Reaffirmation of strict evidentiary thresholds in circumstantial murder cases: Section 65-B compliance, limits of Section 27, and caution on delayed “last seen” evidence — State of Rajasthan v. Bhanwar Singh, 2025 INSC 1166

Introduction

In State of Rajasthan v. Bhanwar Singh etc. (2025 INSC 1166), the Supreme Court of India dismissed the State’s appeals and upheld a Rajasthan High Court acquittal in a murder case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence. The case concerned the killing of Shri Suresh Sharma, whose body was found on 23 January 2006 with multiple injuries and signs of strangulation. Three respondents — Hemlata, Narpat Choudhary and Bhanwar Singh — had been convicted by the trial court for offences under Sections 302 read with 120-B, 143 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), but were acquitted on appeal by the High Court due to insufficient and infirm evidence. The State challenged these acquittals.

The Supreme Court, speaking through Mehta, J., meticulously re-appreciated the record to test whether the prosecution’s circumstantial chain — motive, “last seen” evidence, alleged recoveries, call detail records (CDRs), hotel registers and a vehicle — met the legal standard. Central to the Court’s analysis were:

Admissibility and proof of electronic evidence under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act;
Limits of the “discovery” exception under Section 27 of the Evidence Act;
The reliability of “last seen” evidence where disclosure to police is delayed and conduct appears unnatural; and
The narrow appellate window for interfering with acquittals.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeals and affirmed the High Court’s order acquitting the respondents. Key holdings include:

Electronic evidence (CDRs) not proved: In the absence of a certificate under Section 65-B Evidence Act and with the “CDR” particulars placed through an unproved handwritten note (Ex. P-53) whose scribe was not examined, the alleged call records were inadmissible and could not be relied upon.
Discovery statements (Section 27) limited in use: The content of a disclosure (Ex. P-70) could not be used to infer motive; Section 27 allows proof only of the fact discovered and not the broader inculpatory narrative.
“Last seen” evidence rejected: Crucial witnesses (PW-8 and PW-20) claimed to have seen the deceased near Hemlata’s house, yet failed to inform the police immediately and disclosed the fact after a substantial delay. The Court approved the High Court’s view that such conduct was unnatural, rendering the testimony unreliable.
Inconsequential recoveries: A blood-stained chunni recovered from Hemlata’s house lacked serological linkage to the deceased (no blood group match) and was recovered from a premises accessible and under the control of accused for days, undermining probative value. Alleged blood in a van had no positive grouping and no witness saw the body transported in it. Hotel registers did not link the respondents to supposed hired killers.
Motive and conspiracy against Bhanwar Singh not proved: The testimony of PW-12 was found to contain material omissions and improvements; mere threats, even if proved, were insufficient in isolation to establish a conspiracy to murder.
Appellate restraint in acquittal appeals: Relying on Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149, the Court held there was no perversity, misreading or singularly guilt-consistent view to justify reversal of the High Court’s acquittal.

Analysis

Precedents cited and their role

The Supreme Court expressly relied on Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 to reaffirm the narrow constraints on interfering with an acquittal:

41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;
41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and
41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.

The Court held that none of these conditions were satisfied. This precedent served as the analytical frame for assessing whether the High Court’s appreciation of evidence — especially on admissibility and reliability — was so flawed as to necessitate reversal. It was not.

Legal reasoning

1) Section 27 Evidence Act: Discovery statements cannot prove motive

The trial court drew an inference of motive against Hemlata from a disclosure (Ex. P-70). The Supreme Court was categorical: Section 27 carves out a limited exception permitting proof of the fact discovered as a consequence of information received from an accused in custody. It does not permit importing the accusatory narrative within the disclosure to establish motive or guilt. Using the disclosure to prove motive was legally impermissible.

2) Alleged invitation call by “Dhanesh”: unproved and inadmissible

The prosecution theory that “Dhanesh” (allegedly Hemlata’s brother) called the deceased to Hemlata’s house on 22 January 2006 faltered because:

Neither PW-24 nor PW-27 knew the caller; their testimony did not identify Dhanesh.
No call detail records were lawfully proved through a Section 65-B certificate.

The Court underscored that where identity of a caller is central to the prosecution’s chain, the only safe, lawful route is to properly prove the relevant electronic records — something the prosecution did not do.

3) “Last seen” evidence: delayed disclosure and unnatural conduct

The “last seen” strand rested on PW-8 and PW-20, who said they saw the deceased park his scooter near Hemlata’s house around 6:30–7:00 PM on 22 January 2006. The Court endorsed the High Court’s reasons for discarding their testimony:

Delay: PW-8 disclosed the fact to police after more than a month, despite being an attesting witness to the inquest conducted the very next day. PW-20 also remained silent for 20–25 days.
Unnatural conduct: The failure to immediately inform the family or police, particularly after witnessing the discovery of the body (in PW-8’s case), was implausible.
Lack of detail: Neither claimed to have seen the deceased actually enter Hemlata’s house.

In circumstantial cases, proximity in time and place, spontaneous disclosure, and natural human conduct are critical to the probative value of “last seen” evidence. The prosecution’s proof failed on these counts.

4) Chunni (stole) recovery: no scientific linkage and compromised locus

The recovery of a blood-stained chunni from Hemlata’s house suffered multiple defects:

No serological match: Although human blood was detected, no blood group or DNA linkage to the deceased was established.
Access and control: The house remained accessible and under the accused’s control for several days; the recovery occurred five days after the event. Such circumstances reduce the reliability and exclusivity of the discovery.
Panch reliability: Panch witnesses were either not from the vicinity or were a police constable, diluting the independence of the recovery.

The Court agreed with the High Court’s finding that the recovery looked concocted and planted, and in any event lacked probative force without scientific corroboration linking it to the deceased.

