Plausible View & Double Presumption: Appellate Restraint in Acquittal Appeals
Commentary on Raj Pal Singh v. Rajveer & Ors., 2025 INSC 1442 (Supreme Court of India)

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1. Introduction

The decision in Raj Pal Singh v. Rajveer & Ors., 2025 INSC 1442 is a significant reaffirmation by the Supreme Court of India of the principles governing:

• the standard of proof in criminal trials (“must be” vs “may be” guilt), and
• the limited scope of appellate interference with acquittals, especially where the High Court has reversed a conviction and acquitted the accused.

The case arose from an intra-family property dispute leading to the alleged murder of Captain Praveen Kumar, an Indian Army officer, for which his uncle Dharam Pal, cousin Rajveer, and a relative Sudhir were prosecuted. The trial court convicted all three under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), whereas the High Court of Allahabad acquitted them. The deceased’s father and original complainant, Raj Pal Singh, appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the acquittal.

The Supreme Court, speaking through N.V. Anjaria, J. (with K. Vinod Chandran, J. concurring), upheld the High Court’s acquittal. The judgment does not create a wholly new doctrine, but it consolidates and powerfully re-emphasizes existing principles on:

• when evidence is so doubtful or improbable that benefit of doubt must go to the accused; and
• how an appellate court – particularly the Supreme Court – must approach an appeal against acquittal where the High Court has already taken a plausible view.

The decision thus strengthens the jurisprudence on “double presumption of innocence” and the requirement of “substantial and compelling reasons” to overturn an acquittal, drawing heavily on Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra¹ and Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka².

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2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 Parties and Relationship

• Appellant / Complainant: Raj Pal Singh – father of the deceased Captain Praveen Kumar.
• Deceased: Captain Praveen Kumar – serving in the Indian Army.
• Respondent No. 2: Dharam Pal – elder brother of the complainant (uncle of the deceased), about 65 years old, and allegedly a cancer patient.
• Respondent No. 1: Rajveer – son of Dharam Pal (cousin of the deceased).
• Respondent No. 3: Sudhir – a distant relative of Rajveer.

There was a long-standing property dispute among the three brothers – Raj Pal (complainant), Vijay Pal, and Dharam Pal – concerning division of ancestral land. This dispute forms the underlying motive alleged by the prosecution.

2.2 Prior Complaint from the Army Unit

On 31.05.1996, one Major Akash Johar, Adjutant, wrote to the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, mentioning:

• the hardships being faced by Raj Pal Singh due to the land dispute, and
• that Dharam Pal was in possession of private arms and used to threaten Raj Pal.

This letter is relevant primarily to show background hostility, but not the specific incident of murder.

2.3 The Events of 07.06.1996 – Panchayat & Initial FIR

On 07.06.1996, a village panchayat was convened at about 7:00 a.m. to settle the property dispute between Raj Pal and Dharam Pal. According to the prosecution and evidence on record:

• The village Chowkidar informed the police that:
  • Praveen Kumar and his father Raj Pal joined the panchayat;
  • a heated exchange ensued;
  • Dharam Pal left the panchayat and went towards his house;
  • Praveen and his father allegedly followed him while armed (rifle and hockey-stick respectively); and
  • Dharam Pal allegedly fired at Praveen in self-defence.
• This led to registration of Crime Case No. 19 of 1996 under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) at Police Station Bahadur Garh, Ghaziabad.

Thus, at the earliest point of time, the version given through the Chowkidar suggested that Dharam Pal himself fired at Praveen, and that too in alleged defence.

2.4 The Events of 08.06.1996 – Alleged Dragging and Shooting

The complainant’s later version, which became the foundation of the murder case, is markedly different:

• Praveen reportedly left for a marriage at Hapur on 07.06.1996 after reaching home.
• On 08.06.1996, at around 8 a.m., he returned from the marriage and parked in the house.
• At that time, according to the complainant:
  • Dharam Pal, Rajveer and Sudhir forcibly dragged Praveen from the parking area to the first floor via the staircase,
  • Sudhir was allegedly armed with a country-made pistol,
  • Praveen shouted for help, attracting Raj Pal (complainant), Jal Singh (PW-2), Omkar Singh and Balbir Singh,
  • Sudhir pointed the pistol at them and threatened to shoot if they intervened,
  • Dharam Pal allegedly instigated Rajveer to kill Praveen,
  • Rajveer allegedly fired at Praveen using Dharam Pal’s licensed gun, and
  • Dharam Pal allegedly hit Praveen with a hockey-stick on the head.
• Praveen was taken to the Military Hospital, where he was declared dead.
• Consequently, the original Section 307 IPC case was converted into one under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC (murder with common intention).

