RPF Personnel Are Governed Exclusively by the RPF Act, 1957 and RPF Rules, 1987; Railway Servants (D&A) Rules, 1968 Inapplicable — Appellate Court Quashes Major-Penalty Proceedings for Minor Infraction, Delay, and Post-Retirement Futility

RPF Personnel Are Governed Exclusively by the RPF Act, 1957 and RPF Rules, 1987; Railway Servants (D&A) Rules, 1968 Inapplicable — Appellate Court Quashes Major-Penalty Proceedings for Minor Infraction, Delay, and Post-Retirement Futility

Introduction

The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in The Divisional Security Commissioner, RPF, Trichy & Ors. v. K. Muniyandi (2025 MHC 2265, W.A.(MD) No. 489 of 2020, decided on 23.09.2025) addressed two interlinked questions: (i) which disciplinary regime governs members of the Railway Protection Force (RPF), and (ii) whether, on the facts, a charge memo initiating major-penalty proceedings ought to be sustained. The Division Bench (C.V. Karthikeyan, J. and R. Vijayakumar, J.) clarified that RPF personnel are exclusively regulated by the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 and the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987, and not by the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. Yet, despite correcting the legal foundation on which the Single Judge had quashed the charge memo, the Bench ultimately declined to interfere with the quashment, citing the minor nature of the alleged infraction, an unexplained seven-and-a-half-month delay in issuing the charge sheet, and the employee’s superannuation.

The case arose out of a challenge to a charge sheet issued to a Head Constable in the RPF, Tiruchirappalli, alleging desertion of duty from the CCTV control room and argumentative conduct towards a superior during the inauguration of an RPF barracks/rest room by the General Manager, Southern Railway. The Single Judge quashed the charge memo for non-compliance with Rule 9(7) of the Railway Servants (D&A) Rules, 1968—which prescribes a minimum of ten days for a written statement of defence. On appeal by the RPF authorities, the Division Bench clarified the correct governing law and procedure under the RPF Rules, 1987 but, in the exercise of appellate discretion, sustained the quashment of the charge memo on different grounds.

Summary of the Judgment

  • Exclusive regime: Members of the RPF are governed by the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 and the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987. The Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 do not apply to RPF personnel (see the specific exclusion noted under the D&A regime as reproduced by the Court).
  • Procedural framework under RPF Rules:
    • Rule 153.2.1 permits the disciplinary authority to appoint an Enquiry Officer upon forming an opinion that there are grounds to inquire into alleged misconduct.
    • Rule 153.5 requires delivery of the charges, imputations, and lists of documents and witnesses at least 72 hours before the commencement of the inquiry, with the authority fixing the commencement date.
    • Rule 153.15 provides that if the delinquent pleads “not guilty,” he must be allowed ten days to file a written statement and list of defence witnesses.
  • Correction of the legal basis: The Single Judge’s reliance on Rule 9(7) of the Railway Servants (D&A) Rules, 1968 was misplaced as those rules do not apply to RPF members. The proper yardstick was the RPF Rules, 1987.
  • Outcome nonetheless sustained: Despite correcting the applicable law, the Division Bench declined to interfere with the Single Judge’s order and quashed the charge sheet on the following grounds:
    • The alleged misconduct was minor and did not warrant major-penalty proceedings under Rule 153.
    • There was an unexplained delay of approximately 7.5 months between the incident (16.03.2018) and the charge sheet (03.11.2018), undermining the gravity and urgency of proceedings.
    • The employee had already retired and was receiving provisional pension—continuing proceedings would serve little purpose.
  • Directions: All disciplinary proceedings initiated under the quashed charge sheet are to be dropped, and monetary benefits to be released within 12 weeks.

Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The Division Bench grounded its analysis in the statutory framework rather than case law. The judgment quotes and applies:

  • Railway Protection Force Act, 1957:
    • Section 2(c): Definition of “member of the Force”.
    • Section 3(1): Constitution of the Force as an Armed Force of the Union.
    • Section 9: Power to dismiss, suspend, reduce in rank, and to impose specified punishments, subject to Article 311 of the Constitution and rules made under the Act.
  • Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987:
    • Rule 1.3: Applicability to all persons subject to the RPF Act.
    • Rule 153.1: No major punishment without an inquiry and reasonable opportunity to defend.
    • Rule 153.2.1: Authority to appoint an Inquiry Officer for misconduct inquiries.
    • Rule 153.5: Minimum 72-hour notice of charges, imputations, documents, and witnesses prior to commencement of inquiry; fixing the date.
    • Rule 153.15: Post-plea timeline—ten days to file written statement and defence witnesses list if the delinquent pleads “not guilty.”
  • Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968:
    • The Court reproduces an exclusion clause (described as Rule 801.1) expressly excluding “any member of the Railway Protection Forces” from the D&A regime, thereby confirming inapplicability to RPF personnel.

