Recognition of Social Media Posts as “Stalking” and “Outraging Modesty” under IPC and Limits on Quashing under Section 482 CrPC

Case: Tukaram s/o Balasaheb Raskar v. State of Maharashtra through P.S.O. Police Station Channi & Anr.
Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench (Division Bench)
Coram: Urmila Joshi-Phalke & Nandesh S. Deshpande, JJ.
Case No.: Criminal Application (APL) No. 522 of 2020
Date of Judgment: 2 December 2025
Citation: 2025:BHC-NAG:13357-DB

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1. Introduction

This judgment from the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court addresses two intersecting and increasingly important areas of criminal law:

• How traditional offences under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) relating to outraging modesty and stalking apply to conduct on social media platforms (here, Facebook); and
• The limits on the High Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to quash criminal proceedings at the threshold.

The applicant, Tukaram, sought quashing of:

• an FIR dated 06.02.2020 registered as Crime No. 0039/2020 at Police Station Channi, District Akola, and
• consequential proceedings in Regular Criminal Case (R.C.C.) No. 255/2024 before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patur.

The FIR was lodged by Non-Applicant No. 2, Ku. Rupali Ramesh Adhau, who alleged that the applicant had:

• posted multiple “objectionable” and defamatory posts on her Facebook account,
• harassed and stalked her online, and
• earlier threatened to commit suicide at her residence with a bottle of poison.

On these allegations, offences under Sections 354 and 354-D IPC (outraging modesty and stalking) were registered. Initially, Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 was also added but later deleted. The applicant invoked Section 482 CrPC to argue that the FIR and charge-sheet were an abuse of process and did not disclose any offence.

The High Court rejected the application, holding in substance that:

• Objectionable posts targeting a woman on Facebook can, in principle, constitute offences under Sections 354 and 354-D IPC; and
• The power under Section 482 CrPC is to be used sparingly and cannot be employed to stifle a legitimate prosecution when a prima facie case is made out.

This commentary analyses the factual matrix, the Court’s reasoning, the precedent relied upon, and the wider significance of treating social media conduct as “stalking” and “outraging modesty” within the IPC framework.

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2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 Relationship between the parties

According to the complainant (Non-Applicant No. 2):

• She became acquainted with the applicant, Tukaram, via Facebook approximately two years prior to her marriage.
• They used to chat regularly on the platform.
• The applicant allegedly proposed marriage to her, but she refused, as she did not like him.
• Annoyed by this refusal, the applicant started posting objectionable material on her Facebook account to defame and harass her.

The FIR alleges specific incidents of objectionable posting:

• On 10.01.2019 from his mobile phone;
• Again on 10.06.2019 and 30.09.2019;
• In total, on four distinct occasions, he allegedly posted material with the intent to defame and harass her.

It is also alleged that:

• On 31.07.2018, one day prior to her marriage, the applicant came to her house with a bottle of poison and threatened to commit suicide.
• Her father and relatives took the applicant to the Police Station, where he apologized, so no formal action was then taken.

The complainant married one Sachin Jumale on 30.12.2019 and was living at her matrimonial home at Hingna. She alleged that the applicant was continuing to stalk her by posting defamatory and objectionable material on Facebook, thereby causing disturbance in her marital life.

2.2 Applicant’s version

The applicant advanced a markedly different narrative through his counsel:

• He met Non-Applicant No. 2 on Facebook, and their acquaintance blossomed into a love affair dating back to 2014–2015.
• Families of both sides allegedly met, and their marriage was finalized after discussion.
• Subsequently, Non-Applicant No. 2 and her family allegedly started demanding money from him.
• On the assurance that he would marry her, he claims to have financially helped her and her family to the extent of ₹ 2,88,000/-.
• Later, they allegedly demanded ₹ 5,00,000/- and 5 acres of land as a condition for performing the marriage.
• When he expressed inability to meet these demands and asked for return of the amount already given, her relatives allegedly abused and threatened him.
• He then filed a criminal complaint case before the JMFC, Baramati, registered as MCA No. 484/2018 for offences under Sections 420, 504, 506 read with 34 IPC, which is pending.

The applicant contended that:

• Neither was his money returned nor was the marriage solemnised with the complainant;
• The FIR lodged by her is false, vexatious, and retaliatory, aimed at pressurising him in view of his earlier case; and
• The allegations, even if taken at face value, do not constitute the offences alleged under Sections 354 and 354-D IPC.

