Parity in Bail Requires Similarity of Role, Not Mere Co‑Accused Status:
A Commentary on Sagar v. State of U.P., 2025 INSC 1370

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1. Introduction

The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Sagar v. State of U.P. & Anr., 2025 INSC 1370, is a significant restatement and clarification of the law on parity as a ground for grant of bail and on the requirement of reasons in bail orders.

The case arises out of a homicide incident in village Hastinapur, Uttar Pradesh, where the complainant’s father, Sonveer, was allegedly shot dead during a confrontation involving multiple accused persons armed with pistols. The First Information Report (FIR) named six accused: Suresh Pal, Rajveer, Saurav, Aditya, Prince, and Bijendra. The prosecution case is that:

• There was an earlier verbal altercation between the complainant Sagar and co-villagers Suresh Pal and his son Aditya.
• The complainant’s father, Sonveer, intervened to defuse the dispute, leading to threats being made by Suresh Pal.
• On the date of the incident, when the complainant and his parents were on their way to a field, the accused allegedly blocked their way, armed with pistols.
• Rajveer allegedly threatened that they would “teach a lesson” to the complainant’s family, particularly to Sonveer.
• Suresh Pal allegedly instigated his son Aditya to shoot, and Aditya is said to have fired at Sonveer, killing him.

The present judgment is delivered in two connected criminal appeals (arising from SLP (Crl.) Nos. 8865–8866 of 2025):

1. Appeal concerning Rajveer: challenging the order of the Allahabad High Court granting him bail primarily on the ground of parity with co-accused Suresh Pal.
2. Appeal concerning Prince: challenging another order of the Allahabad High Court granting bail to co-accused Prince in the same case, where the High Court’s order was largely unreasoned.

The offences involved were under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), i.e., rioting, rioting with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly with common object, murder, and criminal intimidation.

Two central legal issues arise:

• Whether parity with a co-accused can, by itself, be the sole ground for granting bail.
• What degree of reasoning is required in an order granting bail, particularly in serious offences like murder.

Justice Sanjay Karol, speaking for a Bench (with Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh concurring), uses this case not only to resolve the parties’ dispute but also to consolidate and clarify the doctrinal position on parity in bail and the necessity of reasoned orders.

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2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Rajveer’s Bail (SLP (Crl.) No. 8865 of 2025)

Rajveer’s regular bail had been rejected twice by the Additional Sessions Judge, Meerut, primarily because of the seriousness of the offence and the nature of ante-mortem injuries, including a gunshot wound and lacerated injuries. The Allahabad High Court, however, granted him bail on 3 January 2025, essentially on one basis:

• He had no criminal antecedents; and
• His father and co-accused, Suresh Pal, had already been granted bail by the High Court in a separate order dated 22 November 2024, and their roles were “similar”.

The High Court thus relied chiefly on parity with Suresh Pal. Notably, the Supreme Court had already set aside the bail granted to Suresh Pal in Criminal Appeal No. 1200 of 2025 (order dated 3 March 2025), criticising the lack of reasons in that bail order.

In the present judgment, the Supreme Court:

• Holds that the High Court erred in granting bail solely on parity with a co-accused, without examining Rajveer’s specific role and other relevant factors.
• Clarifies that parity is not a standalone, automatic ground for bail; it must be linked to similarity of position and role in the crime, not merely common involvement in the same occurrence.
• Finds that Rajveer’s alleged role as the immediate instigator of the shooting is not the same as that of his father, who had issued prior threats and was part of the armed group.
• Concludes that the High Court’s order is perverse and legally unsustainable, and accordingly sets aside the grant of bail.
• Directs Rajveer to surrender before the concerned Court within two weeks.

The Court, however, clarifies that its observations are confined to adjudicating the bail appeal and shall not prejudice the trial on merits.

2.2 Prince’s Bail (SLP (Crl.) No. 8866 of 2025)

Co-accused Prince had also been granted bail by the Allahabad High Court (order dated 18 December 2024) in the same case. Though the order ran into four pages, the Supreme Court noted that it contained no substantive reasoning explaining:

• Why bail was justified in the facts of the case, or
• How the precedents cited (Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI and Manish Sisodia v. CBI) applied.

