Requisitioning of Private Doctors Under COVID-19 Emergency Regulations as Sufficient for PMGKY Insurance Coverage

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in Pradeep Arora & Ors. v. Director, Health Department, Govt. of Maharashtra & Ors., 2025 INSC 1420, addresses a crucial question that arose from the COVID-19 pandemic: when can a doctor or healthcare worker be said to have been “requisitioned” or “drafted” for COVID-19 duty so as to qualify for the Rs. 50 lakh ex gratia insurance under the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Package: Insurance Scheme for Health Workers Fighting COVID-19 (PMGKY-Package)?

The specific dispute concerned the widow of a private medical practitioner, Late Dr. B.S. Surgade, whose claim under the PMGKY-Package was rejected on the ground that his services had never been “requisitioned” for COVID-19-related responsibilities. The Bombay High Court upheld this rejection, taking a narrow view of the requirement of “requisitioning”.

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha with Justice R. Mahadevan concurring, reframed the understanding of requisitioning in the extraordinary context of the pandemic. While the Court did not itself decide the factual entitlement of the claimant, it laid down a binding legal principle of general application:

• There was a requisition of services of doctors and medical professionals in Maharashtra during COVID-19, evident from the statutory and regulatory framework and executive orders issued under the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897.
• The term “requisition” cannot be confined to formal, individual appointment letters; it must be understood in the light of binding emergency regulations and directions compelling doctors to serve.
• However, in each individual case, the claimant bears the burden of proving that the deceased actually died while performing COVID-19-related duties.

This commentary examines the judgment’s background, reasoning, and broader implications for welfare schemes, emergency powers, and the legal recognition of frontline healthcare work during pandemics.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The parties and the claim

Late Dr. B.S. Surgade was a private medical practitioner running his own clinic in Navi Mumbai. During the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic:

• The Government of Maharashtra, invoking the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897, issued the Prevention and Containment of COVID-19 Regulations, 2020 (Notification dated 14.03.2020).
• Regulation 10 empowered District Collectors and Municipal Commissioners to take containment measures, and specifically to:
  • deploy staff of all government departments and organisations, and
  • “requisition the services of any other person also.”

Acting under these Regulations, the Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation (NMMC) issued a notice dated 31.03.2020 to Dr. Surgade:

• Referring expressly to the Epidemic Diseases Act and the 14.03.2020 Regulations.
• Stating that he had already been directed under an earlier order to keep his clinic open during lockdown.
• Ordering him to open his hospital/dispensary immediately during the lockdown, with specified safety measures.
• Warning that failure to comply would lead to an FIR under Section 188 IPC (disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant).

Separately, by a circular dated 08–09.05.2020, the Director of Medical Education & Research (DMER) requested registered Ayurved RMPs to render services for COVID-19 patients for at least 15 days, warning that non-attendance could attract action under the Epidemic Diseases Act and other statutes. This circular was also sent to Dr. Surgade, but the High Court found that he had not responded by volunteering under that circular.

On 08.06.2020, Dr. Surgade tested positive for COVID-19 and died on 10.06.2020. His widow (Appellant No. 3) claimed the Rs. 50 lakh benefit under the PMGKY-Package. The claim was rejected by the State Health Department’s Joint Director (letter dated 07.09.2020) on the basis that:

1. He was a private practitioner;
2. His clinic was not a designated COVID-19 hospital; and
3. His services had not been requisitioned by NMMC or any authority.

A writ petition challenging this decision was dismissed by the Bombay High Court, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

2.2 The PMGKY-Package insurance scheme

The PMGKY Insurance Scheme was announced as part of the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana relief package via:

• Press release dated 26.03.2020 by the Ministry of Finance, announcing an insurance scheme for health workers fighting COVID-19.
• Order dated 28.03.2020 by the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare (MoHFW), formally launching the scheme.

Key features include:

• Coverage amount: Rs. 50 lakh personal accident cover.
• Beneficiaries:
  • Public healthcare providers (including community health workers) directly dealing with COVID-19 patients.
  • Private hospital staff, retirees, volunteers, contract/daily wage/ad hoc/outsourced staff “requisitioned” or “drafted” by Central or State hospitals and specified institutions for COVID-19 responsibilities.
• The scheme envisaged that requisitioning/drafting by State authorities was a key condition for private health workers’ inclusion.

This was elaborated through:

• An explanatory letter dated 03.04.2020 encouraging wide publicity and assuring inclusion of healthcare providers; and
• A detailed FAQ document, which emphasised that private staff and volunteers would be covered if they were “requisitioned by States” or “drafted” for COVID-19 duties.