2.3 Registration of FIR and charge-sheet

On the complaint of Non-Applicant No. 2, the police registered Crime No. 0039/2020 at Police Station Channi, District Akola for offences under:

• Section 354 IPC – Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty; and
• Section 354-D IPC – Stalking.

Initially, Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 was also incorporated in the FIR. However, the Additional Public Prosecutor informed the Court that:

• Section 66A was inadvertently added; and
• It was subsequently deleted after intimation to the concerned Court, presumably in compliance with the Supreme Court’s declaration that Section 66A is unconstitutional.

After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed, leading to Regular Criminal Case No. 255/2024 before the JMFC, Patur, Akola.

2.4 Section 482 CrPC application

The applicant invoked the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC to seek:

• Quashing of the FIR dated 06.02.2020 (Crime No. 0039/2020); and
• Quashing of the entire proceedings in R.C.C. No. 255/2024.

The application was heard finally at the admission stage, with both sides consenting to final disposal.

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3. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court, per Nandesh S. Deshpande, J. (for the Bench), dismissed the application and refused to quash the FIR and the criminal proceedings.

Key elements of the Court’s decision are:

1. Recognition of Facebook posts as potential offences under Sections 354 and 354-D IPC:
   The Court held that, on a prima facie reading of the FIR and the material, the act of posting objectionable content on Facebook targeted at a woman can amount to the commission of offences under Sections 354 and 354-D IPC. It observed that:
   “posting of a post on a social site i.e. Facebook, would amount to committing an offence as contemplated under the above sections.”
2. Limited scope of Section 482 CrPC:
   Relying on State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Court reiterated that the inherent power under Section 482 is to be exercised sparingly and cannot be used to stifle a legitimate prosecution when a prima facie case is disclosed.
3. Irrelevance of financial transactions and prior relationship at the stage of quashing:
   Even assuming the applicant’s version that he had a romantic relationship with the complainant and had advanced substantial amounts of money on the assurance of marriage, the Court held that:
   • Such aspects (relationship and financial dealings) are matters of evidence to be decided in trial; and
   • They do not confer any licence upon the applicant to post objectionable or defamatory material on social media about the complainant.
4. Prima facie case found; quashing not justified:
   The Court concluded that, in view of the “overwhelming material” available at the prima facie stage, this was not a fit case to quash proceedings at the threshold. The application under Section 482 CrPC was therefore rejected.

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4. Legal Framework and Reasoning

4.1 Statutory provisions considered

4.1.1 Section 354 IPC – Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty

The Court reproduced Section 354 IPC in the judgment. The section criminalises:

Essential elements:

• Assault or use of criminal force to a woman; and
• With the intention to outrage, or with knowledge

Traditionally, Section 354 has been applied to physical acts, but courts have also accepted that non-physical conduct accompanied by threatening or invasive behaviour can fall within its ambit where the woman’s dignity and sexual autonomy are targeted.

4.1.2 Section 354-D IPC – Stalking

Section 354-D IPC, introduced after the 2013 Criminal Law Amendment Act, defines stalking. The Court reproduced it, noting that it punishes:

• Following a woman and contacting or attempting to contact her repeatedly to foster personal interaction despite clear disinterest; or
• Monitoring her use of the internet, email, or any other form of electronic communication.

The statutory explanation explicitly contemplates electronic communication, meaning cyber-stalking and online harassment are within the scope of Section 354-D.

4.1.3 Section 482 CrPC – Inherent powers of the High Court

Section 482 preserves the High Court’s inherent power to:

• Give effect to any order under the CrPC;
• Prevent abuse of the process of any Court; and
• Secure the ends of justice.

Over decades, the Supreme Court has held that this power should be exercised:

• Sparingly;
• With great caution;
• Only in cases where, even if all allegations in the FIR/charge-sheet are accepted as true, no offence is disclosed, or where continuation of proceedings would be a clear abuse of process.

4.1.4 Section 66A, Information Technology Act, 2000 (Contextual)

Although not analysed in depth by the Court, it noted that:

• Section 66A IT Act was inadvertently added to the FIR and later deleted.

Section 66A had previously criminalised sending offensive messages by means of a computer resource or communication device, but it was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1. The deletion by the investigating agency indicates compliance with that constitutional ruling.

