Presumption of Trademark Ownership in Foreign Manufacturers and the Limits of Importers’ Rights under Section 30: Commentary on Parul Ruparelia v. Camme Wang

Presumption of Trademark Ownership in Foreign Manufacturers and the Limits of Importers’ Rights under Section 30: A Commentary on Parul Ruparelia & Anr v. Camme Wang & Anr, Calcutta High Court (IPD), 5 December 2025

I. Introduction

The decision of the Calcutta High Court (IPR Division) in Parul Ruparelia and Anr v. Camme Wang and Anr (IP-COM/11/2025, judgment dated 5 December 2025, per Ravi Krishan Kapur J.) is a significant addition to Indian trademark jurisprudence on:

  • The conflict between a foreign manufacturer and an Indian importer/distributor over proprietorship of a trademark;
  • The scope of Section 30 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (exhaustion/consent) as a defence only and not a source of positive rights for importers; and
  • The application of equitable principles—particularly “clean hands” and suppression of material facts—in refusing interim relief in IP litigation.

The dispute concerns torches and related products sold under the marks “SUPREME” and “PL SUPREME”. The petitioners, Indian dealers importing torches from China since around 2006, claimed to have:

  • Coined and adopted the mark “SUPREME” in 2006;
  • Further coined and adopted the composite mark “PL SUPREME” in 2013 (allegedly derived from “Parul” and “Polar Lights”); and
  • Obtained Indian registration of “PL SUPREME” in Class 11 in 2019, claiming user from 10 May 2016.

The respondents, Chinese manufacturers, contended that:

  • They conceived and adopted “PL SUPREME” as early as 2009 in China, with PL = Polar Lights, and “SUPREME” signifying quality;
  • They registered “PL SUPREME” in China on 7 September 2014 and had been exporting goods under that mark (including to India) since about 2010; and
  • The petitioners were merely importers/agents of their branded goods and had no independent proprietorial right in the marks.

The petitioners sued for trademark infringement and passing off, seeking interim injunctions to restrain the respondents from using “PL SUPREME” and related marks and challenging the respondents’ applications in India (including for “RL SUPREME”). Interim orders were initially obtained. The present judgment decides the petitioners’ interlocutory applications (GA‑COM 1/2025 and GA‑COM 3/2025).

The Court ultimately refused interim relief, vacated all interim orders, and directed that the seized goods be returned to the respondents. Crucially, the Court held, at a prima facie level, that:

  • The respondents, as foreign manufacturers, were prior adopters and users of “SUPREME” and “PL SUPREME”;
  • An importer/distributor who merely resells branded goods cannot normally claim proprietorship in the manufacturer’s trademark absent clear evidence displacing the presumption; and
  • Section 30 of the Trade Marks Act provides only a defence to infringement and does not confer any independent positive right to importers to claim the trademark as their own.

The Court also relied heavily on findings of suppression, misrepresentation, and underinvoicing/tax evasion on the part of the petitioners, directing the Chief Commissioner of Customs and the Director General of Revenue Intelligence to investigate.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Factual Matrix

The essential factual backdrop may be summarised as follows:

  • The petitioners ran “Variety Stores”, dealing in torches and spare parts, and from about 2006 began importing torches from Respondent No. 1 in China.
  • The petitioners claimed:
    • They coined and adopted the mark “SUPREME” when importing torches from respondents in 2006; and
    • They further “created” the mark “PL SUPREME” in 2013 (PL derived from “Parul” and as an abbreviation of “Polar Lights”, allegedly linked to the English translation of their son’s name “Dhruv”).
  • They obtained Indian registration for “PL SUPREME” in Class 11 on 6 December 2019, claiming user since 10 May 2016.
  • In December 2024, they discovered that Respondent No. 2 had applied in India for “RL Supreme” and “PL SUPREME”, claiming user from 5 August 2013. The respondents also filed for rectification of the petitioners’ registration.
  • The respondents asserted:
    • They adopted “PL SUPREME” in 2009 in China;
    • They registered it in China in 2014 and had been exporting under that mark since at least 2010, including to India via multiple distributors;
    • “PL” stands for “Polar Lights”; the logo incorporates the initials BJG from the Chinese name “Bei-Ji-Guang” (meaning “Polar Lights” in English);
    • The petitioners were merely one of their importers/agents and owed them more than Rs 7 crores in unpaid dues.

