Presidential Power to Abrogate Article 370 Survives Dissolution of J&K Constituent Assembly; Article 367 Cannot Amend the Constitution: The Supreme Court’s Framework on Article 356 and State Reorganisation

Presidential Power to Abrogate Article 370 Survives Dissolution of J&K Constituent Assembly; Article 367 Cannot Amend the Constitution: The Supreme Court’s Framework on Article 356 and State Reorganisation

Court: Supreme Court of India | Citation: 2023 INSC 1058 | Date: 11 December 2023

Bench: Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI; Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.; Sanjiv Khanna, J.; B.R. Gavai, J.; Surya Kant, J. (Unanimous; with separate concurrences)

Introduction

This Constitution Bench decision settles the most consequential federal question since independence: whether and how the Union could abrogate Article 370 and reorganise the State of Jammu and Kashmir. At the core lay intertwined challenges to (i) two Presidential Constitutional Orders—CO 272 (5 August 2019) and CO 273 (6 August 2019)—which applied the entire Constitution of India to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and declared Article 370 inoperative, and (ii) the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, which bifurcated the State into the Union Territory (UT) of Ladakh (without a legislature) and the UT of Jammu & Kashmir (with a legislature).

The petitioners invoked asymmetric federalism, the distinct political history of accession, and the role of the J&K Constituent Assembly to argue that Article 370 could neither be abrogated without that Assembly’s recommendation, nor through emergency powers. The Union defended the abrogation as the culmination of constitutional integration, and urged that President’s Rule did not disable Parliament and the President from exercising the “powers of the Legislature of the State”, including on constitutional functions.

The Court’s unanimous outcome—authored by the CJI with concurring opinions—upholds the abrogation while carefully cabining the methods used. It reaffirms federalism as a basic feature, clarifies the reach of Presidential powers under Article 356 post-proclamation, and draws a clear line against using Article 367’s interpretive machinery to amend the Constitution.

Summary of the Judgment

  • No internal sovereignty. J&K did not retain sovereignty—“internal” or otherwise—after accession and the 1949 Proclamation adopting the Constitution of India. Article 370 reflected asymmetric federalism, not sovereignty.
  • Article 370 was temporary. By text, placement in Part XXI (Temporary/Transitional/Special Provisions), drafting history, and practice, Article 370 was a temporary arrangement to facilitate gradual integration.
  • Presidential power under Article 370(3) survived the dissolution of the J&K Constituent Assembly. The proviso’s reference to that Assembly became otiose on its dissolution in 1957, but the President’s substantive power to declare Article 370 inoperative remained; the President could exercise it unilaterally. CO 273 is valid.
  • Limits on “modification” power under Article 370(1)(d). Paragraph 2 of CO 272—using Article 367(4)(d) to substitute “Constituent Assembly” with “Legislative Assembly” in Article 370(3)—is ultra vires. Article 367 (interpretation clause) cannot be used to amend the Constitution; nor can “modification” in Article 370(1)(d) be stretched to alter Article 370 itself.
  • But CO 272 validly applied the entire Constitution to J&K. Apart from the invalid Article 367 substitution, applying the whole Constitution via Article 370(1)(d) is permissible and reversible—distinct from permanent cessation under Article 370(3).
  • Standard for actions under Article 356 post-proclamation. Actions must have a reasonable nexus to the objects of the proclamation; “irreversibility” is not, by itself, a ground of invalidity. Everyday administration is generally not justiciable. A challenger must make a prima facie showing of mala fides; then the onus shifts to the Union.
  • Parliament under Article 356 can exercise all “powers of the Legislature of the State”. The phrase embraces legislative and non-legislative (constitutional) functions, including expressing views under the proviso to Article 3.
  • Reorganisation. Formation of the UT of Ladakh is valid under Article 3(a) read with Explanation I. The broader question—whether Parliament can convert a whole state into a UT—was left open in light of the Union’s assurance to restore J&K’s statehood. The Court directed the Election Commission to conduct Assembly elections by 30 September 2024 and recorded that statehood be restored “at the earliest”.
  • Constitution of J&K is now inoperative. With the entire Constitution of India applied and Article 370 inoperative, the Constitution of J&K has become redundant.
  • Justice Kaul’s concurrence. Recommends establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for J&K, inspired by global best practices, to acknowledge and address violations by state and non-state actors and foster healing.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K (1959): Recognised the Maharaja’s internal powers pre-Constitution; crucially, did not hold J&K retained sovereignty post-accession. The present Court clarifies that sovereignty vests in “We the People”, and Article 370 reflected asymmetry, not sovereignty.
  • Sampat Prakash v. State of J&K (1969): Held Article 370 did not automatically lapse after the State Constituent Assembly dissolved; the special conditions persisted. The present Court adopts this, and goes further: the President’s power under Article 370(3) continues despite the Assembly’s dissolution.
  • Puranlal Lakhanpal (I) & (II) (1955/1962): Earlier readings of “modification” under Article 370(1)(d) were not carte blanche. The present Court draws a hard limit—Article 367 cannot be an amendment vehicle; Article 370 itself cannot be altered via 370(1)(d).
  • Mohd. Maqbool Damnoo (1972): Upheld clarificatory use of Article 367 (substituting Sadar-i-Riyasat with “Governor”) as reflective of existing constitutional reality—distinguishable from CO 272’s substantive alteration of Article 370(3)’s architecture.
  • State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977) & S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994): The Court adopts Bommai’s more exacting review of Article 356: parliamentary approval as a check; irreversibility alone is not fatal; restoration of status quo ante may be ordered in appropriate cases.
  • Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017): The “ordinance lapsing” doctrine does not transplant to Article 356 actions; “irreversibility” is not a standalone vice post parliamentary approval.
  • State of W.B. v. Union of India (1964) & Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay (1960): Affirm Parliament’s plenary authority under Article 3; “views” of a State legislature are recommendatory, not binding. Applied to validate the Article 3 process during President’s Rule.
  • Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India (1993): Demonstrates that constitutional obligations post-independence are grounded in the Constitution, not in pre-constitutional instruments (a theme echoed here).
  • Kihoto Hollohan (1992), Rajendra N. Shah (2021): The Court’s “substance over form” approach to constitutional change informs evaluation of whether CO 272’s Article 367 move effectively “amended” Article 370—hence invalid.