4.2 How did the Court apply these provisions?

4.2.1 Treatment of the Facebook posts under Sections 354 and 354-D IPC

The central issue was whether the alleged Facebook posts—described as “objectionable” and intended to defame and harass the complainant—could attract Sections 354 and 354-D IPC.

The Court followed this reasoning:

1. The FIR alleges:
   • Repeated posting of objectionable material on Facebook on multiple dates;
   • Specific intent to defame and harass the complainant; and
   • Interference with her marital life after her marriage to another man.
2. Section 354-D expressly covers:
   • The use of the internet and other forms of electronic communication; and
   • “Monitoring” or repeated attempts to contact a woman despite disinterest.
   The nature of Facebook interactions can amount to such repeated contact and harassment, particularly when the postings are public or targeted at the woman.
3. Section 354 IPC requires that the conduct amount to “assault or criminal force” with intent to outrage modesty. The Court appears to have taken a broader, purposive approach, recognizing that:
   • Online harassment and defamatory posts of a sexual, humiliating, or degrading nature can effectively violate a woman’s dignity and modesty;
   • The medium (physical vs. digital) does not reduce the seriousness of the affront to her modesty.
4. On this basis, the Court concluded that the posting of objectionable material on Facebook “would amount to committing an offence” as contemplated under Sections 354 and 354-D, at least at the prima facie stage.

The judgment thus effectively recognizes that:

• Online conduct can constitute stalking and outraging modesty under the IPC, and
• Such acts are not confined to offline, physical interactions.

4.2.2 Assessment of the applicant’s defence at the quashing stage

The applicant’s defence centred on:

• The existence of a prior romantic relationship with the complainant;
• Substantial financial transfers made to her and her family based on an alleged promise of marriage;
• Alleged extortionate demands (₹5,00,000 and 5 acres of land) as a condition for marriage; and
• His own pending criminal complaint against her and her family.

The Court held:

• Even assuming the applicant’s version to be true for argument’s sake, these facts:
  • Do not give the applicant any legal licence or justification to post objectionable or defamatory material about the complainant on social media;
  • Do not negate the essential ingredients of Sections 354 and 354-D IPC if those are otherwise made out from the FIR and material.
• The issues relating to:
  • Existence and nature of prior relationship,
  • Alleged financial help and demands, and
  • The rival criminal proceedings,
  are matters of evidence that must be tested at trial.

In other words, the Court refused to conduct a mini-trial at the Section 482 stage, which is consistent with long-standing Supreme Court jurisprudence that, while deciding quashing petitions, defence evidence or rival versions of facts are not ordinarily adjudicated.

4.2.3 Prima facie case and the “overwhelming material” standard

After examining the FIR and the charge-sheet, the Court stated:

This formulation indicates:

• The Court was satisfied that the allegations, if accepted at face value, disclose the ingredients of the offences alleged (354 and 354-D IPC);
• The evidentiary sufficiency for conviction is a matter for the trial court, not for the High Court at this stage.

4.3 Precedent Cited: State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688

The only Supreme Court decision expressly cited in the judgment is:

State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688.

In Laxmi Narayan, the Supreme Court:

• Reiterated that the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC are to be exercised sparingly and with caution;
• Clarified the principles and limitations regarding quashing of criminal proceedings, especially on the basis of settlement/compromise between parties in non-compoundable offences;
• Emphasised that, in serious and heinous offences, the High Court should be reluctant to quash even if parties settle.

Although Laxmi Narayan is often discussed in the context of compounding and settlement-based quashing, the present Bench drew from it the broader principle that:

Applying this principle, the High Court held that:

• Where the FIR and charge-sheet disclose a legitimate prosecution, especially involving offences against women such as stalking and outraging modesty,
• The High Court should not use Section 482 CrPC to truncate the proceedings at the threshold, unless it is a clear case of abuse of process or lack of any offence.

The citation of Laxmi Narayan anchors the Court’s approach within the established Supreme Court jurisprudence on cautious exercise of inherent powers.

4.4 Implicit alignment with broader jurisprudence on quashing

Although not cited explicitly, the Court’s approach is consistent with other leading Supreme Court decisions on Section 482 CrPC, such as:

• State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 – which laid down illustrative categories where quashing is justified; and
• Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 6 SCC 73 – emphasising that investigation and trial should not be routinely interfered with.