2. Key Findings

The Court’s principal findings at the interim stage were:

  1. Prior user and proprietorship:
    • There is a “first user” rule in Indian trademark law, which enjoys “pre-eminence” over mere registration (para 8).
    • As a general rule, ownership of a trademark vests in the person who puts the mark on the product—typically the manufacturer (paras 9, 16).
    • The respondents, as Chinese manufacturers, had registered “PL SUPREME” in China in 2014, with evidence of manufacture dating from 2006 and exports bearing the mark prior to 2013.
    • The petitioners had themselves purchased goods under “PL SUPREME” from the respondents prior to their alleged adoption date in 2013.
    • The Court found the respondents’ account of the origin of “PL SUPREME” more credible and held that the petitioners had failed to show any independent reputation in the marks (paras 11–12).
  2. Effect of registration vs prior user:
    • Although the petitioners held an Indian registration for “PL SUPREME” (claiming use from 10 May 2016), this only yields protection subject to the rights of a prior user (para 8).
    • The respondents’ prior use—through manufacture, export invoices and foreign registration—was found to disentitle the petitioners to interim relief (para 14).
  3. Importer vs manufacturer:
    • The Court held that the petitioners are “nothing but re-sellers and importers and the brand belongs to only the respondents i.e. the Chinese manufacturers” (para 9).
    • It relied on a presumption that a brand normally belongs to the manufacturer who applies the mark; an importer can only displace that presumption by showing that consumers associate the mark primarily with the importer, which was not shown here (paras 15–16).
  4. Scope of Section 30 Trade Marks Act:
    • Section 30(3) (exhaustion/consent) merely provides a defence to infringement and does not confer additional rights on importers to claim proprietorship or to import independent of the proprietor’s rights (para 10).
    • Thus, the petitioners’ status as importers could not be converted into proprietorial rights in the mark.
  5. Role of BIS certification:
    • A certificate from the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) showed that the ownership of the mark “PL SUPREME” was vested in the respondents.
    • The petitioners were only recorded as “authorised representative” in India—no assignment or transfer of ownership appeared (para 13).
  6. Suppression, underinvoicing, and bad faith:
    • The Court found prima facie that:
      • The petitioners owed substantial unpaid dues (around Rs 7 crores);
      • Three consignments of torches, which they obtained restraint orders against, had actually been ordered by the petitioners themselves prior to filing the suit, but this was not disclosed (para 17);
      • There was serious material suggesting underinvoicing and tax evasion, including WhatsApp messages and payment trails via third-party foreign entities, indicating underinvoicing of around 30% of invoice value (para 18).
    • These factors, coupled with suppression of material facts, led the Court to conclude that the petitioners had not approached the Court with clean hands and were attempting to intimidate and coerce the respondents (paras 17–19).
    • The Court directed the Chief Commissioner of Customs, Kolkata, and the Director General of Revenue Intelligence, New Delhi, to conduct an enquiry into the underinvoicing and third-party payment mechanism (para 18).
  7. Relief:
    • All interim orders were vacated.
    • The interlocutory applications GA‑COM 1/2025 and GA‑COM 3/2025 were dismissed.
    • The Special Officer/Receiver was discharged and directed to return all goods to the respondents after preparing a full inventory and giving notice to all sides (para 20).

III. Analysis

III.A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. The “First User” Rule and Prior User Jurisprudence

The Court reaffirmed the centrality of the prior user doctrine under Indian law, drawing on Supreme Court authorities:

These cases collectively establish that:

  • Use-based rights can prevail even against a registered proprietor (Section 34, though not expressly cited, underlies this principle);
  • The person who is first in the market—or, in some circumstances, the first in the world with sufficient trans-border reputation—enjoys superior rights even in the face of subsequent registration by another; and
  • Registration under the Trade Marks Act is not absolute but is subject to prior user rights.

In the present case, the petitioners’ registration (2019, claiming use from 2016) was treated as prima facie valid but subordinate to the respondents’ alleged earlier adoption and use. The Court’s language in para 8—“This ‘first user’ rule is a seminal part of the Act and has always enjoyed pre-eminence”—expressly situates the dispute within this well-settled prior user framework.