2.5 Medical & Investigative Evidence

Postmortem by Dr. V.K. Bajpayee (PW‑3) (09.06.1996) revealed the following ante-mortem injuries:

1. Penetrating firearm bullet wound on upper portion of the left thigh (outer side), 3 cm × 2 cm × muscle deep, blackened margins.
2. Multiple penetrating pellet wounds over an area 10 cm × 6 cm on front of right thigh, sizes between 0.33 cm × 0.6 cm and 0.66 cm × 0.5 cm.
3. Incised wound 4 cm × 1 cm on upper portion of head towards the right.
4. Abrasion (scrap wound) 4 cm × 3 cm on upper back side of right hand.

Cause of death: shock and haemorrhage due to injuries.

Other notable evidence:

• PW‑1 Raj Pal (complainant) and PW‑2 Jal Singh claimed to be eye-witnesses to the dragging and shooting.
• PW‑4 Col. Savitri Datti (Senior Registrar, Military Hospital) and PW‑7 Lt. Col. Dr. Sandeep Rastogi confirmed that Praveen was brought dead.
• PW‑5 & PW‑10 (police officers) and PW‑11 Rajiv Kumar (second Investigating Officer) spoke to inquest, investigation and statements.
• PW‑8 Tunda (Chowkidar) lodged the first written report but admitted he had not seen the actual firing.
• Defence witnesses DW‑1 Charan Singh and DW‑2 Lal Singh deposed about enmity between the parties.

The prosecution also recovered Dharam Pal’s licensed firearm but crucially, no ballistic examination was carried out to link the recovered weapon to the bullets/pellets recovered from Praveen’s body.

2.6 Defence Version (Section 313 CrPC Statements)

In their statements under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC):

• Dharam Pal stated that:
  • during the panchayat on 07.06.1996, he and his supporters were assaulted by the complainant’s side;
  • he left the panchayat and went upstairs to his room;
  • he then heard a gunshot but denied firing or being party to murder;
  • he claimed false implication due to property enmity.
• Rajveer claimed:
  • he was employed as a Professor at Shimbhawli College, residing there for 12 years;
  • he was not present in the village at the time of the incident.
• Sudhir stated:
  • he was a B.Sc. student in the same college;
  • he is a distant relative but was not present at the time of incident;
  • he too claimed false implication.

2.7 Trial, High Court Appeal and Supreme Court Appeal

• Trial Court (Sessions Trial No. 291 of 1997, ADJ Ghaziabad):
  • Convicted all three accused under Section 302/34 IPC.
  • Sentenced them to imprisonment for life and fine of ₹1,50,000/- each, with two years’ default imprisonment.
• High Court (Allahabad), Criminal Appeal No. 8119 of 2007:
  • By judgment dated 10.10.2012, set aside the conviction.
  • Acquitted all accused, primarily on grounds of improbabilities, contradictions and gaps in the prosecution case.
• Supreme Court (Present Appeal):
  • Appellant: Raj Pal Singh (complainant-father of the deceased).
  • Respondents: Rajveer & Ors. (accused persons).
  • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on 16.12.2025, affirming the High Court’s acquittal.

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3. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the acquittal recorded by the High Court, essentially holding:

1. The prosecution’s narrative was highly improbable and not credible:
   • Dragging a young, fit Army Captain up a staircase 20 steps long and only 3–5 feet wide by three persons – one being a 65-year-old cancer patient – was inherently unlikely.
   • The alleged presence and use of the country-made pistol by Sudhir and the hockey-stick by Dharam Pal was unexplained and inconsistent with earlier reports.
2. There were material discrepancies and contradictions:
   • The earliest report via the Chowkidar suggested Dharam Pal fired in self-defence on 07.06.1996.
   • The later complaint by Raj Pal (dated 08.06.1996 but submitted on 12.06.1996) shifted the role of firing to Rajveer, allegedly on exhortation by Dharam Pal, and introduced the dragging episode of 08.06.1996.
   • The complaint did not mention the alleged hockey-stick blow by Dharam Pal, although it later surfaced in oral evidence.
3. Investigative lapses were serious:
   • The licensed firearm of Dharam Pal, allegedly used in the shooting, was not sent for ballistic examination.
   • This failure weakened the prosecution’s ability to scientifically link the weapon to the fatal injuries.
4. In such circumstances, the High Court’s view acquitting the accused was a “plausible” and reasonable appreciation of evidence, not perverse or illegal.
5. Given the double presumption of innocence (initial presumption + acquittal), the Supreme Court held that there were no substantial or compelling reasons to overturn the acquittal.

