No Vested Right to Furlough; Current Law at Time of Consideration Governs, and Section 4(3) Proviso of the Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022 Bars Furlough for “Murder with Intention of Collecting Ransom”

Introduction

In Sonu alias Amar v. State of Haryana and Others (CRWP-5022-2025), decided by the Punjab & Haryana High Court on 22 August 2025, Justice Sandeep Moudgil reaffirmed two foundational propositions in the law of temporary release from prison in Haryana:

• Parole and furlough are concessions, not vested rights.
• Applications for such concessions must be decided under the law and policy prevailing on the date of consideration, not the date of conviction.

Applying the Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022, the Court held that the statutory ineligibility under Section 4(3) (second proviso) squarely barred furlough for a life convict involved in “murder with intention of collecting ransom,” thereby upholding the jail authority’s speaking order refusing furlough.

Case Background and Procedural History

• FIR No. 275 dated 26.12.2005 was registered at PS Gannaur, District Sonipat under Sections 302, 328, 364-A, 120-B, 506, 201, 34 IPC.
• The petitioner was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life, with fines and default sentences. His appeal (CRA-D-1066-DB-2010) was dismissed on 11.10.2012.
• In 2025, the petitioner sought four weeks’ furlough, citing accrued remission for good conduct and the need to attend to his elderly parents and maintain social ties.
• The Superintendent, District Jail, Sonipat (respondent no. 4) rejected the request (speaking order dated 24.04.2025) on the basis of Section 4(3) of the 2022 Act, reading the second proviso as an absolute bar.
• The petitioner invoked Articles 226/227 of the Constitution to challenge the rejection, alleging misconstruction of Section 4(3) and a procedural impropriety in the Superintendent deciding “in his personal capacity” without forwarding the case to higher authorities (respondents 2 and 3).
• The State opposed, emphasizing the statutory bar and noting that the petitioner had earlier availed parole 16 times under the pre-2022 regime.

Issues

1. Whether a convict for “murder with intention of collecting ransom” is eligible for furlough under Section 4(3) of the Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022.
2. Whether the grant of furlough/parole is governed by the law at the time of consideration or at the time of conviction.
3. Whether any alleged procedural infirmity in the Superintendent’s handling (non-forwarding to higher authorities) vitiates the refusal.

Statutory Framework: Section 4(3) of the 2022 Act

The Court reproduced and relied on Section 4(3) of the 2022 Act, which, in substance, provides:

• A convict who has not completed three years after conviction is ineligible for furlough.
• A convict punished for a jail offence or for breaching temporary release conditions within the last three years is ineligible.
• Further, convicts sentenced for specific offences—inter alia, offences under the NDPS Act, sedition, rape with murder, robbery/dacoity with murder, murder with intention of collecting ransom or extortion, sexual offences against a child below 12 years, or those sentenced to imprisonment till natural life—are ineligible for furlough.

Summary of the Judgment

• The petition was dismissed.
• The Court held that furlough is a concession, not a matter of right.
• The governing law is that which is in force at the time of consideration of the application, not on the date of conviction; earlier enjoyment of parole/furlough does not create a vested right to future releases.
• Given the petitioner’s conviction involving “murder with intention of collecting ransom,” the second proviso to Section 4(3) of the 2022 Act statutorily disqualifies him from furlough.
• Consequently, the Superintendent’s speaking order dated 24.04.2025 was upheld.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Ajay Jadeja @ Janak v. State of Haryana (Crl. W.P. No. 2104 of 2012)
  • Principle affirmed: Temporary release on parole/furlough is a concession, not a substantive right.
  • Crucially, “those conditions are to be looked into and applied on the date of making an application … and putting up the same before the competent authority.”
  • Thus, upon change in the governing statute or rules, the new conditions apply equally to all convicts, irrespective of their date of conviction.
• Vakil Raj v. State Of Haryana and Others, 2015(5) Law Herald 4242
  • Reiterates and applies the Ajay Jadeja principle in Haryana’s parole/furlough context.
  • Rejects arguments seeking to “freeze” the parole regime as it stood on the date of conviction; grant must accord with the law as on the consideration date.
  • Distinguished Supreme Court authorities (Varinder Singh; Harjit Singh) as inapposite because those involved different contexts (e.g., jail offences, NDPS sentencing), not the concessionary nature of parole/furlough.