Relying on the three-judge Bench decision in Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, the Court held that:

• While elaborate findings are not required at the bail stage, an order “dehors reasoning or bereft of the relevant reasons” is a non-speaking order and violates principles of natural justice.
• Such an order is unsustainable and open to interference.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court:

• Sets aside the High Court’s bail order in Prince’s favour.
• Remands the matter to the Allahabad High Court to reconsider the bail application afresh, specifically directing it to bear in mind:
  • The gravity of the offence,
  • The role of the accused Prince, and
  • Other relevant factors repeatedly laid down by the Supreme Court in bail jurisprudence.
• Directs the Registrar (Judicial) of the Supreme Court to send a copy of this judgment to the Registrar General of the Allahabad High Court for necessary action and compliance.

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3. Analysis of the Judgment

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

3.1.1 Ashok Dhankad v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1690

The Court relies on Ashok Dhankad for the general principles governing appeals against grant of bail. Key extracted principles include:

1. An appeal against the grant of bail is not on the same footing as an application for cancellation of bail.
2. Courts should not undertake a detailed evaluation of evidence at the bail stage.
3. An order granting bail must reflect application of mind and some assessment of relevant factors (such as gravity of offence, role of the accused, etc.).
4. Appeals against grant of bail can be entertained where the order is:
   • Perverse,
   • Illegal,
   • Inconsistent with law, or
   • Passed without considering relevant factors such as the gravity of the crime.

These principles provide the framework for appellate scrutiny which the Supreme Court then applies to the bail orders for Rajveer and Prince.

3.1.2 Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana (Koli), (2021) 6 SCC 230

This case is central to the Court’s discussion on parity in bail. In Ramesh Bhavan Rathod, the Supreme Court had:

• Warned against mechanical reliance on parity.
• Held that parity must be assessed in light of the specific role and individual circumstances of each accused.
• Emphasised that mere co-accused status in the same case does not, by itself, create a right to bail on parity.

In Sagar v. State of U.P., this principle is elevated and elaborated into a refined doctrinal statement: “position” in the crime (role, degree of participation, and nature of acts) is the key lens for applying parity.

3.1.3 Other Supreme Court Precedents on Parity and Bail

• Tarun Kumar v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486
• Sabita Paul v. State of West Bengal & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 374

Though not discussed in detail, these decisions reinforce the proposition that bail decisions must be individualized, considering the role, gravity, and context, and that parity cannot override these core assessments.

3.1.4 High Court Decisions on Parity (Surveyed for Doctrinal Consistency)

A notable feature of this judgment is its systematic survey of judgments from various High Courts, all converging on a common theme: parity is not the sole ground for bail.

1. Nanha v. State of U.P., 1992 SCC OnLine All 871 (Allahabad High Court)
   • Held that parity cannot be the sole ground for bail, even for second or subsequent bail applications.
   • Courts must consider:
     • Additional materials,
     • Further developments in the investigation, and
     • Other relevant considerations.
   • If the applicant’s case is truly identical to that of the bailed co-accused, consistency suggests bail; but mere mention of parity is not enough.
2. Harbhajan Singh v. State, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4920 (Delhi High Court)
   • Reiterated that each case stands on its own facts; there is no straightjacket formula.
   • While consistency is desirable, parity must be anchored in identical factual and legal circumstances.
   • Parity cannot be treated as a mandatory rule; it remains a matter of judicial discretion.
3. ABHAY GUPTA v. STATE of H.P., 2016 SCC OnLine HP 1758 (Himachal Pradesh High Court)
   • Explicitly states that parity is only one of the factors; it cannot be the sole ground.
   • Again, stresses that bail may follow parity only where the accused’s case is identically similar to that of the bailed co-accused.
4. Shri Narayanaswamy v. State of Karnataka, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 1066 (Karnataka High Court)
   • Describes parity as a “desirable rule” where circumstances and roles match.
   • Expressly holds that simply because a co-accused has bail does not mean other accused must also get bail if they stand on a different footing.
   • Notes that parity cannot operate as a universal formula, especially where the prosecution’s material or circumstances have changed.
5. Neeraj @ Vikky Sharma v. State of M.P., 2019 SCC OnLine MP 7023 (Madhya Pradesh High Court)
   • Reaffirms that parity cannot be the sole basis for bail.
   • Specifically warns that serious failure of justice may occur if bail is granted on parity with a co-accused whose own bail order is unreasoned or defective.
6. Pradeep v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4307
   • Holds that grant of bail to a co-accused does not automatically create a right to bail for others.
   • The Court must look at the “sum total of circumstances”, including role, evidence, and risk factors.
7. Subires Bhattacharya v. CBI, 2024 SCC OnLine Cal 11889 (Calcutta High Court)
   • States clearly that parity cannot be the sole ground for bail.
   • In deciding parity, the Court must look at the role attached to each accused, their position vis-à-vis the incident and victims.
   • Warns against a “simplistic assessment” of parity.