Later, by letter dated 15.10.2020, the MoHFW reiterated that coverage extended only to:

• Public healthcare providers; and
• Private and other staff drafted/requisitioned for COVID-19 responsibilities, working as frontline workers, and whose death was due to COVID-19 or accidental death on COVID duty.

3. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

The Supreme Court confined itself to interpreting the PMGKY-Package and the concept of “requisitioning” of services. It explicitly declined to conduct a fact-intensive enquiry into whether the particular claimant met all evidentiary requirements.

The Court’s key holdings can be summarised as follows:

1. Existence of requisitioning of doctors and health professionals
   The Court held that, in the circumstances prevailing during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was indeed a requisition of services of doctors and medical professionals. This was evident from:
   • The Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 and the powers exercised under it;
   • The Maharashtra Prevention and Containment of COVID-19 Regulations, 2020, especially Regulation 10;
   • The NMMC notice dated 31.03.2020 compelling doctors like Dr. Surgade to keep clinics open on pain of criminal prosecution;
   • The PMGKY-Package scheme documents, explanatory communications, and FAQs.
   The Court rejected the High Court’s narrow view that, in the absence of a specific individual requisition order, there was no requisition.
2. Pandemic context and purposive reading of the scheme
   The Court stressed that the emergency context of early 2020 made it unrealistic to expect formal, individual “drafting” orders. The invocation of emergency statutes and regulations, coupled with binding directives (like the NMMC notice), itself amounted to requisitioning in law. A restrictive interpretation would defeat the purpose of the PMGKY-Package, which was to reassure and protect frontline healthcare workers.
3. Individual entitlement depends on proof of COVID-related duty
   While declaring that doctors’ services stood requisitioned, the Court clarified that:
   • Eligibility of a particular deceased doctor under the PMGKY-Package is a factual question.
   • The onus of proof lies on the claimant to show, with credible evidence, that the deceased:
     • was performing COVID-19-related duties; and
     • lost his/her life due to COVID-19 (or in an accident arising out of COVID duty), consistent with the scheme conditions.
   • Such claims must be assessed by the concerned offices/agencies, not by the Court in this proceeding.
4. Partial modification of the High Court’s judgment
   The writ petition’s dismissal by the High Court was partially modified:
   • The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s finding that there was no requisitioning of services.
   • It did not, however, itself grant the insurance amount; it left individual claim adjudication to the administrative machinery, to be done under the clarified legal position.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Statutory and Regulatory Framework

4.1.1 Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 and Maharashtra COVID Regulations, 2020

The State of Maharashtra invoked its powers under Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 and framed the Prevention and Containment of COVID-19 Regulations, 2020. Regulation 10:

• Empowered the Collector/Municipal Commissioner to take wide-ranging containment measures – sealing areas, restricting movement, closing institutions, initiating surveillance and isolation, designating quarantine facilities, and taking “any other measure” as directed by the Public Health Department.
• Placed the staff of all government departments and organisations in the concerned area at the disposal of the Collector/Municipal Commissioner.
• Crucially, authorized them to “requisition the services of any other person also”, thereby extending the reach beyond government employees to private individuals, including private medical practitioners.

Regulation 11 criminalized violations of these Regulations by reference to Section 188 IPC, underscoring the binding and coercive character of the directions issued thereunder.

4.1.2 NMMC notice of 31.03.2020

The NMMC notice:

• Expressly cited the Maharashtra COVID-19 Regulations framed under the Epidemic Diseases Act.
• Referred to an earlier order (No. 123/2020) by which the Commissioner had already directed doctors like Dr. Surgade to keep their hospitals/dispensaries open.
• Ordered immediate compliance, setting out specific safety measures (social distancing, masks, sanitizers).
• Threatened prosecution under Section 188 IPC in case of non-compliance.

Although framed as a “show cause” and compliance notice, the Supreme Court viewed this instrument, in conjunction with the Regulations, as a legal compulsion requiring doctors to remain operational during the pandemic emergency. This was a central plank in the Court’s finding that there was a requisitioning of services.

4.1.3 PMGKY Insurance Scheme instruments

On the central side, four main documents shaped the scheme:

1. Press release (26.03.2020): Announced an insurance cover of Rs. 50 lakh for health workers “fighting COVID-19”, signalling a broad political-legal assurance to those on the frontline.
2. MoHFW Order (28.03.2020):
   • Provided for a 90-day personal accident cover for around 22.12 lakh public health providers and community health workers.
   • Extended coverage, “on account of the unprecedented situation”, to private staff/retired/volunteer/local urban body/contract/daily wage/ad hoc/outsourced staff “requisitioned” by public hospitals and specified institutions for COVID duties.
3. Explanatory letter (03.04.2020): Directed wide dissemination among healthcare providers, emphasising their “inclusion” under the scheme to instil a sense of security.
4. FAQ document: Gave operational detail, including:
   • Coverage for loss of life due to COVID-19 or accidental death on COVID-related duty.
   • Inclusion of public providers, private hospital staff, volunteers, and outsourced staff, so long as they had been “requisitioned by States” or “drafted” for COVID-19 responsibilities.
   • Claim documentation, including certification that the deceased was an employee/engaged person who had been deployed/drafted for care and “may have come in direct contact of the COVID-19 patient”.

