Presumption Under Section 113A Evidence Act Contingent on Proved Cruelty Under Section 498A IPC – Commentary on State of Gujarat v. Rajeshbhai Pitamberbhai Parmar

1. Introduction

The Gujarat High Court’s decision in State of Gujarat v. Rajeshbhai Pitamberbhai Parmar & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 457 of 2002 (decided on 19 November 2025), is a significant reaffirmation of the doctrinal thresholds governing:

the presumption of abetment of suicide by a married woman under Section 113A of the Evidence Act,
the dowry death framework under Section 304B IPC read with Section 113B of the Evidence Act,
the concept of “cruelty” under Section 498A IPC, and
the limits of appellate interference with acquittals under Section 378 CrPC.

The case arose from the alleged dowry-related suicide of one Nehaben, who had been married to respondent–accused Rajeshbhai Pitamberbhai Parmar (accused No. 1) for about two years. On 17.01.1999, at her matrimonial home in Thaledi village (District Anand), she consumed Celphos poison and later died during treatment at the Civil Hospital, Nadiad. The prosecution alleged that the suicide was driven by persistent cruelty and dowry demands by her husband and in-laws, and further alleged suppression of the incident by burying the body without informing the police or conducting a post-mortem.

The trial court (Additional Sessions Judge, Nadiad, in Sessions Case No. 102 of 1999) acquitted all accused of offences under Sections 498A, 306, 201, 176, 304B read with Section 114 IPC. The State preferred an appeal under Section 378(1)(iii) CrPC. The Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court (Justice Ilesh J. Vora and Justice R. T. Vachhani; judgment authored by Justice Vachhani) dismissed the appeal and affirmed the acquittal.

This judgment is doctrinally important because it:

clarifies that Section 113A Evidence Act cannot be automatically invoked merely because suicide occurs within seven years of marriage;
emphasises that the foundation of the 113A presumption is proof of “cruelty” as defined in Section 498A IPC;
distinguishes ordinary marital discord and trivial quarrels from legal “cruelty” or “harassment” sufficient to attract Sections 498A, 304B, and 306 IPC; and
reiterates the double presumption of innocence in appeals against acquittal, restricting appellate interference to cases of clear perversity or illegality.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Procedural Posture

FIR I-C.R. No. 21/1999 was registered at Mahuva Police Station, Anand, at the instance of the deceased’s mother, Pushpaben (PW-4).
Initial charges: Sections 498A, 306, 201 read with 114 IPC.
Upon prosecution’s application under Section 216 CrPC, additional charges under Sections 176 and 304B read with 114 IPC were framed.
The trial court acquitted all accused by judgment dated 22.01.2002.
The State appealed under Section 378(1)(iii) CrPC challenging the acquittal.

2.2 Prosecution Case (in brief)

The deceased had been married to accused No. 1 for about two years and had a minor daughter.
She was allegedly subjected to continuous cruelty and dowry demands by the husband and in-laws, particularly routed through accused No. 4 (sister-in-law, Dahiben), for cash from her parental home.
On 17.01.1999, after a quarrel about feeding her minor daughter and being refused permission to accompany her husband and mother-in-law to Santram Mandir, Nadiad, she allegedly consumed Celphos poison.
She died while under treatment at Civil Hospital, Nadiad; the accused allegedly:
- failed to inform the police (Section 176 IPC), and
- proceeded to bury the body without post-mortem, allegedly to destroy evidence (Section 201 IPC).

2.3 Defence Case

The accused denied all allegations of cruelty, dowry demands and abetment of suicide.
They contended that:
- There were no specific, proved incidents of cruelty or harassment.
- The deceased’s act was self-inflicted and unconnected with any instigation or abetment.
- Hasty burial was for religious/cultural reasons; there was no intention to destroy evidence.