Notably, the Bench did not rely on or discuss judicial precedents; instead, it undertook a textual and structural reading of the applicable statutes and rules to resolve the primary conflict of laws question.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Exclusive applicability of the RPF regime

The Court first delineates the legal universe governing RPF personnel. Section 9 of the RPF Act, 1957 read with Rule 1.3 of the RPF Rules, 1987 demonstrates a complete, self-contained disciplinary code for RPF members. The Division Bench highlights the corresponding express exclusion of RPF personnel from the Railway Servants (D&A) Rules, 1968, making it clear that the D&A regime is neither residual nor concurrent in cases concerning RPF members.

This clarification directly answers the appellate contention that the Single Judge’s reliance on Rule 9(7) of the D&A Rules (requiring a minimum of ten days for a written defence) was legally untenable for an RPF member. The proper reference point is the RPF Rules, which provide a different timeline and structure for disciplinary inquiries.

2) Mapping the procedural architecture under the RPF Rules

The Court details the key touchpoints in major-penalty proceedings under Rule 153:

  • Appointment of Enquiry Officer: Under Rule 153.2.1, once the disciplinary authority is “of the opinion” that there are grounds, it may appoint an Inquiry Officer (not below Inspector, higher than the charged member). This can be contemporaneous with or shortly after issuing the charge sheet.
  • Notice and commencement: Rule 153.5 requires delivery of charges, imputations, and the lists of documents and witnesses at least 72 hours before the “commencement of the inquiry.” The authority also fixes the commencement date. This is a distinct threshold from the D&A Rules’ pre-inquiry written statement period.
  • Plea and written statement: The ten-day period appears in Rule 153.15 of the RPF Rules and is triggered after the delinquent is examined at the inquiry and pleads “not guilty.” It is at this stage that the delinquent must be allowed ten days to file a written statement and list of defence witnesses, not at the pre-inquiry stage as the D&A Rules contemplate.

The Court thereby dispels the confusion between the two regimes: the “ten days of defence time” exists in the RPF regime but at a different procedural station (post-plea) than under the D&A Rules (pre-inquiry). Therefore, the appointment of an Inquiry Officer and fixing of the inquiry date simultaneously with or soon after the charge sheet does not violate the RPF Rules, provided the 72-hour minimum notice and subsequent Rule 153.15 safeguards are observed.

3) Proportionality and classification of misconduct

Turning to the facts, the Bench evaluates whether the alleged conduct—leaving the CCTV control room for approximately 45 minutes during a ceremonial function, being argumentative with a superior, and speaking to the General Manager without permission—warranted initiation of “major penalty” proceedings. The Court signals that the substance of the allegations is at most minor, particularly absent any allegations of disruption, dereliction leading to harm, or aggravating factors beyond raised voice and unauthorised interaction.

By expressly stating that “the infraction alleged is, at best, minor in nature, and does not warrant the initiation of major penalty proceedings under Rule 153,” the Bench embeds a proportionality check into initiation decisions. Authorities must sift conduct through the lens of penalty gradation before invoking the major-penalty machinery.

4) Delay as a ground to doubt seriousness and to terminate proceedings

The Court emphasises the unexplained seven-and-a-half-month delay between the incident (16.03.2018) and the charge sheet (03.11.2018). Such delay “casts doubt on the seriousness and urgency of the allegations” and becomes a relevant equitable factor favouring termination of proceedings, particularly where the alleged misconduct is minor and the employee has since retired. While not explicitly framed as a separate legal rule, the analysis reflects a settled administrative law instinct: unexplained delay can undermine the credibility and fairness of disciplinary action.

5) Superannuation, futility, and moulding of relief

The respondent had already retired and was receiving provisional pension. The Bench notes this development and, balancing interests of justice and administrative finality, declines to permit a continuation of proceedings of doubtful utility. This aligns with the Court’s power to mould relief and to put an end to proceedings where further action would be disproportionate to any conceivable purpose, especially after retirement and in the absence of grave charges.

6) Affirmation on different grounds

A noteworthy facet is the appellate technique: while correcting the Single Judge’s legal error regarding the governing rules, the Bench nonetheless sustains the quashing of the charge memo on different, fact-intensive and equitable grounds (minor nature of the alleged infraction; unexplained delay; post-retirement status). This exemplifies the principle that an appellate court may affirm a final outcome for reasons different from those assigned below when justice so requires.

C. Impact and Prospective Significance

1) Clear demarcation of disciplinary regimes

For RPF and similarly situated forces governed by special statutes, the ruling crystallises a key compliance point: where a special law provides a complete code (here, the RPF Act and Rules), the general railway disciplinary rules do not apply. This reduces litigation over procedural contests and brings uniformity to RPF disciplinary practice.