Later, the MoHFW’s letter dated 15.10.2020 sought to confine the scheme to (a) public healthcare providers, and (b) private and other staff who were drafted/requisitioned and were frontline workers dealing with COVID-19, whose death was COVID-related or accidental on COVID duty. The High Court relied heavily on this letter to insist on strict proof of formal requisition.

4.2 Precedents and Authorities Considered

Notably, the Supreme Court’s judgment does not cite prior judicial precedents in support of its reasoning. The decision is almost entirely grounded in:

• The text and scheme of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 and the Maharashtra Regulations;
• The administrative instruments comprising the PMGKY-Package (press release, MoHFW orders, explanatory letters, FAQs); and
• The factual and normative context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In terms of legal method, the Court implicitly draws on well-established doctrines of:

• Purposive interpretation of welfare and beneficial schemes, favouring coverage over exclusion in cases of ambiguity.
• Contextual reading of legal and administrative instruments, particularly in emergency situations where rigid formal requirements may be impracticable.
• Administrative law principles that the legal effect of state action must be assessed objectively from statutory powers and instruments, not merely from subsequent self-serving assertions by officials.

However, since no previous case law is specifically invoked in the text, this judgment stands as a primary, self-contained precedent on the interpretation of “requisitioning” and coverage under the PMGKY-Package.

4.3 The Supreme Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.3.1 Pandemic context as interpretive lens

From the outset, the Court frames the analysis within the extraordinary context of the early COVID-19 outbreak:

• It recalls the global devastation, the systemic fragility in healthcare, and the extraordinary risk and sacrifice of doctors and health workers (including data from the Indian Medical Association).
• The narrative emphasises that doctors were “requisitioned” and conscripted into service through special laws and regulations, and that the State’s public assurance through the PMGKY-Package formed part of this mobilisation.
• This framing serves a doctrinal function: it justifies a non-technical, purposive, and reality-sensitive interpretation of terms like “requisitioned” and “drafted”, in contrast with the High Court’s narrowly textual reading.

In essence, the Court holds that interpretive choices must be informed by the emergency character of the measures and the moral-political assurance

4.3.2 What counts as “requisitioning”?

The core legal question was whether, under the PMGKY-Package, there had been a “requisitioning” of doctors’ services by the State. The Court answers this affirmatively, through several steps:

1. Absence of prescribed procedure
   The Court notes that there is no prescribed statutory procedure for requisitioning services of doctors under the scheme or the relevant regulations. Thus, insisting on a specific form (e.g., individual appointment letters) would be judicially invented and unrealistic.
2. Reading Regulations and notices together
   The Court reads:
   • The Epidemic Diseases Act;
   • The Maharashtra COVID-19 Regulations, 2020, particularly the power to requisition “any other person”; and
   • The NMMC notice dated 31.03.2020 invoking these powers and compelling doctors to keep clinics open on pain of criminal prosecution;
   as constituting a collective legal framework of requisition. This framework:
   • Was coercive, not merely exhortatory, given the threat of Section 188 IPC.
   • Placed private practitioners in a position akin to emergency conscription: they were required to remain on duty in a pandemic and expose themselves to the risk of infection.
3. Practical impossibility of individual letters
   The Court recognises that, given the speed and scale of the pandemic, issuing individualized requisition orders to each doctor was “not possible” and precisely the reason the government invoked broad emergency powers under the Epidemic Diseases Act and its Regulations.
4. Link to the PMGKY-Package’s intent
   The Court connects this requisitioning framework to the PMGKY-Package:
   • The insurance scheme was announced and operationalised in the same time-frame (late March 2020).
   • Explanatory communications and FAQs made clear that the scheme was designed to support all those called upon—public and private—to undertake COVID duty.
   • The scheme was “equally intended to assure doctors and health professionals in the front line that the country is with them”.
   Hence, a construction of “requisition” that leaves large numbers of such conscripted doctors outside the scheme would be inconsistent with its beneficial and assurance-based purpose.
5. Rejection of narrow textualism
   The Court expressly rejects what it calls the “rather simplistic submission” that, in the absence of a specific requisition order, a claim must fail. It is “not inclined to take a narrow view” that would:
   • Ignore the live pandemic situation; and
   • Disregard the legal effect of broad regulatory and executive actions taken under emergency statutes.