2.4 Holding

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal and affirmed the acquittal, holding:

The prosecution failed to prove cruelty under Section 498A IPC with requisite specificity and corroboration.
In the absence of proved cruelty, the presumption under Section 113A Evidence Act could not be invoked to sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC.
The conditions for dowry death under Section 304B IPC were not met—particularly, there was:
- no credible evidence of dowry demand “soon before death”, and
- demand allegations did not even appear in the FIR but surfaced only at trial as improvements.
There was no evidence of active instigation, aid, or conspiracySection 107 IPC for abetment under Section 306 IPC.
The alleged conduct of the accused in burying the body did not meet the mens rea for offences under Sections 201 and 176 IPC.
The trial court’s appreciation of evidence was neither perverse nor contrary to record; hence, in an acquittal appeal, the High Court could not substitute its own view merely because another view was possible.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Factual Matrix and Evidence

The prosecution examined ten witnesses, including:

three medical officers (PW-1, PW-2, PW-3),
the complainant-mother (PW-4, Pushpaben),
panch witnesses (PW-5 and PW-6),
the deceased’s sister (PW-7, Ilaben),
a relative (PW-8), and
two Investigating Officers (PW-9, PW-10).

Key documentary evidence included:

Post-mortem report (Exh.18),
FSL report (Exh.27) confirming death due to Celphos poisoning,
Scene of offence panchnama (Exh.67),
Inquest panchnama (Exh.20),
FIR (Exh.66),
Documents relating to attempted dying declaration (Exh.68) and related correspondence (Exhs.21, 58, 59), and
Yadis relating to burial and exhumation (Exhs.21–23).

Crucially:

The post-mortem report disclosed no ante-mortem injuries suggestive of physical assault; death was clearly by ingestion of poison.
The FSL report confirmed Celphos poison but could not, by itself, establish abetment.
The attempted dying declaration (Exh. 68) was incomplete and lacked proper certification of fitness and voluntariness; it was therefore not a strong, stand-alone piece of incriminating evidence.

The Court also noted that the immediate precipitating incident was relatively trivial: the deceased insisted on accompanying her husband and mother-in-law to the temple (Santram Mandir); permission was refused, whereupon she ingested poison. This context played a central role in the Court’s assessment of whether the legal thresholds for “cruelty” and “abetment” were met.

3.2 Legal Issues

The High Court addressed, in essence, the following issues:

Whether the prosecution had proved “cruelty” within the meaning of Section 498A IPC against the accused.
Whether, in light of the death occurring within seven years of marriage, the Court should invoke the presumption under Section 113A Evidence Act to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC.
Whether the ingredients of dowry death under Section 304B IPC, particularly “dowry demand soon before death”, were established, thereby attracting the presumption under Section 113B Evidence Act.
Whether the conduct of the accused in burying the body without initially informing the police constituted offences under Sections 201 and 176 IPC.
To what extent the High Court could interfere with the trial court’s order of acquittal in light of Section 378 CrPC and established appellate standards.

3.3 Statutory Framework

The Court’s analysis primarily involved:

Section 498A IPC – cruelty by husband or relatives;
Section 306 IPC – abetment of suicide;
Section 107 IPC – definition of abetment (instigation, conspiracy, intentional aid);
Section 304B IPC – dowry death;
Sections 201, 176 IPC – causing disappearance of evidence, and omission to give notice or information to a public servant;
Section 114 IPC – abetment present when offence is committed;
Section 113A Evidence Act – presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman;
Section 113B Evidence Act – presumption as to dowry death; and
Section 378 CrPC – appeals against acquittal.

3.4 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The High Court grounded its reasoning in a robust set of Supreme Court and High Court precedents:

3.4.1 Presumption under Section 113A Evidence Act

Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 2014 SC 1782:
- Held that suicide within seven years of marriage does not automatically attract the presumption under Section 113A.
- Stressed that the presumption is discretionary (“may presume”) and contingent upon proof that the woman was subjected to cruelty by husband or his relatives.
Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618:
- Laid down the three foundational facts required for Section 113A:
  1. Suicide by a married woman,
  2. Within seven years of marriage, and
  3. Proof that husband or his relatives subjected her to cruelty.
- Reiterated that the presumption is permissive, not mandatory, and that courts must have regard to “all the other circumstances of the case”.
- Emphasised the need for a cause-and-effect relationship between cruelty and suicide.

