Recording “Reasons to Believe” and Locus in Bar Disciplinary Referrals: Opponent-Litigant Complaints Ordinarily Impermissible; Mere Identification/Attestation by Advocate Is Not Misconduct under Section 35

Introduction

In Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v. Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula (2025 INSC 1147), the Supreme Court of India, per Mehta, J. (with Vikram Nath, J. concurring), delivers a reportable ruling that recalibrates the threshold for initiating professional misconduct proceedings against advocates under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The Court quashes a disciplinary reference against Advocate Rajiv Narula arising from a decades-old property litigation and, in connected matters, affirms the Bombay High Court’s quashing of a similar complaint against Advocate Geeta Ramanugrah Shastri.

The decision crystalizes three controlling propositions:

A State Bar Council must record cogent “reasons to believe” showing a prima facie case of misconduct before referring a complaint to the Disciplinary Committee; a bare, cryptic referral order is invalid.
Ordinarily, a disciplinary complaint for “professional misconduct” should arise from a jural (client–advocate) relationship; complaints by an opponent litigant against the opposite counsel are, as a rule, impermissible and an abuse of process.
Routine acts such as identifying a party in consent terms or attesting/identifying a deponent to an affidavit do not, by themselves, make the advocate responsible for the contents nor amount to “misconduct.”

The Court also invokes its jurisdiction under Article 136 to terminate, at the threshold, disciplinary proceedings found to be malafide or perverse, and imposes costs on the State Bar Council and the complainant for misuse of disciplinary machinery.

Background and Procedural History

The primary appeal (arising from SLP (C) No. 27606 of 2023) challenges an interim stay granted by the Bombay High Court on proceedings initiated by the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa (BCMG) against Advocate Rajiv Narula. The complaint—filed by Khimji Devji Parmar—alleged fraud in relation to consent terms recorded in a 1985 suit concerning land in Malad, Mumbai, and imputed misconduct to the advocate based essentially on his identification of the plaintiff’s authorized representative in the consent terms.

In parallel, two connected SLPs (including SLP (C) No. 1492 of 2024) relate to a complaint by one Bansidhar Annaji Bhakad against Advocate Geeta Ramanugrah Shastri. There, the allegation was that the advocate, by identifying a deponent in an affidavit filed with a chamber summons, effectively vouched for the truth of its contents—a proposition the High Court found untenable and the Supreme Court affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court:

Quashes Complaint No. 27 of 2023 and all consequential proceedings against Advocate Rajiv Narula, holding that:
- The Bar Council’s referral order dated 6 July 2023 was non-speaking and did not record the statutorily mandated “reasons to believe” under Section 35(1).
- There was no professional relationship between the complainant (or his predecessor) and the respondent-advocate; anchoring a complaint on the advocate’s mere identification of a party to consent terms is legally unsustainable.
- The consent decree remains undisturbed; a disciplinary complaint cannot be used to collaterally impeach consent terms.
Closes the pending writ petition before the High Court, and imposes costs of Rs. 50,000 on the BCMG for entertaining a frivolous complaint and dragging the advocate to the Supreme Court.
In the connected matters, upholds the Bombay High Court’s quashing of disciplinary proceedings against Advocate Geeta Ramanugrah Shastri, reiterating that identifying/attesting a deponent does not make an advocate responsible for the contents of an affidavit. The SLPs are dismissed with costs of Rs. 50,000 each on the complainant and the BCMG.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court relies centrally on Nandlal Khodidas Barot v. Bar Council Of Gujarat (1980 Supp SCC 318), which articulates the duty of State Bar Councils to apply their mind at the threshold:

“It is apparent that a State Bar Council not only receives a complaint but is required to apply its mind to find out whether there is any reason to believe that any advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct... when the Bar Council has reasonable belief that there is a prima facie case of misconduct that a disciplinary committee is entrusted with such inquiry.”

Drawing from Nandlal Barot, the Court treats the recording of a reasoned, prima facie satisfaction as a sine qua non for valid referral to the Disciplinary Committee. This anchoring precedent directly informs the holding that the BCMG’s cryptic referral—bereft of even a gist of allegations—was invalid for non-application of mind and contrary to Section 35(1).

