Coexistence of SFIO and ED Jurisdiction and Early Provisional Attachment under PMLA: Commentary on Sanjay Aggarwal v. Union of India, 2025 DHC 10498-DB

1. Introduction

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court (Anil Kshetrapal, J. and Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, J.) in Sanjay Aggarwal v. Union of India & Ors., judgment dated 27 November 2025, has delivered an important ruling on:

the interplay between investigations by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) under the Companies Act, 2013, and by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA); and
the timing and prerequisites for issuing a Provisional Attachment Order (PAO) under Section 5(1) of the PMLA, particularly in the absence of a chargesheet under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).

The petitions arose from the high-profile Bank of Baroda foreign exchange remittance scam (approx. ₹6000 crore), involving alleged use of shell companies and bogus import-export documentation to send large sums out of India. The ED registered an Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) based on a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) FIR for offences under:

Section 420 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC); and
Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PCA).

The ED then issued a Provisional Attachment Order attaching movable and immovable properties of the petitioners as “proceeds of crime” under PMLA, followed by an Original Complaint before the Adjudicating Authority (AA) and a Show Cause Notice under Section 8 of PMLA.

The core questions were whether:

the Central Government’s assignment of the matter to SFIO under Section 212 of the Companies Act, 2013 barred ED and CBI from continuing their own investigations; and
a PAO under Section 5(1) PMLA is invalid if issued before a final report / chargesheet under Section 173 CrPC is filed in respect of the scheduled offence.

Ancillary questions included the sufficiency of ED’s “reason to believe” under Section 5 PMLA, the absence of pre-attachment hearing, and the propriety of invoking writ jurisdiction when a statutory appellate remedy under PMLA exists.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court dismissed the writ petitions, holding inter alia:

SFIO’s investigation under Companies Act does not bar ED’s PMLA proceedings. Section 212(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 prevents other agencies from investigating “offences under this Act” once SFIO is seized, but does not curtail investigations or prosecutions under other statutes such as IPC, PCA or PMLA.
PMLA operates as an independent, standalone statute. The PMLA has its own investigative and prosecutorial framework; its operation is not abrogated by the later Companies Act, 2013, even though the latter may provide for SFIO investigations into company affairs.
Provisional attachment can precede filing of chargesheet. A PAO under Section 5(1) PMLA need not await a final report under Section 173 CrPC. The first proviso to Section 5(1) is not an inflexible precondition whose non-compliance thwarts attachment, particularly in light of the second (emergency) proviso and the overall scheme of Section 5.
“Reason to believe” threshold was met. On the material cited—CBI FIR, ECIR, seized documents and digital records, and Section 50 statements—the ED had an adequate, objective “reason to believe” that the attached properties were proceeds of crime and that non-attachment would frustrate eventual confiscation.
No pre-attachment hearing is required. Section 5 PMLA does not mandate hearing the affected person before passing a PAO. Safeguards exist via recording of reasons, review by the Adjudicating Authority, and the show cause process under Section 8.
Alternative statutory remedy bars wide writ review. Since the PAO had already been confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority and appeals under Section 26 PMLA were pending before the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court declined to reappraise the merits in exercise of Article 226, in the absence of exceptional circumstances.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Factual and Procedural Background

The genesis of the litigation is as follows:

A complaint by a Deputy General Manager of Bank of Baroda alleged large-scale irregular foreign exchange outward remittances (~₹6000 crore) through accounts of shell companies.
CBI registered FIR No. RCBD1/2015/E/0009 dated 09.10.2015 for offences under:
- IPC Section 420 (cheating) read with Section 120B (criminal conspiracy); and
- PCA Sections 13(1)(d), 13(2) (criminal misconduct by public servants).
On the basis of that FIR, the ED registered ECIR No. ECIR/DLZO/20/2015 (also dated 09.10.2015) for investigation under Section 3 PMLA (offence of money laundering).