The Gujarat High Court explicitly relied on these decisions to hold that without first proving cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A IPC, Section 113A cannot be invoked. This is the central doctrinal takeaway of the case.

3.4.2 Meaning of “Cruelty” and “Harassment” under Section 498A IPC

Indrasingh M. Raol v. State of Gujarat, 1999 (3) GLR 2536:
- Defined “cruelty” as harsh and harmful conduct of sufficient intensity and persistence causing physical/mental agony and misery such that life appears not worth living.
- Clarified that Section 498A requires persistent and grave cruelty which may drive a woman to suicide, and it is not attracted by every form of marital discord.
- Explained that “harassment” must be continuous or persistent and with the object of coercing the woman or her relatives to meet unlawful demands.
Manju Ram Kalita v. State Of Assam, (2009) 13 SCC 330:
- Held that cruelty must be judged in context; it must becontinuous, persistent or at least proximate in time to the complaint.
- Made it explicit that petty quarrels cannot amount to cruelty under Section 498A IPC.
V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, AIR 1994 SC 710:
- Though in matrimonial context, the Court observed that “cruelty” should be understood in the ordinary sense in matrimonial affairs.
- Intention to harm is not always essential; the focus is on whether the conduct, by its nature, amounts to cruelty.

The High Court integrated these authorities to conclude that:

General allegations, absent specific incidents, dates, nature of beating, or corroboration, are insufficient.
Trivial disputes, including the quarrel preceding the suicide, remain in the realm of ordinary wear and tear of marital life, not legal cruelty.

3.4.3 Abetment of Suicide (Sections 306 and 107 IPC)

Wazir Chand v. State of Haryana, AIR 1989 SC 378:
- Clarified that a conviction under Section 306 IPC requires proof that:
  - the deceased actually committed suicide, and
  - the accused instigated or intentionally aided such suicide within the meaning of Section 107 IPC.
Ramesh Kumar (supra) on “instigation”:
- Defined instigation as to “goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage” a person to do an act.
- Made clear that:
  - A reasonable certainty of inciting the consequence must be discernible.
  - A word uttered in a fit of anger or on the spur of the moment, without intention to push the victim to suicide, does not amount to instigation.

The High Court applied these principles to hold that there was no positive act of instigation or aid by any accused that could be said to have driven the deceased to suicide.

3.4.4 Appellate Interference with Acquittals

Several Supreme Court decisions were cited to delimit the High Court’s role in acquittal appeals:

Ram Kumar v. State Of Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 280
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 (summarised later in Rajesh Prasad)
Rajesh Singh v. State of U.P., (2011) 11 SCC 444
Bhaiyamiyan @ Jardar Khan v. State of M.P., (2011) 6 SCC 394
Ramesh Babulal Doshi V. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225
Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471
Fedrick Cutinha v. State of Karnataka, Crl.A. No. 2251/2010, decided 18.04.2023
H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581

Culled together, these cases reiterate the now-settled principles:

There is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused:
1. the fundamental presumption of innocence; and
2. its reinforcement by acquittal at trial.
The appellate court:
- may reappreciate evidence fully, but
- should not overturn an acquittal if the trial court’s view is a reasonable or possible view on the evidence.
Interference is justified only if the acquittal is perverse, manifestly illegal, or wholly against the evidence.

The Gujarat High Court placed substantial weight on these principles, holding that even if another view were theoretically possible, the trial court’s acquittal could not be reversed in the absence of perversity.

3.5 Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.5.1 On “Cruelty” under Section 498A IPC

Section 498A IPC defines “cruelty” to include:

Wilful conduct likely to drive the woman to suicide or cause grave injury/danger to life, limb or health (mental or physical); or
Harassment with a view to coercing her or her relatives to meet unlawful demands for property/valuable security, or on account of failure to meet such demands.