2. Manufacturer vs Importer: Ownership Presumption

On the core issue of whether an importer can claim proprietorship over a manufacturer’s brand, the Court leaned heavily on:

  • Imperial Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. v. Bonnan & Ors., (1924) AC 755 (Privy Council);
  • S. Meera Sahib v. Hajee M. Abdul Azeez Sahib, AIR 1938 Mad 1;
  • Sunny Sales & Ors. v. Binod Khanna, 2014 SCC OnLine Cal 18505; and
  • Double Coin Holdings Ltd. & Anr. v. Trans Tyres (India) Pvt. Ltd., 2011 SCC OnLine Del 1842, along with Trans Tyres (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Double Coin Holdings Ltd. & Anr., 2012 SCC OnLine Del 596.

In Sunny Sales, this Court had already held that where goods are imported bearing a mark, that mark will normally be the mark of the exporter or manufacturer and that an importer “cannot normally claim proprietorship” over that mark. The judgment in Double Coin (Delhi High Court, V.K. Jain J.) is quoted at length (paras 15–16), setting out a detailed test:

“The ownership of a trademark as a general rule vests in the person, who puts the mark on the product… The relevant consideration… would be who invented the trademark, who first affixed it on the product, who maintains the quality of the product, with whom the relevant public identifies the goods, to whom it looks for warranty and redressal of complaints and who possesses the goodwill associated with the product.”

The Court adopts this framework almost verbatim and applies it to “PL SUPREME”:

  • Who put the mark on the product? – The respondents (Chinese manufacturers).
  • Who maintained quality and controlled manufacture? – Again, the respondents.
  • Who is identified as brand owner in BIS certifications and export documents? – The respondents.
  • What do the invoices show? – The marks “SUPREME” and “PL SUPREME” appear on invoices and export documents of the respondents, dating back before the petitioners’ alleged adoption.

On these facts, the presumption of manufacturer ownership is not merely unrebutted; it is reinforced by the petitioners’ own conduct (continued import of goods already branded “PL SUPREME”).

3. Section 30 and Parallel Import Jurisprudence

The Court relies on Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. Kapil Wadhwa & Ors., 2012 SCC OnLine Del 1004 (the Single Judge decision in the Kapil Wadhwa line of cases) to explain the nature of Section 30(3) of the Trade Marks Act:

“Section 30(3)… operates in the nature of a defence to an infringement… and cannot be equated [with] one giving some additional right to some other person to import the genuine goods from the international market… The purpose is… to exclude the person from the purview of infringement… and not beyond the same by giving any additional right…” (paras 42–47 quoted at para 10 of the judgment).

While debates about national vs international exhaustion have arisen in the appellate judgments in Kapil Wadhwa, the present decision focuses on one clear point: Section 30 is a shield, not a sword. It allows a person who has lawfully acquired genuine goods to defend themselves against an infringement claim, but does not:

  • Create a positive proprietary right in the trademark; or
  • Enable an importer to injunct the foreign manufacturer who is the proprietor of the mark.

This interpretive stance strongly constrains attempts by importers to convert the defence of lawful dealing in goods into a basis for claiming ownership of the mark itself.

4. Trans-border Reputation and Toyota Prius

The petitioners relied on Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 1. However, the Court uses Toyota Prius against the petitioners:

  • It holds that merely attending trade fairs in Nepal and Bangladesh is insufficient to claim reputation or goodwill that could support a prior user claim or a passing off action (para 11).
  • This follows Toyota Prius, where the Supreme Court emphasised the need for evidence of actual reputation and goodwill in India, not just international reputation, for a passing off claim.

Thus, the petitioners’ attempt to bolster their case via limited foreign exposure fails; instead, the precedent highlights their lack of substantial market reputation independent of the respondent manufacturer.

5. Equity, Suppression, and Ancillary Precedents

On the equitable side, the Court relies on:

  • Barbara Taylor Bradford v. Sahara Media Entertainment Ltd., (2004) 1 CHN 448; and
  • Kent RO Systems Ltd. & Anr. v. Gattubhai & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 791.

These authorities underscore the principle that a party who suppresses material facts, misleads the Court or engages in unlawful conduct (such as tax evasion) is not entitled to equitable relief like an interim injunction. The Court finds:

  • Concealment of consignments ordered by the petitioners but portrayed as respondents’ imports in breach of restraint orders;
  • Large outstanding dues; and
  • Substantial evidence of underinvoicing and irregular payment mechanisms.

Taken together, these preclude any equitable intervention in favour of the petitioners.

III.B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Registration vs Prior Use: The Hierarchy of Rights

The petitioners’ case heavily relied on the Indian registration of “PL SUPREME”. Under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act, registration confers on the proprietor:

  • The exclusive right to use the mark in relation to the goods for which it is registered; and
  • The right to obtain relief in respect of infringement.