During investigation, ED allegedly uncovered a complex arrangement whereby:

Shell companies were created in India in names of persons of no real financial standing.
Import Export Codes (IECs) were obtained on the strength of basic documents.
Bank accounts were opened in these shell entities at Bank of Baroda branches, into which large cash deposits were made.
Parallel entities were set up or acquired in Dubai and Hong Kong, with bank accounts controlled by the facilitators.
False proforma invoices and declarations (including Form A-1) were submitted to Bank of Baroda, misrepresenting that genuine imports would follow or that funds would be repatriated if imports did not occur.
On this basis, substantial foreign exchange remittances were made to overseas entities linked to the facilitators, who then rerouted funds or used over/under-invoicing to launder money.

On the basis of the material gathered, the ED issued PAO No. 21/2015 on 10.02.2015, provisionally attaching listed properties as “proceeds of crime”. It thereafter filed Original Complaint (OC) No. 539/2016 under Section 5(5) PMLA before the Adjudicating Authority seeking confirmation of attachment, and issued a Show Cause Notice on 12.01.2016 under Section 8(1) PMLA.

The petitioners (Sanjay Aggarwal and others) challenged:

the PAO under Section 5(1) PMLA;
the Original Complaint before the AA; and
the Show Cause Notice under Section 8 PMLA.

The Single Judge referred the matter to the Division Bench for adjudication, given that common questions of law and fact arose and multiple similar petitions were tagged.

3.2 Issues Before the Court

The key issues were:

SFIO vs. ED jurisdiction
Whether, once the Central Government had assigned investigation of the company’s affairs to SFIO under Section 212(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 (by order dated 15.10.2015), Section 212(2) barred CBI and ED from continuing or initiating their own investigations into the same factual matrix.
Prerequisite of a chargesheet / final report under Section 173 CrPC
Whether, under Section 5(1) PMLA and its provisos, a Provisional Attachment Order can only be issued after a police report under Section 173 CrPC (or an equivalent complaint) has been filed in respect of the scheduled offence; and whether absence of such a report against the petitioner invalidated the PAO.
Validity of “reason to believe”
Whether the ED’s “reason to believe” that (i) the properties were proceeds of crime, and (ii) they were likely to be concealed, transferred or otherwise dealt with so as to frustrate confiscation, was adequately recorded and supported by material, as required by Section 5(1) PMLA.
Pre-attachment hearing and writ maintainability
(a) Whether failure to grant a pre-attachment hearing rendered the PAO illegal; and
(b) Whether the writ petitions were maintainable at all, given that:
- the PAO had already been confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority on 29.08.2016, and
- appeals under Section 26 PMLA were already pending before the Appellate Tribunal.

3.3 Statutory Framework & Precedents

3.3.1 Statutory Framework

The Court carefully examined several statutes:

PMLA, 2002:
- Section 3: defines the offence of money-laundering.
- Section 5: empowers the Director/authorised officer to provisionally attach property if:
  - there is “reason to believe” that any person is in possession of “proceeds of crime”; and
  - such proceeds are likely to be dealt with in a manner frustrating confiscation.
  The first proviso refers to filing of a police report under Section 173 CrPC or a complaint regarding the scheduled offence, while the second proviso permits immediate attachment in emergent situations.
- Sections 48 & 49: prescribe the hierarchy and appointment of PMLA authorities.
- Section 43: constitution of Special Courts for PMLA offences.
- Section 71: PMLA to have overriding effect over other laws to the extent of inconsistency.
Companies Act, 2013:
- Section 209: search and seizure of books and papers of a company.
- Section 212: SFIO investigations into affairs of a company. Notably:
  - Section 212(2): once a case is assigned to SFIO “in respect of any offence under this Act”, no other investigating agency shall proceed with investigation “in such case in respect of any offence under this Act”.
  - Section 212(17)(b): SFIO must share relevant information or documents with other investigating agencies, State Governments, police, or income-tax authorities in respect of any matter being investigated “under any other law”.
- Section 435 & 436: establishment of Special Courts for offences under the Companies Act and their power to also try other connected offences.
- Section 447: punishment for “fraud” in relation to companies, with a broad definition of “fraud”. This section was later added as a scheduled offence to PMLA (in 2018).
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988:
- Section 17: only police officers of specific ranks can investigate PCA offences.
- Section 4: Special Judges to try PCA offences and, incidentally, other connected offences.
CrPC, 1973:
- Section 4: general principle that all offences under IPC and other laws are to be investigated and tried as per the Code.
- Section 173: police report / chargesheet upon completion of investigation.