Applying the legal tests from Indrasingh Raol, Manju Ram Kalita, and V. Bhagat, the Court held:

The prosecution evidence (particularly from PW-4 and PW-7) contained:
- largely general and omnibus allegations of beatings and demands;
- absence of specifics: dates, frequencies, exact amounts, occasions, or clear instances of dowry-linked harassment;
- contradictions and omissions between FIR (Exh.66) and subsequent testimonies.
Allegations of dowry demand did not figure in the FIR but surfaced later during evidence, amounting to improvements/embellishments.
No independent witness credibly corroborated a pattern of cruelty or dowry harassment.
Medical evidence showed no physical injuries on the deceased indicative of recent beatings.
The immediate cause—refusal to take the deceased to the temple—was a trivial domestic disagreement, not wilful conduct of such nature as is likely to drive a woman to suicide.

Thus, the Court concluded that the essential ingredients of Section 498A IPC were not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

3.5.2 Presumption under Section 113A Evidence Act

On Section 113A, the Court articulated a clear doctrinal sequence:

First, the prosecution must establish that the woman committed suicide within seven years of marriage. (Admitted here.)
Second, the prosecution must establish that the husband or his relatives subjected her to cruelty as defined in Section 498A IPC.
Only then may the Court, in its discretion and having regard to all other circumstances, presume that such suicide was abetted by the husband or relatives.

The High Court underscored:

The presumption is rebuttable and discretionary (“may presume”), not inevitable.
Mere proof that suicide occurred within seven years of marriage does not trigger the presumption automatically.
As the prosecution failed to prove legal cruelty under Section 498A, there was no occasion to invoke Section 113A at all.

This is the core precedent-strengthening aspect of the judgment: it makes explicit that Section 113A cannot be an independent shortcut to conviction; it depends squarely on prior proof of cruelty.

3.5.3 Dowry Death under Section 304B IPC and Section 113B Evidence Act

For Section 304B IPC (dowry death), the prosecution must prove, inter alia:

Death of a woman caused by burns, bodily injury, or occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances;
Within seven years of marriage;
That “soon before her death”, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives;
Such cruelty/harassment was in connection with demand for dowry.

Only then does Section 113B Evidence Act mandate the Court to presume that the husband or relatives caused the dowry death.

The High Court found:

No credible evidence that the deceased was subjected to cruelty/harassment “soon before her death” on account of dowry.
Allegations of additional dowry demand did not appear in the FIR (Exh.66), but emerged later during depositions of PW-4 and PW-7, diminishing their reliability.
Given this evidentiary deficit, the statutory preconditions for invoking Section 113B were not satisfied.

Hence, the offence under Section 304B IPC was not established.

3.5.4 Abetment of Suicide (Sections 306 and 107 IPC)

Even apart from Section 113A, a conviction under Section 306 IPC required the prosecution to prove, through evidence, that:

The accused:
- instigated the deceased to commit suicide, or
- engaged in a conspiracy to assist such suicide, followed by an act/omission, or
- intentionally aided the commission of suicide;
And that there was a proximate link between the accused’s conduct and the suicide.

The Court held:

There was no evidence of any:
- specific words, conduct or threats amounting to instigation, or
- plan or conspiracy, or
- intentional aid (by act or illegal omission) driving the deceased to take her life.
The deceased’s act of consuming poison appeared to be a spontaneous emotional reaction to a trivial quarrel, reflecting her own sensitivity rather than abetment in law.
The husband’s conduct in immediately rushing her to hospital was inconsistent with any alleged intention to cause or abet her death.

Accordingly, Section 306 IPC was held not attracted.

3.5.5 Offences under Sections 201 and 176 IPC

Regarding the alleged burial of the body without informing the police:

The prosecution argued:
- The accused buried the body without post-mortem to destroy evidence (Section 201 IPC);
- The accused failed to inform the police of an unnatural death as required (Section 176 IPC).
The defence contended:
- The burial was done in accordance with religious customs requiring early rites;
- There was no intent to destroy evidence or to screen themselves from punishment.