By anchoring its analysis in Ajay Jadeja and Vakil Raj, the Court firmly placed temporal applicability and the concessionary character of temporary release at the core of its reasoning. These precedents legitimize applying the 2022 Act to convicts whose offences and convictions predate the Act.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Characterization of Furlough and Parole
   • The Court reiterates that parole and furlough exist to humanize prison administration, but they remain concessions.
   • Therefore, no convict has a vested right to their grant; eligibility and grant depend on statutory criteria and administrative assessment.
2. Temporal Applicability
   • Relying on Ajay Jadeja and Vakil Raj, the Court held that the law to be applied is the law in force when the application is considered.
   • Consequently, a change in the statutory regime (from the earlier “Parole Act 2012” framework to the 2022 Act) governs current applications, even for older convictions.
3. Statutory Ineligibility under Section 4(3) (Second Proviso)
   • The petitioner’s conviction includes 364-A IPC (kidnapping for ransom) and 302 IPC (murder).
   • The second proviso to Section 4(3) declares ineligible, inter alia, “murder with intention of collecting ransom.”
   • This is framed as a categorical bar; once attracted, the authority has no discretion to grant furlough, regardless of good conduct or accrued remission.
4. Earlier Grants Do Not Create Entitlement
   • The petitioner had availed temporary releases 16 times under the earlier regime. The Court clarified that prior grants do not crystallize a continuing right, nor do they estop application of the new statutory disqualification.
5. Procedural Objection to the Superintendent’s Order
   • The petitioner argued that the Superintendent acted “in his personal capacity” without forwarding the case to higher authorities.
   • The Court did not find it necessary to set aside the refusal on this ground, because the statutory bar squarely applied; forwarding for higher-level consideration would not have changed the outcome under the 2022 Act.
   • In effect, any alleged procedural irregularity was immaterial in the face of an absolute legal disqualification.

3) Impact and Prospective Effect

• For Convicts in Haryana
  • Those convicted of the offences enumerated in the second proviso to Section 4(3) of the 2022 Act (including murder with intent to collect ransom) are per se ineligible for furlough, irrespective of good conduct, remission earned, or earlier temporary releases.
  • Applicants must assess their statutory eligibility first; if barred, the application cannot succeed.
• For Prison Administration
  • Authorities must screen applications against Section 4(3) before engaging with merits, conduct, or grounds.
  • Speaking orders should clearly identify the applicable clause of ineligibility; where a statutory bar applies, the order should record that no discretion exists to grant furlough.
• For Counsel and Courts
  • Arguments premised on the regime at the time of conviction are untenable; practitioners should anchor submissions in the law prevailing on the consideration date.
  • Future challenges would likely focus on either factual non-attraction of the bar (e.g., disputed offence classification) or, in a different proceeding, the constitutional validity of the classification (not raised or decided here).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Parole vs. Furlough
  • Parole: Temporary release often tied to specific exigencies (e.g., family emergencies, medical reasons), typically with oversight and conditions.
  • Furlough: Periodic release earned through good conduct to maintain family and social ties; often counted in lieu of remission. Both are temporary releases but serve different penological goals.
• Concession vs. Right
  • A “right” is enforceable upon satisfaction of conditions; a “concession” is a discretionary or conditional privilege. Parole/furlough, being concessions, can be limited or withdrawn by statute or policy and do not vest as entitlements.
• “Law at the Time of Consideration”
  • When an application is made, the authority applies the statute/policy then in force. Later changes apply prospectively to pending or new applications; one cannot insist on older, more lenient rules based on the date of conviction.
• “Imprisonment for Life” vs. “Till Natural Life”
  • While life imprisonment ordinarily means incarceration for the remainder of natural life unless remitted, some sentencing orders or statutes specify “imprisonment till natural life” to foreclose remission. The 2022 Act’s proviso separately ineligibilizes those expressly sentenced to “imprisonment till natural life,” over and above other listed categories.
• Statutory Bar vs. Administrative Discretion
  • Where a statute declares a class ineligible, the decision-maker has no discretion to grant the concession. Discretion operates only within the zone the statute leaves open.

Practice Notes and Administrative Guidance

• Before processing on merits, prison authorities should perform a threshold check under Section 4(3) of the 2022 Act.
• Speaking orders should:
  • Identify the precise clause/proviso invoked;
  • Record relevant conviction details that trigger the bar;
  • Explicitly state that the bar eliminates discretion to grant furlough.
• Applicants should document how their case falls outside any statutory bar, before urging conduct-based considerations.
• Past instances of parole/furlough cannot be relied upon to claim a continuing entitlement after a change in the law.

Conclusion

Sonu alias Amar reinforces settled principles in the law of temporary prison releases in Haryana. The High Court upheld a straightforward application of Section 4(3) of the Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022 to deny furlough to a life convict whose offence fell within the statute’s enumerated ineligible categories—specifically, “murder with intention of collecting ransom.” Reaffirming Ajay Jadeja and Vakil Raj, the Court clarified that parole/furlough is a concession governed by the law in force on the date of consideration. Earlier grants under a different regime do not confer a vested right or a legitimate expectation of future releases.

The decision signals a rigorous, statute-led approach: where the legislature has identified classes of offenders who are ineligible for furlough, administrative authorities and courts must give effect to that mandate. Going forward, both applicants and administrators must treat Section 4(3) of the 2022 Act as the controlling threshold, with conduct-based factors becoming relevant only if the applicant first clears the statutory eligibility bar.

Key Takeaways

• Furlough/parole is a concession—no vested right exists.
• The applicable regime is that in force on the date of consideration, not the date of conviction.
• Section 4(3) of the 2022 Act imposes absolute ineligibility for specified categories, including “murder with intention of collecting ransom.”
• Prior grants of parole/furlough cannot override a later statutory bar.
• Alleged procedural irregularities will not undo a refusal where a clear statutory ineligibility exists.

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Case: Sonu alias Amar v. State of Haryana and Others, CRWP-5022-2025, Punjab & Haryana High Court

Court and Judge: Justice Sandeep Moudgil

Date: Reserved: 18.07.2025; Pronounced: 22.08.2025