3.3.2 Key Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Among the important authorities referred to were:

SFIO v. Rahul Modi, (2019) 5 SCC 266
The Supreme Court examined the scope of SFIO’s powers and Section 212 Companies Act. The Delhi High Court relied on this to support a narrow reading of Section 212(2), limiting SFIO’s exclusivity to offences “under this Act” (i.e., Companies Act offences), not to other statutory offences.
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929
The Supreme Court substantially upheld the PMLA regime, including the scheme of attachment and the role of ECIR, and affirmed the reasoning of the Bombay High Court in:
- Radha Mohan Lakhotia v. Deputy Director, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1116 – wherein the Bombay High Court had held that provisional attachment can be made even if the person is not yet an accused in the scheduled offence, focusing on “possession of proceeds of crime” rather than formal arraignment.
The Delhi High Court adopted this line to hold that provisional attachment does not hinge on the prior filing of a chargesheet.
Directorate of Enforcement v. M/s Hi-tech Mechantile India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., LPA 588/2022, decided 17.10.2025 (Delhi HC, DB)
The same Bench had, shortly before, examined Section 5 PMLA in depth. It held that while the first proviso to Section 5(1) is a statutory condition, it is not the sole precondition whose absence necessarily invalidates a PAO. This decision is expressly followed and applied in Sanjay Aggarwal.
Directorate of Enforcement v. Poonam Malik, Misc. Appeal (PMLA) 4/2021, decided 14.11.2025 (Delhi HC)
The Court there, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 449, elaborated the meaning of “reason to believe” under PMLA as an objective, evidence-based satisfaction rather than subjective suspicion. That standard was transplanted and applied here.
Vinod Kumar v. State of Haryana & Ors., 2024:PHHC:059827 (P&H HC)
The Punjab and Haryana High Court recognised that multiple agencies may conduct parallel investigations under different statutes, based on the same factual substratum. The Delhi High Court cites this as supporting the view that SFIO’s investigation under the Companies Act does not bar ED’s PMLA proceedings.
Ashish Bhalla v. State & Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5818 (Delhi HC)
Relied on by the petitioners to argue that, once SFIO is seized, other agencies are barred. The Division Bench distinguished this case, noting that it did not concern PCA or PMLA offences and that the Supreme Court in Vishvendra Singh v. State of NCTD & Anr. (SLP (Crl) 327/2024) had left the legal question open.
Jai Singh v. Union Of India, (1977) 1 SCC 1 and Arunima Baruah v. Union Of India, (2007) 6 SCC 120
Cited on the principle that constitutional courts ordinarily refrain from exercising writ jurisdiction when there exists an effective statutory remedy, unless a case of exceptional circumstances, jurisdictional error, or violation of fundamental rights is made out.

3.4 Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.4.1 Scope of Section 212(2) Companies Act and SFIO’s Exclusivity

The central plank of the petitioners’ challenge was that, since the Central Government had assigned investigation to SFIO on 15.10.2015 under Section 212, Section 212(2) barred further investigation by “any other investigating agency” in respect of the “same case”. They argued:

Section 212(2) creates a statutory bar prohibiting concurrent investigations by other agencies when SFIO is seized; and
Given that Section 447 (fraud) of the Companies Act was later added to the PMLA schedule, ED’s investigation should be considered subsumed within the SFIO’s remit.