The Court noted:

The body was later exhumed and post-mortem was conducted (Exh.18), suggesting that no permanent destruction of material evidence occurred.
There was no proof that, at the time of burial, the accused knew or believed that any offence (particularly one punishable with death or life imprisonment) had been committed so as to attract Section 201 IPC.
Similarly, there was no specific proof that the accused intentionally omitted to give information in circumstances where Section 176 IPC would be attracted beyond reasonable doubt.

Thus, both Section 201 and Section 176 IPC charges failed.

3.5.6 Appellate Restraint in an Appeal Against Acquittal

Having reappreciated the evidence, the High Court concluded that:

The trial court had conducted a threadbare analysis of evidence and applied the law correctly.
Its view acquitting the accused was reasonable and plausible given the evidentiary record.
There was no perversity, illegality, or manifest error in the trial court’s findings.

In such circumstances, in line with Chandrappa, Ram Kumar, Rajesh Prasad, Fedrick Cutinha, and H.D. Sundara, the High Court held that it would be impermissible to reverse the acquittal merely because another view was possible. The “double presumption of innocence” in favour of the accused had to prevail.

3.6 Application of Law to the Facts

Key factual-legal linkages drawn by the Court included:

Temporal proximity vs. legal cruelty:
- While death occurred within seven years of marriage, there was no proved continuous cruelty or dowry harassment leading up to the death.
Trivial incident as precipitating cause:
- The refusal to allow the deceased to accompany her husband and mother-in-law to the temple was categorised as part of ordinary wear and tear of matrimonial life, not cruelty.
Absence of “soon before death” dowry demand:
- The absence of any specific, credible evidence of dowry demand “soon before death” was fatal to the prosecution’s 304B case.
Conduct of accused post-incident:
- The act of rushing the deceased to hospital weighed against any allegation of intentional abetment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 What is a “Presumption” in Law? (Sections 113A and 113B Evidence Act)

A presumption is a legal rule that allows or compels a court to conclude that a fact exists if certain other facts are proved. Relevant here:

Section 113A (may presume):
- If a married woman commits suicide within seven years of marriage and it is proved that she was subjected to cruelty by husband/relatives, the court may presume that the suicide was abetted by them.
- “May presume” = discretionary presumption → court is free to either draw or refuse to draw the presumption, depending on all circumstances.
Section 113B (shall presume):
- In dowry death cases, once the prosecution proves the foundational facts (including dowry harassment “soon before death”), the court shall presume that the husband/relatives caused the dowry death.
- “Shall presume” = mandatory presumption → court must draw the presumption unless the accused rebuts it.

This judgment stresses that even Section 113A cannot be invoked unless cruelty (as per Section 498A IPC) is first proved.

4.2 “Cruelty” vs. Ordinary Marital Discord

Not all unhappy or unpleasant marital conduct is “cruelty” in law. For Section 498A:

Not cruelty:
- Petty quarrels, occasional arguments, normal disputes over household duties.
- Isolated incidents without serious physical or mental consequences.
Cruelty in law:
- Persistent, grave behaviour (physical or mental) that is likely to drive the woman to suicide or seriously endanger her health.
- Continuous harassment specifically to force her or relatives to give money or other property (dowry demands).

The Court located the case firmly in the first category—ordinary discord, not legal cruelty.

4.3 Abetment of Suicide (Sections 306 and 107 IPC) – Not Mere Causation

To hold someone guilty of abetment of suicide, the law requires more than a mere causal connection:

Instigation: Active encouragement, provocation, or goading toward suicide.
Intentional aid: Doing something or intentionally omitting to do something which makes it easier or helps the person to commit suicide.
Conspiracy: Agreement with others to facilitate suicide, followed by an act/omission in pursuance of it.