Legal Reasoning

1) Section 35 requires recorded reasons to believe

Section 35(1) vests the State Bar Council with the responsibility to filter complaints by forming, and recording, “reasons to believe” that an advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct before referring a matter to the Disciplinary Committee. The Court emphasizes that:

A referral is not a ministerial act; it follows an evaluative, reasoned belief.
A non-speaking, one-line referral that merely asserts a prima facie case is invalid because it neither reflects application of mind nor allows meaningful judicial or intra-institutional scrutiny.
Given the reputational and professional consequences of a disciplinary reference, minimum due process at the threshold is indispensable.

Applying the rule to the facts, the BCMG’s order dated 6 July 2023 was “absolutely cryptic and laconic,” failing the statutory standard and attracting quashment.

2) Locus and the “jural relationship” requirement

The Court states a new and significant organizing principle for bar discipline:

“Ordinarily, the existence of a jural relationship between the complainant and the advocate concerned is a precondition for the invocation of disciplinary jurisdiction on the ground of ‘professional misconduct’.”

Two corollaries follow:

Complaints by an opponent litigant against the opposite counsel are, as a rule, “highly objectionable, totally impermissible, and absolutely uncalled for.”
Section 35’s “complaint or otherwise” language does not license Bar Councils to entertain adversary-driven complaints that do not spring from a lawyer–client relationship, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances (the Court uses “ordinarily”) where concrete reasons can be recorded as to why the conduct impugned is professional or other misconduct within the Act.

In Narula’s case, there was indisputably no engagement between the complainant and the respondent-advocate; this decisively undermined the maintainability of the complaint for professional misconduct.

3) Mere identification/attestation is not misconduct; no liability for contents

In both the principal and connected matters, the Court sharply distinguishes between:

The acts of identifying an authorized representative in consent terms or identifying a deponent to an affidavit; and
Assuming responsibility for the substantive truth of the contents of the consent terms or affidavit.

The Court holds that an advocate who merely identifies the signatory or deponent does not become “privy to the contents” and cannot be proceeded against for the truthfulness or otherwise of those contents. Thus:

In Narula, the advocate’s limited role—identifying the plaintiff’s representative—could not found a charge of misconduct under Section 35, especially when the consent terms remained unassailed in the suit.
In Shastri, identifying the deponent to an affidavit filed with a chamber summons did not amount to swearing an affidavit nor attesting to the veracity of its contents; the complaint was “wholly absurd and untenable.”

4) Collateral attack on consent terms is impermissible via bar discipline

The Court underscores that the consent terms taken on record by the High Court “continue to hold good and have not been recalled or rescinded.” Alleged fraud or irregularity in such consent terms must be addressed in appropriate substantive proceedings; a disciplinary complaint is not an avenue to collaterally impeach a subsisting consent decree, still less to target an opposite counsel who merely identified a signatory.

5) Exercise of Article 136 despite interlocutory origin

Although the matter reached the Supreme Court from an interim order, the Court invoked Article 136 to conclusively quash the disciplinary proceedings. It justified this departure from the norm by citing “stark and glaring facts” showing abuse of process and the need to avoid further harassment to the advocate. This signals the Court’s readiness to intervene at an early stage to arrest perverse or mala fide disciplinary actions that threaten the dignity and independence of the Bar.

6) Costs as a structural disincentive against misuse

The Court imposed Rs. 50,000 costs on the BCMG in the principal matter and, in the connected matters, Rs. 50,000 each on the complainant and the BCMG. These costs serve as a deterrent against:

Frivolous or adversarially motivated complaints designed to pressure opposite counsel; and
Non-speaking referrals by State Bar Councils that do not satisfy the statutory standard of “reasons to believe.”