The Court rejected this in clear terms. Its reasoning rests on a close textual and purposive reading:

Textual limitation to “offence under this Act”.
Section 212(2) reads (emphasis added):

“Where any case has been assigned by the Central Government to the Serious Fraud Investigation Office for investigation under this Act, no other investigating agency of Central Government or any State Government shall proceed with investigation in such case in respect of any offence under this Act…”
The Court emphasised the restricted phrase “in respect of any offence under this Act”. This, by its plain language, bars parallel investigation by other agencies only for offences under the Companies Act—not for offences under IPC, PCA or PMLA.
Distinct legislative fields.
The Companies Act, 2013 largely addresses:
- corporate governance norms,
- fraud and mismanagement internal to corporate entities,
- statutory violations by company officers, directors, and key managerial personnel.
By contrast, PMLA targets:
- the process and activity of laundering “proceeds of crime” derived from specified scheduled offences, and
- the attachment and confiscation of property involved in such laundering.
The Court underlined that these are distinct offences with different ingredients and objectives, even if they may be factually interlinked.
Section 212(17)(b) Companies Act presupposes parallel proceedings.
Section 212(17)(b) mandates SFIO to share information/documents with other investigating agencies “which may be relevant or useful… in respect of any offence or matter being investigated… under any other law”. The Court treated this provision as a strong indicator that:
- Parliament contemplated simultaneous investigations by SFIO (under Companies Act) and other agencies (under other statutes) on the same factual matrix; and
- Section 212(2) was never meant to extinguish or “take over” the jurisdiction of agencies enforcing other laws like PMLA or PCA.
No implied repeal of PMLA by Companies Act.
The petitioners attempted to argue that Companies Act, 2013, as a subsequent special statute, effectively abrogated or curtailed PMLA in company-related fraud matters, despite PMLA’s own overriding clause (Section 71). The Court found no basis for such implied repeal:
- Both statutes can co-exist harmoniously by operating in their respective spheres.
- The mere addition of Section 447 Companies Act as a scheduled offence under PMLA (in 2018) does not mean that all PMLA investigations into corporate frauds must be led or controlled by SFIO.

Thus, ED’s PMLA investigation and provisional attachment were held to be fully maintainable notwithstanding SFIO’s assignment under Section 212.

3.4.2 Independent Investigative Regimes under PMLA, PCA, IPC & Companies Act

The Court elaborated that each of the relevant statutes creates its own investigative architecture:

PCA Section 17: prescribes the minimum rank of police officers competent to investigate corruption offences.
PMLA Sections 48–49: establish PMLA authorities and vest them with specific investigatory powers (e.g., summons, statement recording under Section 50).
CrPC Section 4: governs investigation and trial of all IPC and other statutory offences, unless otherwise provided.
Companies Act Sections 209, 212, 436: create mechanisms for Registrar, inspectors, and SFIO investigations into company affairs and prescribe the jurisdiction of Special Courts for offences “under this Act”.

The Court drew a critical distinction:

Provisions such as:
- PCA Section 4(3);
- PMLA Section 43(2); and
- Companies Act Section 436(2)
empower Special Courts to try other offences along with the main scheduled / special statute offences in a joint trial.
However, these trial-related provisions do not confer any authority on SFIO, ED, or other investigative agencies to investigate offences falling outside their parent statute.

Thus, in the Court’s view, the trial court’s power to try multiple offences together does not translate into a monopoly of any single investigative agency over all such offences.

3.4.3 Provisional Attachment under Section 5(1) PMLA and the Chargesheet Question

The petitioners urged that:

Under the first proviso to Section 5(1) PMLA, a PAO cannot be issued unless:
- a police report under Section 173 CrPC has already been filed before a Magistrate in respect of the scheduled offence, or
- a complaint in respect of such offence has been filed by the authorised authority.
They had neither been chargesheeted nor subjected to such a report; hence, any PAO against them was invalid.

