---

5. Conclusion

The decision in Mukhtar Ahmad v. State of U.P. is a significant illustration of how bail jurisprudence operates in the dynamic space between higher court directions, social concerns, and evolving evidence.

Key takeaways include:

1. Even after the Supreme Court cancels bail and emphasises the need for heightened vigilance in dowry death cases, a High Court is empowered to grant bail again if:
   • there is a substantial and genuine change in circumstances, and
   • fresh material (here, hostile testimony of core witnesses) significantly alters the strength of the prosecution case.
2. The Court’s reliance on the hostility of crucial prosecution witnesses—the informant, the father, the uncle and the sister of the deceased—demonstrates that:
   • bail decisions must respond to the current evidentiary landscape, not just the original accusations, and
   • continued pre-trial incarceration in the face of a weakened prima facie case may infringe fairness and proportionality.
3. The judgment’s explicit acknowledgment of the rise of “fake cases” of dowry demand adds to the jurisprudential and public debate on the misuse of dowry laws, even as higher courts simultaneously stress the urgent need to address genuine dowry deaths.
4. Ultimately, the order reaffirms two concurrent commitments of criminal justice:
   • a robust stance against dowry-related violence informed by social realities, and
   • a steadfast adherence to individual rights, presumption of innocence, and the necessity of evidence-based detention.

In doctrinal terms, Mukhtar Ahmad stands as an example of a High Court carefully navigating prior Supreme Court directions while still discharging its ongoing constitutional role of safeguarding personal liberty in light of new facts, especially where the prosecution’s own witnesses undermine the original narrative of dowry death.