Impact and Prospective Significance

The judgment has immediate and systemic implications for the functioning of bar disciplinary mechanisms and litigation culture:

Due process at the referral stage: State Bar Councils must issue reasoned, speaking orders demonstrating application of mind to the complaint and the statutory standard. “Rubber-stamp” referrals to the Disciplinary Committee will be void and liable to be quashed.
Filtering of opponent-driven complaints: The “ordinarily precondition” of a client–advocate relationship will screen out most complaints by adversaries against opposite counsel. This safeguards advocates from harassment and preserves adversarial independence.
Clarification of routine professional acts: Identifying signatories or deponents—widespread in litigation practice—does not expose advocates to liability for content. This clarity should reduce tactical complaints alleging perjury/forgery against counsel based on such formal endorsements.
Proper forum for disputing consent decrees: Parties must challenge consent terms in the suit or via appropriate substantive remedies. Bar discipline is not a collateral forum to nullify or attack a subsisting decree.
Strengthening institutional accountability: Costs imposed on State Bar Councils may prompt tighter internal scrutiny and institutional training on Section 35 standards, enhancing fairness and credibility of the disciplinary process.
Judicial readiness to intervene: The Court’s use of Article 136 to quash proceedings at an interlocutory stage signals that higher courts will act promptly to prevent abuse of disciplinary jurisdiction when the record makes such abuse manifest.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 35 (Advocates Act, 1961): The provision under which State Bar Councils discipline advocates. A valid referral requires “reasons to believe” (a prima facie, recorded satisfaction) that an advocate is guilty of professional or other misconduct, after which a Disciplinary Committee conducts a hearing and may dismiss, reprimand, suspend, or remove the advocate from the roll.
“Reasons to believe” vs. suspicion: More than a hunch; it demands an articulated, objective basis—reflected in the order—showing why the conduct alleged could amount to misconduct.
Jural relationship: A legal relationship—here, the client–advocate relationship—creating duties of care and fidelity. The Court holds that, ordinarily, professional misconduct complaints should arise from such a relationship, not from adversaries.
Professional misconduct: Conduct by an advocate that violates professional ethics or statutory rules (e.g., conflict of interest, breach of confidence, fraud in professional capacity). Not every act in litigation by an advocate qualifies.
Identification/attestation by advocate: When an advocate notes that a person is known to them (or has been identified before them) and signs accordingly. This does not mean the advocate vouches for the truth of the document; responsibility for contents lies with the deponent/signatory.
Consent terms/decree: A settlement recorded by a court with the parties’ consent, culminating in a decree. It binds the parties unless set aside by appropriate proceedings; it cannot be undermined through collateral forums like disciplinary complaints.
Disciplinary Committee (DC): A committee of the State Bar Council that hears and decides complaints referred under Section 35 after a reasoned prima facie view is formed.
Article 136 (Special Leave to Appeal): Discretionary power of the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal; it can be used to correct grave injustice or abuse of process, even at an interim stage, where the record compels intervention.

Key Passages

On the threshold requirement: “Recording of reasons to believe that the advocate has committed misconduct is a sine qua non before the complaint can be referred to the disciplinary committee for inquiry.”
On opponent-driven complaints: “Since the respondent-advocate was not representing the complainant... His prosecution, as being the lawyer of the opposite party... was highly objectionable, totally impermissible, and absolutely uncalled for.”
On formal endorsements: “An advocate, by mere attestation of the affidavit, does not become a privy to the contents of the affidavit.”
On consent terms: “We are... of the firm opinion that no one can be allowed to raise an issue questioning the Consent Terms... [which] have not been recalled or rescinded.”

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s ruling in 2025 INSC 1147 sets a clear procedural and substantive framework for bar disciplinary governance under Section 35 of the Advocates Act. It mandates reasoned screening by State Bar Councils, circumscribes locus by emphasizing the primacy of the client–advocate relationship in professional misconduct complaints, and protects advocates from harassment based on routine procedural acts such as identification or attestation. By quashing perverse proceedings and levying costs, the Court reaffirms that disciplinary machinery must neither be a proxy battlefield for adversaries nor a tool that undermines the independence and dignity of the Bar.

Going forward, Bar Councils must issue speaking referral orders grounded in a clear prima facie assessment, and complainants must route grievances through proper remedial channels, especially where consent decrees remain in force. The judgment is a robust reaffirmation of due process within professional regulation and a deterrent against the weaponization of disciplinary processes in litigation strategy.