The Court relied on:

• Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra¹ – reiterating that guilt must be established to the level of “must be guilty”, not merely “may be guilty”.
• Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka² – restating the law on appellate powers in acquittal appeals and the “two views” rule.

The appeal was accordingly dismissed, leaving the High Court’s acquittal intact.

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4. Detailed Legal Analysis

4.1 Evaluation of Evidence and Factual Improbabilities

4.1.1 The “Dragging” Story and Physical Improbability

A central plank of the prosecution case was that:

• Praveen was forcibly dragged by Dharam Pal (65 years, cancer patient), Rajveer and Sudhir from the parking area;
• He was dragged up a staircase of about 14–20 steps, 3–5 feet wide; and
• This occurred even though Praveen was a young, physically fit Army Captain.

The Supreme Court endorsed the High Court’s reasoned skepticism:

• It was inherently improbable that three persons could drag such a person up a narrow staircase, especially when one of them was elderly and seriously ill.
• PW‑1 and PW‑2, while alleging dragging and scuffle, could not even say whether Praveen’s clothes were torn, which one would expect if considerable physical force was applied.

These improbabilities strongly suggested that the incident may not have transpired in the manner claimed by the prosecution.

4.1.2 Inconsistent Use and Origin of Weapons

The prosecution’s account of weapons was also found unreliable:

• Country-made pistol with Sudhir:
  • PW‑1 and PW‑2 assert that Sudhir held a country-made pistol and threatened them during the dragging.
  • Neither could explain where Sudhir obtained this pistol or at what point he armed himself.
  • If Rajveer had gone to fetch a weapon (as one possible explanation), that would leave only Dharam Pal (elderly, ill) and Sudhir to overpower and drag Praveen – further straining plausibility.
• Hockey-stick allegedly used by Dharam Pal:
  • The later oral evidence suggested Dharam Pal struck Praveen with a hockey-stick.
  • However, the complaint dated 08.06.1996 (filed on 12.06.1996) is silent on any hockey-stick blow.
  • There is no explanation as to from where or how Dharam Pal procured the hockey-stick at that point.
• Licensed weapon of Dharam Pal:
  • The gun is alleged to have been used by Rajveer to shoot Praveen.
  • Though recovered, it was not subjected to ballistic testing to relate it to the recovered bullets/pellets.

The Court found these gaps material. When the prosecution theory hinges on specific weapons and their use, unexplained and inconsistent narratives about such weapons significantly weaken the case.

4.1.3 Contradictory Versions of Who Fired

A highly significant inconsistency lies in the attribution of the fatal shot:

1. Chowkidar’s report (PW‑8):
   • Indicates Praveen followed Dharam Pal after the panchayat;
   • States Dharam Pal fired upon Praveen in defence; i.e., Dharam Pal as shooter.
2. Later complaint by Raj Pal (08.06.1996, filed 12.06.1996):
   • Shifts the story to a separate incident on 08.06.1996 at the house;
   • Alleges Rajveer fired the fatal shot using Dharam Pal’s gun on exhortation by Dharam Pal;
   • Dharam Pal is no longer the shooter; his role is of instigator.

These two versions cannot easily be reconciled:

• One version places the firing on 07.06.1996 at the panchayat site by Dharam Pal (self-defence).
• The other places it on 08.06.1996 at the house, by Rajveer following dragging.

The Supreme Court regarded these contradictions as fundamental, not minor discrepancies. They go to the core of the manner of occurrence, place and assailant. In criminal law, such contradictions fuel reasonable doubt.

4.1.4 Delay and Inadequacies in the Complaint

The complaint by Raj Pal:

• was dated 08.06.1996 but was actually submitted only on 12.06.1996;
• did not thoroughly or clearly narrate the events of 07.06.1996 (panchayat and earlier firing);
• did not attribute specific firing role to Dharam Pal in that earlier incident, even though other contemporaneous information (via the Chowkidar) did.

While delay in filing an FIR or complaint is not always fatal, here the delay, coupled with shifting narratives, raised suspicion about the spontaneity and reliability of the account.

4.1.5 Lack of Ballistic Evidence

The Supreme Court also highlighted that:

• The licensed firearm of Dharam Pal was recovered.
• Despite this, there was no attempt to get it forensically tested (ballistics) to see if the bullets/pellets from the deceased’s body matched this weapon.

This omission is not merely a technical lapse. In a case highly dependent on which weapon was used, by whom, and when, a ballistic link could have been crucial. Its absence contributed to the Court’s view that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

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4.2 Standard of Proof in Criminal Cases – “Must Be” vs “May Be”

The Court reiterates the fundamental principle from Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra¹:

"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.."