However, the Court explicitly places this right beneath the prior user rule:

“Ordinarily, registration of a mark per se entitles a party to protection under the Act. The only exception being where the respondents can demonstrate prior use of the impugned marks.” (para 8; emphasis added)

Given the respondents’ evidence—Chinese registration (2014) with user from earlier dates, invoices showing exports to India under “PL SUPREME” prior to 2013, and the BIS certificate—it was relatively straightforward for the Court to find that the respondents were the prior adopters and continuous users of the marks “SUPREME” and “PL SUPREME”.

The petitioners’ explanation that “PL SUPREME” was coined from “Parul” and “Polar Lights” was found “unconvincing and questionable” (para 11), especially when juxtaposed with:

  • The foreign registration and branding history of the respondents; and
  • The petitioners’ own purchase of respondent-branded goods prior to 2013.

In short, the Court treats the registration not as conclusive but as vulnerable to displacement by superior rights of a prior user, aligning with Section 34 and Supreme Court precedent.

2. Applying the Manufacturer Presumption

The Court’s approach can be viewed as a two-step analysis:

  1. Who is presumptively the owner? – The manufacturer who puts the mark on the product.
  2. Has that presumption been displaced here?

The answer to (1) was straightforward: the respondents placed the marks on the torches manufactured in China.

On (2), the Court examined:

  • Whether the petitioners had shown that:
    • They were perceived by consumers as the source of the goods under “PL SUPREME”; or
    • They exercised control over the quality or branding; or
    • They had built domestic goodwill in the mark distinct from the manufacturer.

The Court found that:

  • The petitioners were “throughout… acting as agents or importers” with “no experience of manufacturing” (para 12);
  • They “have been unable to adduce any evidence to show that they can claim any independent reputation as importers vis-à-vis the marks” (para 11); and
  • The BIS certificate expressly named the respondents as the brand owner, with the petitioners as merely authorised representatives (para 13).

Accordingly, the legal presumption in favour of the manufacturer remained intact, and indeed was strengthened by documentary evidence.

3. Section 30 as a Defence, Not a Source of Proprietorship

Section 30 of the Trade Marks Act sets out limits on the effect of trademark registration—i.e., it describes situations where use of a registered mark does not amount to infringement. Section 30(3), in particular, protects dealings in genuine goods that have been lawfully put on the market by or with the consent of the proprietor.

The Court, following Kapil Wadhwa, emphasises:

  • Section 30(3) is a defensive provision: it shields a reseller or importer from infringement claims if certain conditions are met;
  • It does not itself confer a right to import or a right of proprietorship in the mark; and
  • It cannot be used as a basis to injunct the proprietor of the mark (here, the foreign manufacturer).

In this case, the petitioners effectively sought to “flip” Section 30: having been importers dealing with the proprietor’s genuine goods, they used that role (and a later Indian registration) as a springboard to assert exclusive rights over the mark in India and to restrain the proprietor itself. The Court rejected this maneuver at a conceptual level, clarifying that:

“Section 30(3)… cannot be equated [with] the one giving some additional right to some other person to import the genuine goods… The purpose is… to exclude the person from the purview of infringement… and not beyond the same by giving any additional right…” (para 10, quoting Kapil Wadhwa).

4. Evaluating Evidence and Credibility

The Court carefully weighed the competing narratives about the origin and use of the marks:

  • It considered the chronology:
    • Respondents’ adoption of “PL SUPREME” in China (circa 2009);
    • Respondents’ registration in China (2014);
    • Invoices showing exports under “PL SUPREME” prior to 2013;
    • Petitioners’ claimed adoption in 2013 and Indian registration in 2019 with user from 2016.
  • It found the petitioners’ account of coining the mark retrospectively (tying it to “Parul” and the son’s name) implausible in the face of contemporaneous evidence of respondents’ prior branding.

Additionally, the Court dismissed the petitioners’ argument that the user date in the trade mark register was “erroneously recorded”:

  • No attempt had been made to correct the register formally;
  • At the interim stage, such a naked assertion without correction was considered “untenable” and of “no value” (para 12).

Thus, on the merits, the Court concluded there was no prima facie case of the petitioners being proprietors of the mark.