By collating these authorities, the Supreme Court shows that there is a national consensus across High Courts: parity is a relevant but not decisive factor and never the sole ground for bail.

3.1.5 Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau Of Investigation & Anr., (2022) 10 SCC 51

This decision, cited by the High Court in Prince’s case, is a leading authority on:

• The general presumption in favour of “bail, not jail”;
• Streamlined guidelines for bail, particularly at pre-trial stages; and
• Recognising the importance of personal liberty under Article 21.

However, the Supreme Court criticises the High Court for merely citing this authority without a reasoned application to the facts of the case. The citation, in other words, was formal rather than substantive.

3.1.6 Manish Sisodia v. CBI, (2024) 12 SCC 691

This judgment, arising from an economic offences case, deals with:

• Complex issues under special statutes,
• The twin conditions for bail (where applicable), and
• The balance between gravity of accusation and personal liberty.

Again, in Prince’s bail order, the High Court referred to Manish Sisodia but did not explain:

• Why its principles apply, or
• How they justify bail in a murder case involving a group attack with weapons.

This uncritical invocation of precedent is precisely what the Supreme Court condemns: citations without reasoning.

3.1.7 Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar & Anr., (2022) 4 SCC 497

This three-judge Bench decision is central to the part of the judgment concerning Prince’s bail. In Brijmani Devi, the Supreme Court held:

• While bail orders need not contain elaborate discussion of evidence, they must not be totally unreasoned.
• A court must show at least a prima facie application of mind to:
  • Nature of the allegations,
  • Severity of the potential punishment,
  • Likelihood of influencing witnesses or tampering with evidence,
  • Criminal antecedents, and
  • Overall prima facie support for the charge.
• An order “dehors reasoning or bereft of the relevant reasons” amounts to a non-speaking order and is a violation of natural justice.

The Supreme Court directly quotes and applies these passages, holding that Prince’s bail order, though of some length, is in substance a non-speaking order.

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3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 The Central Question: Can Parity Alone Justify Bail?

At paragraph 10, the Court frames the core question:

“Whether, as done by the High Court in the impugned order, parity with the co-accused persons can be the sole reason for granting bail.”

The Court begins by reaffirming the oft-quoted principle that “bail is the rule and jail the exception,” but immediately tempers it with a crucial qualification:

• This principle does not imply that bail must be granted without regard to the circumstances of the offence or the role of the accused.
• Courts must systematically consider several factors (gravity, role, evidence, risk of abscondence, etc.) before granting bail.

Having established the general bail framework through Ashok Dhankad, the Court then turns to the issue of parity.

3.2.2 Conceptual Clarification: What is “Parity” in Bail?

The Court offers a concise but conceptually important clarification using a dictionary definition. Referring to the Cambridge Dictionary, it notes that parity means:

“Equality, especially of pay or position.”

The Court stresses that:

• In bail jurisprudence, parity is about equality of “position” in relation to the crime.
• “Position” is not satisfied merely by the fact that multiple persons are involved in the same incident.
• “Position” refers to the role in the crime:
  • Who instigated?
  • Who fired the weapon?
  • Who wielded a deadly weapon?
  • Who was just part of a crowd?