This reinforces the bedrock of criminal jurisprudence:

• The prosecution must prove its case to the standard of beyond reasonable doubt.
• Circumstances must point to the “must have” guilt of the accused, not merely that they “may have” committed the crime.
• Where two or more reasonable hypotheses are possible, one consistent with innocence, the court must give the accused the benefit of doubt.

In this case:

• Several versions of the incident existed (panchayat firing vs home dragging incident; shooter being Dharam Pal vs Rajveer),
• The physical capacity of the accused and the physical possibility of the dragging story were questionable, and
• Weapon-use, motive, and participation were not established with the required clarity.

Consequently, at best, the prosecution case raised a suspicion – perhaps even a strong suspicion – but did not cross the threshold into “sure conclusion”. The law does not allow conviction on suspicion, however strong.

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4.3 Appellate Interference with Acquittals – Chandrappa Principles Reaffirmed

The Supreme Court draws extensively from Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka², a leading authority on the powers of an appellate court when dealing with an acquittal.

4.3.1 Scope of Appellate Power

Chandrappa holds, and this judgment reiterates, that:

"(i) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded."

Thus:

• The Supreme Court or High Court is not mechanically bound by the trial court’s or High Court’s view.
• It can re-evaluate the entire evidence – facts and law.

However, this power is tempered by strong judicial self-restraint when dealing with acquittals.

4.3.2 Double Presumption of Innocence

The Court emphasizes the doctrine of double presumption of innocence:

"(iv) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused."

This means:

1. Every accused is initially presumed innocent unless proven guilty by a court of law; and
2. When a court acquits the accused, that presumption is reinforced, making subsequent interference even more difficult.

Therefore, once acquitted, an accused enjoys a stronger shield against conviction in appeal than an accused who has been convicted at the first instance.

4.3.3 Two-Views Rule and “Plausible View” Standard

The Court reiterates principle (v) from Chandrappa:

"(v) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

In this case:

• The High Court, on re-appreciation of evidence, found serious doubts and acquitted the accused.
• The Supreme Court evaluated whether this acquittal was:
  • perverse, or
  • based on an impossible or unreasonable reading of evidence.

The Court concluded that:

• The High Court’s reading of the evidence was a “plausible” view – one that a reasonable judicial mind could take on the facts.
• Where such a plausible view exists, even if another view theoretically leading to conviction could also be taken, the appellate court should not substitute its own view for the acquittal.

This is critical: the Supreme Court is not deciding whether it would have convicted on the same evidence; it is deciding whether the High Court’s acquittal is so unreasonable that it must be reversed. Finding that it is not, it refuses to interfere.

4.3.4 “Substantial and Compelling Reasons” – Flourish, Not Limitation

The judgment restates that expressions like:

• “substantial and compelling reasons”
• “good and sufficient grounds”
• “very strong circumstances”
• “glaring mistakes”, etc.

used in earlier decisions are:

"...more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court..."

This maintains a balance:

• The power to interfere with acquittal is not legally curtailed;
• But the judicial duty is to exercise that power sparingly and cautiously, respecting the double presumption of innocence.

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4.4 Interaction Between Evidence, Standard of Proof, and Appellate Restraint

The Supreme Court’s reasoning knits together three themes:

1. Quality of prosecution evidence – marred by contradictions, improbabilities, and investigative gaps.
2. Standard of proof – prosecution must reach the “must be guilty” threshold; here it fell short.
3. Nature of appellate review – especially in a second appeal scenario (against High Court’s acquittal), interference is justified only where the lower court’s view is clearly unsustainable.

Having found that:

• the prosecution case suffered from material discrepancies;
• the story of dragging and weapon use did not convince on a rational assessment;
• the investigation failed to complete critical forensic steps; and
• the High Court’s appreciation of these issues was well-reasoned and plausible;

the Supreme Court concluded that:

• there was no legal justification to substitute the High Court’s acquittal with a conviction, and
• doing so would breach the principles of criminal justice and appellate restraint laid down in Shivaji and Chandrappa.

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5. Impact and Significance of the Judgment

5.1 Strengthening the “Plausible View” Shield for Acquitted Accused

The judgment reinforces that when a High Court acquits accused persons by taking a reasonably possible view of the evidence, the Supreme Court will be slow and cautious in interfering, particularly:

• where the prosecution case is not overwhelmingly strong;
• where material doubts about the incident’s manner or location exist; and
• where investigative shortcomings (like non-use of ballistics) persist.

This serves to:

• Protect individuals from conviction on weak or doubtful evidence, and
• Provide finality and stability to acquittals, thereby strengthening the rule of law.