5. Equity: Clean Hands, Suppression, and Underinvoicing

Even if the merits had been more evenly balanced, the Court’s equitable analysis would likely have defeated the petitioners’ applications.

The following findings were particularly damaging:

  • Unsettled accounts and outstanding dues:
    • The respondents’ claim of dues in excess of Rs 7 crores was not rejected at the interim stage (para 17).
  • Suppression of fact regarding consignments:
    • The consignments of torches that the Court had initially restrained were in fact ordered by the petitioners (in the name of “DP Trading Company”) in December 2024 and shipped on credit in early 2025 (para 17).
    • The petitioners did not disclose this, and instead gave the “misleading and distorted impression” that the respondents had violated a restraint order by sending goods (para 17).
  • Underinvoicing and tax evasion:
    • WhatsApp communications, payment records and charts showed payments routed through multiple foreign entities (Hong Kong, Singapore, Riyadh, Jakarta, Toronto, Kuala Lumpur) and underinvoicing “approximately 30%” of actual invoice value (para 18).
    • The Court considered this prima facie evidence of serious financial irregularities and directed investigation by the customs and revenue intelligence authorities.

All of this led to the stern conclusion that:

  • The petitioners’ motive was to “intimidate and coerce” the respondents (para 17);
  • The petitioners were guilty of “suppression and bad faith”, thus failing the maxim that “he who comes to equity must come with clean hands” (para 19); and
  • Such conduct “disentitles any party to relief” (para 18).

Consequently, even on the standard triple test for interim relief—prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury—the petitioners failed on all three counts (para 19).

III.C. Impact and Significance

1. Consolidation of Manufacturer-Focused Proprietorship Presumption

This judgment strongly reinforces, within the Calcutta High Court’s IP Division, the principle that:

  • As a general rule, the brand belongs to the manufacturer who affixes the mark on the product; and
  • An importer or distributor must produce exceptionally clear evidence to rebut this presumption—e.g., by showing that:
    • They commissioned the manufacture of goods under a mark they themselves coined;
    • They first affixed the mark on goods in the relevant territory; and
    • Consumers primarily associate the mark with them rather than the manufacturer.

This aligns Calcutta jurisprudence with Delhi precedents like Double Coin and Trans Tyres, sending a clear message that:

  • Local partners or distributors cannot opportunistically attempt to “capture” foreign brands via registration in India without a proper assignment or licence; and
  • Courts will look closely at the factual matrix—invoices, packaging, BIS certificates, promotional materials—to identify the true proprietor.

2. Clarifying the Limits of Section 30 for Importers

By emphasising that Section 30(3) is purely a defence, the judgment:

  • Reminds litigants that lawful acquisition and resale of genuine goods does not transform an importer into a trademark proprietor;
  • Constrains attempts by importers to turn parallel-import or distributorship models into claims of exclusivity over the trademark; and
  • Influences future arguments on the interaction between exhaustion of rights and claims of competing proprietorship.

This has potential ramifications for parallel import cases and for structuring contractual arrangements between foreign manufacturers and Indian distributors, who may need to:

  • Clearly record ownership of IP in written agreements;
  • Define the scope of use of the mark by importers; and
  • Address registration strategies to prevent opportunistic filing by local partners.

3. Evidentiary Value of BIS Certificates and Regulatory Documents

The Court’s reliance on the BIS certificate to identify the brand owner is another key aspect:

  • It treats BIS records as persuasive evidence of who owns the brand in the eyes of regulatory authorities;
  • Where an importer is merely listed as an “authorised representative” and the foreign manufacturer as “brand owner”, that designation will carry considerable weight in disputes over proprietorship.

This is particularly important in sectors where BIS or other regulatory approvals are mandatory (e.g., electrical goods, electronics, safety equipment).

4. Strong Signal on Litigation Conduct and Regulatory Spillovers

The Court’s direction to Customs and the DRI to investigate underinvoicing underscores that:

  • Civil IP litigation can have regulatory and criminal spillovers where tax evasion or customs violations appear on record;
  • Courts are prepared to treat IP suits brought in bad faith—especially where they are intertwined with irregular commercial practices—as a trigger for broader regulatory scrutiny.

For future litigants, this is a salient warning: attempts to deploy IP litigation as leverage in commercial disputes or debt recovery, while simultaneously engaging in undisclosed tax or customs irregularities, may backfire dramatically.