The underlying test applied by the Bench resembles the well-accepted standard:

• Assume the allegations in the FIR/charge-sheet to be true on their face; and
• Ask whether they disclose the commission of any offence.

The Court’s answer was in the affirmative, particularly for Sections 354 and 354-D IPC, given the nature of the alleged Facebook posts and the pattern of harassment.

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5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 “Outraging modesty” under Section 354 IPC

In simple terms:

• Modesty refers to a woman’s sense of dignity and sexual privacy.
• Outraging modesty means doing something deliberately that any decent person would recognise as an affront to a woman’s dignity in a sexual or gendered sense.

Traditionally, it involved physical acts (e.g., unwanted touching), but courts have recognized that:

• Words, gestures, public shaming, or online publication of indecent or sexually loaded material about a woman can also attack her modesty.

5.2 “Stalking” under Section 354-D IPC

Stalking, in law, is:

• Persistent, unwanted attention or contact directed at someone (here, a woman) that causes fear, distress, or harassment;
• Including:
  • Following her physically;
  • Repeatedly calling or messaging her;
  • Monitoring her activities on the internet, social media, or email.

In the context of this case:

• Repeated posting of objectionable material about the complainant on Facebook, especially after she has indicated disinterest or objection, can amount to cyber-stalking.

5.3 Section 482 CrPC – What is “quashing” of FIR/proceedings?

“Quashing” an FIR or criminal case means:

• The High Court uses its special power under Section 482 CrPC to end the criminal case at the very beginning, without a full trial, because:
• Either no offence is made out even if all allegations are taken as true; or
• Continuing the case would be an abuse of the court’s process (for instance, when it is purely malicious or patently frivolous).

The Court does not normally examine the truth of the allegations or weigh the evidence in detail at this stage. It focuses on:

• Whether the complaint, as written, discloses the ingredients of any offence known to law.

5.4 Prima facie case

“Prima facie” means:

• On the face of it; at first glance;
• Based on an initial review of allegations and material, without detailed proof or cross-examination.

A prima facie case is sufficient to:

• Allow the prosecution to proceed to trial; but not necessarily
• Sufficient for conviction, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt.

5.5 FIR and charge-sheet

• FIR (First Information Report): The initial information given to the police about the commission of a cognizable offence, recorded under Section 154 CrPC.
• Charge-sheet: The final report filed by the police under Section 173 CrPC after investigation, listing the evidence collected and the offences alleged.

5.6 Section 66A IT Act – Its deletion and significance

Section 66A of the IT Act once criminalised sending “offensive” messages via electronic means. It was widely criticized for vagueness and abuse, particularly against free speech, and was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

In this case:

• The investigating agency initially added Section 66A to the FIR;
• It later deleted it, acknowledging that it was added inadvertently.

This:

• Shows a shift in law enforcement practice towards relying more on IPC provisions like Sections 354 and 354-D in cases of online harassment and cyber-stalking;
• Avoids the constitutional infirmities associated with Section 66A.

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6. Impact and Wider Significance

6.1 Recognition of social media conduct as punishable under IPC

A central contribution of this decision is its clear affirmation that:

• Objectionable and harassing social media posts targeting a woman can, in appropriate cases, amount to:
• Outraging modesty (Section 354 IPC); and
• Stalking (Section 354-D IPC).

This has several practical implications:

• For law enforcement:
  • Police have clear judicial backing to register IPC offences for cyber harassment and stalking, without over-relying on IT Act provisions (especially given the invalidation of Section 66A).
  • It encourages the use of Section 354-D IPC for cyber-stalking, consistent with its textual coverage of internet-based monitoring and contact.
• For victims:
  • Women facing harassment or character assassination on social media have a stronger legal footing to lodge FIRs under specific offences protecting bodily and sexual autonomy, not merely under general defamation.
• For potential offenders:
  • The judgment reinforces that social media is not a “law-free” zone. Online harassment can attract the same, or more serious, penal consequences as offline conduct.

6.2 Limits on Section 482 CrPC in gender-based and cyber offences

By refusing to quash the FIR at the threshold, the Court sends a clear message:

• In offences involving harassment of women, particularly via modern platforms like social media, the High Court should be slow to interfere at the pre-trial stage if the FIR discloses a prima facie case.
• Section 482 CrPC cannot be used as a shortcut to avoid trial where there are disputed facts or where the defence seeks to rely on its own version of events.