The Court offers illustrative examples:

• A person who is part of a large group intended to intimidate;
• A person who instigates violence;
• A person who actually inflicts the fatal blow (fires a gun or swings a machete).

These different positions in the incident cannot be treated as identical for purposes of parity. Thus, parity must be assessed among accused who have similar roles, not merely common involvement.

3.2.3 Application to Rajveer: Why Parity Failed

The Court carefully distinguishes between the roles of Rajveer and Suresh Pal:

• Rajveer is alleged to be the “instigator of the moment”, directly telling co-accused Aditya to shoot the deceased, which allegedly led to the fatal gunshot.
• Suresh Pal, according to the FIR, had:
  • Earlier issued threats during the verbal spat, and
  • Was a member of the armed mob at the time of the incident.

Even assuming a common intention to cause harm, the immediate, proximate instigation attributed to Rajveer places him in a distinct and more direct role in relation to the fatal act. Therefore:

• His “position” is not identical to that of Suresh Pal.
• He cannot claim parity with Suresh Pal as a matter of right.

Furthermore, the Court points out that there is, in any event, no parity left to rely upon because:

• The Supreme Court had already set aside the bail granted to Suresh Pal in March 2025.
• Once the very foundation of parity (the earlier bail order) is quashed, relying upon it to grant bail to another is legally untenable.

In sum, the High Court’s approach is flawed on two counts:

1. It treated parity as the sole ground for bail, contrary to settled law.
2. It failed to recognise that Rajveer’s specific role (instigator of the shooting) made him differently placed from the bailed co-accused.

This sufficed, in the Supreme Court’s view, to set aside the bail as perverse and inconsistent with law.

3.2.4 Application to Prince: Necessity of Reasoned Bail Orders

With respect to Prince, the Supreme Court’s critique is slightly different. Here the fault is not parity, but the absence of reasons.

The High Court’s order:

• Formally cites Satender Kumar Antil and Manish Sisodia, but
• Fails to explain:
  • What is Prince’s alleged role in the crime?
  • How serious is the material against him?
  • Why the general principles from those cases justify bail here?

Quoting Brijmani Devi, the Court emphasises that:

• Bail orders may be concise but cannot be opaque.
• Judicial discretion must be exercised in a “judicious manner”, and that implies at least minimal disclosure of reasoning.

In Prince’s case, the High Court order is found to be a non-speaking order, violating natural justice. This justifies setting it aside and remanding the bail application for a fresh, reasoned determination.

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3.3 Impact and Significance

3.3.1 Consolidation of the Law on Parity in Bail

The most important doctrinal contribution of this judgment is the clear articulation of the scope and limits of parity as a bail ground:

• Parity is not an independent, stand-alone ground for bail; it is one factor among many.
• Parity is meaningful only where there is genuine similarity of “position” — i.e., role, nature of participation, and incriminating material, not merely common FIR or common charge.
• Courts must avoid treating bail granted to one accused as creating a “chain entitlement” for all co-accused.

This clarification will be particularly influential in:

• Murder and violent crime cases involving unlawful assemblies and Section 149 IPC (common object), where multiple accused are often charged on a common footing.
• Cases involving multiple accused in economic or organised crime, where disparate roles (mastermind, intermediary, minor participant) are alleged.

3.3.2 Reinforcing the Duty to Give Reasons in Bail Orders

By setting aside Prince’s bail on the ground of absence of reasons, the Supreme Court reinforces an important institutional norm:

• Even at the bail stage, which is preliminary and not determinative of guilt, judges must indicate why they are persuaded one way or another.
• Citations of case law without explanation are insufficient.
• Non-speaking bail orders, particularly in serious offences like murder, are vulnerable to challenge and likely to be quashed.

The direction to send a copy of the judgment to the Registrar General of the Allahabad High Court underscores that this is not an isolated correction, but a systemic signal to improve the quality and transparency of bail orders.

3.3.3 Clarifying the Interface Between “Bail is Rule” and Case-Specific Scrutiny

While the judgment reaffirms the constitutional preference towards liberty (“bail is rule, jail is exception”), it warns against:

• Transforming this into a blanket policy that disregards the specific role,
• Using parity as a shortcut to evade judicial application of mind, and
• Issuing unreasoned bail orders that undermine victims’ and society’s faith in criminal justice.