Legal Reasoning

1) Sovereignty and Article 370’s character

The Court disaggregates “sovereignty” into external and internal facets, emphasising that in India sovereignty ultimately vests in the people. Accession, the 1949 Proclamation, Article 1, and the Constitution of J&K’s own text (Sections 3, 5, 147) establish that the State was “an integral part of India” and lacked any sovereign residuum. Article 370 was an instrument of asymmetric federalism—intended to facilitate phased integration by enabling selective application of constitutional provisions and central laws.

2) The survival of Presidential power under Article 370(3)

Article 370(3) begins with a non obstante clause and vests substantive power in the President to declare Article 370 inoperative or operational with exceptions/modifications. The proviso—requiring a recommendation of the J&K Constituent Assembly—became moot on dissolution of that Assembly in 1957. But the power did not lapse. Interpreting the provision as defunct would render a “temporary” Article permanent by happenstance—contrary to its design and history. Hence, the President could act unilaterally in 2019. CO 273 stands.

3) The hard limit on “modification” via Article 370(1)(d) and Article 367

Article 370(1)(d) empowers the President to apply “other provisions” of the Constitution to J&K “with exceptions and modifications.” It does not authorise altering Article 1 or Article 370. CO 272’s use of Article 367(4)(d) to replace “Constituent Assembly” with “Legislative Assembly” in Article 370(3) is, in substance, an amendment of Article 370; Article 367 is an interpretive clause, not an amendment conduit. Holding: Para 2 of CO 272 is ultra vires; Article 367 cannot be used to bypass Article 368 or the specific mechanism in Article 370(3).

However, the Court upholds the balance of CO 272—application of the entire Constitution to J&K through Article 370(1)(d)—as lawful and, importantly, reversible.

4) Article 356: standard of review and scope of power

  • Review standard. Post-proclamation actions must bear a reasonable nexus to the proclamation’s object. Courts avoid micro-managing day-to-day governance; irreversibility alone is insufficient to invalidate, particularly after parliamentary approval (Bommai).
  • Burden shifting. A petitioner must lay a prima facie foundation of mala fides or extraneousness; the onus then shifts to the Union to justify the action’s nexus.
  • “Powers of the Legislature of the State”. The phrase in Article 356(1)(b) includes non-legislative/constitutional functions (e.g., giving “views” under the proviso to Article 3; ratifications). Article 357(1) deals with delegation of law-making competence and does not confine the broader grant in Article 356.