2) Procedural milestones under the RPF Rules clarified

  • It is permissible under Rule 153.2.1 to appoint an Enquiry Officer contemporaneously with issuing the charge, and under Rule 153.5 to fix the commencement date, so long as:
    • At least 72 hours’ notice is given with full particulars (charges, imputations, documents, and witnesses), and
    • Upon a “not guilty” plea, the delinquent is given ten days under Rule 153.15 to submit a written statement and defence witness list.
  • Authorities should document compliance with each procedural protection to avoid later challenges.

3) Proportionality at the threshold

The decision signals that initiating major-penalty proceedings for minor infractions is disfavoured and susceptible to judicial correction. Disciplinary authorities within RPF should:

  • Assess the nature and gravity of alleged misconduct at the inception stage;
  • Choose the appropriate penalty track (minor vs major) with recorded reasons; and
  • Avoid escalation to Rule 153 unless the conduct prima facie warrants major consequences.

4) Delay as a substantive fairness concern

Unexplained delay, especially in non-grave matters, can be fatal to disciplinary proceedings. This judgment adds to the normative expectation that inquiries should be initiated and conducted with reasonable promptitude, and that unexplained dormancy may be treated as undermining the bona fides and utility of the proceedings.

5) Post-retirement pragmatism

Where an employee has superannuated, and the alleged misconduct is minor with inordinate delay preceding initiation, continuation of disciplinary proceedings may be viewed as futile and inequitable. The Court’s direction to release monetary benefits within a time-bound frame reinforces the imperative of closure.

6) Writ challenges at the charge memo stage

Although courts are generally slow to entertain writ petitions at the nascent “charge memo” stage, this case illustrates that intervention is not foreclosed where:

  • A wrong legal regime has been invoked or applied in argument, and
  • Independent equitable factors (minor infraction, unexplained delay, superannuation) overwhelmingly support termination of proceedings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Exclusive disciplinary code: When a special statute (like the RPF Act) and its rules cover the field for a class of employees, general rules (like the Railway Servants D&A Rules) do not apply to that class unless expressly incorporated.
  • Major vs minor penalties: “Major” penalties include dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, etc., typically requiring a full-fledged inquiry with stricter safeguards (Rule 153). “Minor” penalties involve lesser consequences and may follow a more abbreviated process; the choice must match the gravity of alleged misconduct.
  • Commencement of inquiry (RPF Rule 153.5): The “commencement” refers to the formal start of the inquiry proceedings. The charged official must receive the charge and supporting particulars at least 72 hours earlier.
  • Ten-day written statement period (RPF Rule 153.15): Under the RPF regime, this ten-day period arises after the charged member is examined and pleads “not guilty” at the inquiry, not at the pre-inquiry stage.
  • Ex parte inquiry: If the delinquent does not attend despite adequate notice and opportunity, the inquiry may proceed in his absence; however, authorities must still observe procedural fairness and record reasons.
  • Article 311 of the Constitution: Provides procedural safeguards to civil servants against dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank, requiring reasonable opportunity to defend. The RPF Act, via Section 9, expressly makes disciplinary action subject to Article 311 and the RPF Rules.
  • Provisional pension: A temporary pension paid post-retirement while proceedings or other formalities are pending; final settlement typically follows once matters are concluded or dropped.
  • Letters Patent Appeal/Writ Appeal (Clause 15): An intra-court appeal to a Division Bench from the judgment of a Single Judge in certain High Court jurisdictions, as invoked by the RPF authorities here.

Conclusion

This Division Bench ruling constitutes a clear and practical exposition on the disciplinary governance of RPF personnel. The core doctrinal holding is unambiguous: members of the RPF are subject only to the RPF Act, 1957 and the RPF Rules, 1987; the Railway Servants (D&A) Rules, 1968 do not apply to them. Within that exclusive regime, the Court carefully maps the procedural touchpoints—72-hour pre-commencement notice (Rule 153.5) and a ten-day written statement period that arises only after a “not guilty” plea is recorded (Rule 153.15).

Equally significant is the Court’s pragmatic approach to justice in the facts: it discourages initiation of major-penalty proceedings for minor infractions, treats unexplained delay as evidencing lack of seriousness, and values closure when the employee has already retired. The appellate technique—correcting the legal basis while affirming the outcome—demonstrates the Court’s willingness to mould relief to the equities of the case, culminating in a time-bound direction to release monetary benefits.

For RPF disciplinary authorities, this judgment supplies a compliance roadmap: apply the correct code (RPF Rules), respect the distinct procedural stations and timelines, classify charges proportionately, act with promptitude, and recognise when continued pursuit of proceedings is no longer just or useful. For practitioners and employees, it offers clarity on rights and safeguards under the RPF framework and a nuanced articulation of when the High Court will intervene even at an early stage. In both respects, the decision is likely to guide future disciplinary practice and litigation involving the RPF.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Madras High Court

Judge(s)

Hon'ble Mr.Justice C.V. Karthikeyan

Advocates

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