The judgment strengthens the principle that:

• Claims of prior relationship, alleged misuse of prior intimacy, or disputes over money do not automatically dilute criminal liability for harassment, especially of a sexual or gendered nature.

6.3 Intersection of romantic/financial disputes with criminal liability

The applicant attempted to portray the case as primarily a:

• Breach of trust in a romantic context; and
• Financial dispute arising out of alleged payments made on the promise of marriage.

The Court’s response is significant:

• It draws a clear boundary between:
  • Private disputes (e.g., money advanced, disagreement about marriage); and
  • Criminal conduct (e.g., online harassment, defamation, stalking, threats of suicide).
• Even if the applicant’s grievances about money and broken promises are genuine, they do not justify or excuse criminal acts of harassment, whether online or offline.

This prevents a dangerous tendency wherein:

• Men who feel aggrieved at the breakdown of a relationship or refusal of marriage might seek to justify subsequent harassment of women by reference to past intimacy or monetary help.

6.4 Doctrinal tension: Section 354 IPC and non-physical online acts

One doctrinally interesting aspect is the application of Section 354 IPC—traditionally about assault or criminal force—to purely online posting of objectionable material.

Points of discussion:

• There is an ongoing legal and academic debate about whether Section 509 IPC (word, gesture, or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman) may sometimes be more textually apt for non-physical, verbal/online conduct.
• However, courts have increasingly adopted a purposive approach to Section 354 IPC to cover conduct that, even without physical contact, has a direct and serious impact on a woman’s bodily and sexual autonomy or induces a sense of physical insecurity or humiliation.

The present judgment:

• Does not engage in a detailed doctrinal analysis of the boundary between Sections 354 and 509 IPC; but
• By stating broadly that posting objectionable material on Facebook “would amount to committing an offence” under Section 354, it reinforces a broader protective lens in interpreting women-centric offences.

(From a doctrinal perspective, future cases may benefit from more detailed reasoning distinguishing when Section 354 vs. Section 509 IPC is engaged for online acts. Nonetheless, this decision clearly situates online harassment within the ambit of serious offences against women.)

6.5 Compliance with constitutional jurisprudence (Section 66A)

Though only tangential, the deletion of Section 66A IT Act is noteworthy:

• It reflects increasing awareness among prosecutors and courts of the unconstitutionality of Section 66A;
• It encourages reliance on:
  • IPC provisions such as Sections 354, 354-D, 499, 500, 509, etc., and
  • Other specific IT Act provisions (e.g., Sections 66E, 67, 67A, where applicable),
  instead of the defunct Section 66A.

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7. Conclusion

This decision in Tukaram s/o Balasaheb Raskar v. State of Maharashtra is significant for several reasons:

1. Substantive recognition of online offences against women:
   The Court explicitly acknowledges that objectionable and harassing posts on Facebook can, at least prima facie, amount to offences of:
   • Outraging the modesty of a woman (Section 354 IPC); and
   • Stalking (Section 354-D IPC).
   This aligns criminal law with the digital realities of contemporary harassment and cyber-stalking.
2. Re-affirmation of the narrow scope of Section 482 CrPC:
   Relying on Laxmi Narayan, the Court reiterates that inherent powers must be exercised sparingly and not be used to short-circuit legitimate prosecutions, especially in offences against women where a prima facie case is disclosed.
3. Separation between private disputes and public criminal liability:
   The judgment makes clear that:
   • Prior romantic relationships,
   • Alleged promises of marriage, and
   • Financial transactions
     do not entitle a person to engage in criminal harassment or character assassination online.
4. Procedural discipline post–Shreya Singhal:
   The deletion of Section 66A IT Act from the FIR reflects the growing compliance with constitutional mandates and encourages the use of correct statutory provisions for cyber offences.

In the broader legal landscape, this judgment contributes to a growing body of jurisprudence that:

• Modernises the interpretation of IPC provisions to encompass cyber-based misconduct;
• Strengthens procedural safeguards against premature quashing in sensitive offences involving women; and
• Signals to both law enforcement and potential offenders that digital spaces are subject to the same, if not stricter, standards of criminal accountability as offline conduct.

Taken together, the ruling advances both the protection of women’s dignity and privacy in the digital age and the principled use of inherent judicial powers within the criminal process.