The result is a functional definition of requisitioning: where, under emergency laws and binding regulations, the State compels doctors and healthcare workers to remain available, operate their facilities, or otherwise place themselves at risk to support containment and treatment efforts, their services are “requisitioned” for purposes of the PMGKY-Package.

4.3.3 Distinguishing “general requisition” from “individual entitlement”

Having established that doctors’ services were requisitioned in law, the Court makes an important doctrinal separation:

• General legal position: The Court issues a declaratory holding applicable generally: that, in Maharashtra, there was requisition of doctors’ services, evident from the combined reading of the Act, Regulations, NMMC order, and PMGKY instruments (para 30(a)).
• Case-specific entitlement: Whether a particular deceased doctor:
  • fell within the categories envisaged by the scheme; and
  • actually died while performing COVID-19-related duties;
  remains a question of fact, to be determined by the competent authorities on evidence.

Accordingly, in para 29 and 30(b), the Court clarifies:

• The onus is on the claimant to prove that the deceased lost his/her life while performing COVID-19-related duty.
• This must be established on the basis of credible evidence, in accordance with the scheme’s conditions.

This preserves the administrative space for authorities to scrutinise claims (e.g., ensuring a causal link with COVID duty) while preventing them from denying coverage a priori by asserting that there was no requisition at all.

4.4 Critique of the High Court’s Approach

The Supreme Court’s reasoning implicitly identifies several errors in the Bombay High Court’s analysis.

4.4.1 Over-reliance on formal language of “drafted” and “requisitioned”

The High Court placed “great emphasis” on the words “drafted” and “requisitioned for COVID-19 related responsibilities” as used in:

• The MoHFW letter of 15.10.2020; and
• The FAQ to the PMGKY-Package.

From this, it concluded that:

• Private practitioners are eligible, but only if they can show that they were specifically “requisitioned/drafted” for COVID duty.
• The NMMC notice directing clinics to remain open was not such a requisition but merely an encouragement to keep facilities open during lockdown.

The Supreme Court considered this approach too literal and decontextualized. It held that:

• The NMMC notice was coercive in nature, backed by threat of prosecution, and issued under emergency regulations.
• The distinction the High Court drew between “specific requisition” and “direction not to close clinics” was artificial in the circumstances of a public health emergency where keeping clinics open was itself a critical part of the health response.

4.4.2 Deference to post-facto administrative denials

The High Court also relied on “overwhelming correspondence” in which State and municipal authorities asserted that:

• Dr. Surgade’s services had not been requisitioned; and
• His clinic was not designated as a COVID hospital.

The Supreme Court declined to treat such correspondence as determinative of the legal question of requisition, emphasising instead the objective legal effect of the statutory framework and binding regulations at the time of the pandemic’s onset. In doing so, the Court reinforced a key principle of administrative law:

State authorities cannot, by post-hoc self-characterization, narrow the legal scope of their earlier binding actions, especially where such narrowing would defeat a public assurance embodied in a central welfare scheme.

4.4.3 Misreading of the scheme’s purpose

The High Court’s restrictive approach effectively undermined the PMGKY-Package’s purpose of:

• Protecting and reassuring those on the frontline, including private practitioners compelled to serve under emergency powers; and
• Reflecting societal gratitude and support to those risking their lives.

By insisting on formal requisition letters and accepting administrative disclaimers at face value, the High Court’s interpretation risked excluding many doctors who in substance had been conscripted by law but lacked documentary “drafting” orders. The Supreme Court corrected this by realigning the interpretation with the welfare and assurance aim of the scheme.

4.5 Impact and Implications

4.5.1 Broadening access to PMGKY coverage

The most immediate impact of the judgment is on pending and future claims under the PMGKY-Package (and similar schemes):

• Private practitioners whose services were compelled under emergency regulations and municipal orders can no longer be denied coverage on the preliminary ground that there was “no requisition”.
• Authorities must now proceed to examine whether:
  • the deceased was in fact performing COVID-19-related duties; and
  • the death was caused by COVID-19 or by an accident arising from such duty, following the evidentiary requirements of the scheme.

This substantially widens the effective ambit of the PMGKY-Package for private healthcare workers.

4.5.2 Interpretation of emergency powers and welfare schemes

Doctrinally, the case sets an important precedent on how courts should interpret:

• Emergency public health measures under statutes like the Epidemic Diseases Act; and
• Beneficial insurance/welfare schemes announced in response to such emergencies.