5) Article 3: reorganisation and federal guardrails

The Court affirms plenary power under Article 3 to form new States or Union Territories, alter areas, boundaries, and names; “views” of State legislatures are not binding. Formation of the UT of Ladakh is valid. The broader question—whether the Constitution permits converting a whole state into a UT—was expressly left open in view of the Union’s assurance that J&K’s statehood will be restored. Meanwhile, the Court directed Assembly elections by 30 September 2024.

Impact

  • Constitutional integration completed. All provisions of the Constitution of India apply to the territories of the former State. The Constitution of J&K is inoperative.
  • Uniform fundamental and statutory rights. Residents enjoy the same rights and are subject to the same constitutional discipline as other citizens. Article 35A (a product of CO 48, 1954) has ceased to exist along with Article 370, ending the “permanent resident” carve-outs created under that rubric.
  • Clear limits on executive shortcuts. A significant doctrinal brake: Article 367’s interpretive clause cannot be used to amend the Constitution; “modifications” under Article 370(1)(d) cannot alter Article 370.
  • Article 356 doctrine refined. The Court adopts a “reasonable nexus” test for post-proclamation actions, clarifies the challenger’s burden, and recognises Parliament’s authority to perform a State Legislature’s constitutional functions during President’s Rule.
  • Federalism’s baseline protected, future litigation possible. While Ladakh’s UT status is upheld, the “degradation” of a State into a UT in toto remains an open constitutional question—preserving a safeguard for federalism in future cases.
  • Democratic restoration mandated. The Election Commission must conduct Assembly elections for J&K by 30 September 2024; statehood to be restored “at the earliest”.
  • Transitional justice roadmap. Justice Kaul’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission recommendation, if implemented, could begin a structured process of acknowledgement, healing, and reform across the region.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Asymmetric Federalism: The Constitution permits certain States to have special arrangements to accommodate unique historical, cultural or security considerations. Article 370 was one such mechanism—temporary and transitional.
  • Instrument of Accession (IoA): A legal instrument executed by princely rulers to accede to the Dominion of India in 1947. After the Constitution came into force, obligations were constitutional, not merely contractual.
  • Article 370(1)(d) vs 370(3): Under 370(1)(d), the President can apply “other provisions” of the Constitution to J&K with “exceptions and modifications” (a reversible, executive route). Under 370(3), the President can declare Article 370 inoperative (a permanent, cessation route). The Court says you cannot use 370(1)(d) to modify 370(3).
  • Article 367: An interpretation clause. It helps construe constitutional terms but cannot be turned into an amendment vehicle to alter the Constitution’s substance.
  • Article 356 Proclamation: When “Constitutional machinery” fails in a State, the President may assume State executive functions and declare that the “powers of the Legislature of the State” shall be exercised by or under Parliament’s authority. Post-proclamation, actions must have a reasonable nexus to restoring governance; challengers carry a threshold burden.
  • Article 3 Proviso: Requires that a Bill affecting a State’s area, boundary or name be referred to that State’s legislature for “views”—which are not binding. During President’s Rule, Parliament can validly stand in for the State Legislature.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court has crafted a careful constitutional grammar for the abrogation of Article 370—one that affirms federalism and the rule of law while acknowledging the historical design of temporary asymmetry. Three enduring propositions stand out. First, the President’s substantive power under Article 370(3) is independent of the now-dissolved J&K Constituent Assembly; the proviso cannot transmute a temporary arrangement into a permanent one. Second, Article 367 and the “modification” power under Article 370(1)(d) cannot be abused to effect constitutional amendments by stealth. Third, the Court clarifies the scope and review of actions under Article 356, balancing elasticity for governance continuity with judicially enforceable limits.

Equally significant are the judicial guardrails for the future: the unaddressed question on wholesale conversion of a State into a Union Territory preserves a federal red line; the binding directions for early elections and restoration of statehood anchor the return to representative self-government; and Justice Kaul’s call for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission offers a path to moral and civic repair. Together, these holdings chart a framework for integration through law, and for healing through justice.

Case Details

Year: 2023
Court: Supreme Court Of India

Judge(s)

HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURYA KANT

Advocates

AAKARSH KAMRADEBASIS MISRA

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