5) Hotel registers and the “hired killers” narrative: no nexus

The prosecution seized visitor registers from two hotels to suggest that Narpat Choudhary arranged accommodation for hired killers from Uttar Pradesh. The Court found no evidence connecting Narpat to any persons named in the registers or proving that the alleged assailants stayed there. Mere existence of entries, absent identification or linkage, carried no evidentiary weight.

6) Maruti van recovery: no chain of custody or serological support

The van allegedly used to transport the body yielded blood stains, but serology did not produce a positive group match. No witness saw the body in the vehicle. Without forensic linkage and eye-witness support, the van did not advance the prosecution case.

7) Call Detail Records (CDRs): non-compliance with Section 65-B and improper proof

The most emphatic evidentiary ruling concerned CDRs. The prosecution:

Did not produce a Section 65-B certificate for the electronic records; and
Relied on a handwritten note (Ex. P-53) from a customer care executive to connect numbers to the accused, without examining the scribe (Ms. Ragini Vyas).

The Court held that these twin defects — absence of the 65-B certificate and attempt to prove CDRs through an unproved handwritten note — made the call data inadmissible. As a result, the alleged telephonic links between the respondents could not be considered.

8) Motive and conspiracy attributed to Bhanwar Singh: exaggerations and insufficiency

The conspiracy theory rested on PW-12 (Sayri Devi), who suggested that Bhanwar Singh had threatened the deceased due to land disputes. On cross-examination, material omissions vis-à-vis her police statement (Ex. D-6) were exposed, and the land sale involved another person named Bhanwar Singh. The Court found her testimony exaggerated and unreliable.

Crucially, even a proved threat may only be an incriminating circumstance; it does not, without more, establish a conspiracy to murder. In the absence of legally admissible corroboration (e.g., proven CDRs), the conspiracy charge failed.

9) Appellate restraint: no perversity, misreading or singular guilt-consistent view

Applying Babu Sahebagouda, the Court held that the High Court’s evaluation of evidence was plausible and founded on sound legal principles of admissibility and reliability. With multiple breaks in the circumstantial chain and significant evidentiary inadmissibility, no case for reversing the acquittal was made out.

Impact

The judgment sharpens and operationalizes key evidentiary standards in circumstantial cases, with systemic implications:

Electronic Evidence Discipline: Investigating officers and prosecutors must ensure Section 65-B compliance for all electronic records (e.g., CDRs). Attempts to substitute such proof with informal notes or oral claims will fail.
Discovery under Section 27: Trial courts must confine themselves to the fact discovered; narrative content cannot be used to prove motive or guilt. Recoveries from accessible or uncontrolled locations, or after significant delays, merit heightened skepticism.
Forensic Rigor: Mere detection of “human blood” is not enough. Serological grouping or DNA linkage tying an object to the victim is essential to imbue recoveries with probative value.
“Last seen” Caution: Courts will closely scrutinize delays in disclosure and unnatural conduct. Prosecution should promptly record statements and secure corroboration (e.g., CCTV, location data, contemporaneous witnesses).
Conspiracy Charges: Bare threats do not equate to conspiracy. The State must adduce independent, legally admissible evidence connecting alleged conspirators (communications, meetings, surveillance-footed corroboration) to the criminal act.
Appellate Practice: The decision reinforces the high threshold for overturning acquittals — a reminder that the presumption of innocence, combined with an acquittal, demands demonstrable perversity or misreading to justify interference.

Complex Concepts Simplified

What is Section 65-B (Evidence Act)?

Section 65-B sets out conditions for admitting electronic records (like call detail records, emails, CCTV footage) as evidence. Typically, the proponent must produce a certificate from a responsible official confirming how the record was produced, its source, and that the system was operating properly. Without this certificate, electronic evidence is generally inadmissible unless covered by recognized exceptions.

What does Section 27 (Evidence Act) allow?

Section 27 creates a narrow exception to the general rule that a confession to police is inadmissible. It permits proof of only that portion of an accused’s custodial statement which distinctly relates to a discovered fact (e.g., location of a weapon), and only to the extent that the statement led to the discovery. The larger narrative or admissions of guilt remain inadmissible.

“Last seen” theory in circumstantial cases

This is an inferential tool — if a person is last seen alive with the accused and soon thereafter found dead, a strong suspicion may arise against the accused. However, courts insist on:

Proximity in time and space;
Prompt disclosure by witnesses; and
Corroboration by other circumstances (e.g., recoveries, motive, scientific evidence).

Unexplained delays or unnatural conduct of witnesses seriously erode the reliability of “last seen” evidence.

Appellate interference with acquittal

Appellate courts will reverse an acquittal only if the lower court’s judgment is perverse, involves misreading or ignoring material evidence, or if the evidence admits only one reasonable view consistent with guilt. Where two plausible views are possible, the acquittal stands.

Conclusion

State of Rajasthan v. Bhanwar Singh is a clear, rigorous reaffirmation of foundational evidentiary safeguards in circumstantial prosecutions. The Supreme Court refused to dilute admissibility rules for electronic records, policed the narrow scope of Section 27, and insisted that “last seen” evidence comport with natural human conduct and timely reporting. Equally, it reinforced the settled norm that an acquittal cannot be overturned absent clear perversity or misreading.

The message for investigators and prosecutors is unmistakable: build cases on admissible, scientifically anchored, and promptly collected evidence; shun conjecture; and respect procedural disciplines. For trial courts, the decision underscores the necessity of demanding complete, coherent chains of circumstances. For appellate courts, it reiterates restraint in disturbing acquittals.

Ultimately, the judgment fortifies the justice system’s commitment to both accuracy and fairness: a conviction must rest on reliable, legally admissible proof that excludes reasonable doubt; anything less preserves the acquittal.