5.2 Guidance to Investigating Agencies and Prosecution

The case implicitly underscores to investigators and prosecutors:

• The necessity of conducting a thorough, scientific investigation, including:
  • timely and complete recording of statements,
  • careful preservation and forensic analysis of weapons, and
  • avoiding or explaining material contradictions between early and later versions.
• That lapses such as:
  • failure to send seized weapons for ballistic examination,
  • delayed or shifting complaints,
  • weak corroboration of eye-witness accounts,
  can seriously undermine the case at the appellate stage.

5.3 Significance for Victim/Complainant Appeals Against Acquittal

Although the judgment does not explicitly discuss locus or procedural aspects of a complainant’s appeal (such questions now arise under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC and related provisions), it is important practically because:

• The appellant here was the complainant-father of the deceased, not the State.
• Yet, the Court applied the same strict standards of appellate restraint as in appeals by the State.

This means that:

• Whether the appeal is by the State or the victim/complainant,
• The substantive test for overturning an acquittal remains the same:
  • The High Court’s view must be shown to be perverse or wholly unreasonable.

5.4 Consolidation of Jurisprudence Rather than Novel Doctrine

The case is best understood not as creating “new law” but as a strong reaffirmation of:

• Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade on the standard of proof and the “may be” vs “must be” distinction; and
• Chandrappa on appellate court powers and the double presumption of innocence.

Its main contribution lies in applying these principles to a factually sensitive case (alleged murder of a serving Army officer in a family property dispute) and yet resisting the temptation to tilt the balance emotionally in favour of the victim at the cost of doctrinal consistency.

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6. Key Legal Concepts Simplified

6.1 Section 302 and Section 34 IPC

• Section 302 IPC: Punishes the offence of murder. The punishment is typically death or imprisonment for life, plus fine.
• Section 34 IPC: Deals with acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. Even if only one person physically commits the act, all who share the common intention can be held equally liable.

In this case:

• The allegation was that all three accused shared the common intention to kill Praveen (property dispute motive), and
• Rajveer fired the shot, Sudhir aided with pistol threat, and Dharam Pal instigated and allegedly struck with hockey-stick.

6.2 Section 313 CrPC – Accused’s Personal Statement

Section 313 CrPC allows the court to:

• question the accused, personally, after the prosecution evidence is led;
• give the accused an opportunity to explain any incriminating circumstances appearing against them.

The answers are not on oath and are not “evidence” in the usual sense, but:

• they can be considered by the court;
• if the prosecution’s case is weak and the accused offers a plausible explanation, it may strengthen the defence version.

6.3 “Beyond Reasonable Doubt” and “Benefit of Doubt”

• Beyond reasonable doubt does not mean 100% mathematical certainty.
• It means:
  • no reasonable person, after considering all evidence, would remain in substantial doubt that the accused is guilty;
  • if a real, rational doubt remains, the accused must get the benefit of doubt.

The doctrine protects individuals from wrongful conviction where evidence is weak or inconsistent.

6.4 Double Presumption of Innocence

This concept refers to:

1. The basic presumption: every accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
2. The reinforced presumption: when a court acquits an accused, this presumption is strengthened.

Therefore:

• An appellate court must be slow to disturb an acquittal unless it finds clear error or perversity.

6.5 “Non-Reportable” Judgment

The judgment is marked as “Non-Reportable”, meaning:

• It may not be meant for publication in official law reports like SCC or AIR.
• However, it still holds legal value and can be cited, particularly for persuasive purposes, unless barred by specific rules.

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7. Conclusion

Raj Pal Singh v. Rajveer & Ors. offers a clear and robust restatement of core principles of criminal law and appellate review:

• The prosecution must firmly establish guilt to the level of “must be guilty”, not merely “may be guilty”.
• Inconsistencies in key aspects – who fired, where and when the incident occurred, and how weapons were used – can generate reasonable doubt.
• Investigative gaps, particularly failure to utilise available forensic tools like ballistic examination, can critically weaken the prosecution case.
• Once a High Court has acquitted the accused on a plausible appreciation of evidence, the Supreme Court will not lightly interfere:
  • the double presumption of innocence operates strongly;
  • only clear illegality, perversity or irrationality in the acquittal justifies reversal.

The case thus stands as a reaffirmation that:

“Plausible doubt must favour the accused; plausible views of acquittal must be respected by appellate courts.”

In the broader legal context, the decision strengthens the protection of individual liberty in criminal cases, ensures that convictions are based on solid and credible evidence, and underscores the judiciary’s commitment to principled restraint in appellate interference with acquittals – even in emotionally charged cases involving the killing of a serving Army officer in a family dispute.

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¹ Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793.
² Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415.