The Court rejected this, following its earlier Division Bench ruling in Hi-tech Mechantile India (LPA 588/2022). The crux of its approach is:

First proviso is not the sole precondition.
While the first proviso has statutory force, it must be read in the context of:
- the second (emergency) proviso, and
- the overarching purpose of Section 5 to prevent dissipation of proceeds of crime.
The Court declined to interpret the proviso so rigidly as to nullify attachments whenever a Section 173 CrPC report is yet to be filed.
Reliance on Radha Mohan Lakhotia (Bom HC) approved in Vijay Madanlal.
The Bombay High Court had held that ED can attach property of any person in possession of “proceeds of crime” even if that person has not been arrayed as an accused in the predicate offence. The Supreme Court, in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, approved this reasoning.
Focus on “proceeds of crime”, not procedural stage.
Section 5(1)(a) focuses on whether any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime, and Section 5(1)(b) on whether such proceeds are likely to be transferred or dealt with to frustrate confiscation. The statutory emphasis is on:
- the nature and risk to the property, not solely on the stage of criminal procedure in the predicate offence.

Accordingly, the Court held that a PAO is not rendered void merely because a Section 173 CrPC report has not yet been filed in respect of the scheduled offence, or has not yet named the concerned person as accused.

3.4.4 “Reason to Believe” under Section 5(1) PMLA

The petitioners contended that the PAO and the Adjudicating Authority’s order did not adequately disclose how the ED formed the required “reason to believe” that:

the attached properties were “proceeds of crime”; and
non-attachment would frustrate PMLA proceedings.

Relying on its own decision in Poonam Malik and the Supreme Court’s judgment in Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, the Court reiterated that:

“Reason to believe” must be based on tangible, objective material; it cannot be mere suspicion or ipse dixit of the officer.
There must be a rational nexus between the material and the inference drawn.

Applying this standard, the Court identified the material on which the ED relied for forming its belief:

CBI FIR (RCBD1/2015/E/0009) for IPC and PCA offences.
ECIR ECIR/20/DLZO/2015 registered by ED.
Documents and emails recovered from searches (including digital data).
Statements of suspects and witnesses recorded under Section 50 PMLA.

Significantly, Section 50 statements of co-accused indicated that:

The petitioner, between January 2015 and July 2015, facilitated advance remittances of about ₹450 crore.
He created a web of shell companies in names of different individuals with no genuine business, primarily to route foreign exchange out of India under the guise of advance import payments.
The shell entities were used in tandem with overseas companies in Dubai and Hong Kong, also controlled by the facilitators, to move funds abroad and then re-route or layer them through sham trade transactions.

On this foundation, the Court held:

“The formation of belief was not perfunctory or based on mere suspicion, but was founded on a rational nexus between the material collected and the inference drawn regarding the involvement of the Petitioner in the process of money-laundering.”

Thus, the statutory threshold of “reason to believe” under Section 5(1) PMLA was satisfied.

3.4.5 No Pre-Attachment Hearing and Role of Statutory Remedies

On the alleged requirement of a pre-decisional hearing before passing a PAO, the Court held:

Section 5 PMLA does not contemplate a personal hearing or notice prior to provisional attachment.
The safeguards lie in:
- mandatory recording of reasons to believe in writing;
- forwarding such reasons and material to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope; and
- subsequent issuance of a Show Cause Notice and adjudication process under Section 8 PMLA, where the affected party can fully contest the attachment.

Importantly, the Court stressed that in the present case:

The PAO had already been confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority (order dated 29.08.2016); and
The petitioners had already availed the statutory appeal under Section 26 PMLA before the Appellate Tribunal.

In such circumstances, and in light of the principle that constitutional courts ordinarily decline to exercise writ jurisdiction where efficacious alternative remedies exist (as discussed in Jai Singh and Arunima Baruah), the Court held that:

It would be inappropriate to undertake a full re-examination of the merits of the PAO.
The PMLA is a self-contained code with its own adjudicatory and appellate structure; the proper forum to assail the attachment on facts and merits is the Appellate Tribunal.

Consequently, while the Court addressed the key legal contentions, it deliberately refrained from a detailed merits review of the PAO, expressly clarifying in para 27 that nothing in the judgment should prejudice or predetermine future adjudication before other fora.

4. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

4.1 Proceeds of Crime

Under PMLA, “proceeds of crime” broadly means any property (tangible or intangible, movable or immovable) that is derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, from a “scheduled offence” (predicate offence). If funds originate from cheating, corruption, fraud, etc. specified in the PMLA Schedule, they become “proceeds of crime” once tainted by such illegality.

4.2 ECIR (Enforcement Case Information Report)

An ECIR is ED’s internal record of information regarding a money-laundering offence, akin in function to an FIR for police, though not identical in legal status. It triggers PMLA investigation. Courts (notably in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary) have upheld ED’s practice of using ECIR as the starting point, while recognising that non-supply of ECIR to the accused does not, by itself, vitiate proceedings.

4.3 Provisional Attachment Order (PAO)

A PAO under Section 5(1) PMLA is a temporary order freezing specified properties suspected to be proceeds of crime. Key features:

It is provisional—valid for a limited period (initially up to 180 days, subject to statutory exclusions).
It prevents the owner from selling, transferring, or otherwise dealing with the property, preserving it for potential confiscation.
It is subject to confirmation by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8; unless confirmed, the attachment lapses.

4.4 “Reason to Believe”

This is a common legal standard in fiscal and enforcement statutes. It lies between mere suspicion and proof:

The authority must record reasons based on relevant, tangible material, not conjecture.
Those reasons must be such that a reasonable person, in the officer’s position, could form the belief that the conditions of the statute (e.g., existence of proceeds of crime and risk of frustration of confiscation) are satisfied.
Court reviews whether the belief is bona fide and grounded in material—not whether the belief will ultimately be proved correct at trial.

4.5 Scheduled Offence and Predicate Crime

PMLA does not punish the original illegal act (e.g., cheating or corruption) directly. Instead:

The underlying offences listed in the PMLA Schedule (IPC, PCA, NDPS Act, Companies Act section 447, etc.) are called “scheduled offences” or “predicate offences”.
If property is derived from these offences, and then laundered (concealed, layered, integrated into the financial system), that laundering activity is prosecuted under PMLA.

4.6 SFIO (Serious Fraud Investigation Office)

SFIO is a specialised multi-disciplinary investigation agency within the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. It investigates complex corporate frauds under the Companies Act, 2013, particularly when:

there is public interest or significant financial impact; or
a Registrar of Companies or other authority reports serious irregularities.

Once a matter is assigned under Section 212, SFIO has primacy in investigating offences under the Companies Act; however, as this judgment clarifies, it does not monopolise investigations under other laws like PMLA or PCA.

4.7 Adjudicating Authority and Appellate Tribunal under PMLA

Adjudicating Authority (AA): A three-member quasi-judicial body that:
- examines ED’s PAOs and complaints;
- issues show cause notices; and
- confirms or quashes provisional attachments under Section 8 PMLA.
Appellate Tribunal: Hears appeals against orders of the Adjudicating Authority (Section 26) and has wide powers to re-examine facts and law.

5. Impact and Implications

5.1 Clarification of Parallel Jurisdiction: SFIO vs. ED

The most significant legal principle emerging from Sanjay Aggarwal is the Court’s unequivocal ruling that:

Assignment of a case to SFIO under Section 212 Companies Act does not extinguish the investigative jurisdiction of the ED under PMLA or of other agencies like CBI in respect of IPC or PCA offences.
Section 212(2) is confined to Companies Act offences and cannot be stretched to cover predicate or laundering offences under other laws.

This has practical consequences:

In large corporate frauds with multi-dimensional wrongdoing (company law breaches, cheating, corruption, money-laundering), multiple agencies may lawfully investigate different offences in parallel.
Information-sharing between SFIO and ED is encouraged and mandated under Section 212(17)(b), rather than being a marker of exclusivity.
Arguments that SFIO’s assignment ousts ED’s powers under PMLA, especially after Section 447 was added to the PMLA Schedule, will be difficult to sustain in future litigation.