Key lessons include:

• Courts will adopt a purposive and context-sensitive approach, especially where the State has publicly assured support to a vulnerable group (here, health workers).
• Formalistic requirements (like specific forms of requisition orders) should not be read into schemes where the underlying reality of compulsion and service is evident from the broader legal and executive framework.
• Clarificatory circulars and FAQs cannot be used to shrink substantive entitlements in a manner inconsistent with the scheme’s object and the legal context in which it was conceived.

4.5.3 Future pandemic or disaster response

For future health emergencies or disasters, this judgment:

• Encourages governments to articulate clearly the scope of emergency requisitioning and linked entitlements, but also;
• Warns that, in the absence of such clarity, courts will interpret the framework in favour of those who bear the risks on the ground.
• Signals that assurances given to frontline workers, once operationalised through binding schemes, carry legal weight and cannot be treated as merely political or symbolic.

4.5.4 Administrative practice and burden of proof

On the other hand, by placing the onus of proof on claimants to show that death occurred during COVID-19 duty, the Court:

• Preserves the State’s ability to prevent fraudulent or unsupported claims; but
• Also places a practical burden on families, especially where documentation may be imperfect, to gather evidence of COVID duty.

In practice, this will require:

• Hospitals, municipal bodies, and health departments to maintain clear records of deployment, duty rosters, and COVID-related responsibilities; and
• Fair and transparent processes for certifying whether a deceased health worker was indeed on COVID duty, in line with the scheme’s FAQ requirements.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Requisitioning of services
  In simple terms, “requisitioning” means the State legally compels a person to make their services available for public purposes, especially in emergencies. It does not always require a personalised letter; it can occur through:
  • Emergency laws empowering authorities to require services;
  • Regulations and orders that bind categories of people (like doctors) to remain on duty, with penalties for non-compliance.
• Drafting for COVID-19 responsibilities
  To be “drafted” is to be assigned or deployed to perform specific COVID-19-related work—such as treating COVID patients, conducting testing, surveillance, or other frontline duties—as part of the official response.
• Section 188 IPC
  This provision punishes disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant, where such disobedience can cause obstruction, annoyance, injury, or risk to human life or health. When an order under emergency regulations threatens prosecution under Section 188 for non-compliance, it reflects a binding legal obligation, not a mere request.
• Beneficial / welfare scheme interpretation
  Courts often interpret social welfare schemes and beneficial policies in a manner that favours the intended beneficiaries where the language is ambiguous, rather than reading them narrowly to exclude people. This flows from the principle that the State, having chosen to confer benefits, should not defeat its own purpose through hyper-technical readings.
• Frontline health worker
  A frontline health worker is a doctor, nurse, paramedic, community health worker, or similar professional who:
  • Directly interacts with and cares for patients;
  • Faces higher risk of infection, especially during pandemics; and
  • Is critical to the immediate response (testing, treatment, containment).
  The PMGKY-Package specifically intended to benefit such workers.
• Onus (burden) of proof
  The “onus of proof” refers to who must bring evidence to establish a fact in legal proceedings. Here, the Supreme Court held that the claimant (e.g., the deceased doctor’s family) must prove, with credible evidence, that:
  • The deceased was performing COVID-19-related duty; and
  • The death occurred due to COVID-19 or an accident on such duty.

6. Conclusion

The decision in Pradeep Arora v. Director, Health Department marks an important development in the legal treatment of frontline healthcare workers during emergencies. Its central contribution is the clear holding that:

• The emergency mobilisation of doctors and health professionals under the Epidemic Diseases Act and COVID-19 Regulations, coupled with binding municipal orders like the NMMC notice, constitutes “requisitioning” of their services for purposes of the PMGKY-Package.
• Courts must interpret such welfare schemes in a manner consistent with their protective and assurance-based purpose, not through narrow formalism.

At the same time, the Court balances this expansive recognition with a safeguard: individual claims must still satisfy evidentiary requirements, and the burden remains on claimants to prove that the deceased died while on COVID-19 duty.

In the broader legal landscape, this judgment:

• Affirms a purposive, context-aware approach to interpreting emergency measures and welfare schemes;
• Signals that State assurances to those risking their lives—especially in pandemics—carry real legal force; and
• Establishes a binding precedent on what amounts to requisitioning in the context of public health emergencies, likely to guide future disaster-response schemes and litigation.

Ultimately, the judgment stands as both a legal and moral acknowledgment of the role of doctors and health workers during COVID-19, and a directive to the administrative state to honour, in substance and not merely in rhetoric, the commitments made to them.