Thus, the judgment contributes to a more balanced understanding:

• Liberty remains a central value, but
• Its protection must be harmonised with fairness to victims, public safety, and integrity of the trial.

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4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 What is “Parity” in Bail?

In simple terms, parity means treating similarly placed persons in a similar way. In bail matters:

• If two accused have similar roles in the alleged crime, and one gets bail, the other can argue that he too should be treated the same — this is a plea of parity.
• However, if one accused:
  • Fired the fatal shot, and
  • Another was only standing nearby without any overt act,
  their positions are not equal, even though they are in the same case. Parity in such circumstances does not apply.

This judgment clarifies that courts must look at who did what, not just who is named in the same FIR.

4.2 “Non-Speaking” or Unreasoned Orders

A non-speaking order is one that does not explain the reasons for the decision. In the context of bail:

• It is not necessary to write a long judgment.
• But the order must show, at least briefly:
  • Which factors were considered (gravity, role, evidence, etc.), and
  • How those factors led the judge to grant or refuse bail.

If the order simply states “bail granted” or cites some cases without any reasoning, it is considered a non-speaking order and can be struck down.

4.3 Appeal Against Grant of Bail vs Cancellation of Bail

The Court distinguishes between:

• Appeal against grant of bail:
  • Filed to challenge the correctness and legality of the bail order.
  • Focuses on whether the order is perverse, illegal, or ignores relevant factors.
• Cancellation of bail:
  • Usually based on subsequent misconduct by the accused, such as:
    • Threatening witnesses,
    • Tampering with evidence, or
    • Misusing the liberty granted.

In this case, the Supreme Court treats the matter as an appeal against the grant of bail, focusing on the legal flaws in the High Court’s orders.

4.4 “Bail is the Rule, Jail the Exception” — With Limits

This phrase means:

• As a general principle, people should not be kept in jail before being convicted, unless there are good reasons to do so.
• This is rooted in the presumption of innocence and the right to personal liberty.

However, the judgment reminds that:

• This does not mean automatic bail in every case.
• Courts must weigh:
  • The seriousness of the offence,
  • The strength of the evidence,
  • The risk of absconding, and
  • The possibility of influencing witnesses or repeating the offence.

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5. Conclusion

Sagar v. State of U.P., 2025 INSC 1370, is a significant clarificatory ruling on two core aspects of Indian bail jurisprudence:

1. Parity in bail is role-based and cannot be the sole ground.
   The Court crystallises the principle that:
   • Parity hinges on similarity of position and role in the crime, not mere co-accused status.
   • Parity is one consideration among many, never an automatic entitlement.
   • Grant of bail to one accused, particularly on an unreasoned or questionable order, does not create a binding chain of bail for all co-accused.
2. Bail orders must be reasoned, even if briefly.
   Relying on Brijmani Devi, the Court reiterates that:
   • Judicial discretion in bail must be exercised transparently.
   • Non-speaking bail orders, especially in serious offences like murder, are contrary to natural justice and liable to be set aside.
   • Citations of precedent must be accompanied by a reasoned explanation of how the precedent applies to the case at hand.

On the facts, this leads to:

• Rajveer’s bail being cancelled, with a direction to surrender, because the High Court wrongly relied solely on parity and failed to recognise his distinct role as an alleged instigator of the fatal shot.
• Prince’s bail order being set aside and remanded for fresh consideration, because the High Court had not provided any substantive reasons for granting bail.

Beyond the immediate parties, the judgment sends a clear message to trial and appellate courts alike:

• Parity must be applied with care, nuance, and focus on role;
• Bail decisions, though often urgent, must still be principled and reasoned; and
• The “bail not jail” principle is robust, but not a license for mechanical or unreasoned orders.

In this way, Sagar v. State of U.P. strengthens both individual justice (through careful, role-specific assessment in bail) and systemic integrity (through the insistence on reasoned judicial orders), and will likely be a frequently cited authority in future bail litigation, particularly where parity is invoked.