A spontaneous, impulsive suicide due to the victim’s own sensitivity, without clear evidence of instigation or aid, does not satisfy these legal requirements. The present judgment strongly reaffirms this.

4.4 “Double Presumption of Innocence” in Acquittal Appeals

In an appeal against acquittal, the accused enjoys:

The general presumption: every accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Once acquitted, this presumption is further strengthened by the trial court’s verdict.

Therefore, unless the trial court’s view is clearly perverse or untenable, appellate courts should not overturn acquittals merely because they might have taken a different view as a trial court.

4.5 “Improvements” and “Embellishments” in Witness Testimony

When important allegations (like dowry demand) are:

Absent in the FIR or initial statements to police, but
Introduced only later during trial testimony,

courts often treat them as improvements or embellishments. Such late additions are generally viewed with suspicion and carry reduced evidentiary value, especially in criminal trials where proof beyond reasonable doubt is required. The High Court did exactly this with the belated dowry-demand allegations here.

5. Impact and Significance

5.1 For Prosecution in Dowry and Suicide Cases

The judgment is a clear signal that:

Mere proof that suicide occurred within seven years of marriage is insufficient to sustain charges under Sections 498A, 304B, or 306 IPC.
Prosecution must:
- Document specific incidents of cruelty and dowry demand;
- Ensure that crucial facts like dowry demand appear in the earliest versions—FIR, initial statements;
- Secure independent corroboration where possible;
- Link cruelty or harassment clearly to the timing of the suicide (“soon before death”).

5.2 For Trial Courts

The decision reinforces that:

Courts must distinguish between:
- ordinary matrimonial discord and
- legally cognizable cruelty under Section 498A IPC.
The statutory presumptions under Sections 113A and 113B cannot substitute for basic failure of proof on foundational facts.
Generalised and uncorroborated testimonies, especially with improvements, cannot be the basis for reversing the presumption of innocence.

5.3 For Defence Strategy

The case illustrates how the defence can effectively:

Highlight omissions and contradictions between FIR and trial evidence;
Underscore the trivial or normal nature of the precipitating incident;
Point to corrective conduct (such as taking the victim to the hospital) to negate allegations of mens rea and abetment;
Insist on the appellate standard of double presumption of innocence when acquittals are challenged.

5.4 Systemic Implications

More broadly, this judgment:

Contributes to a line of cases discouraging the mechanical use of stringent provisions like Sections 498A, 304B, and 306 IPC without careful factual foundation.
Simultaneously protects the integrity of genuine dowry-cruelty prosecutions by insisting that they be built on proper investigation, timely allegations, and credible evidence.

6. Conclusion

State of Gujarat v. Rajeshbhai Pitamberbhai Parmar is a careful reaffirmation of settled but frequently misunderstood principles in dowry-related suicide litigation. The Gujarat High Court held that:

Section 113A Evidence Act cannot be invoked independently of proven cruelty under Section 498A IPC.
Ordinary domestic quarrels and a trivial refusal to allow the deceased to accompany her in-laws to the temple do not amount to “cruelty” or “harassment” in the legal sense.
The essential ingredients of:
- Section 498A IPC (cruelty),
- Section 304B IPC (dowry death with demand “soon before death”),
- Section 306 IPC (abetment via instigation, aid, or conspiracy), and
- Sections 201 and 176 IPC (intentional disappearance of evidence/omission of information)
were all not made out on the evidence.
Given the absence of perversity in the trial court’s acquittal, and the strong double presumption of innocence, the High Court refused to interfere with the acquittal under Section 378 CrPC.

The decision thus stands as a robust precedent clarifying that criminal liability for dowry-related cruelty or abetment of suicide cannot rest on assumptions arising purely from timing or emotional reactions to trivial disputes. It demands clear, specific, and credible evidence of cruelty and dowry-linked harassment before the harsh penal consequences of Sections 498A, 304B, and 306 IPC, and the presumptions of Sections 113A and 113B Evidence Act, can be legitimately invoked.