5. Protection of Foreign Brand Owners

For foreign brand owners, this decision is reassuring:

  • It recognises and enforces the rights of foreign manufacturers as prior users, even where the local importer has obtained an Indian registration;
  • It demonstrates that documentary trails (foreign registration, export invoices, regulatory certifications) can successfully establish prior user and proprietorship in Indian courts; and
  • It discourages “reverse infringement” suits by local partners designed to wrest control of the brand in India.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Prior User vs Registered Proprietor

Under Indian law:

  • A trademark can be protected by:
    • Registration under the Trade Marks Act; and/or
    • Use in the market, which gives rise to common law rights (passing off) and statutory protection for prior users (Section 34).
  • Where a conflict arises between:
    • A prior user (who used the mark first in relation to the goods/services); and
    • A later registrant (who obtained registration later);
    the prior user generally prevails.

In this case, the respondents were held to be prior users of “PL SUPREME” and “SUPREME”, so the petitioners’ later registration was insufficient to justify injuncting them.

2. Importer vs Manufacturer: Who Owns the Trademark?

Where goods are manufactured abroad and imported into India:

  • By default, the manufacturer who:
    • Conceives the mark,
    • AFFIXES it on the goods, and
    • Controls quality
    is presumed to be the trademark owner.
  • An importer/distributor can only become owner if:
    • They can demonstrate that customers identify the mark primarily with them (not the manufacturer); and
    • There is evidence that they created or first used the mark in the relevant territory.

Simply importing and selling goods bearing a manufacturer’s mark does not turn an importer into the trademark proprietor.

3. Section 30 Trade Marks Act and Exhaustion

Section 30 of the Trade Marks Act limits the scope of infringement. In particular:

  • Section 30(3) says that if a person has lawfully acquired goods bearing a registered trademark, then selling or otherwise dealing in those goods is not infringement, provided the goods were put on the market by or with the consent of the proprietor.
  • This is a form of “exhaustion of rights”: once the proprietor has sold a product, they usually cannot control its further resale.

However:

  • Section 30(3) is a defence against infringement claims—it does not itself give the importer any rights in the trademark;
  • It cannot be turned into a weapon to stop the trademark owner from using their own mark.

4. Interim Injunction: The Triple Test

Courts consider three main factors before granting interim injunctions:

  1. Prima facie case – Is there a serious question to be tried in favour of the applicant?
  2. Balance of convenience – Which side will suffer greater hardship if the injunction is granted or refused?
  3. Irreparable injury – Will the applicant suffer harm that cannot be adequately compensated by damages?

Additionally, equitable considerations like clean hands and full and frank disclosure are vital. A party that suppresses facts or engages in misconduct may be refused relief even if some merits exist.

5. Clean Hands Doctrine

The maxim “he who comes to equity must come with clean hands” means:

  • If you seek discretionary, equitable relief (like an injunction), you must:
    • Act honestly,
    • Disclose all material facts, and
    • Not misuse the court process.
  • If you conceal facts, mislead the court, or are involved in illegality (e.g., tax evasion), the court may dismantle your claim to equitable relief.

In this case, findings of suppression and underinvoicing significantly contributed to the refusal of interim relief.

V. Conclusion

The Calcutta High Court’s decision in Parul Ruparelia & Anr v. Camme Wang & Anr is a robust restatement—and modest evolution—of Indian trademark law at the intersection of foreign manufacture, local importation, and registration strategy.

Key takeaways include:

  • The prior user doctrine remains paramount: a later Indian registration cannot displace the rights of a foreign manufacturer who is a demonstrable prior user.
  • There is a strong presumption that the manufacturer who affixes the trademark owns it; distributors/importers bear a heavy evidential burden to prove otherwise.
  • Section 30(3) of the Trade Marks Act is a defence-only provision; it does not create proprietary rights for importers or entitle them to injunct the proprietor.
  • Regulatory documents such as BIS certificates can powerfully indicate brand ownership where they clearly name the manufacturer as proprietor and the importer as authorised representative.
  • Courts will not hesitate to deny equitable relief where there is suppression, misrepresentation, or apparent illegality (e.g., underinvoicing), and may even refer such matters to tax and customs authorities.

In the broader legal context, this judgment sends a clear message to Indian importers and foreign manufacturers alike: trademark ownership must follow genuine origin, control and goodwill, not opportunistic registration; and courts will vigilantly safeguard both the integrity of the marketplace and the integrity of their own processes.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Calcutta High Court

Judge(s)

The Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Advocates

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