5.2 Strengthening ED’s Early Attachment Powers

The judgment fortifies ED’s ability to move rapidly to secure property:

By reaffirming that a PAO can precede the filing of a chargesheet under Section 173 CrPC, the Court aligns with a trend of judicial deference to PMLA’s preventive-confiscatory objectives.
Paired with the Supreme Court’s approval of Lakhotia in Vijay Madanlal, the principle is clear: if ED has material to form “reason to believe” about proceeds of crime and risk of frustration, it may attach even at a preliminary stage of the criminal process.

While this supports robust enforcement against money-laundering, it also underscores the importance of:

judicial oversight by the Adjudicating Authority and Appellate Tribunal; and
careful scrutiny of the quality and sufficiency of the material forming the basis of “reason to believe”.

5.3 Writ Jurisdiction vs. Statutory Remedies in PMLA Matters

The Court’s restrained approach to merits review, in light of the pending PMLA appeal, reinforces a recurring theme in PMLA jurisprudence:

High Courts will generally insist on exhaustion of PMLA’s internal appellate hierarchy (AA → Appellate Tribunal → High Court) before entertaining writ challenges to attachment or confiscation orders.
Only in cases of:
- patent lack of jurisdiction,
- apparent violation of natural justice, or
- constitutional infirmity,
are writs likely to be entertained at an early stage.

Strategically, litigants challenging PAOs must therefore:

primarily prepare for fact-intensive and evidentiary arguments before the Adjudicating Authority and Appellate Tribunal; and
reserve writ petitions for exceptional contexts where statutory remedies are inadequate or palpably ineffective.

5.4 Corporate Fraud, Multi-Agency Cases and Coordination

The judgment reflects a legislative and judicial preference for:

functional specialisation – SFIO for company law frauds; CBI/State police for IPC/PCA offences; ED for money-laundering; and
cooperative federalism and information sharing – as envisaged in Section 212(17)(b) Companies Act.

For practitioners and corporates, this means:

Complex economic offences may now more routinely involve multi-agency investigations, increasing the compliance and defence burden.
However, such multiplicity is legally sanctioned so long as each agency remains within the bounds of its parent statute.

6. Conclusion

Sanjay Aggarwal v. Union of India is an important addition to the developing body of PMLA and corporate criminal law. The key takeaways are:

Parallel Jurisdiction Clarified: The SFIO’s assignment of a case under Section 212 Companies Act does not oust ED’s jurisdiction under PMLA or CBI’s under IPC/PCA. Section 212(2) is confined to offences “under this Act”.
Independent Operation of PMLA: PMLA remains a standalone confiscatory regime, not impliedly repealed or curtailed by the Companies Act, 2013, even in company-related fraud scenarios.
Provisional Attachment Prior to Chargesheet Upheld: ED can provisionally attach property as proceeds of crime even before the filing of a final report under Section 173 CrPC, provided the statutory conditions of Section 5(1) PMLA and its provisos are met.
“Reason to Believe” is an Objective Standard: Courts will examine whether ED’s belief was based on cogent material with a rational nexus to the inference of money-laundering and risk of dissipation, not whether guilt is conclusively established.
No Pre-Attachment Hearing Required: The PMLA’s built-in safeguards via the Adjudicating Authority and Appellate Tribunal suffice; there is no statutory mandate for a pre-decisional hearing at the attachment stage.
Primacy of Statutory Remedies: With a comprehensive adjudicatory and appellate framework under PMLA, High Courts will ordinarily decline to engage in merits review under Article 226 when those remedies are being pursued.

In the broader legal landscape, the judgment strengthens the architecture of anti-money-laundering enforcement in India, while clarifying the boundaries and coexistence of various specialised investigative agencies. Future disputes at the intersection of corporate fraud, corruption, and money-laundering will likely rely on and be shaped by the principles articulated in this decision.

Parallel ED & SFIO Jurisdiction and Early Provisional Attachments under PMLA: Commentary on Sanjay Aggarwal v. Union of India (2025 DHC 10498-DB)